pad/internal/server/middleware_auth.go

package server

import (
	"context"
	"crypto/sha256"
	"encoding/hex"
	"encoding/json"
	"log/slog"
	"net"
	"net/http"
	"strings"
	"time"

	"github.com/PerpetualSoftware/pad/internal/models"
	"github.com/PerpetualSoftware/pad/internal/store"
	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
)

type contextKey string

const (
	// ctxTokenWorkspaceID is set when a valid API token is present.
	ctxTokenWorkspaceID contextKey = "token_workspace_id"
	// ctxCurrentUser is set when an authenticated user is resolved.
	ctxCurrentUser contextKey = "current_user"
	// ctxWorkspaceRole is set by RequireWorkspaceAccess with the user's role.
	ctxWorkspaceRole contextKey = "workspace_role"
	// ctxIsAPIToken is set to true when the request is authenticated via an API token
	// (as opposed to a session cookie or CLI session token).
	ctxIsAPIToken contextKey = "is_api_token"
	// ctxTokenScopes carries the JSON-encoded scopes string from the
	// validated API token (e.g. `["read"]`, `["*"]`). Stashed by
	// MCPBearerAuth so the in-process MCP dispatcher can re-check
	// scopes per synthesized tool call (the dispatcher bypasses
	// TokenAuth's chain-level scope check by setting WithCurrentUser
	// directly). See WithTokenScopes / TokenScopesFromContext in
	// context.go and the per-tool gate in internal/mcp/dispatch_http.go.
	ctxTokenScopes contextKey = "token_scopes"
	// ctxResolvedWorkspaceID is set by RequireWorkspaceAccess after resolving
	// the workspace slug/ID. Avoids redundant lookups in handlers.
	ctxResolvedWorkspaceID contextKey = "resolved_workspace_id"
	// ctxTokenAllowedWorkspaces carries the OAuth token's workspace
	// allow-list set at consent time (TASK-952). Either a list of
	// slugs or `["*"]` (wildcard). Read by RequireWorkspaceAccess to
	// reject requests against workspaces the user didn't include in
	// the consent (TASK-953). nil → no token-level workspace
	// constraint (PAT auth, or pre-TASK-952 OAuth tokens).
	ctxTokenAllowedWorkspaces contextKey = "token_allowed_workspaces"
	// ctxMCPTokenKind / ctxMCPTokenRef carry the bearer's identity for
	// MCP audit logging (TASK-960). Stashed by MCPBearerAuth so the
	// audit middleware (middleware_mcp_audit.go) can record which
	// connection (OAuth request_id chain) or which PAT (api_tokens.id)
	// drove the call. Empty when no MCP-auth happened (i.e. the request
	// didn't go through MCPBearerAuth). The ref values aren't sensitive
	// — they're internal IDs / chain identifiers, never the raw bearer
	// — so leaking via context is fine.
	ctxMCPTokenKind contextKey = "mcp_token_kind"
	ctxMCPTokenRef  contextKey = "mcp_token_ref"
	// ctxValidatedSessionBearer is set to true when the request was
	// authenticated via a validated CLI session-bearer token
	// (Authorization: Bearer padsess_...), as distinct from ctxIsAPIToken
	// (a long-lived PAT) and from a session cookie. Deliberately a
	// separate key rather than reusing ctxIsAPIToken: ctxIsAPIToken also
	// gates PAT-vs-interactive-session behavior elsewhere (e.g. 2FA
	// management requires an interactive session and explicitly rejects
	// isAPITokenAuth callers) — a CLI session-bearer token IS an
	// interactive session and must not trip that gate the way a PAT
	// does. CSRFProtect reads this (via isValidatedBearerAuth) to tell
	// "TokenAuth validated this Bearer credential" apart from "the
	// request merely carries an Authorization: Bearer header TokenAuth
	// never checked or rejected" — see the codex-round-3 fix note there
	// (TASK-1932).
	ctxValidatedSessionBearer contextKey = "validated_session_bearer"
)

// TokenAuth middleware checks for an Authorization: Bearer pad_xxx header.
// If a valid token is found, the associated workspace ID is stored in the
// request context. If no token header is present the request passes through
// unchanged (existing localhost behaviour). Invalid or expired tokens
// receive a 401 response — UNLESS the request targets a path in
// isPublicAPIPath (login, /auth/session, password reset, share links,
// health), in which case the request falls through unauthenticated so
// the caller can recover from a stale token. Without that fallthrough a
// developer with a stale `~/.pad/credentials.json` (e.g. after wiping a
// test DB) would see "Invalid or expired session" on every CLI command,
// including the very endpoints needed to log in again. See BUG-1227 and
// the matching IP-change-revoked branch below for the same pattern.
func (s *Server) TokenAuth(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		auth := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
		if auth == "" {
			// No token provided — allow through (localhost access).
			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
			return
		}

		// Expect "Bearer pad_<64 hex chars>" or "Bearer padsess_<64 hex chars>"
		if !strings.HasPrefix(auth, "Bearer ") {
			rejectInvalidBearer(w, r, next, "unauthorized", "Invalid authorization header format")
			return
		}

		token := strings.TrimPrefix(auth, "Bearer ")
		token = strings.TrimSpace(token)

		// Session token (from CLI login)
		if strings.HasPrefix(token, "padsess_") {
			session, err := s.store.ValidateSession(token)
			if err != nil {
				writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal_error", "Session validation failed")
				return
			}
			if session == nil {
				rejectInvalidBearer(w, r, next, "unauthorized", "Invalid or expired session")
				return
			}
			// Session binding: log a User-Agent change for visibility but do
			// NOT reject. The UA is client-supplied and trivially replayed by
			// anyone who already stole the token, so hard-enforcing it adds
			// little security while breaking legitimate clients (browser/WebView
			// updates, DevTools device emulation, mobile-app rebuilds). This
			// mirrors the default IP-change handling (logged, request allowed);
			// strict rejection on IP change is still available via
			// PAD_IP_CHANGE_ENFORCE=strict.
			if session.UAHash != "" && sha256hex(r.UserAgent()) != session.UAHash {
				slog.Warn("session binding mismatch: User-Agent changed (logged, request allowed)",
					"session_ip", session.IPAddress,
					"client_ip", clientIP(r))
			}
			// Session binding: detect IP changes. Log to audit log in all modes;
			// reject only when PAD_IP_CHANGE_ENFORCE=strict.
			switch s.handleSessionIPChange(w, r, session, token) {
			case sessionIPChangeTerminated:
				return
			case sessionIPChangeRevoked:
				// Session was destroyed. For public API paths (login,
				// password reset, health, share links) pass through
				// unauthenticated so the caller can recover. For
				// authenticated-only paths, the Bearer flow has no SPA
				// fallback — treat revocation as a hard 401.
				if isPublicAPIPath(r.URL.Path) {
					next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
					return
				}
				writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "session_ip_changed",
					"Session client IP changed — please log in again.")
				return
			}
			// Sliding renewal: extend the session's expiry on activity so an
			// actively-used token never hits the fixed TTL cliff. Bearer
			// clients hold the token directly (no cookie to re-issue) — just
			// push the row's expiry forward. Best-effort: a renewal error must
			// not fail an otherwise-valid request.
			if _, _, err := s.store.RenewSessionIfStale(token); err != nil {
				slog.Warn("session renewal failed (request allowed)", "error", err)
			}
			ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), ctxCurrentUser, session.User)
			ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ctxValidatedSessionBearer, true)
			next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
			return
		}

		// API token
		if !strings.HasPrefix(token, "pad_") || len(token) != 68 {
			rejectInvalidBearer(w, r, next, "unauthorized", "Invalid token format")
			return
		}

		apiToken, err := s.store.ValidateToken(token)
		if err != nil {
			writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal_error", "Token validation failed")
			return
		}
		if apiToken == nil {
			rejectInvalidBearer(w, r, next, "unauthorized", "Invalid or expired token")
			return
		}

		// Enforce token scopes
		if !tokenScopeAllows(apiToken.Scopes, r.Method, r.URL.Path) {
			writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "forbidden", "Token scope does not permit this action")
			return
		}

		// Add near-expiry warning headers
		setTokenExpiryWarning(w, apiToken)

		ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), ctxIsAPIToken, true)

		// Resolve user from token's user_id (new user-owned tokens)
		if apiToken.UserID != "" {
			user, err := s.store.GetUser(apiToken.UserID)
			if err == nil && user != nil {
				ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ctxCurrentUser, user)
			}
		}

		// Store workspace ID from the token if workspace-scoped
		if apiToken.WorkspaceID != "" {
			ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ctxTokenWorkspaceID, apiToken.WorkspaceID)
		}

		next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
	})
}

// SessionAuth middleware resolves session cookies into authenticated users.
// If a user was already resolved by TokenAuth, this is a no-op.
func (s *Server) SessionAuth(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		// Already authenticated by TokenAuth — user-bound API tokens set
		// currentUser, legacy workspace-scoped tokens set tokenWorkspaceID
		// with no user. In either case we must short-circuit: otherwise a
		// stale session cookie on the same request could trigger the
		// IP-change strict-mode path and 401 the request even though the
		// API token itself is valid.
		if currentUser(r) != nil || tokenWorkspaceID(r) != "" {
			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
			return
		}

		// Try session cookie (with fallback to unprefixed name for upgrade path)
		cookie, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookieName(s.secureCookies))
		if err != nil {
			cookie, err = r.Cookie("pad_session")
			if err != nil {
				next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
				return
			}
		}

		session, err := s.store.ValidateSession(cookie.Value)
		if err != nil || session == nil {
			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
			return
		}

		// Session binding: log a User-Agent change for visibility but do NOT
		// de-authenticate. See the matching note in TokenAuth above — UA is
		// client-supplied, weak as a binding, and false-positives on routine
		// client churn (browser/WebView updates, DevTools device emulation,
		// mobile-app rebuilds). Logged-but-allowed, like the default IP path.
		if session.UAHash != "" && sha256hex(r.UserAgent()) != session.UAHash {
			slog.Warn("session binding mismatch: User-Agent changed (logged, request allowed)",
				"session_ip", session.IPAddress,
				"client_ip", clientIP(r))
		}

		// Session binding: detect IP changes. Log to audit log in all modes;
		// reject only when PAD_IP_CHANGE_ENFORCE=strict.
		switch s.handleSessionIPChange(w, r, session, cookie.Value) {
		case sessionIPChangeTerminated:
			return
		case sessionIPChangeRevoked:
			// Browser path: let the request through unauthenticated so
			// the SPA renders its login flow instead of a JSON error.
			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
			return
		}

		// Sliding renewal: extend the session's expiry on activity and re-issue
		// the session cookie (plus CSRF, to keep their lifetimes in sync) with a
		// fresh Max-Age so an actively-used session never expires out from under
		// the user at the fixed TTL. Best-effort: a renewal error must not fail
		// an otherwise-valid request. When this re-issues the CSRF cookie it
		// also covers the "missing CSRF cookie" case below.
		renewed := false
		if newExpiry, didRenew, err := s.store.RenewSessionIfStale(cookie.Value); err != nil {
			slog.Warn("session renewal failed (request allowed)", "error", err)
		} else if didRenew {
			if maxAge := int(time.Until(newExpiry).Seconds()); maxAge > 0 {
				setSessionCookie(w, cookie.Value, maxAge, s.secureCookies)
				if !strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/v1/auth/") {
					setCSRFCookie(w, maxAge, s.secureCookies)
				}
				renewed = true
			}
		}

		// Re-issue CSRF cookie if the session is valid but the cookie is missing.
		// This can happen when cookies expire at different times or are selectively cleared.
		// Skip for auth endpoints — they manage their own CSRF cookies (login sets, logout clears).
		// Skip when sliding renewal already re-issued the CSRF cookie above.
		if !renewed && !strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/v1/auth/") {
			if _, csrfErr := r.Cookie(csrfCookieName(s.secureCookies)); csrfErr != nil {
				setCSRFCookie(w, 7*24*60*60, s.secureCookies)
			}
		}

		ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), ctxCurrentUser, session.User)
		next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
	})
}

// rejectInvalidBearer writes a 401 with the given code/message UNLESS
// the request targets a path in isPublicAPIPath, in which case it falls
// through to the next handler unauthenticated. The fallthrough is the
// recovery hatch that lets a stale Bearer token still reach
// /api/v1/auth/session, /login, /forgot-password, etc. — without it a
// stale `~/.pad/credentials.json` (e.g. after wiping a test DB) would
// 401 every CLI command, including the ones needed to recover. Mirrors
// the existing isPublicAPIPath fallthrough in the IP-change-revoked
// branch (BUG-1227).
func rejectInvalidBearer(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, next http.Handler, code, message string) {
	if isPublicAPIPath(r.URL.Path) {
		next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
		return
	}
	writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, code, message)
}

// isPublicAPIPath reports whether the given request path is an API
// endpoint that bypasses authentication entirely. These handlers must
// work even when the caller has no valid session (login, registration,
// password reset, health probes, public plan limits, share-link tokens).
// Shared between RequireAuth and the session-IP-change path so both stay
// in sync — in particular, strict IP-change enforcement must NOT 401
// these endpoints, otherwise a user with a stale cookie can't even
// recover by logging in again.
func isPublicAPIPath(path string) bool {
	return strings.HasPrefix(path, "/api/v1/auth/") ||
		path == "/api/v1/health" ||
		strings.HasPrefix(path, "/api/v1/health/") ||
		strings.HasPrefix(path, "/api/v1/s/") ||
		path == "/api/v1/plan-limits" ||
		// Non-consuming invitation preview (BUG-1934). A logged-out invitee
		// hits /join/{code} before authenticating, and the page fetches the
		// invited email + workspace name to prefill the form. Read-only and
		// always-200 (enumeration-safe); the accept path (/accept) stays
		// auth-gated. Matches only the trailing /preview segment so
		// /invitations/{code}/accept is unaffected.
		(strings.HasPrefix(path, "/api/v1/invitations/") && strings.HasSuffix(path, "/preview")) ||
		// Server capability profile (TASK-878). The editor reads this
		// before login on shared-item preview surfaces, and the
		// handler is intentionally read-only (no DB writes, no
		// per-user state). Keeping it public matches the route's
		// register-time intent in server.go.
		path == "/api/v1/server/capabilities"
}

// RequireAuth middleware blocks unauthenticated requests when users exist
// in the system. When no users exist (fresh install), all requests pass
// through to allow the setup flow.
func (s *Server) RequireAuth(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		path := r.URL.Path

		// Auth endpoints, share link resolution, health, and the public
		// plan-limits endpoint are always exempt from auth.
		if isPublicAPIPath(path) {
			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
			return
		}

		// Cloud sidecar endpoints authenticate via cloud_secret (X-Cloud-Secret
		// header, or legacy ?cloud_secret query-param). Only bypass the auth
		// gate when BOTH conditions hold:
		//   1. The request path is one of the three cloud admin endpoints.
		//   2. The request carries a cloud-secret marker.
		// The path gate is critical — without it, setting X-Cloud-Secret on
		// any route (e.g. GET /api/v1/workspaces) would globally bypass auth.
		// After the bypass, requireCloudMode (route-level) + validateCloudSecret
		// (handler-level) still confirm cloud mode is actually on and that the
		// secret matches.
		if isCloudAdminPath(path) && hasCloudSecretMarker(r) {
			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
			return
		}

		// Static assets are exempt
		if strings.HasPrefix(path, "/_app/") ||
			path == "/favicon.ico" ||
			strings.HasSuffix(path, ".png") ||
			strings.HasSuffix(path, ".svg") ||
			strings.HasSuffix(path, ".ico") ||
			strings.HasSuffix(path, ".webmanifest") ||
			strings.HasSuffix(path, ".json") && !strings.HasPrefix(path, "/api/") {
			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
			return
		}

		// If no users exist, allow everything (fresh install / setup mode)
		count, err := s.store.UserCount()
		if err != nil || count == 0 {
			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
			return
		}

		// Already authenticated via token or session
		if user := currentUser(r); user != nil {
			if user.IsDisabled() {
				writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "account_disabled", "Your account has been disabled. Contact an administrator.")
				return
			}
			// Use a short-lived context so the write is cancelled if the DB is slow,
			// preventing goroutine/connection buildup under load. Tracked via
			// s.goAsync so Stop() can drain it before the DB is closed (BUG-842).
			s.goAsync(func() {
				ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second)
				defer cancel()
				s.store.TouchUserActivity(ctx, user.ID)
			})
			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
			return
		}
		if tokenWorkspaceID(r) != "" {
			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
			return
		}

		// Unauthenticated — return 401 for API, let SPA handle for browser
		if strings.HasPrefix(path, "/api/") {
			writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthorized", "Authentication required")
			return
		}

		// For browser page requests, serve the SPA (frontend will check auth and show login)
		next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
	})
}

// tokenWorkspaceID returns the workspace ID set by the TokenAuth middleware,
// or an empty string if no token was used.
func tokenWorkspaceID(r *http.Request) string {
	v, _ := r.Context().Value(ctxTokenWorkspaceID).(string)
	return v
}

// currentUser returns the authenticated user from the request context,
// or nil if no user is authenticated.
func currentUser(r *http.Request) *models.User {
	u, _ := r.Context().Value(ctxCurrentUser).(*models.User)
	return u
}

// isAPITokenAuth returns true if the request was authenticated via an API token
// (not a session cookie or CLI session). Use this to gate sensitive operations
// like 2FA enrollment that should require an interactive session.
func isAPITokenAuth(r *http.Request) bool {
	v, _ := r.Context().Value(ctxIsAPIToken).(bool)
	return v
}

// isValidatedSessionBearerAuth returns true if the request was authenticated
// via a validated CLI session-bearer token (Authorization: Bearer
// padsess_...) — set by TokenAuth only on successful ValidateSession, never
// on the rejectInvalidBearer fallthrough. See ctxValidatedSessionBearer.
func isValidatedSessionBearerAuth(r *http.Request) bool {
	v, _ := r.Context().Value(ctxValidatedSessionBearer).(bool)
	return v
}

// isValidatedBearerAuth reports whether the request was authenticated via a
// Bearer credential TokenAuth actually validated — a long-lived API token
// (isAPITokenAuth) or a CLI session-bearer token
// (isValidatedSessionBearerAuth) — as opposed to merely carrying an
// Authorization: Bearer header that TokenAuth never checked, or checked and
// rejected (the rejectInvalidBearer fallthrough on public API paths). Both
// validated forms are unguessable secrets a CSRF attacker can't forge, so
// CSRFProtect treats them as exempt regardless of whether a session cookie
// is also present on the same request (TASK-1932, codex round 3).
func isValidatedBearerAuth(r *http.Request) bool {
	return isAPITokenAuth(r) || isValidatedSessionBearerAuth(r)
}

// isBearerAuth reports whether the request was authenticated via an
// Authorization: Bearer header rather than a browser session cookie.
// True for: PATs on /api/v1, PATs on /mcp, OAuth bearers on /mcp, AND
// CLI session-bearer tokens (padsess_* delivered via Authorization:
// Bearer, see TokenAuth's session-bearer branch at line 92-132).
// False for: cookie-borne SessionAuth (the web UI / SPA path).
//
// Mirrors the dual signal used by middleware_csrf.go (line 73-80) —
// either an Authorization: Bearer header on the live request OR a
// ctxIsAPIToken stash on context counts as "non-browser caller."
//
// Used by RequireWorkspaceAccess (BUG-1616) to suppress the
// platform-admin global bypass: admin identity carries owner-level
// authority over every workspace ONLY for the cookie-borne web UI
// surface. Bearer-borne callers (CLI, PAT, MCP) get the strict
// workspace_members check — a leaked admin token, or an MCP client
// that picked "all current workspaces" at consent time, must not
// silently widen access from "workspaces the admin joined" to
// "every workspace on the server."
func isBearerAuth(r *http.Request) bool {
	if auth := r.Header.Get("Authorization"); strings.HasPrefix(auth, "Bearer ") {
		return true
	}
	return isAPITokenAuth(r)
}

// currentUserID returns the authenticated user's ID, or empty string.
func currentUserID(r *http.Request) string {
	if u := currentUser(r); u != nil {
		return u.ID
	}
	return ""
}

// RequireWorkspaceAccess checks that the current user is a member of the
// workspace identified by the {slug} URL parameter. The user's workspace
// role is stored in the request context for downstream permission checks.
//
// When no users exist (fresh install), access is granted with an implicit
// "owner" role. Legacy API tokens (workspace-scoped, no user) are allowed
// if the token's workspace matches the requested workspace.
func (s *Server) RequireWorkspaceAccess(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		slugOrID := chi.URLParam(r, "slug")
		if slugOrID == "" {
			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
			return
		}

		// Resolve workspace: supports both UUID and slug.
		ws, err := s.resolveWorkspace(slugOrID, currentUser(r))
		if err != nil {
			writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal_error", "Failed to resolve workspace")
			return
		}
		if ws == nil {
			writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "not_found", "Workspace not found")
			return
		}

		// OAuth token allow-list gate (TASK-953). The consent UI
		// (TASK-952) lets the user pick which workspaces a token
		// can access; MCPBearerAuth stashes that list in context
		// via WithTokenAllowedWorkspaces. Reject any request hitting
		// a workspace outside the list, even if the user is a
		// member of it — the user explicitly chose not to grant the
		// app that access.
		//
		// nil → no token-level constraint (PAT auth, or pre-TASK-952
		// OAuth tokens that predate the consent UI). Wildcard `["*"]`
		// → grant access to any membership the user has. Else: the
		// resolved workspace's slug MUST appear in the list.
		//
		// Compares against the canonical slug (ws.Slug) because the
		// consent UI persists slugs and the URL slugOrID may be a
		// UUID which resolveWorkspace just translated. Slug-vs-slug
		// is the right comparison.
		if !tokenAllowedWorkspaceMatches(r.Context(), ws.Slug) {
			// TASK-961: count workspace-allow-list denials so the
			// MCP dashboard can flag tokens hitting workspaces outside
			// their consent scope. Gated on MCP-origin requests only
			// (presence of MCP token identity in context) so non-MCP
			// /api/v1 traffic — which can't even reach this gate
			// today, but might in a future PAT-with-allow-list world
			// — doesn't pollute the MCP-specific counter.
			s.recordMCPAuthzDenial(r, "workspace_not_in_allowlist")
			writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "permission_denied",
				"Token is not authorized for this workspace")
			return
		}

		// Store resolved workspace ID in context for downstream handlers
		ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), ctxResolvedWorkspaceID, ws.ID)

		// Fresh install: no users → everyone gets owner access
		count, _ := s.store.UserCount()
		if count == 0 {
			ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ctxWorkspaceRole, "owner")
			next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
			return
		}

		// Legacy API token: workspace-scoped token without user context
		if tokenWsID := tokenWorkspaceID(r); tokenWsID != "" && currentUser(r) == nil {
			if tokenWsID == ws.ID {
				ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ctxWorkspaceRole, "editor")
				next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
				return
			}
			writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "forbidden", "Token not authorized for this workspace")
			return
		}

		// Authenticated user: check workspace membership
		user := currentUser(r)
		if user == nil {
			writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthorized", "Authentication required")
			return
		}

		// Admin users get owner access to all workspaces — but ONLY for
		// browser cookie session auth (the web UI / SPA surface). For
		// every bearer-borne path (PATs on /api/v1, PATs and OAuth
		// bearers on /mcp, AND padsess_* session bearers from the CLI),
		// the platform-admin global bypass is suppressed and the admin
		// falls through to the membership-only check below.
		//
		// Rationale (BUG-1616): a token — including a CLI session
		// bearer — carries the user's identity, not the user's
		// platform-admin authority. The OAuth consent UI's "All
		// current workspaces" option, and the CLI's general affordance
		// of "log in once and address every workspace by slug," are
		// both meant to mean "every workspace the user is a member of"
		// — not "every workspace on the entire server, by virtue of
		// the user holding the platform admin role." A leaked admin
		// token, an MCP client that picked the wide consent scope, or
		// even a CLI session running on a compromised machine, would
		// otherwise reach data the admin never joined.
		//
		// The cookie-borne web UI keeps the bypass because the UI
		// shows the admin's chosen workspace explicitly and the
		// /console/admin surface is the documented spot to act
		// cross-workspace; the deliberate UI affordance + same-origin
		// cookie binding make that a different threat model from the
		// programmatic surfaces.
		//
		// isBearerAuth folds two signals (Authorization: Bearer header
		// OR ctxIsAPIToken stash) so MCP-dispatcher synthesized
		// requests and CLI session bearers are both covered — see
		// the helper's comment for the full table.
		isBearer := isBearerAuth(r)
		if user.Role == "admin" && !isBearer {
			ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ctxWorkspaceRole, "owner")
			next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
			return
		}

		member, err := s.store.GetWorkspaceMember(ws.ID, user.ID)
		if err != nil {
			writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal_error", "Failed to check workspace access")
			return
		}
		if member == nil {
			// Admin-via-bearer (BUG-1616): membership-only. Skip the
			// guest-grants fallback so a platform admin who happens to
			// hold a guest grant on some workspace still can't reach
			// it via a bearer-borne caller (CLI / PAT / MCP) —
			// strictly the workspaces they're actually a member of.
			// Falls through to the same not_a_member denial non-admin
			// non-members hit.
			if user.Role == "admin" && isBearer {
				s.recordMCPAuthzDenial(r, "not_a_member")
				writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "forbidden", "You are not a member of this workspace")
				return
			}
			// Not a member — check for guest access via grants
			hasGrants, grantErr := s.store.UserHasGrantsInWorkspace(ws.ID, user.ID)
			if grantErr != nil {
				slog.Error("failed to check guest grants", "workspace_id", ws.ID, "user_id", user.ID, "error", grantErr)
				writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal_error", "Failed to check workspace access")
				return
			}
			if !hasGrants {
				// TASK-961: not_a_member denial — counts only when the
				// request originated from the /mcp surface (otherwise
				// the regular /api/v1 403s would inflate the MCP-
				// specific counter).
				s.recordMCPAuthzDenial(r, "not_a_member")
				writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "forbidden", "You are not a member of this workspace")
				return
			}
			ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ctxWorkspaceRole, "guest")
			next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
			return
		}

		ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ctxWorkspaceRole, member.Role)
		next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
	})
}

// workspaceRole returns the user's role in the current workspace,
// as set by RequireWorkspaceAccess. Returns empty string if not set.
func workspaceRole(r *http.Request) string {
	v, _ := r.Context().Value(ctxWorkspaceRole).(string)
	return v
}

// RecordMCPTierMismatch bumps the pad_mcp_authz_denials_total counter
// with reason="tier_mismatch" (TASK-1119). Wired from
// internal/mcp/dispatch_http.go's OnScopeDenied callback — every
// dispatcher invocation is by construction MCP-origin (only the /mcp
// surface routes through HTTPHandlerDispatcher), so unlike
// recordMCPAuthzDenial below this helper does NOT need a context
// gate.
//
// Exported for cross-package wiring (cmd/pad attaches it as the
// dispatcher observer at startup). The (method, urlPath) arguments
// match the dispatcher's callback signature so callers can wire with
// a one-liner; we currently ignore them because the metric only
// labels by reason.
//
// No-op when metrics aren't wired (selfhost / tests).
func (s *Server) RecordMCPTierMismatch(method, urlPath string) {
	_ = method
	_ = urlPath
	if s.metrics == nil {
		return
	}
	s.metrics.MCPAuthzDenialsTotal.WithLabelValues("tier_mismatch").Inc()
}

// recordMCPAuthzDenial bumps the pad_mcp_authz_denials_total counter
// when the request originated from the MCP surface. The discriminator
// is the presence of an MCPTokenIdentity in the request context —
// MCPBearerAuth stashes that for every authenticated /mcp request, and
// no other entry point sets it.
//
// Called from middleware that runs DOWNSTREAM of MCPBearerAuth (the
// in-process MCP dispatcher routes through the API handler tree, so
// /api/v1/* middleware sees the same context). Called sites must pass
// a reason string from the documented vocabulary in
// internal/metrics/metrics.go's MCPAuthzDenialsTotal comment.
//
// No-op when metrics aren't wired (selfhost / tests) or when the
// request didn't come through MCP — keeps the metric MCP-specific
// without forcing every caller to repeat the gate.
func (s *Server) recordMCPAuthzDenial(r *http.Request, reason string) {
	if s.metrics == nil {
		return
	}
	if kind, _ := MCPTokenIdentityFromContext(r.Context()); kind == "" {
		return
	}
	s.metrics.MCPAuthzDenialsTotal.WithLabelValues(reason).Inc()
}

// requireRole checks if the user's workspace role meets the minimum
// required level. Role hierarchy: owner > editor > viewer.
func requireRole(r *http.Request, minRole string) bool {
	role := workspaceRole(r)
	if role == "" {
		return false
	}
	return roleLevel(role) >= roleLevel(minRole)
}

// requireMinRole checks role and writes a 403 if insufficient.
// Returns true if the request should continue, false if it was rejected.
func requireMinRole(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, minRole string) bool {
	if requireRole(r, minRole) {
		return true
	}
	writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "forbidden", "Insufficient permissions")
	return false
}

// roleLevel returns a numeric level for role comparison.
// Higher values indicate more permissions.
func roleLevel(role string) int {
	switch role {
	case "owner":
		return 3
	case "editor":
		return 2
	case "viewer":
		return 1
	case "guest":
		return 0 // Guests have grant-based access only, no role-based permissions
	default:
		return 0
	}
}

// permissionLevel returns a numeric level for grant permission comparison.
func permissionLevel(perm string) int {
	switch perm {
	case "owner":
		return 4
	case "admin":
		return 3
	case "editor":
		return 2
	case "edit":
		return 2
	case "viewer":
		return 1
	case "view":
		return 1
	default:
		return 0
	}
}

// sha256hex returns the SHA-256 hex digest of a string.
func sha256hex(s string) string {
	h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(s))
	return hex.EncodeToString(h[:])
}

// canonicalIP returns the semantic (canonical text) form of an IP
// address string. For IPv6 this collapses different valid spellings
// (compressed vs expanded, uppercase vs lowercase, leading zeroes) to
// a single representation so comparing two strings by == reflects
// actual IP equality. For IPv4 it accepts both 4-byte and IPv4-in-IPv6
// forms. For inputs that don't parse as an IP the original string is
// returned so behavior stays predictable on malformed/debug values.
func canonicalIP(s string) string {
	if s == "" {
		return s
	}
	if ip := net.ParseIP(s); ip != nil {
		return ip.String()
	}
	return s
}

// sessionIPChangeOutcome captures what the caller (TokenAuth / SessionAuth)
// should do after handleSessionIPChange inspected the session.
type sessionIPChangeOutcome int

const (
	// sessionIPChangeContinue — happy path. IP matches (or no recorded IP).
	// Caller proceeds to install the session user in context and call next.
	sessionIPChangeContinue sessionIPChangeOutcome = iota
	// sessionIPChangeAllowedLogged — IP differs, log-only mode. Session
	// remains valid, caller proceeds as usual.
	sessionIPChangeAllowedLogged
	// sessionIPChangeRevoked — strict mode. The session was destroyed and
	// the caller must NOT install the user in context. For browser (non-API)
	// paths the request should continue unauthenticated so the SPA can
	// render its login screen instead of a raw JSON error.
	sessionIPChangeRevoked
	// sessionIPChangeTerminated — strict mode + API path. A 401 has already
	// been written; caller must return immediately.
	sessionIPChangeTerminated
)

// handleSessionIPChange compares the client IP on this request to the IP
// recorded when the session was created.
//
// Behavior:
//   - Session has no recorded IP (legacy pre-migration row): continue.
//   - IP matches: continue.
//   - Log-only mode (default): atomically rotate the stored IP via
//     compare-and-set. The race winner emits exactly one
//     ActionSessionIPChanged audit row per transition — concurrent
//     requests that lose the CAS skip logging to avoid duplicate rows.
//   - Strict mode (PAD_IP_CHANGE_ENFORCE=strict): do NOT rotate the
//     stored IP. Instead use DeleteSessionIfExists as the CAS primitive
//     — the request that actually deletes the row (a) logs the audit
//     entry once, (b) returns 401 for API / revoked for browser paths.
//     Rotating the IP first would be unsafe: if the subsequent
//     DeleteSession failed (transient DB error) the session would remain
//     valid rebound to the new IP, defeating strict enforcement. By
//     deleting atomically, any failure leaves the session bound to the
//     original IP so a follow-up request from the new IP still mismatches
//     and is still rejected. If the delete errors outright, the request
//     is rejected with 500 so the client can't proceed.
//
// Log-only mode breaks fewer legitimate clients (mobile roaming, VPN
// toggles, carrier NAT) while still giving operators a visible signal.
func (s *Server) handleSessionIPChange(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, session *store.SessionInfo, plainToken string) sessionIPChangeOutcome {
	// Canonicalize both sides so equivalent IPv6 representations
	// (compressed vs expanded, case, leading zeros) don't register as a
	// spurious change. Raw trusted-proxy X-Forwarded-For values can
	// arrive in any valid form.
	storedIP := canonicalIP(session.IPAddress)
	newIP := canonicalIP(clientIP(r))
	if storedIP == "" || newIP == "" || storedIP == newIP {
		return sessionIPChangeContinue
	}

	userID := ""
	if session.User != nil {
		userID = session.User.ID
	}

	if s.ipChangeEnforceStrict {
		// Destroy the session atomically. Only the caller whose DELETE
		// affected a row logs and issues the "session_ip_changed" response
		// body. A failed delete means the session is still valid AND still
		// bound to the old IP (we skipped the rotation), so a follow-up
		// request from the new IP will hit this path again — safe.
		deleted, err := s.store.DeleteSessionIfExists(plainToken)
		if err != nil {
			// Fail closed: we can't prove the session is gone, so refuse
			// to let the request through. A retry will converge once the
			// DB recovers.
			slog.Error("failed to destroy session on IP-change in strict mode; failing closed",
				"session_ip", storedIP,
				"client_ip", newIP,
				"user_id", userID,
				"error", err)
			writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "internal_error",
				"Unable to validate session. Please try again.")
			return sessionIPChangeTerminated
		}
		if deleted {
			s.logAuditEventForUser(models.ActionSessionIPChanged, r, userID, auditMeta(map[string]string{
				"old_ip": storedIP,
				"new_ip": newIP,
			}))
			slog.Warn("session destroyed: IP changed (strict enforcement)",
				"session_ip", storedIP,
				"client_ip", newIP,
				"user_id", userID)
		}
		// Clear client-side cookies regardless — even if another request
		// already deleted the row, this client is still holding the now-
		// invalid token.
		clearSessionCookie(w, s.secureCookies)
		clearCSRFCookie(w)
		// Public API paths (login/register/password-reset, health, share
		// links, plan-limits) must STILL work after the session was
		// destroyed — a user with a stale cookie needs a way back in, and
		// Prometheus health probes shouldn't 401 because some other tab
		// left a stale session. Pass the request through unauthenticated.
		if isPublicAPIPath(r.URL.Path) {
			return sessionIPChangeRevoked
		}
		if strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/") {
			writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "session_ip_changed",
				"Session client IP changed — please log in again.")
			return sessionIPChangeTerminated
		}
		// Non-API (browser) path: caller must NOT install the destroyed
		// session's user into the request context. The SPA will render its
		// unauth state and the user will redirect to login.
		return sessionIPChangeRevoked
	}

	// Log-only mode: CAS-rotate the stored IP so only the winner logs.
	// The CAS compares against session.IPAddress (the raw value we read
	// from the DB) and writes the canonical newIP so future comparisons
	// are consistent. Err on the side of "winner" when the CAS errors
	// — we'd rather log an extra row than miss the signal entirely.
	// A failed rotate here is non-fatal: worst case the next request
	// also gets an audit row.
	won, err := s.store.UpdateSessionIPIfEquals(plainToken, session.IPAddress, newIP)
	if err != nil {
		slog.Warn("failed to rotate session ip after change", "error", err)
		won = true
	}
	if won {
		s.logAuditEventForUser(models.ActionSessionIPChanged, r, userID, auditMeta(map[string]string{
			"old_ip": storedIP,
			"new_ip": newIP,
		}))
		slog.Info("session client IP changed (logged, request allowed)",
			"session_ip", storedIP,
			"client_ip", newIP,
			"user_id", userID)
	}
	return sessionIPChangeAllowedLogged
}

// clearSessionCookie expires the session cookie on the client so a
// subsequent request doesn't keep presenting a now-revoked token.
// setSessionCookie (re)issues the session cookie with the given value and
// max-age (seconds). Used by the sliding-renewal path to push the cookie's
// lifetime forward in lockstep with the extended server-side expiry. The
// attributes mirror createAuthSession and clearSessionCookie so the cookie's
// identity (name/path/flags) stays stable across issue, renew, and clear.
func setSessionCookie(w http.ResponseWriter, value string, maxAge int, secure bool) {
	http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
		Name:     sessionCookieName(secure),
		Value:    value,
		Path:     "/",
		MaxAge:   maxAge,
		HttpOnly: true,
		Secure:   secure,
		SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
	})
}

func clearSessionCookie(w http.ResponseWriter, secure bool) {
	http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
		Name:     sessionCookieName(secure),
		Value:    "",
		Path:     "/",
		MaxAge:   -1,
		HttpOnly: true,
		Secure:   secure,
		SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
	})
}

// tokenAllowedWorkspaceMatches reports whether the OAuth token's
// workspace allow-list (set at consent time, TASK-952) permits the
// given workspace slug. The three return-shape cases match
// TokenAllowedWorkspacesFromContext:
//
//   - nil — no allow-list set (PAT auth, or pre-TASK-952 tokens) →
//     allow.
//   - ["*"] — wildcard consent → allow.
//   - [slug-a, slug-b, ...] — explicit allow-list → require slug ∈
//     list.
//
// Empty (non-nil) slice — the SetAllowedWorkspaces guard rejects
// nil → empty translation, and the consent flow rejects
// `allowed_workspaces` with no entries (handlers_oauth.go's
// parseConsentPayload). So an empty list shouldn't appear in
// practice; if it does, fail closed (no slug matches an empty list).
//
// Used by RequireWorkspaceAccess; package-private because the
// allow-list semantics are coupled to that middleware's flow.
func tokenAllowedWorkspaceMatches(ctx context.Context, slug string) bool {
	allowed := TokenAllowedWorkspacesFromContext(ctx)
	if allowed == nil {
		return true // no token-level gate
	}
	for _, entry := range allowed {
		if entry == "*" {
			return true
		}
		if entry == slug {
			return true
		}
	}
	return false
}

// tokenScopeAllows checks if the token's scopes permit the given HTTP method
// and path. Scopes are stored as a JSON array of strings.
//
// Supported scopes (PAT vocabulary):
//   - "*"       — full access
//   - "read"    — GET/HEAD/OPTIONS only
//   - "write"   — all methods
//
// Supported scopes (OAuth 2.1 / RFC 6749 vocabulary, sub-PR E TASK-1027):
//   - "pad:read"  — equivalent to PAT "read"
//   - "pad:write" — equivalent to PAT "write"
//   - "pad:admin" — equivalent to PAT "*"
//
// MCPBearerAuth's OAuth introspection branch translates fosite's
// space-separated scope string into the same JSON-array stash form
// PAT auth uses, so the same policy applies to both transports. This
// keeps MCP tool authorization centralized: a `pad:read` OAuth token
// can drive read tools; a `pad:write` OAuth token can drive any.
//
// Policy (deny-by-default whitelist):
//   - Empty scope string → allow (legacy DB rows where the column was never
//     populated). These tokens pre-date scope enforcement.
//   - Empty JSON array `[]` → allow (explicit "unrestricted" legacy form,
//     equivalent to no scopes recorded).
//   - Parseable array with at least one scope: allow iff a RECOGNIZED scope
//     grants this method. Unrecognized scopes never contribute to allow
//     and are logged once per request so operators can spot typos like
//     "read-only" that would previously have fallen open.
//   - Unparseable JSON → deny (data corruption or tampering). Previously
//     fell open; that was the security concern behind TASK-667.
//
// Switching to deny-by-default closes the hole where a future scope name
// like "read-only" would silently grant full access.
func tokenScopeAllows(scopesJSON, method, path string) bool {
	_ = path // reserved for future per-resource scopes

	// Empty string (legacy DB rows where the column was never populated)
	// → full access. Same fast path for the explicit wildcard.
	if scopesJSON == "" || strings.TrimSpace(scopesJSON) == `["*"]` {
		return true
	}

	var scopes []string
	if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(scopesJSON), &scopes); err != nil {
		slog.Warn("token has unparseable scopes; denying request",
			"method", method, "path", path, "error", err)
		return false
	}

	// Distinguish JSON null (scopes == nil after unmarshal) from an
	// explicit empty array (non-nil, len 0). null falls into the deny
	// path because it signals a client-side serializer bug, not a
	// documented legacy form. An explicit [] (including whitespace-
	// padded "[ ]" or "[\n]") is the documented legacy-unrestricted
	// form and keeps working.
	if scopes == nil {
		slog.Warn("token has null scopes; denying request",
			"method", method, "path", path, "scopes_json", scopesJSON)
		return false
	}
	if len(scopes) == 0 {
		// Explicit empty array → unrestricted (legacy pre-enforcement).
		return true
	}

	allowed := false
	var unknown []string
	for _, scope := range scopes {
		switch scope {
		case "*", "write", "pad:write", "pad:admin":
			allowed = true
		case "read", "pad:read":
			if method == http.MethodGet || method == http.MethodHead || method == http.MethodOptions {
				allowed = true
			}
		default:
			unknown = append(unknown, scope)
		}
	}

	if len(unknown) > 0 {
		slog.Warn("token has unrecognized scopes; treated as no-grant",
			"method", method, "path", path, "unknown_scopes", unknown)
	}
	return allowed
}