Files
pad/internal/webhooks/validate.go
T
xarmian 8aa6481421 PHASE-12: Security Hardening for Pad Cloud (#67)
* feat: enforce RBAC role checks on all mutation endpoints (TASK-150)

Add requireMinRole helper and role enforcement to 30+ mutation handlers.
Viewers are now blocked from all state-changing operations, editors can
mutate items/docs/comments/views but not collections/webhooks/workspace
settings, and only owners can perform administrative operations.

Includes 11 integration tests with real auth covering viewer/editor/owner
access across items, collections, documents, comments, agent roles,
item links, and workspace operations.

* fix: scope search results to user's workspaces (TASK-151)

Search without a ?workspace= param previously returned results from all
workspaces in the database. Now the handler resolves the authenticated
user's workspace memberships and passes their IDs to the store query,
ensuring results only include items from workspaces the user belongs to.

Fresh installs (no users) retain unscoped search for backward compat.
Includes integration test proving cross-workspace isolation.

* fix: add webhook URL validation and SSRF protection (TASK-152)

Webhook creation now validates URLs before accepting them: only HTTP(S)
schemes allowed, embedded credentials rejected, private/reserved IPs
blocked (loopback, RFC1918, link-local, cloud metadata 169.254.169.254),
and hostnames are DNS-resolved to verify they don't point to private IPs.

Defense-in-depth check also added to the dispatcher's deliver function
so existing webhooks with unsafe URLs are blocked at delivery time.

* feat: add CSRF protection with double-submit cookie pattern (TASK-153)

Implements CSRF middleware that validates X-CSRF-Token header matches
the pad_csrf cookie on all state-changing API requests. Bearer token
auth, auth endpoints, and fresh installs are exempt. The frontend
client reads the CSRF cookie and attaches the header on mutations.

* feat: add per-endpoint rate limiting middleware (TASK-154)

Adds IP-based rate limiting for auth endpoints (5/min login, 3/hr
password reset, 5/hr registration) and user-based limits for API
(100/min) and search (30/min). Uses golang.org/x/time/rate with
automatic stale-entry cleanup. Adds chi RealIP middleware for
correct client IP behind proxies. Returns 429 with Retry-After.

* fix: sanitize error responses and remove PII from logs (TASK-155)

Replace all writeError(500, err.Error()) calls with writeInternalError
that logs the real error server-side and returns a generic message to
clients. Remove email addresses, user IDs, and password reset tokens
from log output to prevent PII leakage.

* feat: add security headers, configurable CORS, and secure cookies (TASK-160)

Add SecurityHeaders middleware (CSP, X-Frame-Options, nosniff,
Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy). Make CORS origins configurable
via PAD_CORS_ORIGINS env var. Add PAD_SECURE_COOKIES for TLS
deployments (sets Secure flag on session/CSRF cookies and enables
HSTS). Also adds X-CSRF-Token to CORS allowed headers.

* fix: address PR review — lazy router init and trusted IP for rate limits

Fix two issues flagged by Codex:

1. CORS/HSTS config was ignored because setupRouter() ran in New()
   before SetCORSOrigins/SetSecureCookies were called. Now uses
   sync.Once to lazily build the router on first ServeHTTP/Listen.

2. Rate limiter read X-Real-IP directly from untrusted headers,
   allowing clients to spoof IPs. Now uses RemoteAddr only (which
   chimiddleware.RealIP already sanitizes from trusted proxy headers).
2026-04-05 10:26:00 -04:00

108 lines
2.3 KiB
Go

package webhooks
import (
"fmt"
"net"
"net/url"
"strings"
)
// ValidateWebhookURL checks that a webhook URL is safe to call.
// It rejects non-HTTP(S) schemes, URLs with credentials, private/reserved
// IPs (loopback, link-local, RFC1918, cloud metadata), and hostnames that
// resolve to private IPs.
func ValidateWebhookURL(rawURL string) error {
u, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid URL: %w", err)
}
// Scheme must be http or https
switch u.Scheme {
case "http", "https":
// ok
default:
return fmt.Errorf("unsupported scheme %q: only http and https are allowed", u.Scheme)
}
// Reject URLs with embedded credentials
if u.User != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("URLs with embedded credentials are not allowed")
}
host := u.Hostname()
if host == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("URL must have a hostname")
}
// Check if host is a literal IP
if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil {
if isPrivateIP(ip) {
return fmt.Errorf("webhook URLs must not target private or reserved IP addresses")
}
return nil
}
// Host is a name — resolve it and check all resulting IPs
ips, err := net.LookupIP(host)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve hostname %q: %w", host, err)
}
for _, ip := range ips {
if isPrivateIP(ip) {
return fmt.Errorf("hostname %q resolves to private/reserved IP %s", host, ip)
}
}
return nil
}
// isPrivateIP returns true if the IP is in a private, reserved, or
// otherwise non-routable range.
func isPrivateIP(ip net.IP) bool {
// Loopback (127.0.0.0/8, ::1)
if ip.IsLoopback() {
return true
}
// Link-local (169.254.0.0/16, fe80::/10)
if ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() {
return true
}
// Unspecified (0.0.0.0, ::)
if ip.IsUnspecified() {
return true
}
// RFC1918 private ranges
privateRanges := []struct {
network string
}{
{"10.0.0.0/8"},
{"172.16.0.0/12"},
{"192.168.0.0/16"},
// IPv6 unique local (fc00::/7)
{"fc00::/7"},
// Cloud metadata (AWS, GCP, Azure)
{"169.254.169.254/32"},
}
for _, r := range privateRanges {
_, cidr, err := net.ParseCIDR(r.network)
if err != nil {
continue
}
if cidr.Contains(ip) {
return true
}
}
// Also catch common cloud metadata IPv6 variants
if strings.EqualFold(ip.String(), "fd00::") {
return true
}
return false
}