complete() assembled the received parts into the one target file and
created the File row with no guard against a second complete() for the
same session running at the same time -- an Uppy retry, a double submit,
a resend after a lost connection. Two of them would interleave writes
into the session's single `assembled` file (the stored bytes then no
longer match the checksum computed from the in-memory buffers) and could
each create a File row.
Take a per-session lock around the finalisation and fail a second caller
fast; the lock's TTL releases the claim if a completion dies mid-flight,
so a genuine retry still works. The body moves to a finalise() helper so
complete() reads as auth + lock + finalise.
store() checks Setting::MaxFileSizeMb against the size the client declares
when it opens the session, and complete() re-checks the storage quota
against the real assembled byte count -- but nothing re-checked the size
limit itself. A client that declared a one-byte upload and then streamed
gigabytes of parts passed store()'s check and was never stopped, so the
configured limit (which store() applies to everyone, staff included) did
not hold for the resumable path that real uploads use.
Re-check the assembled byte count against MaxFileSizeMb in complete(),
cleaning up the assembled bytes and the session exactly as the quota
branch already does.
Two bugs a green suite could not find, both from pointing the
application at a real Google Cloud Storage bucket.
The adapter attaches a legacy per-object ACL to every write, and a
bucket with uniform bucket-level access — which our own setup
instructions require, and which Google recommends — refuses it:
"Cannot insert legacy ACL for an object when uniform bucket-level access
is enabled". So the default configuration could not write to the
recommended bucket. The library ships
UniformBucketLevelAccessVisibility for exactly this, and nothing is
lost by never setting an ACL: every object here is private and every
read is a signed URL.
The second is worse and was never about Google. Both file disks are
configured 'throw' => false, so a refused write returns false rather
than raising, and LocalPartStore ignored the return. The upload reported
success, the File row was written, and the bytes were nowhere — the
listing showed a file whose download could never work. An expired S3
credential did the same thing. It now checks, and the controller already
turns that into a validation error rather than a 500, so the person
uploading is told.
Verified against a live bucket with a key scoped to
roles/storage.objectAdmin: the probe lists, writes land, reads
round-trip byte for byte, and a signed URL comes back 200 carrying
"Informe año.pdf" intact through both the ASCII and RFC 8187 forms of
Content-Disposition.
Client file sharing, rebuilt from the ground up: a private area per
client, resumable uploads, folders, groups and categories, sharing with
expiry dates and download limits, comments, file versions, an activity
log, a REST API, and sixteen languages.
This repository begins here. ProjectSend 2 was developed privately, and
that development history is not published — the previous generation
remains available, with its own history, at projectsend/legacy.
Free software under the GNU General Public License v2, or (at your
option) any later version.
denkfabrik-li