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https://github.com/PerpetualSoftware/pad.git
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xarmian
fc5a54dff7
* fix(server): read raw TCP peer for loopback check (TASK-662) TrustedProxyRealIP rewrites r.RemoteAddr when the peer is a trusted proxy. Without additional defense, an attacker reaching a trusted reverse proxy could set X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1 and trick the bootstrap loopback check into accepting them as a local caller — reopening the full-instance-takeover path that TASK-660 closed at the spoof layer. Add CapturePeerAddr middleware that runs BEFORE TrustedProxyRealIP and stashes the untampered r.RemoteAddr in request context. Change requestIsLoopback to read via rawPeerAddr(r) (context-first, with a safe fallback for test paths that skip the middleware). r.RemoteAddr stays the rewritten value for the rate-limiter / audit-log paths that actually want the client's IP. Tests cover: direct loopback → true; direct LAN → false; trusted proxy forwarding spoofed 127.0.0.1 → false; untrusted peer with spoofed XFF=127.0.0.1 → false; and that rawPeerAddr falls back to r.RemoteAddr when CapturePeerAddr is absent. Parent: PLAN-643 (OSS Security Hardening). * fix(server): require loopback peer AND no proxy headers for bootstrap (Codex P1) Codex caught a regression in the initial PR: reading rawPeerAddr(r) made every request through a same-host reverse proxy look loopback, so a Caddy or nginx on 127.0.0.1 forwarding public traffic would let attackers reach the bootstrap endpoint from the internet. Tighten the rule to two independent conditions: 1. The untampered TCP peer is a loopback address. 2. Neither X-Forwarded-For nor X-Real-IP is set. A legitimate local CLI calling Pad directly satisfies both. A reverse proxy forwarding public traffic always sets the forwarding headers, so the presence of either disqualifies the request. The raw-peer check still defeats X-Forwarded-For spoofing from non-loopback attackers, and now also handles the Codex-flagged scenario where a local proxy is trusted or left misconfigured. Tests updated to cover: direct loopback no-headers allowed; loopback peer + XFF rejected; loopback peer + X-Real-IP rejected; IPv6 loopback allowed.
97 lines
2.7 KiB
Go
97 lines
2.7 KiB
Go
package server
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import (
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"testing"
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)
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// TestRequestIsLoopback_IgnoresRealIPRewrite verifies that the bootstrap
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// loopback check reads the untampered TCP peer captured by
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// CapturePeerAddr, not r.RemoteAddr. A proxied attacker setting
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// X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1 must not be able to trick the check.
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func TestRequestIsLoopback_IgnoresRealIPRewrite(t *testing.T) {
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tests := []struct {
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name string
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peer string
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spoofedXFF string
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spoofedXRI string // X-Real-IP
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trustedCIDRs string
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wantLoopback bool
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}{
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{
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name: "direct loopback peer, no proxy headers: allowed",
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peer: "127.0.0.1:54321",
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wantLoopback: true,
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},
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{
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name: "direct LAN peer: rejected",
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peer: "192.168.1.5:54321",
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wantLoopback: false,
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},
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{
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name: "loopback peer WITH X-Forwarded-For: rejected (proxy relay)",
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peer: "127.0.0.1:54321",
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spoofedXFF: "203.0.113.8",
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wantLoopback: false,
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},
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{
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name: "loopback peer WITH X-Real-IP: rejected (proxy relay)",
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peer: "127.0.0.1:54321",
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spoofedXRI: "203.0.113.8",
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wantLoopback: false,
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},
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{
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name: "loopback peer with spoofed XFF=127.0.0.1: rejected (any XFF rejects)",
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peer: "127.0.0.1:54321",
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spoofedXFF: "127.0.0.1",
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wantLoopback: false,
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},
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{
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name: "trusted proxy forwarding spoofed XFF=127.0.0.1: rejected",
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peer: "10.0.0.5:54321",
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spoofedXFF: "127.0.0.1",
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trustedCIDRs: "10.0.0.0/8",
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wantLoopback: false,
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},
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{
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name: "untrusted peer with spoofed XFF=127.0.0.1: rejected",
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peer: "203.0.113.7:54321",
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spoofedXFF: "127.0.0.1",
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trustedCIDRs: "10.0.0.0/8",
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wantLoopback: false,
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},
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{
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name: "IPv6 loopback peer, no proxy headers: allowed",
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peer: "[::1]:54321",
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wantLoopback: true,
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},
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}
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for _, tt := range tests {
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t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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var got bool
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handler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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got = requestIsLoopback(r)
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})
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// Replicate the production middleware order: CapturePeerAddr, then TrustedProxyRealIP.
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cidrs := ParseTrustedProxyCIDRs(tt.trustedCIDRs)
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chain := CapturePeerAddr(TrustedProxyRealIP(cidrs)(handler))
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req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/v1/auth/bootstrap", nil)
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req.RemoteAddr = tt.peer
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if tt.spoofedXFF != "" {
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req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", tt.spoofedXFF)
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}
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if tt.spoofedXRI != "" {
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req.Header.Set("X-Real-IP", tt.spoofedXRI)
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}
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chain.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), req)
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if got != tt.wantLoopback {
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t.Fatalf("requestIsLoopback = %v, want %v", got, tt.wantLoopback)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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