Run against the dev stack with real ClamAV and queue workers, and a code
review looking for ways around the scanner.
Quarantine now stays quarantined until somebody releases the file. A
rescan only touches files people can download, and changes nothing when
the scanner cannot answer or scanning is off. Before, an old infected file
rescanned while clamd restarted went through the "allow" policy and became
downloadable. The daily missing-files check leaves quarantined files alone,
so a storage outage no longer brings one back as a fresh upload.
A file longer than clamd's StreamMaxLength is "too large" again. clamd
answers and hangs up; the next write raised a warning that became an
exception before the answer was read, so the file was recorded as
"scanner down" and retried past the unscannable policy.
The production compose example gives clamd the settings it needs. On its
own defaults an encrypted zip comes back clean. The Test button now sends a
password-protected zip and fails when it is called clean, and says when an
address answers but is not ClamAV.
Saving the settings restarts the queue workers, which kept the old values
in memory. New scan runs --all, as its name says, and is refused while
scans are queued. A retry scheduled for later no longer counts as a scan
in progress.
Also: quarantine respects client scope for listing, release and
notifications; a zip built before a file was quarantined is refused;
public comments and version links skip unavailable files; a client no
longer sees their own quarantined or missing upload; a file whose bytes
return is scanned at once; clamd listens on IPv6 too, so its container
health check passes.
tcp://clamav:3310djlkasjdlk connected happily. PHP reads a port the way
atoi does — the digits at the front, the rest ignored — so an address
with a typo on the end was saved, tested, and reported as working, while
tcp://clamav:33101 went somewhere else and failed. The feedback an
operator got had nothing to do with the mistake they made.
ScannerAddress says what an address is: tcp:// with a host and a port of
1 to 65535 and nothing after it, or unix:// with an absolute path. It is
asked in all three places an address arrives — saving, testing, and
connecting. The third matters because a managed address comes from the
environment and never passes the screen.
The answer names the problem rather than reporting "no answer", which
would be true of any unreachable scanner and would send somebody to look
at their network for a typo.
Checked in a browser with both addresses from the report: each is now
refused on Test and on Save, with the same sentence, and
tcp://clamav:3310 still comes back "Working. ClamAV 1.5.4 detected the
test file".
`scan_engine` was always null: the column existed, the client never
filled it. Found by running a real ClamAV against a real upload rather
than by a test, since the fake scanner reports whatever it is told.
Asked once per scanner instance — so once per queue job, and the worker
is recycled hourly — rather than on every scan, which would double the
connections to answer a question that changes daily.
Every upload now starts as "being checked" and is not served to anyone
until a scanner has looked at it. Infected files are quarantined: kept
on disk, unreachable, waiting for an administrator.
The scanner is ClamAV, reached over a socket, streaming the file
wherever it is stored — no temporary copy for an S3 or GCS disk. What
the scanner answers is a fact; what it means for the file is this
installation's setting, so ClamAvScanner knows nothing about settings
and ScanPolicy knows nothing about sockets. Three of clamd's own alert
options are what make a file it could not open come back as an answer
rather than as "OK"; the client maps those to "too large" and
"encrypted" instead of to a threat.
Both policies default to letting files through, marked "not scanned",
which is the product owner's decision: a scanner that cannot answer must
not stop people working. Every such file is logged, and the screens that
say so come with the rest of this work.
Withholding is two rules. A file that is not available drops out of the
scopes that answer "what may this person see" — recipients and the
public listings, never the uploader's own copy. And every route that
puts bytes on the wire asks FileAvailability first: download, thumbnail,
preview, share link, the four public routes and both ends of a zip
build. A share link minted before the scan finishes says the file is
still being checked rather than 404ing.
Not yet here, and coming next: the quarantine screen and its permission,
the notifications, the settings screen, the hourly retry, the backfill
for existing libraries, and the Docker service.
ignacionelson