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ec70f13608
The "should this be here at all" angle, which my own record says I do not reliably ask of my own work. Six findings; one was a real inconsistency, the rest were claims that needed stating rather than code that needed removing. REMOVED: the presence observer's interface, adapter type and constructor, in favour of a plain callback. One method, one production consumer — and the same diff already uses bare callbacks for RedisHealth and the stream gauge, so this was inconsistent with itself. internal/watchevents keeps an interface because it reports five distinct conditions; one does not earn one. TRIMMED: .env.example's per-variable prose down to the upgrade-relevant facts plus a pointer at docs/deployment.md, which is canonical. The same policy was restated in seven artifacts and that is a drift surface. KEPT, with the reason written where a reader will ask: - The receive-loop-exit counter is expected to stay at zero, and that is what it is for — a should-never-fire alarm on a state undetectable from outside the process (an instance that publishes fine, answers health checks and receives nothing). BUG-2727 filed the silent return as the defect, and a log line nobody greps is not the same artifact as a counter somebody alerts on. - The prober's synchronous first probe duplicates cmd_server's dial-time ping. Deliberate: reusing that result would couple this type to its caller's startup sequence for one round trip that runs once per process. The consequence is now stated too — because the dial-time ping is FATAL, the prober's "unreachable at startup" branch cannot fire in the shipped binary. - The keyspace wiring guard parses source and will break on a rename. The alternative on offer needs three packages' constructors collapsed into one API. A guard that costs a one-line update after a deliberate rename beats an invariant with no enforcement, which is what the package comment alone amounts to. RAISED WITH THE LEAD, not decided here: events.EventBus.Publish's global limit parameter is now dead in production, since the handler passes 0 and the process-wide gate owns that bound. Removing it is the clean seam and it is an interface change in a shared package, which is a structural call. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JVDBKbgn3Xt7ndW1YoYd8X
173 lines
9.1 KiB
Bash
173 lines
9.1 KiB
Bash
# Pad — Docker Compose environment example
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#
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# Copy to .env, fill in values, then run `docker compose up -d`.
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#
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# If you don't already have a POSTGRES_PASSWORD, generate one with:
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# openssl rand -base64 32
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# …and paste it below. Docker Compose WILL refuse to start with the password
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# missing; this is deliberate so a fresh deploy can never inherit a known-weak
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# default credential.
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# REQUIRED — PostgreSQL password for the `pad` user.
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POSTGRES_PASSWORD=
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# REQUIRED on Postgres — AES-256 encryption key for TOTP seeds and other
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# sensitive fields. 64-character hex string (32 bytes). Pad will auto-
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# generate one on SQLite deployments but refuses to on Postgres because
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# multi-replica deployments would generate divergent keys and fail cross-
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# instance decryption. Generate with:
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# openssl rand -hex 32
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PAD_ENCRYPTION_KEY=
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# OPTIONAL — Which host interface the Pad web UI publishes to.
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# Default (loopback only) is the safest choice on a fresh install, because
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# the bootstrap endpoint is reachable until the first admin is created.
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# 127.0.0.1 → localhost only (default)
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# 0.0.0.0 → every interface (LAN + internet if no firewall)
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# 10.0.0.5 → bind to a specific LAN IP
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# PAD_BIND_ADDR=127.0.0.1
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# OPTIONAL — Container UID/GID for the pad process (Docker only).
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# Default: 1000/1000 with docker-compose; 99/100 with raw `docker run`
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# (Unraid `nobody:users` convention). Set these to match your host
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# volume's ownership to avoid permission errors on /data writes.
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# Must be POSITIVE integers — 0 (root) is rejected by the entrypoint.
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# See docker-entrypoint.sh.
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# PUID=1000
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# PGID=1000
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# OPTIONAL — Redis auth (docker-compose.prod.yml only).
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# If set, Redis starts with `--requirepass` and Pad connects with the password.
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# REDIS_PASSWORD=
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# OPTIONAL — Pad Cloud sidecar shared secret (cloud mode only).
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# Comma-separated list supports rotation for INBOUND calls: pad accepts
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# any listed secret when pad-cloud calls pad's admin endpoints.
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# PAD_CLOUD_SECRET=
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# OPTIONAL — Base URL pad uses to call pad-cloud back (reverse direction,
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# e.g. Stripe cancel-customer when a user deletes their account). Required
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# in cloud mode to cascade account deletion through to Stripe billing;
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# without it, pad deletes local rows but never cancels the subscription.
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# PAD_CLOUD_SIDECAR_URL=http://pad-cloud:7778
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# OPTIONAL — Exact outbound secret pad sends on reverse calls. Use this
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# during a cloud-secret rotation when pad-cloud is still validating against
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# the OLD value: pin the outbound here so the reverse call matches, then
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# roll pad-cloud, then unpin. When unset, pad falls back to the LAST entry
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# of PAD_CLOUD_SECRET (the older rotation value).
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# PAD_CLOUD_OUTBOUND_SECRET=
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# OPTIONAL — Encryption key for sensitive fields (32-byte hex string).
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# If unset, Pad stores 2FA seeds in plaintext — set this for production.
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# openssl rand -hex 32
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# PAD_ENCRYPTION_KEY=
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# OPTIONAL — Trusted reverse-proxy CIDRs. Only peers in these CIDRs may set
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# X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP. Leave unset for direct-exposed deploys.
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# PAD_TRUSTED_PROXIES=10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12
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# OPTIONAL — Bearer token required to scrape /metrics. When unset, /metrics
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# is reachable only from loopback (so a Prometheus on the same host keeps
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# working without config); when set, every scrape must send
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# "Authorization: Bearer $PAD_METRICS_TOKEN".
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# openssl rand -hex 32
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# PAD_METRICS_TOKEN=
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# OPTIONAL — Session IP-change policy.
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# Default (unset) logs an ActionSessionIPChanged audit entry when a session
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# presents a new client IP and updates the stored IP. "strict" additionally
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# destroys the session and forces re-login. Strict mode breaks legitimate
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# mobility (mobile roaming, VPN toggles, carrier NAT); enable only for
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# high-sensitivity deployments.
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# PAD_IP_CHANGE_ENFORCE=strict
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Core server — see docs/deployment.md for full reference.
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Listen address. 0.0.0.0 for containers, 127.0.0.1 for loopback-only.
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# PAD_HOST=0.0.0.0
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# Listen port.
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# PAD_PORT=7777
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# Public-facing base URL. Used to build invitation + password-reset links.
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# Required on deployments that bind to 0.0.0.0 — without it, emailed links
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# point at "http://0.0.0.0:7777" which recipients cannot reach (BUG-899).
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# PAD_URL=https://pad.example.com
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# Alternative to PAD_URL using the generic env-var convention. Read by the
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# server only (does not flip the CLI to remote mode, does not contaminate
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# the CLI's BaseURL, and is intentionally NOT persisted to config.toml on
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# `pad init` / `pad configure` saves), so it's safe to set on hosts that
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# already use PUBLIC_URL for other tooling. Pad-cloud sets it on its
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# sidecar and forwards it to the pad service in the same compose.
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# Precedence: PAD_URL > PUBLIC_URL > constructed http://host:port.
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# PUBLIC_URL=https://pad.example.com
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# Writable data directory — SQLite DB, config, logs. Default: ~/.pad
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# PAD_DATA_DIR=/data
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# Log level: debug | info | warn | error
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# PAD_LOG_LEVEL=info
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# Operating mode: local | remote | cloud. Controls how the CLI
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# discovers the daemon and which credential keying rules apply.
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# PAD_MODE=local
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Database — SQLite default; set PAD_DB_DRIVER=postgres for Postgres.
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# PAD_DB_DRIVER=postgres
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# PAD_DB_PATH=/data/pad.db # SQLite path, ignored on Postgres
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# PAD_DATABASE_URL=postgres://pad:secret@postgres:5432/pad?sslmode=disable
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Real-time events — cross-instance fan-out via Redis. Carries three things:
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# SSE activity events, watch/push notifications, and the session-presence
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# registry that `pad push` and the web UI's agent-session picker read.
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# Without this, all three stay in-process (fine for single-node).
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# Use a non-evicting maxmemory-policy — see docs/deployment.md.
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# PAD_REDIS_URL=redis://redis:6379
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# Scopes every Redis key and channel to THIS installation. Leave unset
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# unless two Pad installations share one Redis endpoint — unset keeps the
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# historical key names, so upgrading changes nothing. Lowercase letters,
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# digits, '-' and '_' only; a whitespace-only value is refused at startup
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# rather than treated as unset. Changing it on a running deployment is a
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# cutover, not a tweak — see docs/deployment.md.
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# PAD_REDIS_NAMESPACE=prod
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# Streaming connection caps, all PER INSTANCE (no shared counter — a
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# three-replica deployment admits 3x these). MAX_CONNECTIONS and
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# MAX_PER_USER cover BOTH SSE endpoints; MAX_PER_WORKSPACE covers
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# /api/v1/events only. UPGRADING: MAX_CONNECTIONS used to bound only
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# /api/v1/events, so a tuned value now bounds more than it did.
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# Full detail, including the refusal contract: docs/deployment.md.
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# PAD_SSE_MAX_CONNECTIONS=1000
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# PAD_SSE_MAX_PER_WORKSPACE=100
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# PAD_SSE_MAX_PER_USER=50
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Security hardening for production behind TLS.
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Set Secure flag on session cookies — requires TLS.
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# PAD_SECURE_COOKIES=true
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# Comma-separated list of allowed CORS origins. Leave unset to disable CORS.
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# PAD_CORS_ORIGINS=https://pad.example.com,https://app.example.com
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Transactional email via Maileroo. Optional — without it, workspace
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# invites fall back to CLI-copyable join codes.
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# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# PAD_MAILEROO_API_KEY=your-sending-key
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# PAD_EMAIL_FROM=noreply@example.com
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# PAD_EMAIL_FROM_NAME=Pad
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