name: Release

on:
  push:
    tags:
      - "v*"

# Serialize all release runs. If two v* tags land close together (e.g.
# rc.3 then rc.4 within a minute), queue rather than race — they share
# mutable outputs (the GHCR `:latest` tag, the homebrew cask in the
# separate tap repo, the GitHub Releases page) and parallel runs would
# interleave nondeterministically. Group is intentionally NOT keyed by
# `github.ref`: we want different tag names to serialize too, not just
# repeat pushes of the same tag. cancel-in-progress=false so a queued
# tag never aborts a release mid-publish (which could leave GHCR and the
# brew tap in inconsistent states).
concurrency:
  group: release
  cancel-in-progress: false

permissions:
  contents: write
  packages: write
  # id-token: write is required for keyless cosign signing (GitHub OIDC
  # exchanges this workflow's identity token for a short-lived Fulcio
  # certificate) and for actions/attest-build-provenance to mint SLSA
  # v1 provenance statements.
  id-token: write
  # attestations: write is required by actions/attest-build-provenance so
  # the resulting provenance bundles can be stored against the repo.
  attestations: write

# All third-party Actions are pinned to a 40-char commit SHA with a trailing
# '# vX.Y.Z' comment so a compromised maintainer or moved tag cannot silently
# execute attacker code in the release pipeline (this workflow has
# contents:write + packages:write + the GHCR token, so a malicious action
# here could publish tampered binaries). Bump the SHA + comment together.

jobs:
  release:
    name: Build & Release
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4.3.1
        with:
          fetch-depth: 0

      - uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff # v5.6.0
        with:
          go-version: "1.26"

      - uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4.4.0
        with:
          node-version: "22"
          cache: "npm"
          cache-dependency-path: web/package-lock.json

      - name: Create web build placeholder for tests
        run: mkdir -p web/build && echo "placeholder" > web/build/.gitkeep

      - name: Run tests
        run: go test ./...

      - name: Set up Docker Buildx
        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@8d2750c68a42422c14e847fe6c8ac0403b4cbd6f # v3.12.0

      - name: Login to GitHub Container Registry
        uses: docker/login-action@c94ce9fb468520275223c153574b00df6fe4bcc9 # v3.7.0
        with:
          registry: ghcr.io
          username: ${{ github.actor }}
          password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}

      # cosign + syft need to be on PATH before goreleaser runs — goreleaser
      # shells out to both for the signs/docker_signs/sboms sections.
      - name: Install cosign
        uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@7e8b541eb2e61bf99390e1afd4be13a184e9ebc5 # v3.10.1

      - name: Install syft (for SBOM generation)
        uses: anchore/sbom-action/download-syft@f325610c9f50a54015d37c8d16cb3b0e2c8f4de0 # v0.18.0

      # Build the SvelteKit web UI before GoReleaser so the static assets
      # get embedded into the Go binary. Done as a dedicated step (instead
      # of a goreleaser `before:` hook) so the npm install/build does NOT
      # inherit the MACOS_* signing secrets — those are scoped only to the
      # `Run GoReleaser` step's env block below. This isolates the 5-year
      # Developer ID cert from any npm supply-chain compromise during
      # dependency install.
      - name: Build web UI
        run: cd web && npm ci && npm run build

      - name: Run GoReleaser
        id: goreleaser
        # GoReleaser binary is pinned to an exact version (not "~> v2") to
        # match the SHA-pinning policy applied to the Actions themselves —
        # see the comment at the top of this file. With Apple signing
        # credentials now flowing through this step, a compromised or
        # regressed GoReleaser release would carry meaningful blast radius;
        # pinning forces an explicit, reviewed bump.
        uses: goreleaser/goreleaser-action@e435ccd777264be153ace6237001ef4d979d3a7a # v6.4.0
        with:
          version: "v2.15.4"
          # --timeout=2h overrides GoReleaser's 1h default. With Apple
          # notarization (`wait: true`, up to 20m per the .goreleaser.yaml
          # notarize block) layered on top of build + cosign blob-sign +
          # SBOM + multi-arch docker manifest, slow notary days could push
          # close to the default ceiling. 2h gives comfortable headroom
          # without burning excessive Action minutes when notarization
          # actually fails fast (the worker exits as soon as Apple replies).
          args: release --clean --timeout=2h
        env:
          GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
          # Cross-repo PAT for pushing the brew formula to PerpetualSoftware/homebrew-tap.
          # The default GITHUB_TOKEN above only has access to PerpetualSoftware/pad.
          # Add this secret in repo settings before tagging a release that ships
          # a brew formula — without it goreleaser fails at the brew publish step.
          HOMEBREW_TAP_GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.HOMEBREW_TAP_GITHUB_TOKEN }}
          # macOS code-signing + Apple notarization (per IDEA-830). The
          # `notarize:` block in .goreleaser.yaml is gated on MACOS_CERT_P12
          # being set, so PR builds + snapshot mode skip cleanly when these
          # are absent. The .p12 cert and .p8 notary key are stored
          # base64-encoded; GoReleaser's Quill backend decodes them in-process,
          # so no external signing tool needs to be installed on the runner.
          MACOS_CERT_P12: ${{ secrets.MACOS_CERT_P12 }}
          MACOS_CERT_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.MACOS_CERT_PASSWORD }}
          MACOS_NOTARY_KEY_P8: ${{ secrets.MACOS_NOTARY_KEY_P8 }}
          MACOS_NOTARY_KEY_ID: ${{ secrets.MACOS_NOTARY_KEY_ID }}
          MACOS_NOTARY_ISSUER_ID: ${{ secrets.MACOS_NOTARY_ISSUER_ID }}

      # SLSA build provenance for every archive GoReleaser produced.
      # Writes a Sigstore-backed attestation to the repo so downstream
      # consumers can verify this binary was actually built by this
      # workflow from this commit, e.g.:
      #   gh attestation verify pad_v1.0.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz \
      #     --repo PerpetualSoftware/pad
      - name: Generate build provenance for archives
        uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@a2bbfa25375fe432b6a289bc6b6cd05ecd0c4c32 # v4.1.0
        with:
          subject-path: "dist/pad_*_*_*.tar.gz,dist/pad_*_*_*.zip"