Files
pad/internal/server/handlers_claim_code.go
T
xarmian fc6afd01be feat(connect): unified Connect-to-agent modal + claim-code endpoint (TASK-1525) (#586)
* feat(connect): unified Connect-to-agent modal + claim-code endpoint (TASK-1525)

Phase E of PLAN-1519. Repurposes the avatar-menu "Connect a project…"
modal as a one-stop hub where users can connect ANY agent surface
(claim-code → existing OAuth grant, fresh MCP OAuth, or local CLI)
to the current workspace.

Backend
- GET /api/v1/workspaces/{slug}/claim-code — generates a stateless
  6-digit HMAC claim code (re-uses the verifier's secret + bucket
  math) for the calling member, OR reports `suppressed: true` when
  smart-suppression detects the workspace is already covered by one
  of the user's active OAuth connections (wildcard OR explicit
  allow-list rows). Returns `expires_at` at the current bucket
  boundary so the UI can drive a countdown.
- store.IsWorkspaceCoveredForUser — single indexed query against
  oauth_connections + oauth_*_tokens; filters by ACTIVE tokens so a
  dangling revoked connection row doesn't suppress fresh modals.
- Tests cover 412 (disabled), 404 (non-member), 200 + matching code,
  wildcard suppression, explicit-allow-list suppression, and the
  revoked-connection-doesn't-suppress invariant.

Frontend
- ConnectWorkspaceModal rewritten as a tabbed unified modal:
  - Agent (claim code) — fetches on activate, live countdown,
    auto-refetches at bucket roll-over, renders smart-suppression
    panel that links to /console/connected-apps, and renders the
    locked prompt block
    `Authorize the pad workspace '<slug>' with claim code <code>.`
    per IDEA-1517 §4.
  - MCP setup — subsumed from the now-deleted ConnectMCPModal: URL
    block + client-card grid linking to per-client docs.
  - CLI — existing install + `pad init` flow, unchanged.
- Default tab: Agent when mcpPublicUrl is set; CLI when not. MCP tab
  hidden entirely on self-host without a public MCP URL.
- ConnectBanner simplified: single modal state, generic "Connect an
  AI agent to this workspace" copy, no MCP/CLI dual-modal branching.
- ConnectMCPModal.svelte deleted (fully subsumed).
- API client gets `workspaces.claimCode(slug)` + `ClaimCodeResponse`
  TypeScript type.
- TopBar + workspace home callsites pass `mcpPublicUrl` from
  authStore so the unified modal can pick the right default tab.

Verification
- go build ./... clean
- go test ./... — all packages green (server + store)
- cd web && npm run build — clean

Parent: PLAN-1519. Phases A-D already shipped (oauth_connections
schema, MCP claim action, /authorize redesign, connections-page
mutation UI); this lands Phase E. Phase F (TASK-1526) will wire
post-create auto-open from IDEA-1516's new-workspace modal; Phase G
(TASK-1527) is cross-agent paste validation of the locked prompt
string.

* fix(connect): require membership at claim-code generation; guard modal against stale-response races per Codex review (round 1)

1. Guest-grant generation gap. RequireWorkspaceAccess admits item-grant
   guests who aren't workspace members; claim-code REDEMPTION requires
   full membership. Generating without the same check handed guests a
   valid-looking code + prompt that the claim endpoint always 404s.
   Add an explicit GetWorkspaceMember check after getWorkspace and
   return 403 not_a_member to fail closed on the same response shape
   the redemption path would have used.

2. Stale-response race in the modal. ConnectWorkspaceModal stays
   mounted across workspace switches (TopBar reuses the same
   instance), so an older claimCode fetch can resolve AFTER a newer
   one and stomp claimState with suppression or a code for the wrong
   workspace. Add a monotonic seq + captured-slug guard mirroring the
   refreshHasAgentActivity pattern already in ConnectBanner.

Test additions:
- TestHandleWorkspaceClaimCode_GrantOnlyGuest_403 asserts a non-member
  authenticated caller never gets a 200 + code from the generation
  endpoint.
2026-05-18 10:25:08 -04:00

150 lines
6.1 KiB
Go

package server
import (
"net/http"
"time"
)
// GET /api/v1/workspaces/{slug}/claim-code — claim-code generation +
// smart-suppression endpoint (PLAN-1519 / TASK-1525 / IDEA-1517 §4).
//
// The "Connect a project" modal in the web UI calls this to render
// either:
//
// - A 6-digit claim code the user reads to their agent, which then
// calls `pad_workspace.action: claim` to add this workspace to
// its OAuth grant's allow-list (handled by handleOAuthClaim).
//
// - A "your agent can already see this workspace" hint when smart
// suppression detects the workspace is already covered by one of
// the user's active OAuth connections — IDEA-1517 §4: "if the
// user has any active grant they personally own with
// include_future_workspaces=on, the modal detects the workspace
// is already auto-covered and replaces the code with…"
//
// We broaden the suppression predicate slightly from the strict IDEA
// reading to cover any active-and-covering grant — wildcard
// (all_current_workspaces=1) and explicit allow-list entries alike —
// because the user-facing answer to "would my existing agent already
// see this workspace today?" is identical regardless of which flag
// got it onto the allow-list. include_future_workspaces is the most
// common path but not the only one.
//
// **Why a workspace-scoped GET.** The route mounts under
// `/api/v1/workspaces/{slug}` so it inherits RequireWorkspaceAccess —
// the same membership gate the rest of the workspace-scoped surface
// uses. The handler then re-derives the code for (current user,
// workspace) so a viewer/editor/owner can each pull a fresh code
// for any workspace they belong to. Membership IS the consent —
// IDEA-1517 §4: "the user generating + handing over the code IS the
// consent."
//
// **Idempotency / freshness.** DeriveClaimCode is stateless: the
// same (user, workspace, 5-min bucket) always returns the same six
// digits. A page that polls this endpoint will see the digits roll
// over every 5 minutes. `expires_at` reports the END of the CURRENT
// bucket so the client UI can render a countdown; the verification
// path accepts the previous bucket too, so a code is usable for a
// sliding 5-10 minute window.
//
// **Error envelope.**
// - 412 claim_disabled — deployment hasn't wired the claim secret
// (self-host without cloud-mode OAuth). Endpoint exists but
// can't produce a redeemable code.
// - 401 auth_required — defense in depth (route is RequireAuth).
// - 404 — RequireWorkspaceAccess handles non-members.
// - 500 internal_error — DB I/O failure on the coverage query.
func (s *Server) handleWorkspaceClaimCode(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if len(s.claimSecret) < 16 {
writeError(w, http.StatusPreconditionFailed, "claim_disabled",
"Claim-code redemption is not enabled on this deployment.")
return
}
user := currentUser(r)
if user == nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "auth_required", "Authentication required.")
return
}
ws, ok := s.getWorkspace(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
// Explicit membership check. RequireWorkspaceAccess admits
// grant-only guests (per middleware_auth.go) — they can see an
// item-scoped slice of the workspace without being a member.
// Claim-code REDEMPTION at handleOAuthClaim requires full
// membership (it calls GetWorkspaceMember), so generating a code
// for a non-member here would hand the user a valid-looking
// 6-digit code + prompt that the claim path always rejects. Fail
// closed on the same envelope shape RequireWorkspaceAccess uses
// for guests on the workspace-as-a-whole.
member, err := s.store.GetWorkspaceMember(ws.ID, user.ID)
if err != nil {
writeInternalError(w, err)
return
}
if member == nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "not_a_member",
"Claim codes can only be generated by workspace members. "+
"Ask the owner for an invitation, or sign in as a member.")
return
}
// Smart suppression: does the calling user already have an active
// OAuth connection that covers this workspace? If so, the modal
// has no claim code to offer — it points the user at
// /console/connected-apps instead. Failure here is non-fatal for
// the page (we'd still want to render SOMETHING rather than 500
// over a non-critical hint) but we surface a 500 so the bug is
// visible — silent suppression failures would be worse than a
// loud one.
connName, covered, err := s.store.IsWorkspaceCoveredForUser(user.ID, ws.ID)
if err != nil {
writeInternalError(w, err)
return
}
now := time.Now()
resp := map[string]any{
"workspace": ws.Slug,
"suppressed": covered,
// expires_at reports the end of the CURRENT 5-min bucket in
// UTC RFC3339. Verification still accepts the previous bucket
// for up to ~5 additional minutes (sliding window), so this
// is the conservative "fresh through" timestamp the UI should
// use to drive a countdown without over-promising lifetime.
"expires_at": bucketEndTime(now).UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
}
if covered {
// Hand the connection name back so the UI can render
// "your agent '<name>' can already see this workspace —
// go to Connected apps." Empty string is fine (the
// connection may not have been named at /authorize); the
// UI falls back to a generic phrasing in that case.
resp["suppression_grant_name"] = connName
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
return
}
resp["code"] = DeriveClaimCode(s.claimSecret, user.ID, ws.ID, now)
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
}
// bucketEndTime returns the Unix timestamp at which the CURRENT
// 5-minute claim-code bucket rolls over to the next one. Used as
// the `expires_at` value in the generation response so the modal
// can show a countdown without re-implementing the bucket math.
//
// The claim verifier accepts the PREVIOUS bucket too, so a code is
// actually usable for ~5 minutes past this timestamp — but the
// "guaranteed fresh" promise ends here, and the UI shouldn't
// over-promise lifetime.
func bucketEndTime(at time.Time) time.Time {
bucket := at.UTC().Unix() / claimBucketSeconds
return time.Unix((bucket+1)*claimBucketSeconds, 0).UTC()
}