The test above this said "whichever path stored it" and only exercised
the plain staff POST. The path the hosted free tier hangs on is the other
one: a client, through the resumable flow, whose upload is what
cloud-modules listens for to mint the public link.
Worth its own test rather than trusting the shared StoreUploadedFile,
because the package's suite structurally cannot tell us. It fakes both the
event and the link-minting, so a chunked path that stopped dispatching
would leave all 140 of its tests green and the free tier silently inert on
a real instance. That gap is why the listener was checked against
sim-cloud by hand rather than believed; this is the half of it that
belongs in core and runs on every commit.
The counter-check is worth a note. The first attempt at it changed
nothing — `\$file` inside a sed pattern is a literal, so the substitution
never matched and all six tests passed, which reads exactly like a fix
that is not load-bearing. Confirmed the mutation landed by counting the
line before re-running: three tests fail without the dispatch, the new one
among them.
Two pieces of groundwork, no behaviour change.
FileWasStored is dispatched from StoreUploadedFile, which every upload
path converges on — the chunked flow staff and clients share, and the
synchronous POST beside it. A listener therefore sees each upload once
without knowing which route produced it, which is the property that makes
it usable from outside this repository. A notification, not a filter:
nothing on it is mutable, and anything that needs to influence an upload
has to do so before the bytes land, which is what ResolvingUploadDisk is
already for.
CreateShareLink is the other half. Minting a link was a ShareLinksController
private concern, and the controller is an HTTP handler behind `staff`
middleware — so a link now needs making from outside a request as well.
Two copies of "make a token, write the row, log it" would drift, and the
half most likely to drift is the token, which is the entire authorization
for /s/{token}: there is no session behind it and no second factor, so
being unguessable is its only defence. Anything minted through the action
gets Str::random(32) — about 190 bits, more than a UUID's 122 — and never
a chosen value. The chosen-token path stays in the controller, where a
person is typing one into a form and its minimum length can be argued
about in a validation rule.
The permission questions stay in the controller too. Whether somebody may
set an expiry or a download cap is a fact about them, and the action has
no viewer to ask; it takes both already resolved, including the expiry,
because "the end of the 12th" depends on whose timezone you are in.
Five tests, including that the file a listener receives is complete and
readable rather than half-built, and that the staff form still refuses an
expiry to somebody without the permission after the extraction.
ignacionelson