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02b1cb2bca
Closes #13, Closes #14. This release squashes the v1.4.0 → v1.5.0 development line. v1.4.0 shipped the ACME stability & enterprise audit (Issues #10/#11/#12). v1.5.0 builds on that foundation with two co-equal headline features plus a 22-round audit campaign hardening the prior configuration surface. License remains MIT for v1.5.0 (relicense to AGPL-3.0 lands in v1.5.2). ------------------------------------------------------------------ HEADLINE FEATURE A — ACME Diagnostic Panel (Issue #13) ------------------------------------------------------------------ A live pre-flight + post-failure diagnostic surface for every ACME order, reachable from the ACME Automation page. The panel exists to make ACME failures legible to operators who do NOT have shell access to the API host. Endpoints (`backend/routers/acme_diagnostics.py`): POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics Run the full 5-check suite (DNS / port-80 / routing / account / agents) and humanize the order's `error_detail` (>=11 RFC-8555 problem types, backwards compatible with legacy plain-string failures). POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics/ {check_id}/rerun Re-run a single check in place — used by the "Re-run" button on every row of the modal's pre-flight table. GET /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/events Merged event timeline combining the typed `acme_order_events` rows with correlated `user_activity_logs` entries (resource_type = 'letsencrypt_order' AND resource_id = order_id). The diagnostic modal auto-tails this timeline every 5 seconds while open. Service-level checks (`backend/services/acme_diagnostics.py`): * DNS resolution via stdlib socket.gethostbyname_ex through run_in_executor (intentionally avoiding an aiodns runtime dep for v1.5.0). * Port-80 HEAD probe, target locked to the order's domains, success on HTTP 200 OR 404, warns on egress timeout (corp egress policies routinely blackhole outbound 80 — fail-hard would be too noisy). * SSRF guard: probe refuses non-public IPs and surfaces the skip in the diagnostic result; IPv4-mapped IPv6 normalisation closes the `::ffff:169.254.169.254` cloud-metadata vector. * HAProxy routing presence check: matches the order's cluster_ids to a port-80 HTTP frontend. * ACME account validity check against `letsencrypt_accounts`. * Agent presence check (>=1 active agent in target cluster). * Every sub-check wrapped in a wall-clock timeout to bound impact on the API event loop. RBAC: ssl.read for run, ssl.read for events. Per-user 5/min rate limit on both run and rerun, backed by the (user_id, action, created_at DESC) composite index. Frontend (`frontend/src/components/ACMEAutomation.js`): * "Diagnose" button on every order row + the existing "stuck order" warning row. * Modal with two tabs: - Pre-flight Checks (Antd Table with status pills + Re-run buttons + humanized error banner) - Event Log (Antd Timeline with auto-tail polling, scroll- to-bottom, pause-on-hover) * Correlation IDs surfaced in error banners and individual check fail details for backend-log lookup. ------------------------------------------------------------------ HEADLINE FEATURE B — Site Setup Wizard (Issue #14) ------------------------------------------------------------------ A single guided flow that creates a Backend + Servers + HTTP Frontend (and optional HTTPS Frontend) in one atomic transaction. Endpoints (`backend/routers/site_wizard.py`): POST /api/site-wizard/preview — diff-preview the changeset POST /api/site-wizard/create — atomic execute POST /api/site-wizard/reject — clean rollback (including any wizard_staged ACME orders) GET /api/site-wizard/drafts — draft persistence PUT /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id} — save/update DELETE /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id} Feature surface: * One screen captures both backend (mode + servers) AND frontend (http + optional https + SSL mode) inputs. * SSL modes: ACME (new order, HTTP-01 only for v1.5.0), Upload (existing PEM), Existing (link to a stored cert), or None. * ACME-staged path: wizard_staged_until watermark on the `letsencrypt_orders` row defers finalisation until agent confirmation; per-mode reject cleanly cancels and rolls back the staged order. * Live diff preview against the cluster's current generated config (renderer-evolution noise stripped — track-sc<N> dedup, per-server cookie strip, defaults-cookie inheritance, listen-block flattening). * Draft persistence with PEM stripped at save time (private keys never round-trip through the drafts table). * Per-cluster multi-tenancy: drafts and wizard_staged orders are isolated to the creating user's cluster scope. Frontend (`frontend/src/components/SiteWizard.js`): * 4-step Antd Steps flow: Backend → Frontend → SSL → Review. * Render the live diff preview inline before commit. * Antd Form-level validation mirrors backend Pydantic validators (numeric bounds, HAProxy reserved keywords, ALPN consistency, IPv6 scope-id, domain regex, server name dedup). ------------------------------------------------------------------ AUDIT CAMPAIGN — Rounds 1 → 22 (Bulgu #1 → #82) ------------------------------------------------------------------ v1.5.0 includes 22 adversarial review passes. Each round produced its own commit set in the corporate development line; this squash collapses those into the v1.5.0 release artefact. Highlights: Round 1-4 Site Wizard core: dry-run parity, single-line value injection guard, ACL -f pattern-file block, SSL parity, timeout regex, form-state pin. Round 5-7 defaults-cookie inheritance, server-named-cookie guard, fe/be mode mismatch, duplicate server names, health_check_uri + server_address validators. Round 8-10 cookie_name / cookie_options newline-injection guard, dry-run parity (round 9), TCP-mode HTTP-only feature blockers. Round 11 SSL name path traversal + health-check >= 1. Round 12-13 SSL & ACME deep dive (Bulgu #23-#32). Round 14 single-line value injection (Bulgu #33). Round 15-17 ACME multi-tenant UX, numeric bounds, HAProxy reserved keywords, ALPN/TLS consistency, all-backup, multi-domain & multi-user enterprise edges, drain/HSTS/post-completion (Bulgu #34-#53). Round 18-21 concurrency, agent state, TCP-mode HTTP-only, list size caps, IPv6 scope-id, preview account validation, TCP backend + balance uri reject (Bulgu #54-#61). Round 22 FE error visibility + 3x stale-data lockouts, referential integrity + cascade safety, authentication & authorization, multi-cluster isolation, apply_pending_changes concurrency, script injection + bulk import multi-tenancy, prefix-stripped signature comparison (Bulgu #62-#82). ------------------------------------------------------------------ NO CORPORATE-SPECIFIC ARTIFACTS ------------------------------------------------------------------ This squash deliberately sanitises corporate hostnames, container registry references, and TLS secret names into generic placeholders (`your-registry.example.com/your-org`, `haproxy-openmanager*.example.com`, `wildcard-tls`, `taylanbakircioglu/haproxy-openmanager-*`) so the public artefact contains no internal infrastructure detail. Pilot / development history that retained those values stays in the corporate fork and is NOT part of this commit.
188 lines
8.1 KiB
Python
188 lines
8.1 KiB
Python
from pydantic import BaseModel, field_validator, model_validator
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from typing import Optional, List, Dict, Any
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from datetime import datetime
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import logging
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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class SSLCertificateCreate(BaseModel):
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name: str
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certificate_content: str # PEM format certificate
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private_key_content: Optional[str] = None # PEM format private key (optional for server SSL)
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chain_content: Optional[str] = None # PEM format certificate chain (optional)
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cluster_ids: Optional[List[int]] = None # List of cluster IDs for multi-cluster support
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is_global: bool = False # True for global SSL certificates
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usage_type: str = "frontend" # "frontend" or "server" - determines if private key is required
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@field_validator('usage_type')
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@classmethod
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def validate_usage_type(cls, v):
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if v not in ['frontend', 'server']:
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raise ValueError('usage_type must be either "frontend" or "server"')
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return v
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@field_validator('name')
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@classmethod
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def validate_name_no_path_traversal(cls, v):
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"""Bulgu #21 (round-11 audit): SSL certificate `name` is interpolated
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into the on-disk certificate path:
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cert_path = f"/etc/ssl/haproxy/{ssl_cert['name']}.pem"
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and emitted into the rendered HAProxy config. The agent then
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runs `mv "$temp_cert_file" "$cert_file_path"` as root, which
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means a name like '../../tmp/evil' resolves to '/tmp/evil.pem'
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and lets an operator with ssl.create permission overwrite
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arbitrary `*.pem` files on the agent host. The trailing `.pem`
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suffix mitigates common exploit paths (cron.d, profile.d,
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authorized_keys) but is defense-only — the right fix is to
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constrain `name` at the API boundary. Mirror SSLChoice's
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constraints so the wizard and direct API give the same answer.
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"""
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if v is None:
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return v
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stripped = v.strip()
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if not stripped:
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raise ValueError('SSL certificate name must not be empty')
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if stripped != v:
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raise ValueError('SSL certificate name must not contain leading/trailing whitespace')
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if len(stripped) > 200:
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raise ValueError('SSL certificate name must be 200 characters or fewer')
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import re as _re
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if not _re.match(r'^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+$', stripped):
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raise ValueError(
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f'SSL certificate name={v!r} contains forbidden characters '
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'— only letters, digits, underscore, hyphen, and dot are '
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'allowed (the name is used as a filename component under '
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'/etc/ssl/haproxy/).'
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)
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if '..' in stripped:
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raise ValueError(f'SSL certificate name={v!r} must not contain ".." (path traversal)')
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if stripped.startswith('.'):
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raise ValueError(f'SSL certificate name={v!r} must not start with "." (hidden filename)')
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if stripped.startswith('-'):
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raise ValueError(f'SSL certificate name={v!r} must not start with "-" (CLI flag confusion)')
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return stripped
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@field_validator('certificate_content')
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@classmethod
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def validate_certificate(cls, v):
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if not v or not v.strip():
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raise ValueError('Certificate content is required')
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# Basic PEM format check
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v = v.strip()
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if '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----' not in v or '-----END CERTIFICATE-----' not in v:
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raise ValueError('Certificate must be in PEM format')
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return v
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@model_validator(mode='after')
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def validate_private_key_based_on_usage(self):
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"""Private key is required for frontend SSL, optional for server SSL"""
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usage_type = self.usage_type
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private_key = self.private_key_content
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if usage_type == 'frontend':
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# Frontend SSL requires private key
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if not private_key or not private_key.strip():
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raise ValueError('Private key is required for frontend SSL certificates')
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# Basic PEM format check
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private_key = private_key.strip()
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if '-----BEGIN' not in private_key or '-----END' not in private_key:
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raise ValueError('Private key must be in PEM format')
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elif usage_type == 'server':
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# Server SSL - private key is optional
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if private_key and private_key.strip():
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# If provided, validate format
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private_key = private_key.strip()
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if '-----BEGIN' not in private_key or '-----END' not in private_key:
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raise ValueError('Private key must be in PEM format')
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return self
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@field_validator('chain_content')
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@classmethod
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def validate_chain(cls, v):
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if v and v.strip():
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# Basic PEM format check for chain
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if '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----' not in v or '-----END CERTIFICATE-----' not in v:
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raise ValueError('Certificate chain must be in PEM format')
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return v
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class SSLCertificateUpdate(BaseModel):
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name: Optional[str] = None
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certificate_content: Optional[str] = None
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private_key_content: Optional[str] = None
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chain_content: Optional[str] = None
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cluster_id: Optional[int] = None
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usage_type: Optional[str] = None # "frontend" or "server"
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@field_validator('usage_type')
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@classmethod
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def validate_usage_type(cls, v):
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if v is not None and v not in ['frontend', 'server']:
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raise ValueError('usage_type must be either "frontend" or "server"')
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return v
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# Bulgu #63 (round-22 audit) — the path-traversal guard previously
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# lived here as a strict Pydantic validator (Bulgu #21, round-11).
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# On UPDATE the manual SSL UI re-sends the existing `name` along
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# with the field the operator actually edited (usage_type /
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# cluster_id / content). If the existing certificate name was
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# imported BEFORE Bulgu #21 landed (or by a different upload path)
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# and contained a now-rejected character — e.g. legacy uploads
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# with `cert (1).pem`, `*.example.com`, `client cert.pem`, or
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# `wildcard.example.com` if dot was not yet escaped — every PUT
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# would 400 even though the operator was only changing usage
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# type or attaching the cert to another cluster. That mirrors
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# the Bulgu #62 lockout on frontends.
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#
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# The guard was moved into `routers/ssl.py::_assert_safe_cert_name`
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# and is now invoked by the create + update routes:
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# * create: strict — rejects unsafe names outright (Bulgu #21
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# contract preserved for fresh inserts).
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# * update: skipped if `name` is unchanged from the DB row;
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# enforced strictly only when the operator actually renames
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# the certificate.
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class SSLCertificate(BaseModel):
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id: int
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name: str
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domain: str # Auto-parsed from certificate
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all_domains: List[str] = [] # All domains from SAN + CN
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certificate_content: str
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private_key_content: Optional[str] = None # Optional for server SSL
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chain_content: Optional[str] = None
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expiry_date: Optional[datetime] = None # Auto-parsed from certificate
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issuer: Optional[str] = None # Auto-parsed from certificate
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status: str # 'valid', 'expiring_soon', 'expired', 'invalid'
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days_until_expiry: int = 0
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fingerprint: Optional[str] = None
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cluster_id: Optional[int] = None
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usage_type: str = "frontend" # "frontend" or "server"
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created_at: Optional[datetime] = None
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updated_at: Optional[datetime] = None
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has_pending_config: bool = False
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# Certificate details for UI display
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certificate_info: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None
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class SSLCertificateResponse(BaseModel):
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"""Response model for SSL certificate API endpoints"""
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id: int
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name: str
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domain: str
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all_domains: List[str] = []
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status: str
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days_until_expiry: int = 0
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expiry_date: Optional[datetime] = None
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issuer: Optional[str] = None
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fingerprint: Optional[str] = None
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cluster_id: Optional[int] = None
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usage_type: str = "frontend" # "frontend" or "server"
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created_at: Optional[datetime] = None
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updated_at: Optional[datetime] = None
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has_pending_config: bool = False |