updated docs with dns-exfiltration-safe defaults and security note

This commit is contained in:
G
2025-10-25 02:21:42 +03:00
parent 8555a06ddc
commit 686ab951d1
5 changed files with 16 additions and 13 deletions
+2 -2
View File
@@ -32,14 +32,14 @@ Body example:
}
```
Body example with egress whitelist:
Body example with egress whitelist (safe pattern: proxy IP only):
```json
{
"name": "my-restricted-sandbox",
"image": "alpine:latest",
"namespace": "default",
"egress_whitelist": ["1.1.1.1/32", "8.8.8.8/32"],
"egress_whitelist": ["10.0.0.5/32"],
"limits": {"cpu": "500m", "memory": "512Mi"}
}
```
+6 -2
View File
@@ -105,12 +105,12 @@ Partial isolation (no inter-VM communication, but external internet allowed):
{ "name": "partial-isolation", "image": "alpine:latest" }
```
Whitelist specific external services:
Whitelist specific external services (avoid public DNS resolvers):
```json
{
"name": "egress-restricted",
"image": "alpine:latest",
"egress_whitelist": ["1.1.1.1/32", "8.8.8.8/32"]
"egress_whitelist": ["10.0.0.5/32"]
}
```
@@ -121,6 +121,10 @@ Whitelist specific external services:
- **Administrative access**: `kubectl exec`, `k7 shell`, and API operations bypass network policies
</Info>
<Warning>
Do not whitelist public DNS resolver IPs (e.g., 1.1.1.1, 8.8.8.8). Because K7's `egress_whitelist` is CIDR-only (no L7/port rules), allowing those IPs enables outbound DNS (UDP/TCP 53) and DNS-over-HTTPS (443), which can be used for exfiltration. If you want an egress deny with whitelisting, prefer whitelisting only your own egress proxy/gateway IP and enforce DNS/DoH policy at that proxy. Later, whenever we integrate Cilium (a roadmap feature), it will be much simpler as you'll be able to whitelist domain names directly.
</Warning>
### Mitigations when DNS is blocked
- Use IP/CIDR whitelisting only (no domains post-lockdown)