Add configurable global and per-workspace SSE connection limits to
prevent memory exhaustion from unbounded connections. Returns HTTP 429
when limits are reached. Logs warnings at 80% capacity.
Configurable via PAD_SSE_MAX_CONNECTIONS (default 1000) and
PAD_SSE_MAX_PER_WORKSPACE (default 100), or config.toml.
Adds WorkspaceSubscriberCount to EventBus interface for per-workspace
tracking (MemoryBus iterates subscribers, RedisBus uses existing
wsCounts map).
Resolves TASK-165
* feat: enforce RBAC role checks on all mutation endpoints (TASK-150)
Add requireMinRole helper and role enforcement to 30+ mutation handlers.
Viewers are now blocked from all state-changing operations, editors can
mutate items/docs/comments/views but not collections/webhooks/workspace
settings, and only owners can perform administrative operations.
Includes 11 integration tests with real auth covering viewer/editor/owner
access across items, collections, documents, comments, agent roles,
item links, and workspace operations.
* fix: scope search results to user's workspaces (TASK-151)
Search without a ?workspace= param previously returned results from all
workspaces in the database. Now the handler resolves the authenticated
user's workspace memberships and passes their IDs to the store query,
ensuring results only include items from workspaces the user belongs to.
Fresh installs (no users) retain unscoped search for backward compat.
Includes integration test proving cross-workspace isolation.
* fix: add webhook URL validation and SSRF protection (TASK-152)
Webhook creation now validates URLs before accepting them: only HTTP(S)
schemes allowed, embedded credentials rejected, private/reserved IPs
blocked (loopback, RFC1918, link-local, cloud metadata 169.254.169.254),
and hostnames are DNS-resolved to verify they don't point to private IPs.
Defense-in-depth check also added to the dispatcher's deliver function
so existing webhooks with unsafe URLs are blocked at delivery time.
* feat: add CSRF protection with double-submit cookie pattern (TASK-153)
Implements CSRF middleware that validates X-CSRF-Token header matches
the pad_csrf cookie on all state-changing API requests. Bearer token
auth, auth endpoints, and fresh installs are exempt. The frontend
client reads the CSRF cookie and attaches the header on mutations.
* feat: add per-endpoint rate limiting middleware (TASK-154)
Adds IP-based rate limiting for auth endpoints (5/min login, 3/hr
password reset, 5/hr registration) and user-based limits for API
(100/min) and search (30/min). Uses golang.org/x/time/rate with
automatic stale-entry cleanup. Adds chi RealIP middleware for
correct client IP behind proxies. Returns 429 with Retry-After.
* fix: sanitize error responses and remove PII from logs (TASK-155)
Replace all writeError(500, err.Error()) calls with writeInternalError
that logs the real error server-side and returns a generic message to
clients. Remove email addresses, user IDs, and password reset tokens
from log output to prevent PII leakage.
* feat: add security headers, configurable CORS, and secure cookies (TASK-160)
Add SecurityHeaders middleware (CSP, X-Frame-Options, nosniff,
Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy). Make CORS origins configurable
via PAD_CORS_ORIGINS env var. Add PAD_SECURE_COOKIES for TLS
deployments (sets Secure flag on session/CSRF cookies and enables
HSTS). Also adds X-CSRF-Token to CORS allowed headers.
* fix: address PR review — lazy router init and trusted IP for rate limits
Fix two issues flagged by Codex:
1. CORS/HSTS config was ignored because setupRouter() ran in New()
before SetCORSOrigins/SetSecureCookies were called. Now uses
sync.Once to lazily build the router on first ServeHTTP/Listen.
2. Rate limiter read X-Real-IP directly from untrusted headers,
allowing clients to spoof IPs. Now uses RemoteAddr only (which
chimiddleware.RealIP already sanitizes from trusted proxy headers).
* feat: add user management database migration and models
Add migration 012_users.sql with users, sessions, and workspace_members
tables. Add user_id columns to api_tokens, items, comments, activities,
item_links, and item_versions for proper user attribution. Create Go
model structs (User, Session, WorkspaceMember) in models/user.go.
* feat: add store layer for users, sessions, and workspace members
Implement CRUD operations for user management:
- users.go: create, get, update, list, validate password (bcrypt)
- sessions.go: create, validate, delete, cleanup expired (SHA-256 hashed tokens)
- workspace_members.go: add/remove members, role management, access checks
Adds golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt dependency. Includes 16 new tests
covering all store methods, password validation, session lifecycle,
and workspace membership operations.
* feat: rewrite auth system from single-password to user-based
Replace single-password auth with email/password user authentication:
- New endpoints: POST /auth/register, GET /auth/me
- Rewritten: POST /auth/login (email+password), GET /auth/session
(needs_setup detection), POST /auth/logout (DB session destroy)
- Delete in-memory SessionManager, use DB-backed sessions via store
- New middleware: SessionAuth (cookie→user), RequireAuth (with
fresh-install passthrough when no users exist)
- Remove Password field from config, PAD_PASSWORD env var, SetPassword()
All 23 existing server tests pass (fresh DBs have no users → passthrough).
* feat: add workspace access control middleware
Add RequireWorkspaceAccess middleware that checks workspace_members for
authenticated users, with fallback for legacy API tokens and fresh
installs (no users → implicit owner). Includes role hierarchy helpers
(workspaceRole, requireRole) for downstream permission checks.
Wire middleware into the /{slug} workspace route group.
* feat: add CLI auth commands and credential storage
Add pad login, pad logout, pad whoami commands with credential
storage in ~/.pad/credentials.json (0600 permissions). Update CLI
HTTP client to auto-attach auth tokens and X-Pad-Agent header on
all requests. Add auth API methods (Login, Register, Logout,
CheckSession, GetCurrentUser). Extend .pad.toml with optional
agent_name field. Add golang.org/x/term for masked password input.
* feat: derive actor/source from auth context in all handlers
Replace hardcoded "user"/"web" actor/source strings with auth-aware
helpers. actorFromRequest() derives actor ("user"/"agent" via
X-Pad-Agent header) and source ("web"/"cli" from auth method).
agentMeta() merges agent name into activity metadata. Update all
item, document, comment, and move handlers to use request-based
logActivity/logActivityWithMeta. Remove hardcoded CreatedBy/Source
from all CLI commands — server now determines these from auth context.
* feat: frontend auth — login, registration, auth guard, user menu
Rewrite login page with email/password fields, add registration page
for first-time setup, update auth guard to handle needs_setup redirect.
Add user menu to sidebar with logout. Update API client with new auth
methods (register, login with email, session with needs_setup flag).
* feat: migrate API tokens from workspace-scoped to user-owned
API tokens now have a user_id owner and optional workspace_id scope.
CreateAPIToken takes userID as first parameter. ValidateToken resolves
the token's user into the request context. TokenAuth middleware now
sets ctxCurrentUser when a user-owned API token is used. Add user-
scoped endpoints: GET/POST/DELETE /auth/tokens. Keep workspace-scoped
token endpoints for backwards compatibility.
* feat: workspace membership, invitations, and role enforcement
Add workspace_invitations table (migration 013) with join codes.
Implement invitation store methods (create, get by code, accept,
list). Add member management handlers: list members + invitations,
invite (auto-adds existing users or creates invitation), remove
member, change role, accept invitation by code. Add API routes
under /workspaces/{slug}/members/* and /invitations/{code}/accept.
Add CLI commands: pad members, pad invite, pad join.
* feat: auth tests and documentation updates
Add comprehensive auth endpoint tests: registration flow (first user
becomes admin), login/logout, validation errors, duplicate email,
auth enforcement (401 after users exist, exempt paths), /me endpoint.
Update CLAUDE.md and README.md to document user-based auth system,
replacing old PAD_PASSWORD references with pad login/members/invite
workflow and role-based access control.
* feat: add members management UI to workspace settings page
Add Members section to settings with: member list (avatar, name,
email, role), role change dropdown (owner only), remove button
(owner only), pending invitations display with join codes, and
invite form with email + role picker. Add members API methods to
the TypeScript client (list, invite, remove, updateRole).
* fix: backfill workspace owners for pre-migration workspaces
Add backfillWorkspaceOwners() that runs on server start. For any
workspace with no members, adds the first admin user as owner.
This handles the migration case where workspaces existed before the
user system — without it, the members list shows empty.
* feat: shareable invite links with /join/[code] page
Replace raw join codes with full shareable URLs. Server generates
join_url using its configured base URL (e.g. https://pad.example.com/
join/a3f8b2c1). New /join/[code] page handles the full flow: checks
auth → shows login/register if needed → accepts invitation → redirects
to workspace. Settings page shows "Copy invite link" button that copies
URL to clipboard. CLI outputs shareable link instead of raw code.
* fix: auto-add workspace creator as owner, integrate auth into pad init
handleCreateWorkspace now adds the authenticated user as owner of the
new workspace immediately — no more relying on the startup backfill.
pad init now checks auth status before making API calls. If no users
exist, prompts to register. If not logged in, prompts to login. After
auth, proceeds with workspace creation normally.
* fix: add join_url to invite response type in API client
* fix: address codex review — invite registration, logout token revocation, workspace scoping
- Allow registration with valid invitation_code (fixes invite flow for new users)
- Revoke Bearer session tokens on logout, not just cookies
- Filter workspace listing to user's memberships (admins see all)
When PAD_PASSWORD is set (env var) or password is configured in
~/.pad/config.toml, the server requires authentication:
Backend:
- SessionManager with HMAC-SHA256 signed cookies (7-day TTL)
- POST /api/v1/auth/login — validates password, sets session cookie
- GET /api/v1/auth/session — returns auth status (exempt from auth)
- POST /api/v1/auth/logout — destroys session, clears cookie
- PasswordAuth middleware gates all API/page requests
- API tokens still work independently (no change to CLI flow)
- Constant-time password comparison + 500ms delay on failure
Frontend:
- Login page at /login with password form and error handling
- Root layout checks auth status before loading app shell
- Global 401 handler in API client redirects to /login
- Login page renders without sidebar/app shell
When no password is configured, everything works exactly as before
(zero-friction localhost). This is a security requirement for any
deployment that exposes the server beyond localhost.
Pad — project management for developers and AI agents.
Single Go binary with embedded SvelteKit web UI, SQLite storage,
CLI, and Claude Code /pad skill integration.
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