Run against the dev stack with real ClamAV and queue workers, and a code
review looking for ways around the scanner.
Quarantine now stays quarantined until somebody releases the file. A
rescan only touches files people can download, and changes nothing when
the scanner cannot answer or scanning is off. Before, an old infected file
rescanned while clamd restarted went through the "allow" policy and became
downloadable. The daily missing-files check leaves quarantined files alone,
so a storage outage no longer brings one back as a fresh upload.
A file longer than clamd's StreamMaxLength is "too large" again. clamd
answers and hangs up; the next write raised a warning that became an
exception before the answer was read, so the file was recorded as
"scanner down" and retried past the unscannable policy.
The production compose example gives clamd the settings it needs. On its
own defaults an encrypted zip comes back clean. The Test button now sends a
password-protected zip and fails when it is called clean, and says when an
address answers but is not ClamAV.
Saving the settings restarts the queue workers, which kept the old values
in memory. New scan runs --all, as its name says, and is refused while
scans are queued. A retry scheduled for later no longer counts as a scan
in progress.
Also: quarantine respects client scope for listing, release and
notifications; a zip built before a file was quarantined is refused;
public comments and version links skip unavailable files; a client no
longer sees their own quarantined or missing upload; a file whose bytes
return is scanned at once; clamd listens on IPv6 too, so its container
health check passes.
An infected file now goes somewhere rather than nowhere. Staff holding
the new release_quarantined_files permission get a Quarantine screen
listing what was refused, who uploaded it, and what the scanner called
it. They can delete it as they always could, or release it — which
needs a written reason, a password confirmation on top of the
permission, and lands in the activity log under their name.
Only the administrator role holds that permission by default. Deciding
a threat report is wrong is a different judgement from deciding a file
is no longer needed, which is why it is not delete_files.
Two notifications, two audiences: staff who can act on it, and the
person who uploaded it — for whom this is how they learn their own
machine has something on it. The people the file was shared with are
deliberately not told about a file they never received.
`projectsend:scan-files` runs hourly: it re-queues files still waiting,
and re-scans the ones that went out unscanned while the scanner was
unreachable, since it may be back. With --existing it also works
through a library uploaded before scanning was switched on, paced by a
setting so it does not starve today's uploads.
A file that was downloadable before it was caught says so on the
screen, with its download count, because that is the case where
somebody may already have a copy.
ignacionelson