From d2ceab6120aa7ad8d93a09a58ea00edc384d562e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: xarmian Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 21:50:16 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] fix(web): fence every async commit point on the library page on the signed-in identity (BUG-3084) (#1378) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Surface 3 of 7. Three async handlers and FOUR DEFERRED TIMERS — a population of 7, not the 3 a function-level count sees. The originally filed survey reported 3; the widened instrument's number is confirmed again here on the current tree rather than carried from the survey. What this fixes ---------------------------------------------------------------------- `activateConvention` and `activatePlaybook` COMPOSE A WRITE from state chosen under the previous identity: the entry the user clicked came from a list `loadData` fetched then. A click after an identity change is the current epoch, so every entry capture passes and the previous session's choice is activated into whatever workspace is on screen now. Both now take `pageIdentityHeld()` at entry, the same question the roles board's drag handlers needed. The four timers are the distinctive class. Each fires three seconds after its handler returned and clears `toast` — by which time the page may belong to someone else and be showing THEIR toast. Clearing it then is a commit by a session that has ended. Driven with fake timers rather than reasoned about. `loadData` had no identity bookkeeping at all, and its `$effect` is keyed on `wsSlug` alone, so nothing re-ran it when the identity moved. It now has an entry capture, per-arm fences, a generation guard, and an `onIdentityChange` subscription that resets transient state before re-loading. The rules carried from surfaces 1 and 2, not re-derived ---------------------------------------------------------------------- - The epoch is re-stamped AFTER the awaited state is assigned, never before the await, and on BOTH arms. Too early and the guard vouches for data it has not replaced; missing on a path and a transient error pins the fence shut for ever. Bounded on both sides in the guard. - A continuation that has LOST the identity writes no shared interaction state — `resetTransientState()` owns that reset, and a stale continuation writing it again can only clobber what the NEW user is doing. `activatingTitle` gates both handlers at their first line, so this is not cosmetic: a stale release permits a second concurrent activation. - `loadGen` gates the state assignments, not merely `loading`. Different question from the identity fence and neither implies the other — both loads can belong to the same user, which is what a workspace switch produces here. - The transient-state reset is ENUMERATED against the file's own `$state` declarations, with every non-member named and justified, so a new piece of interaction state fails the guard rather than waiting for a reviewer (CONVE-35). Evidence ---------------------------------------------------------------------- - Mutation matrix 8/8 detected, positive control green. Four of the eight are caught by a BEHAVIOURAL leg independently of the source guard, so the semantics are measured and not merely the syntax. - One mutant (L6, a stale `finally` releasing the activate gate) survived its first instrument. The instrument was fixed rather than the mutant dropped — the continuation rule cannot govern a `finally`, because the success-path check always sits in its window, so the two arms are named explicitly instead of pretending a regex expresses "which check governs which statement". - `npx vitest run` from `web/`: 226 files / 3104 tests, 0 failures. - `npx svelte-check --threshold error`: 0 errors. Codex round 1 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- No P1. Three P2, all taken. - **Double loads on every identity change.** `loadData` reads `authStore.identityEpoch` synchronously via `captureIdentity()` before its first await, so the `$effect` took a dependency on the epoch and re-ran on an identity change — on top of the listener that already re-loads for that event. Eight requests where four were wanted, with `loadGen` quietly discarding half: correct on screen, a mystery in a network log. Untracked, naming the workspace as the real key, the way settings (#1370) suppresses the same class. **This is a class, and the merged collection page has it too** (#1374's listener plus a `$effect` calling `loadCollection`, which reads the epoch the same way). Out of scope here — merged code, a different surface — and reported to the lead as its own unit rather than widened into this PR. - **A fenced timer that clears nothing passed every test.** The stale-timer leg proves the toast SURVIVES a timer armed by the previous session; it says nothing about the timer doing its job when the identity is unchanged, and the source guard only looked for `identityHeld(` in the callback. Fixing a stale-write by making the write never happen is the failure this family already shipped once, as a fence that latched shut (#1372). Added: a control leg that advances the clock under an unchanged identity and requires the toast to clear, and a guard assertion that every timer still assigns `toast = null`. - **`activatePlaybook` had no driven coverage** — every behavioural leg clicked the convention button, so the near-identical playbook handler was vouched for only by source text. It now has its own control and its own click-after-the-change leg. Mutation matrix: 11/11 detected at this round, both positive controls green. Codex round 2 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- No P1. Two P2, both the same rule as round 1's and both taken — the instrument could not tell a commit correctly REFUSED from a commit that never existed. - **The load path had no driven leg at all.** The source guard permits the fence to sit after the assignments, and nothing held a load open across an identity change to notice. The implementation ordering was right; the instrument could not say so. Added a leg that holds the reload open, moves the identity, then resolves it with different content and requires that content not to be painted. - **Two of the four timers live in CATCH arms, and nothing executed them.** A dead branch carrying both `identityHeld()` and `toast = null` satisfied the source guard and the whole suite — source text vouching for a path nothing runs. This round drove the CONVENTION failure arm and the playbook success arm, plus a stale-timer leg on the convention failure path. It did NOT reach the playbook failure arm; round 3 found that, and the wording here has been corrected rather than left reading as though the catch-arm class had been closed. Per the lead's ruling, the rule those three rounds keep re-teaching is now in the shared instrument's header (`identityFenceSource.ts`), so surfaces 4-7 meet it before writing their first assertion: every rule in that core asks a REFUSAL question, none can distinguish refusal from absence, and a surface therefore owes one case that keeps USING the page after an identity change, one unchanged-identity case per fenced commit proving it still happens, and a driven leg per handler rather than per handler SHAPE. Mutation matrix: 14/14 detected at this round, three positive controls green. Codex round 3 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- No P1, and no correctness defect in the page code at all — both findings are coverage, both on the playbook path, and one of them is that round 2's own write-up overclaimed. - `activatePlaybook`'s LATE-RESPONSE fence had no driven leg. Round 2 gave that handler a control and a click-after-the-change leg, which between them prove the request starts and that a preflight refusal works, and say nothing about the fence after the await. Removing that fence left the entire suite passing. - The playbook FAILURE timer — the fourth of four — still had no driven leg. Round 2 named "two of the four timers live in catch arms" as the problem and then drove one of them. The prose above is corrected in place; a write-up that describes a class and fixes half of it is how a reviewer stops being able to trust the next one. Both now have driven legs, and both mutants (dropping the post-await fence; unfencing the playbook failure timer) are detected. Round 3 also confirmed the load-window leg discriminates: it starts from a rendered baseline, holds a second load, supplies unique content, and moves the epoch before resolving, so without the fence that content would be painted. Mutation matrix: 17/17 detected, four positive controls green. Full suite: 226 files / 3114 tests, 0 failures; svelte-check 0 errors. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PDYjP67KTAcqpFpo3ijAAA --- .../[workspace]/library/+page.svelte | 192 ++++++- .../libraryIdentityFence.svelte.test.ts | 517 ++++++++++++++++++ .../library/libraryIdentityFence.test.ts | 406 ++++++++++++++ web/src/test/identityFenceSource.ts | 35 ++ 4 files changed, 1142 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) create mode 100644 web/src/routes/[username]/[workspace]/library/libraryIdentityFence.svelte.test.ts create mode 100644 web/src/routes/[username]/[workspace]/library/libraryIdentityFence.test.ts diff --git a/web/src/routes/[username]/[workspace]/library/+page.svelte b/web/src/routes/[username]/[workspace]/library/+page.svelte index 5793d59a6..7204ba84e 100644 --- a/web/src/routes/[username]/[workspace]/library/+page.svelte +++ b/web/src/routes/[username]/[workspace]/library/+page.svelte @@ -1,11 +1,58 @@