mirror of
https://github.com/projectsend/projectsend.git
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ignacionelson
6e47d76ba6
Client file sharing, rebuilt from the ground up: a private area per client, resumable uploads, folders, groups and categories, sharing with expiry dates and download limits, comments, file versions, an activity log, a REST API, and sixteen languages. This repository begins here. ProjectSend 2 was developed privately, and that development history is not published — the previous generation remains available, with its own history, at projectsend/legacy. Free software under the GNU General Public License v2, or (at your option) any later version.
98 lines
3.2 KiB
PHP
98 lines
3.2 KiB
PHP
<?php
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declare(strict_types=1);
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namespace App\Modules\Identity\Passwords;
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use App\Modules\Platform\Settings\Setting;
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use App\Modules\Platform\Settings\Settings;
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use Illuminate\Validation\Rules\Password;
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/**
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* The one definition of what makes an acceptable password here.
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*
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* Every field in the application that *sets* a password validates with
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* `Password::defaults()`, and AppServiceProvider points that at this
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* class — so there is a single place to change, rather than the fourteen
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* call sites that would each have to be remembered.
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*
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* Deliberately not a composition policy. v1 offered "require an
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* uppercase / a number / a special character" and NIST SP 800-63B
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* advises against exactly those, because they push people towards
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* `Password1!` and away from length. The two things that measurably help
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* — how long it is, and whether it already appears in a breach corpus —
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* are what this exposes.
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*
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* Nothing here runs at login. A password is checked against this policy
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* when it is chosen, never when it is used, which is why tightening the
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* policy cannot lock out an existing account (including the ones the v1
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* migration carried across with a five-character password).
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*/
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class PasswordPolicy
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{
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/**
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* Laravel's own default, and the lowest an installation may go.
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* A stored value below this is clamped rather than honoured, so
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* neither a hand-edited row nor a future bug can take an
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* installation under the framework's floor.
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*/
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public const MIN_LENGTH = 8;
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public const MAX_LENGTH = 128;
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public function __construct(
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private readonly Settings $settings,
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) {}
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public function minLength(): int
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{
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$configured = $this->settings->get(Setting::PasswordMinLength);
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return max(self::MIN_LENGTH, min(self::MAX_LENGTH, (int) $configured));
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}
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public function rejectsBreached(): bool
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{
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return (bool) $this->settings->get(Setting::PasswordRejectBreached);
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}
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/**
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* The rule object handed to every password field.
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*
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* `uncompromised()` calls the k-anonymity range API at
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* haveibeenpwned, so it stays production-only regardless of the
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* setting: outside production it would put a network round-trip (and
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* a flaky one) into the test suite and local dev.
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*/
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public function rule(): Password
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{
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$rule = Password::min($this->minLength());
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if ($this->rejectsBreached() && app()->isProduction()) {
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$rule = $rule->uncompromised();
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}
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return $rule;
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}
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/**
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* What the forms tell the person choosing a password, shared with
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* every page through HandleInertiaRequests.
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*
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* `reject_breached` reports the setting rather than whether the check
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* will actually run, because it is a statement of this
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* installation's policy — the production gate above is an
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* implementation detail of how we keep tests offline, not something
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* an administrator configured.
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*
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* @return array{min_length: int, reject_breached: bool}
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*/
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public function descriptor(): array
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{
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return [
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'min_length' => $this->minLength(),
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'reject_breached' => $this->rejectsBreached(),
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];
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}
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}
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