Connecting a provider needed nothing but the session. Anyone holding one
could POST /settings/connected-accounts/google, follow the returned
Inertia::location(), sign in at the provider as *themselves*, and
completeLink() would bind their identity to the victim's account.
SocialAccount says what that row is:
This row *is* the authorization to sign in as that account.
So it is not a preference -- it is a credential, and one that outlives
every way the victim has of ending the session that created it. It
survives a password change, it survives Auth::logoutOtherDevices(), it
survives invalidating every session. Where a stolen session gives an
attacker access until it is noticed, this gives them an account.
routes/settings.php already makes exactly this argument, twenty lines
down, for the two-factor block and the API token routes:
a token outlives the session that minted it, so a stolen session must
not be enough to mint one
The link has that property too, and was the one thing on this screen
without the gate. Now it has it.
The gate goes on `connect`, not on the callback: starting the flow is what
writes the intent the callback completes, and the callback deliberately
sits outside every group so a provider sign-in works without a session.
Not changed, deliberately: `connected-accounts.destroy`. Disconnecting
removes a way in rather than adding one, and destroy() already refuses to
remove the last one ("This is the only way you can sign in. Set a password
first"). Putting it behind password.confirm would fall hardest on the
accounts a provider provisioned -- they hold a Str::password(64) nobody
has ever seen -- and leave them unable to disconnect anything at all.
There is a test pinning that it stays reachable.
Also not changed: the account owner still is not told. SocialLoginController
writes an activity log entry, and that sits behind `staff` +
can:view_actions_log, so a client never sees it. Notifying them is a real
gap and a separate change; this one closes the door rather than adding a
bell to it.
Tests: two that fail against the ungated route -- the redirect, and the
whole attack end to end with a stranger identity never binding. The
existing connect() helper now confirms the password, the way
enableTwoFactor() already did, so the rest of the file keeps exercising
the real gate rather than asserting around it.
Two accounts reach the same reset with opposite needs, and it treated
both as "write a hash and hope".
A provider-created account is told, on the Connected accounts screen, to
"set a password first, then disconnect Google" -- and doing it changed
nothing, because nothing ever set auth_source back to Local.
AccountConversion is the only writer, and that is an administrator. So the
screen went on asking for something that had already been done, and the
person could not release their last provider without help.
AuthSource states the rule that closes this: `social` means the account
came into existence without anybody choosing a password, and, in as many
words, "a social account may later set a real password". A reset by
emailed token is where somebody does. The screen's has_local_password prop
is literally auth_source === Local, so the write is what completes the
sentence it prints.
A directory account is the opposite case and gets the opposite answer.
isDirectoryAccount() means the local hash is not consulted at all, so the
reset reported success and left the person with a password that cannot
sign them in -- including when the directory it points at is gone, which
is exactly when somebody reaches for a reset. It is refused now, with the
reason, and nothing about the account moves: taking one off its directory
is an administrator's decision through AccountConversion, not a side
effect of a reset.
The refusal sits where the token has already been validated, not where the
link is asked for. That endpoint answers "A reset link will be sent if the
account exists" to everybody on purpose, and refusing there would tell a
stranger both that an address is an account and how it signs in. Throwing
before the write also leaves the token unspent, since PasswordBroker
deletes it after the callback returns.
Client file sharing, rebuilt from the ground up: a private area per
client, resumable uploads, folders, groups and categories, sharing with
expiry dates and download limits, comments, file versions, an activity
log, a REST API, and sixteen languages.
This repository begins here. ProjectSend 2 was developed privately, and
that development history is not published — the previous generation
remains available, with its own history, at projectsend/legacy.
Free software under the GNU General Public License v2, or (at your
option) any later version.
denkfabrik-li