compose.example.yaml does two things that are each fine alone and unsafe
together:
ports:
- "8080:80" # Docker binds 0.0.0.0 unless told otherwise
environment:
TRUSTED_PROXIES: "*" # believe the X-Forwarded-For of whoever connects
Behind a proxy that appends the header, "*" is correct and harmless --
Symfony strips the peer and takes the real client the proxy appended. The
example never gets there. It publishes the container on every interface,
so a visitor can reach port 8080 themselves, and then *they* are the peer
the application has been told to trust. `X-Forwarded-For: 203.0.113.9`
makes request()->ip() return exactly that.
What that costs, all of it on the signed-out surface:
- the login lockout, keyed on `email|ip` in LoginRequest::throttleKey()
- throttle:6,1 on register, password-email, password-reset, two-factor
- throttle:30,1 on share-link, public-browse, public-comment
- the download log, the activity log, and the `ip_address` recorded on
guest comments -- which FileComments::post calls "the one handle that
makes spam actionable"
Rotate the header and every one of them counts a different attacker.
The project's own test states the primitive: TrustedProxiesTest sets
trustedproxy.proxies = '*', sends X-Forwarded-For from a *direct* client,
and asserts the address is taken.
The documentation has always qualified "*" correctly -- .env.example says
it is "only safe when nothing but the proxy can reach the app", and
dockerhub-overview.md repeats it. The example file is what did not meet
its own precondition, and it is the file the Docker Hub description tells
a first-time reader to copy.
Publishing on 127.0.0.1 restores the precondition: a proxy on the host, or
in this compose file, still reaches it; nothing off the machine does. This
repository's own compose.yaml already publishes Adminer that way, for the
same reason.
The two settings are now documented as a pair in all three places that
carry them, including what to do when the proxy is on another host: bind
to the interface it arrives from and name that address in TRUSTED_PROXIES
instead of "*".
DOCKER.md's health-check command changes with it -- it told the reader to
curl <host-ip>:8080 from the same machine, which the new binding does not
answer. It now says 127.0.0.1:8080.
No test: this is packaging and prose. `docker compose config` parses the
edited file.
The example compose file shipped with ADMIN_NAME/ADMIN_EMAIL/ADMIN_PASSWORD
filled in, so the entrypoint created the first administrator and nobody ever
reached the setup screen the README, the Docker Hub page and the website all
promise. Someone who followed the instructions literally — edit APP_URL and
the passwords — also ended up with a publicly reachable administrator on
admin@example.com with a password printed in a public file.
Comment the three variables out. Unattended provisioning still works for
anyone who wants it, it is just opt-in now, and the first thing a new install
shows is the setup screen again.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Client file sharing, rebuilt from the ground up: a private area per
client, resumable uploads, folders, groups and categories, sharing with
expiry dates and download limits, comments, file versions, an activity
log, a REST API, and sixteen languages.
This repository begins here. ProjectSend 2 was developed privately, and
that development history is not published — the previous generation
remains available, with its own history, at projectsend/legacy.
Free software under the GNU General Public License v2, or (at your
option) any later version.
denkfabrik-li