Files
pad/internal/server
xarmian cdc5b301e2 fix(server): minting or rotating an API token requires an interactive session (BUG-2890) (#1267)
A PAT that could reach POST /auth/tokens minted further tokens with
independent names and expiries. Those survive the revocation of the token
that created them, and nothing in the token list records which token
minted which -- so revoking a leaked credential did not end the access it
had been used to establish.

Ruled on the item's trail day 57: create and rotate require session auth
and refuse a PAT-authenticated call with 403 session_required; list and
revoke stay PAT-reachable.

Population is THREE doors, not the two the filing named. Enumerating every
route that reaches store.CreateAPIToken / RotateAPIToken turns up the
workspace-scoped mint at POST /workspaces/{ws}/tokens, which had only
requireMinRole("owner") in front of it -- and a user-owned PAT held by an
owner satisfies that. Measured, not read: with the fixture's owner also
written into workspace_members, that door returned 201 with a live token
on the unfixed tree. All three doors are gated; list and revoke on both
the user and workspace routes are deliberately untouched, because neither
extends access and revocation is the compromised-credential response.

The gate is on the CREDENTIAL, not on the door: isAPITokenAuth is false
for a session cookie AND for a padsess_ CLI bearer, a distinction that
predates this fix (see ctxValidatedSessionBearer's note in
middleware_auth.go) because a CLI session IS an interactive session. At
the workspace door the check runs before requireMinRole, so a PAT-borne
caller cannot learn its own membership status from the difference between
the two 403s.

Five mutants run, each detected by its own leg: dropping the gate at each
of the three doors fails that door's test; gating on Authorization != ""
instead of the credential kind fails the CLI-session leg AND NOTHING ELSE;
over-applying the gate to list and revoke fails both PAT-still-works
controls. The fourth is why the CLI leg exists -- a header-shaped gate
passes every PAT assertion and breaks every logged-in CLI.

Also documents the refusal on the CLAUDE.md route line: the routes were
listed without saying anything about credential kind, so an agent holding
a PAT would have met an unexplained 403.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HeChkgZVYb3NTgTcckF5KR
2026-09-06 22:02:05 -04:00
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