8 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
ignacionelson a5496d24cd Stop describe() vouching for a detection it could not make
`FileDelivery::describe()` from a console returned
`{"method":"php","detected":true}` on every installation, whatever its web
server. detect() reads SERVER_SOFTWARE, which only exists inside a
request, so a console process has nothing to look at and falls to the
`php` default — and `detected: true` then vouched for it.

The value is right for that process and wrong as a statement about the
installation, which is how anybody running it from `artisan tinker` will
read it. Somebody verifying a healthy nginx tenant hit exactly that, spent
an afternoon on it, and only recognised it as an artefact of *where* the
question was asked after reading `nginx -T` in the container.

There is now a third field. `observed` is false only outside a request,
where `method` is a default rather than a finding. Both screens that read
this run in a request and always see true; it exists for whoever asks from
a shell, which is the one place the answer could mislead.

The two web paths are unchanged and were never wrong — `projectsend:status`
does not report delivery at all, so no fleet ever reported this
incorrectly. What was wrong was a confident answer to a question that
could not be answered from where it was asked.

Three tests: a console reading says not observed and still says php,
because php is what that process would actually do; a reading during a
request observes nginx; and a stated method is observed wherever it is
read, since a decision needs nothing detected to be true.

Found by the session verifying the 2.4.0 canary, not by me.
2026-09-08 10:21:02 -03:00
ignacionelson 02946abf85 Stop the delivery docblock naming nginx as the only local path
#1733 explains its two lifetimes by contrasting a presigned URL with
X-Accel-Redirect, "nginx serves these bytes, now, to this request". That
was true when the branch was written and stopped being true on 1 September,
when FileDelivery gave the local path four methods — auto, nginx, xsendfile
and PHP streaming.

The argument survives intact: every one of those authorises exactly one
response and nothing that outlives it, which is the property the contrast
rests on. Only the naming was stale, and a docblock that says "nginx" to
an operator running Apache reads as "this does not apply to me".

Found resolving the merge, not by the author — the branch predates the
change it collided with.
2026-09-07 19:24:00 -03:00
ignacionelson b7ac44e77b Merge pull request #1733 from fix/presigned-download-window
Give a download's presigned URL a minute rather than an hour

Conflicted against FileDelivery, which landed on main after this branch
was written: main added a constructor where the branch added two
constants. Both belong; the resolution keeps each.
2026-09-07 19:23:52 -03:00
ignacionelson 97596da7d0 Refuse a stored path carrying a control character
Found reviewing the delivery work. The path is written into
X-Accel-Redirect or X-Sendfile, and a CR or LF in a header value is
header injection. PHP's header() refuses to emit one, so the real effect
is a 500 on every download, preview and thumbnail of that file rather
than a split response -- a file permanently broken by its own name.

Paths are generated here as Y/m/{uuid}.{ext}, so this should be
unreachable. The extension is not generated: it comes from the
uploader's filename, and on a migrated installation from a v1 database.
The upload routes all check the extension against an allowlist, which no
control character can match -- but upload_type_restriction can be set to
none, and the importer does not consult that policy at all.

assertRelative() was documented as the backstop for what a path may be
and only covered traversal, which is the half that cannot happen here.
Low severity, and the guard should have covered it either way.
2026-08-31 22:57:02 -03:00
ignacionelson d6fd5a917d Send downloads the way the web server in front of us understands
Uploads live outside the web root, so PHP authorizes every download and
then hands the file to the web server with a header naming it. Four
routes decided that for themselves and all four hard-coded nginx's
spelling. On Apache or LiteSpeed nothing acts on the header, so the
empty body PHP sent goes to the visitor: files upload fine, thumbnails
are broken images, and downloads arrive as 0 bytes, with every other
page working. Reported as #1765 from an Apache 2.4 install, and before
that as #1266, #1215, #870 and #1271.

It is also a regression from v1, which had a download_method setting --
php, apache_xsendfile, litespeed, nginx_xaccel -- defaulting to php. v1
therefore worked on any server out of the box and v2 did not, and a v1
Apache user migrating lost every download with nothing to tell them why.

So the four sites now go through one FileDelivery, and it picks:

  auto (default)  nginx when SERVER_SOFTWARE says nginx, else php
  nginx           X-Accel-Redirect, a URL path via the internal location
  xsendfile       X-Sendfile, an absolute path (Apache mod_xsendfile,
                  LiteSpeed)
  php             BinaryFileResponse

Defaulting to auto rather than nginx is the point of the change: a
default that assumes nginx leaves an Apache install exactly as broken as
it is today until somebody reads INSTALL.md. Slow beats empty.

Auto never picks xsendfile, even where the module is loaded.
mod_xsendfile also needs XSendFilePath to allow the storage directory,
which cannot be seen from here, and choosing it on the strength of the
module being present would trade a silent failure an administrator can
diagnose from the dashboard for one nobody can.

BinaryFileResponse rather than a readfile loop because it answers Range
requests. nginx does that itself on the fast path, so hand-rolling it
would have broken seeking through a video on exactly the installations
this fallback exists for. Verified end to end: 206 with the right
Content-Range through the live stack.

Two guards. Every method checks the path cannot climb out of the storage
area -- nginx resolves `..` in the URL it is handed as happily as PHP
would -- and the two methods that hand over a filesystem path resolve it
and prove it lands inside the root. Callers pass paths from rows they
just authorized, so this is a backstop; it is here because the cost of
being wrong once is handing over any file the web server can read.

The dashboard's System panel names the method, with a warning icon and a
dialog when PHP is doing the sending: what is happening, what it costs
(one worker held for the whole of each download, so a few large
simultaneous ones can occupy every worker while the processor sits
idle), why it is set that way, and the three ways out. Written to be
accurate rather than reassuring -- nothing is broken, it does not scale
-- and the notice stays even when php was chosen deliberately, because
the trade-off is the same either way. /system/settings/downloads repeats
it, which is where somebody coming from v1 goes looking for the
dropdown.

An environment variable rather than a stored setting: it describes the
server this installation runs on, not a preference, and a value in the
database travels to a different server in a restore and is wrong there.
Read only in config/projectsend.php, so config:cache cannot blank it.

The suite pins itself to nginx. Left at auto it would detect no server
at all, fall back to php, and quietly retire the coverage of the
mechanism most installations actually use.
2026-08-31 22:31:27 -03:00
denkfabrik-li 5a9133bb07 Give a download's presigned URL a minute rather than an hour
StoredFileResponse hands external storage a presigned URL for an hour,
whatever the delivery is for. That URL is a bearer credential: whoever
holds it fetches the file without passing any of the caller's checks
again, and it outlives them. A download cap spent in the meantime, an
expires_at that falls inside the hour, an assignment withdrawn -- none of
them reach it, and nothing here can revoke one. It is also forwardable,
which the local path is not: X-Accel-Redirect authorises one response to
one request.

The two deliveries do not need the same window, so they no longer share
one.

A download has to survive being followed -- a redirect and a request --
which a minute covers with room to spare. An object store checks the
signature when the request arrives rather than while it runs, so a
transfer that starts inside the window finishes however long it takes.

A preview keeps the hour, because it is watched rather than fetched: the
player holds the URL and issues a Range request every time somebody seeks
past the buffer, so a minute would break playback of anything longer than
a minute. The class docblock now says that this is the trade being made,
instead of leaving it in a single number.

Two tests, one per window. Without the fix the download link is an hour
long.
2026-08-28 06:40:53 +02:00
ignacionelson 57540164fa Read a file from the disk it is actually on, everywhere
Two routes still assumed every file sits on local disk, which stopped
being true the moment external storage was switched on. A share link
answered with X-Accel-Redirect whatever the file's disk said, pointing
nginx at a path it has nothing behind; a public listing built a
thumbnail from Storage::disk('files')->path(), which for an externally
stored file is a path nobody ever wrote. Both fail only for installs
using S3, and only on those two routes, so the same file downloading
correctly from the file manager made the share link look like the
broken thing rather than where the file lives.

Neither is a new rule. FileDownloadController and
FileThumbnailController already did it right, which is the actual
finding: the knowledge was sitting in a private method on one class and
inline in another, so the next caller could not inherit it and did not.
Both are now objects with one job.

StoredFileResponse replaces InlineFileResponse and grows an
attachment() alongside inline(), since the two differ only by
disposition. LocalSourceFile takes a closure rather than returning a
path: the version that returned one also left the caller to unlink it,
and both of those are exactly the mistakes made here.

The regression tests fail against the previous controllers — checked in
both directions rather than assumed.
2026-08-24 16:24:39 -03:00
ignacionelson 88c182cf3b Preview video, audio and PDF, not only images
v1 could preview four kinds of file in a modal — images, video, audio and
PDF. v2 previewed only images, and not by decision: preview shipped as part
of the image *thumbnail* work (1c68aa1), so "previewable" quietly became a
synonym for "GD can decode it". FileThumbnailController::preview() gated on
ThumbnailGenerator::SUPPORTED_MIME_TYPES, the frontend mirrored the same
four types, and the dialog was a hardcoded <img>.

Rather than widen that list — it drives pathFor(), extensionFor(),
generate() and FileDiskCleanup, and a video reaching getimagesize() is a
500 — this separates the two questions. PreviewKind now answers "may these
bytes be served inline, and what element renders them?", while
ThumbnailGenerator keeps answering the narrower "can this app decode it
itself?", which is what renditions, the cache and the watermark hook
actually depend on. Image delegates to it so the two cannot drift.

The allowlist stays a security boundary: mime_type is sniffed from the
bytes, so text/html and image/svg+xml remain excluded, and PreviewKind is
deliberately narrower than "formats a browser might cope with" — no
quicktime, avi or matroska, because an embedded player for those shows a
black rectangle. Those still download exactly as before.

docs/security-audit-2026-08-05.md finding 1 recorded that adding
application/pdf "should be a conscious decision". This is that decision,
and three things were measured rather than assumed:

- An <iframe sandbox> cannot be used. Chrome refuses to run its PDF viewer
  in a sandboxed frame at all (ERR_BLOCKED_BY_CLIENT, with or without
  allow-same-origin) — the attribute removes the feature, it does not
  harden it.
- nginx's `Content-Security-Policy: sandbox; default-src 'none'` on
  /protected-files/ does work (a <video> frame lands in an opaque origin),
  but Chrome exempts its PDF viewer from it, so it is not what protects
  the PDF case.
- What does is the allowlist plus the browser's own PDF sandbox, where PDF
  JavaScript has no DOM and no cookies.

Range requests were verified end to end: 206 with a correct Content-Range,
a byte-perfect file reassembled from three ranges, and a real browser
seeking to 10s of a 20s clip. nginx drops the upstream Content-Length on
the X-Accel path, so there is no collision.

Two settings, both defaulting on so no installation loses what it has:
clients_can_preview_files and public_listing_preview_enabled. Staff are
never gated. The anonymous side needed a route of its own — there was no
public preview endpoint — with its own throttle bucket, since a bare
throttle: shares one counter across that whole block.

A preview now logs at most one FilePreviewed per viewer per file per five
minutes: a <video> turns one deliberate act into a long tail of Range
requests, and a row each would bury the log.

Also fixes a layout bug the tests could never catch. A portal file row was
flex justify-between with three children — name, comment trigger, download
— so the middle one settled wherever the name happened to end and the
comment icon sat at a different place on every row. The name block now
takes the slack and every action lives in one trailing group, with the
comment trigger in a fixed-width slot so the icons form a column. And
because half the previewable files have no thumbnail to click — a PDF, an
mp3 and an mp4 all render as a generic icon — every row gains an explicit
PreviewAction beside DownloadAction, matching whatever style that theme
gives its download control.
2026-08-21 14:14:23 -03:00