Reported by @choewonwoo1817 as GHSA-wgxf-v8cr-37mj, with a working
end-to-end reproducer against Keycloak.
`where('email', $address)` is not an exact match. It is whatever the
database says equality means, and the collation INSTALL.md tells people to
create — utf8mb4_unicode_ci — folds accents:
administrator@example.com = administrator@éxample.com -> 1
Those are two different domains. The second is xn--xample-9ua.com, which
somebody else can register and honestly verify at an OIDC provider. So an
attacker with no account here could sign in as themselves and be handed
the first account: SocialAuthenticator found it, linked their subject to
it permanently, and started a session. No password, no interaction from
the owner, an administrator session where that account was one.
Comparison now happens in PHP, in one place, on every driver. Case is
still folded because that is a real requirement — addresses are stored
lowercased and a provider may send any case — and mb_strtolower folds case
without folding accents, which is exactly the line to draw.
Three call sites move to it and two deliberately do not. Loose matching is
right when *refusing* and wrong when *selecting*: AvailableEmailRule and
ClientProvisioning ask "is this address free", where a collation that says
no to a near-miss refuses more registrations, which is the safe direction.
The three that ask "which account is this" are the social path, the login
form (where a password still gated it, so it was confusion rather than
takeover) and the erasure command (irreversible, and the wrong row is the
wrong person).
The test story is the part worth reading. The suite runs on SQLite, whose
`=` is byte-exact, so this defect does not exist there and never did —
which is how it survived six releases with everything green. A test
written the obvious way passes on unfixed code. So the comparison is
pinned by driver-independent tests that always run, and the chain is
proved by AccountLookupCollationTest, which skips unless the connection is
MySQL and carries the command to run it. Run against real MySQL with the
real collation: it fails on the old code and passes on the new.
Reported by Nooraldden Khalel as GHSA-f32x-fgmp-q353.
The profile screen let a signed-in session change its own email address
with nothing else, and that address is where a password reset is sent. So
a stolen session was enough: point the account at your own inbox, ask for
a reset, set a password, and temporary access is permanent ownership.
Clearing email_verified_at did not stand in the way, because the model
does not implement MustVerifyEmail and the reset broker never asks.
destroy(), thirty lines further down the same controller, has always
required the current password, and its comment says why: "the rule every
other door into this already asks". This door leads to the same place and
was not asking.
Only a *different* address asks. A name, a timezone or a custom field is
not a credential, so the rest of the screen saves with nothing extra —
which is why the rule is excluded rather than flat, and why the comparison
is trimmed and lowercased: re-saving a profile with the address typed in a
different case must not demand a password for nothing.
An account whose credentials live in a directory or at an identity
provider is refused outright and told why, rather than being asked for a
password it does not have. LdapProvisioner stores Str::password(64)
exactly so that local password can never be used, so asking would be a
dead end dressed as a form error — and the address is not theirs to change
here anyway: it is what the directory says it is.
The test walks the whole chain rather than checking the field is
validated, because the chain is what made this high: change the address,
ask for a reset there, and confirm nothing is sent and no such account
exists.
ConfirmablePasswordController checked the local hash and nothing else:
Auth::guard('web')->validate(['email' => ..., 'password' => ...])
An account provisioned from a directory has no local password. It holds a
Str::password(64) generated at provisioning time that nobody has ever
seen, and the application knows this -- LdapAuthenticator::isDirectoryAccount()
is the question, and the sign-in form asks it before deciding what to
check. This screen did not, so it refused those accounts the only password
they have.
That is not a cosmetic refusal. `password.confirm` stands in front of
enrolling in two-factor, so a directory-provisioned client could not enrol
at all. Set TwoFactorEnforcement to `clients` or `all` and EnforceTwoFactor
redirects every request they make to two-factor.show -- a screen whose
"enable" button leads to a door they cannot open. PR #1708 fixed the
routing half of that ("Let an enforced user reach the far side of the
confirm-password screen"); this is the credential half.
The rule now lives in one place. PasswordVerification is the sibling of
SignIn on the other side of the line SignIn draws -- SignIn is everything
after a credential checks out, this is the one question asked before it --
and it exists for the reason SignIn gives for existing: "the way they get
broken is by being written twice". LoginRequest keeps its ordering, its
provisioning and its rate limiting, and delegates the check itself.
Behaviour preserved exactly on the sign-in path: local hash first so an
account that answers locally generates no directory traffic, directory
only for accounts whose credentials live there, the stale-hash re-hash on
the local branch only, and the ldap_dn stamp on the directory branch. All
23 existing LDAP sign-in tests pass unchanged.
One thing this closes on the way past. Because the old check went straight
to the local hash, a directory account's placeholder *would* have confirmed
if anybody ever learned it -- a door the sign-in form does not have, since
it skips the local branch for those accounts. It now behaves the same on
both screens; there is a test.
**What this does not fix, and should be read as a limitation.** Accounts
provisioned by a social provider are in the same position -- a random local
password nobody holds -- and they are not directory accounts, so this
changes nothing for them. Their route to a local password is the password
reset, which #1748 made work end to end by moving auth_source to Local when
the reset completes. A social account that has never done that still cannot
confirm a password, and so still cannot enrol in two-factor.
Tests: three fail against the unfixed pair, including the placeholder case
above. Two more pin what must not change -- a wrong directory password is
still refused, and a local account with LDAP switched on still confirms
against its own hash.
Client file sharing, rebuilt from the ground up: a private area per
client, resumable uploads, folders, groups and categories, sharing with
expiry dates and download limits, comments, file versions, an activity
log, a REST API, and sixteen languages.
This repository begins here. ProjectSend 2 was developed privately, and
that development history is not published — the previous generation
remains available, with its own history, at projectsend/legacy.
Free software under the GNU General Public License v2, or (at your
option) any later version.
ignacionelson