Files
pad/cmd
xarmian df3cf55d8f fix(mcp): stop cloud session-workspace bleed across users (BUG-1865) (#780)
The cloud /mcp transport constructed a single process-global
WorkspaceState shared across every OAuth user and MCP session.
pad_set_workspace mutated it, and env.Dispatch injected the shared
value into any tool call without an explicit `workspace` — so one
session's selection bled into another's (cross-user, and across a
single user's concurrent sessions).

Not a cross-tenant write: BUG-1616's bearer-auth membership gate
already 403s a non-member. The real harm is workspace-slug leakage,
confusing "not a member of <someone else's ws>" errors, and
wrong-destination reads/writes among a user's OWN accessible
workspaces.

Fix: add NewSharedWorkspaceState() whose ResolveDefault() always
returns "". The cloud mount uses it, so the shared value is never
injected as a per-call default — resolution falls back to explicit
workspace= (or the per-user maybeInjectWorkspace default), never
cross-user shared memory. pad_set_workspace on a shared state no
longer persists and returns status=not_persisted. Local
`pad mcp serve` (single-user-per-process) is unchanged.

Also make the agent-facing surfaces honest per-deployment: the
pad_set_workspace tool description, the pad_item workspace param,
pad_meta tool-surface, and the embedded instructions.md no longer
promise session defaulting on multi-user/remote servers, and the
two "workspace is required" hints drop the stale pad_set_workspace
reference.

Regression guards in internal/mcp/bug1865_test.go. Full suite green.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HxBkAMiFBtCRJ2tKSCt3ST
2026-07-01 19:35:23 -04:00
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