The last of the three. Enforcement is a database setting defaulting to
'none', and on a managed installation the only writers are whoever
administers it and the boot that creates them — so a policy meant to be
on from the start had nowhere to be written. A control plane calling in
afterwards leaves a window between the first account existing and the
policy covering it, and the first account is the one with every
permission.
The entrypoint already seeds an account from the environment. This seeds
the policy one line above it, so the administrator is born under the rule
rather than ahead of it. There is a test for exactly that ordering,
because the ordering is the whole point.
Seeded, never overridden. A value that won on every boot would take the
setting away from the person it belongs to — somebody who tightened it
would find it loosened again by a restart. So it writes only when nothing
has ever been stored, the same shape as `projectsend:admin --if-none`.
Two things that would have been easy to get wrong, both pinned:
'none' is the enum's own default, so Settings::get() cannot tell "stored
as none" from "never stored". Asking the accessor would have overwritten
an administrator who deliberately chose it. The command asks the table.
And it reads config rather than env() directly. `config:cache` stops .env
being read at all, which is how TRUSTED_PROXIES came to have no effect on
any web request while looking correct in the file.
Deliberately not a general PROJECTSEND_SETTING_<KEY> mechanism. Every
setting reachable from outside is one whose value depends on where you
look, and the blast radius of getting that wrong is the settings table.
One named key per setting that needs it.
The three new variables are documented in config/projectsend.php and not
in .env.example or the Docker Hub overview. Those two are written for
somebody running one installation for themselves, and a seat cap is not
a thing they have — FILES_WEB_SERVER_READABLE is in .env.example because
a self-hoster on cPanel genuinely meets that problem.
Updating a server install cost nine artisan invocations plus a PHP-FPM
reload, written out in three places that had already drifted apart. One
of those steps is silently fatal to skip: with opcache.validate_timestamps
off — what production guides recommend and what our own image ships — the
database moves to the new version while every visitor keeps being served
the old code, and artisan reports the new version throughout.
`sudo ./update.sh` is now the whole procedure. It asks whether to check
GitHub, asks whether to download the release and verifies the checksum
published beside it, and asks whether there is a backup — offering to dump
the database when the answer is no. Then it takes the site down, replaces
the files, runs the update, reloads PHP-FPM, restarts the worker and
brings the site back. The application still has no self-updater: nothing
is fetched or applied unless somebody runs this and answers yes.
Underneath it is `php artisan projectsend:update`, which is everything an
update does that needs no root — and now the only definition of it. Both
container entrypoints call it instead of carrying their own copy of the
sequence, so the two paths cannot drift again.
Three findings worth keeping in the record, all from rehearsing rather
than reasoning:
- queue:restart has to come last. It writes its signal into the cache,
so clearing the cache afterwards deletes it and the worker runs old
code forever.
- optimize:clear is not safe to recommend. It runs cache:clear, which
on Redis is FLUSHDB — harmless on the default two-database layout,
but on a single-database Redis it takes the sessions and the queue
with it. The compiled caches are cleared individually instead.
- update.sh overwrites itself mid-run, because the zip contains it and
bash reads its own script lazily by byte offset. It re-execs from a
temporary copy before touching anything.
And when the reload is skipped anyway, the application now says so:
projectsend:update records the version it applied, and any staff page
compares that with what the running process actually compiled. The same
check catches the mirror image — new files in place, update never run.
Rehearsed end to end against real installs: a container upgrade (69 to 73
migrations, key and data intact, healthy), a scripted update on a real
nginx + php-fpm install with OPcache pinned (web process moved 2.1.0 to
2.1.1), the skipped-reload case (banner appears naming both versions, and
clears on reload), the refusals (downgrade, non-release zip, truncated
zip, URL passed to --zip, non-root), a database taken down mid-update
(site comes back out of maintenance mode by itself), and a real download
of the published 2.0.0 zip with its checksum verified.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The base php:*-fpm image creates /var/www/html owned by its own www-data
(uid 82) and mode 1777, so that an image can run as an arbitrary user.
This image replaces www-data with a fixed uid 1000 and copies the
release in with COPY --chown — which re-owns what it copies into the
directory, never the directory itself. It was left world-writable,
sticky, and owned by a uid the container no longer has.
fs.protected_symlinks — on by default on Ubuntu, Debian and most current
distributions — then refuses to let a non-root process follow a symlink
in such a directory, and .env is exactly that: the entrypoint keeps it
on the storage volume so a generated APP_KEY survives container
replacement, and links it into place. So every request 503'd with
"ProjectSend is not configured yet" while `docker exec ... cat .env`,
run as root, printed the file back perfectly (#1615).
Three changes, each independently sufficient for the reported case, and
deliberately so — this failure is silent and its symptom points away
from its cause:
- the image owns /var/www/html as the runtime user, at mode 755;
- the entrypoint owns the symlink it creates, so it stays followable
even if that directory's mode ever drifts back;
- preflight distinguishes "no .env" from ".env is there and cannot be
read", instead of reporting the second as the first and sending the
operator off to create a file they already have.
Verified by building the production image before and after: every
request 503s beforehand, with /var/www/html at uid 82 mode 1777 and
www-data denied on the symlink while root reads it; afterwards /up
answers 200, the container reports healthy, and / redirects to /setup.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Client file sharing, rebuilt from the ground up: a private area per
client, resumable uploads, folders, groups and categories, sharing with
expiry dates and download limits, comments, file versions, an activity
log, a REST API, and sixteen languages.
This repository begins here. ProjectSend 2 was developed privately, and
that development history is not published — the previous generation
remains available, with its own history, at projectsend/legacy.
Free software under the GNU General Public License v2, or (at your
option) any later version.
ignacionelson