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haproxy-openmanager/backend/models/backend.py
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taylanbakircioglu 02b1cb2bca feat: v1.5.0 — Site Wizard (Issue #14) + ACME Diagnostic Panel (Issue #13)
Closes #13, Closes #14.

This release squashes the v1.4.0 → v1.5.0 development line. v1.4.0
shipped the ACME stability & enterprise audit (Issues #10/#11/#12).
v1.5.0 builds on that foundation with two co-equal headline features
plus a 22-round audit campaign hardening the prior configuration
surface. License remains MIT for v1.5.0 (relicense to AGPL-3.0
lands in v1.5.2).

------------------------------------------------------------------
HEADLINE FEATURE A — ACME Diagnostic Panel (Issue #13)
------------------------------------------------------------------
A live pre-flight + post-failure diagnostic surface for every ACME
order, reachable from the ACME Automation page. The panel exists
to make ACME failures legible to operators who do NOT have shell
access to the API host.

Endpoints (`backend/routers/acme_diagnostics.py`):
  POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics
       Run the full 5-check suite (DNS / port-80 / routing /
       account / agents) and humanize the order's `error_detail`
       (>=11 RFC-8555 problem types, backwards compatible with
       legacy plain-string failures).
  POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics/
                                {check_id}/rerun
       Re-run a single check in place — used by the "Re-run"
       button on every row of the modal's pre-flight table.
  GET  /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/events
       Merged event timeline combining the typed
       `acme_order_events` rows with correlated
       `user_activity_logs` entries (resource_type =
       'letsencrypt_order' AND resource_id = order_id). The
       diagnostic modal auto-tails this timeline every 5 seconds
       while open.

Service-level checks (`backend/services/acme_diagnostics.py`):
  * DNS resolution via stdlib socket.gethostbyname_ex through
    run_in_executor (intentionally avoiding an aiodns runtime
    dep for v1.5.0).
  * Port-80 HEAD probe, target locked to the order's domains,
    success on HTTP 200 OR 404, warns on egress timeout
    (corp egress policies routinely blackhole outbound 80 —
    fail-hard would be too noisy).
  * SSRF guard: probe refuses non-public IPs and surfaces the
    skip in the diagnostic result; IPv4-mapped IPv6 normalisation
    closes the `::ffff:169.254.169.254` cloud-metadata vector.
  * HAProxy routing presence check: matches the order's
    cluster_ids to a port-80 HTTP frontend.
  * ACME account validity check against `letsencrypt_accounts`.
  * Agent presence check (>=1 active agent in target cluster).
  * Every sub-check wrapped in a wall-clock timeout to bound
    impact on the API event loop.

RBAC: ssl.read for run, ssl.read for events. Per-user 5/min rate
limit on both run and rerun, backed by the (user_id, action,
created_at DESC) composite index.

Frontend (`frontend/src/components/ACMEAutomation.js`):
  * "Diagnose" button on every order row + the existing
    "stuck order" warning row.
  * Modal with two tabs:
    - Pre-flight Checks (Antd Table with status pills + Re-run
      buttons + humanized error banner)
    - Event Log (Antd Timeline with auto-tail polling, scroll-
      to-bottom, pause-on-hover)
  * Correlation IDs surfaced in error banners and individual
    check fail details for backend-log lookup.

------------------------------------------------------------------
HEADLINE FEATURE B — Site Setup Wizard (Issue #14)
------------------------------------------------------------------
A single guided flow that creates a Backend + Servers + HTTP
Frontend (and optional HTTPS Frontend) in one atomic transaction.

Endpoints (`backend/routers/site_wizard.py`):
  POST /api/site-wizard/preview     — diff-preview the changeset
  POST /api/site-wizard/create      — atomic execute
  POST /api/site-wizard/reject      — clean rollback (including
                                       any wizard_staged ACME
                                       orders)
  GET  /api/site-wizard/drafts      — draft persistence
  PUT  /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id} — save/update
  DELETE /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id}

Feature surface:
  * One screen captures both backend (mode + servers) AND
    frontend (http + optional https + SSL mode) inputs.
  * SSL modes: ACME (new order, HTTP-01 only for v1.5.0),
    Upload (existing PEM), Existing (link to a stored cert),
    or None.
  * ACME-staged path: wizard_staged_until watermark on the
    `letsencrypt_orders` row defers finalisation until agent
    confirmation; per-mode reject cleanly cancels and rolls
    back the staged order.
  * Live diff preview against the cluster's current generated
    config (renderer-evolution noise stripped — track-sc<N>
    dedup, per-server cookie strip, defaults-cookie
    inheritance, listen-block flattening).
  * Draft persistence with PEM stripped at save time (private
    keys never round-trip through the drafts table).
  * Per-cluster multi-tenancy: drafts and wizard_staged orders
    are isolated to the creating user's cluster scope.

Frontend (`frontend/src/components/SiteWizard.js`):
  * 4-step Antd Steps flow: Backend → Frontend → SSL → Review.
  * Render the live diff preview inline before commit.
  * Antd Form-level validation mirrors backend Pydantic
    validators (numeric bounds, HAProxy reserved keywords, ALPN
    consistency, IPv6 scope-id, domain regex, server name
    dedup).

------------------------------------------------------------------
AUDIT CAMPAIGN — Rounds 1 → 22 (Bulgu #1#82)
------------------------------------------------------------------
v1.5.0 includes 22 adversarial review passes. Each round produced
its own commit set in the corporate development line; this squash
collapses those into the v1.5.0 release artefact. Highlights:

  Round 1-4   Site Wizard core: dry-run parity, single-line
              value injection guard, ACL -f pattern-file block,
              SSL parity, timeout regex, form-state pin.
  Round 5-7   defaults-cookie inheritance, server-named-cookie
              guard, fe/be mode mismatch, duplicate server
              names, health_check_uri + server_address
              validators.
  Round 8-10  cookie_name / cookie_options newline-injection
              guard, dry-run parity (round 9), TCP-mode HTTP-only
              feature blockers.
  Round 11    SSL name path traversal + health-check >= 1.
  Round 12-13 SSL & ACME deep dive (Bulgu #23-#32).
  Round 14    single-line value injection (Bulgu #33).
  Round 15-17 ACME multi-tenant UX, numeric bounds, HAProxy
              reserved keywords, ALPN/TLS consistency,
              all-backup, multi-domain & multi-user enterprise
              edges, drain/HSTS/post-completion (Bulgu
              #34-#53).
  Round 18-21 concurrency, agent state, TCP-mode HTTP-only,
              list size caps, IPv6 scope-id, preview account
              validation, TCP backend + balance uri reject
              (Bulgu #54-#61).
  Round 22    FE error visibility + 3x stale-data lockouts,
              referential integrity + cascade safety,
              authentication & authorization, multi-cluster
              isolation, apply_pending_changes concurrency,
              script injection + bulk import multi-tenancy,
              prefix-stripped signature comparison
              (Bulgu #62-#82).

------------------------------------------------------------------
NO CORPORATE-SPECIFIC ARTIFACTS
------------------------------------------------------------------
This squash deliberately sanitises corporate hostnames, container
registry references, and TLS secret names into generic
placeholders (`your-registry.example.com/your-org`,
`haproxy-openmanager*.example.com`, `wildcard-tls`,
`taylanbakircioglu/haproxy-openmanager-*`) so the public artefact
contains no internal infrastructure detail. Pilot / development
history that retained those values stays in the corporate fork
and is NOT part of this commit.
2026-05-14 00:04:19 +03:00

198 lines
8.4 KiB
Python

from pydantic import BaseModel, validator
from typing import Literal, Optional, List
class ServerConfig(BaseModel):
server_name: str
server_address: str
server_port: int
weight: int = 100
max_connections: Optional[int] = None
check_enabled: bool = True
check_port: Optional[int] = None
backup_server: bool = False
ssl_enabled: bool = False
# PR-2 (R11.B): tighten to strict Literal aligned with HAProxy's
# `server ... ssl verify <none|required>` semantics. Backend-side
# `verify optional` is NOT supported by HAProxy (only frontend
# bind-side accepts it) — pre-PR-2 the field accepted arbitrary
# strings (`'optional'`, `'true'`, etc.) and the generator
# rendered them verbatim, producing parser errors. Empty strings
# from the React form are coerced to None by
# `coerce_ssl_verify_empty_to_none` below.
ssl_verify: Optional[Literal["none", "required"]] = None
ssl_certificate_id: Optional[int] = None # SSL certificate for backend server
# SSL Advanced Options (server SSL parameters)
ssl_sni: Optional[str] = None # SNI hostname for backend SSL connections
ssl_min_ver: Optional[str] = None # Minimum TLS version (TLSv1.2, TLSv1.3)
ssl_max_ver: Optional[str] = None # Maximum TLS version
ssl_ciphers: Optional[str] = None # Cipher suite list for backend connections
cookie_value: Optional[str] = None
inter: Optional[int] = None
fall: Optional[int] = None
rise: Optional[int] = None
is_active: bool = True
@validator('ssl_min_ver', 'ssl_max_ver')
def validate_tls_version(cls, v):
if v is not None:
valid_versions = ['SSLv3', 'TLSv1.0', 'TLSv1.1', 'TLSv1.2', 'TLSv1.3']
if v not in valid_versions:
raise ValueError(f'Invalid TLS version: {v}. Must be one of: {", ".join(valid_versions)}')
return v
@validator('ssl_verify', pre=True)
def coerce_ssl_verify_empty_to_none(cls, v):
"""PR-2 (R11.B): React form Select widgets clear to '' (empty
string) but the strict Literal would reject that. Coerce the
empty string and the legacy sentinels written by older
clients into None. Note: server-side mTLS only accepts
``none`` or ``required`` (HAProxy's `server ... verify`
keyword has no `optional` mode); a legacy `'optional'`
value is also coerced to None to fail-safe rather than
rendering an invalid directive.
"""
if v is None:
return None
if isinstance(v, str):
stripped = v.strip().lower()
if stripped in ("", "[]", "{}", "null"):
return None
if stripped == "none":
return "none"
if stripped == "required":
return "required"
if stripped == "optional":
# Server-side `verify optional` is invalid HAProxy.
# Coerce to None so the generator simply omits the
# directive instead of producing a parser-fatal line.
return None
return v
class BackendConfig(BaseModel):
name: str
cluster_id: int
balance_method: str = 'roundrobin'
mode: str = 'http'
@validator('name')
def reject_system_prefix(cls, v):
# R18 audit fix (round 3 #5): manual backend create previously
# accepted leading-underscore names (e.g. `_my_backend`). The
# agent's `_should_sync_backend` filter then dropped any such
# row from the agent->backend reverse-sync, producing silent
# control-plane drift between DB and on-disk haproxy.cfg. The
# wizard's BackendStep already rejected this; align the manual
# path so the constraint is uniform across entry points.
if isinstance(v, str) and v.startswith('_'):
raise ValueError(
"Backend name must not start with '_' (reserved for "
"system-managed entities such as the ACME challenge "
"backend)."
)
return v
health_check_uri: Optional[str] = None
health_check_interval: Optional[int] = 2000
health_check_expected_status: Optional[int] = 200
fullconn: Optional[int] = None
cookie_name: Optional[str] = None
cookie_options: Optional[str] = None
default_server_inter: Optional[int] = None
default_server_fall: Optional[int] = None
default_server_rise: Optional[int] = None
request_headers: Optional[str] = None
response_headers: Optional[str] = None
timeout_connect: Optional[int] = 10000
timeout_server: Optional[int] = 60000
timeout_queue: Optional[int] = 60000
options: Optional[str] = None
servers: List[ServerConfig] = []
# Bulgu #68 (round-22 audit) — wizard's BackendStep declares
# `fullconn: Optional[int] = Field(default=None, ge=0, ...)`
# (0 == HAProxy "fullconn disabled" sentinel). The manual
# BackendConfig pre-fix used a single `check_positive` that
# rejected `<= 0` for ALL of `health_check_interval`,
# `timeout_connect`, `timeout_server`, `timeout_queue`, AND
# `fullconn` — so a wizard-created backend with
# `fullconn=0` (or one persisted before fullconn was
# introduced and now defaults to 0) would 422 on every PUT,
# even when the operator was only changing the balance
# method or adding a server. Same Bulgu #62 "wizard
# accepted / manual rejects" lockout pattern.
#
# Split into two validators: the four timeout/interval fields
# keep `> 0` (HAProxy parser hard requirement), while
# `fullconn` switches to `>= 0` mirroring the wizard.
@validator('health_check_interval', 'timeout_connect', 'timeout_server', 'timeout_queue')
def check_positive(cls, v):
if v is not None and v <= 0:
raise ValueError('Timeout, interval, and connection values must be positive')
return v
@validator('fullconn')
def check_fullconn_non_negative(cls, v):
if v is not None and v < 0:
raise ValueError('fullconn must be >= 0 (0 disables the directive)')
return v
@validator('health_check_expected_status')
def check_http_status(cls, v):
if v is not None and (v < 100 or v > 599):
raise ValueError('HTTP status code must be between 100 and 599')
return v
class BackendConfigUpdate(BaseModel):
name: Optional[str] = None
balance_method: Optional[str] = None
mode: Optional[str] = None
@validator('name')
def reject_system_prefix_update(cls, v):
# R18 audit fix (round 3 #5): rename guard. Without it an
# operator could `PUT` a backend's name to `_anything`, which
# would then be filtered out by the agent reverse-sync.
if v is not None and isinstance(v, str) and v.startswith('_'):
raise ValueError(
"Backend name must not start with '_' (reserved for "
"system-managed entities)."
)
return v
health_check_uri: Optional[str] = None
health_check_interval: Optional[int] = None
health_check_expected_status: Optional[int] = None
fullconn: Optional[int] = None
cookie_name: Optional[str] = None
cookie_options: Optional[str] = None
default_server_inter: Optional[int] = None
default_server_fall: Optional[int] = None
default_server_rise: Optional[int] = None
request_headers: Optional[str] = None
response_headers: Optional[str] = None
timeout_connect: Optional[int] = None
timeout_server: Optional[int] = None
timeout_queue: Optional[int] = None
options: Optional[str] = None
servers: Optional[List[ServerConfig]] = None
# Bulgu #68 (round-22 audit) — same alignment as BackendConfig
# above. Update path is where the wizard-created `fullconn=0`
# row most often blows up.
@validator('health_check_interval', 'timeout_connect', 'timeout_server', 'timeout_queue')
def check_positive_update(cls, v):
if v is not None and v <= 0:
raise ValueError('Timeout, interval, and connection values must be positive')
return v
@validator('fullconn')
def check_fullconn_non_negative_update(cls, v):
if v is not None and v < 0:
raise ValueError('fullconn must be >= 0 (0 disables the directive)')
return v
@validator('health_check_expected_status')
def check_http_status_update(cls, v):
if v is not None and (v < 100 or v > 599):
raise ValueError('HTTP status code must be between 100 and 599')
return v