Files
haproxy-openmanager/frontend/package.json
T
taylanbakircioglu bd6a31cb0d feat: v1.6.0 — Multi-Factor Authentication (Issue #18)
Adds opt-in TOTP-based Multi-Factor Authentication that is fully
backwards compatible with existing logins. Operators choose to enable
MFA per account; nothing changes for users who do not opt in.

Highlights
==========

* RFC 6238 TOTP (6 digits, 30s period, SHA1) with ±30s skew tolerance,
  compatible with Microsoft / Google Authenticator, Authy, Duo, 1Password.
* Per-step replay protection (`mfa_last_used_totp_step`) so a captured
  code cannot be reused inside the same window.
* Fernet-encrypted TOTP secrets at rest, key resolution via
  `MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY` env (HKDF-derived from `SECRET_KEY` as fallback).
* 10 single-use, bcrypt-hashed backup codes per user, formatted
  `XXXX-YYYY` from a confusion-free alphabet (no 0/O/1/I/L).
* Two-step login flow: `POST /api/auth/login` returns `mfa_required`
  + `mfa_token`, then `POST /api/auth/login/mfa-verify` accepts a TOTP
  code OR a backup code. JWT is minted only after MFA succeeds.
* Self-service: users enable / disable MFA from their own row in the
  Users page; admins reset (single user or bulk) but never enable on
  behalf of someone else (matches AWS IAM / GitHub / Google Workspace).
* Bulk emergency reset CLI: `scripts/admin-mfa-reset-all.sh`.

Security hardening
==================

* Atomic transactions with `SELECT … FOR UPDATE` on `mfa_pending_logins`
  and `users` rows so concurrent verify / enroll calls cannot race.
* `/api/mfa/enroll/start` refuses re-enrollment when MFA is already on
  (prevents silent secret rotation via a stolen JWT).
* Pydantic `ValidationError` messages are sanitized before reaching the
  audit log so request bodies (TOTP / backup codes in flight) never
  appear in plaintext.
* Slowapi rate limits are per-USER, not per-IP, with a trusted-proxy
  XFF strategy so a single ingress address cannot exhaust the bucket
  for thousands of operators (`MFA_TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDRS`,
  `MFA_RATE_LIMIT_*` env-overridable).
* Login query now scopes to `is_active = TRUE` so a soft-deleted row
  with the same username can no longer occlude the active user
  (also closes a small account-enumeration side channel).

Database
========

Additive migrations (idempotent `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS`,
`CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS`):

  - users: mfa_enabled, mfa_method, mfa_secret_encrypted,
    mfa_enrolled_at, mfa_last_used_at, mfa_last_used_totp_step
  - mfa_backup_codes (user_id ON DELETE CASCADE)
  - mfa_pending_logins (user_id ON DELETE CASCADE, challenge_token,
    attempts, expires_at)
  - mfa_pending_enrollments (user_id ON DELETE CASCADE)

Frontend
========

* Login page becomes a 3-phase state machine
  (credentials → MFA → submitting); legacy single-step login is
  preserved for users who haven't enrolled.
* New MFAEnrollModal (3-step wizard: QR + secret → verify → backup
  codes) using `qrcode.react`.
* Users page shows MFA column + per-row enable/disable/reset actions.
  Admins viewing other users with MFA off see a non-actionable info
  icon explaining that only the user themselves can enable MFA.

Deployment
==========

* `MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY` is added to `k8s/manifests/03-secrets.yaml` as
  a placeholder; `SECRET_KEY` is also placeholder-ized so both are
  injected by the existing pipeline pattern (sed-replace + apply).
* No new build-time env vars are required for the frontend. The SPA
  uses `window.location.host` for `/api/*` and is routed by the
  existing nginx ingress configuration.
* `frontend/.dockerignore` ensures host `.env*` files cannot bleed
  into the production bundle.

Tests
=====

* New unit suites:
  - `test_mfa_service.py` (TOTP, encryption, backup codes)
  - `test_mfa_backwards_compat.py` (regression — non-MFA flow unchanged)
  - `test_mfa_rate_limits.py` (env override + dataclass immutability)
  - `test_mfa_rate_limit_key.py` (JWT key, trusted-proxy XFF, fallbacks)
* All existing 1000+ unit tests continue to pass.

Documentation
=============

* README MFA section (overview, day-to-day operations, emergency
  reset CLI, env variables, rate-limit tuning).
* `scripts/README.md` documents the bulk reset script.

Issue: #18
2026-05-19 04:35:16 +03:00

59 lines
1.5 KiB
JSON

{
"name": "haproxy-openmanager-frontend",
"version": "1.6.0",
"description": "HAProxy Load Balancer Management UI",
"license": "AGPL-3.0-or-later",
"dependencies": {
"react": "^18.2.0",
"react-dom": "^18.2.0",
"react-router-dom": "^6.8.0",
"axios": "^1.3.0",
"antd": "^5.2.0",
"@ant-design/icons": "^5.0.0",
"recharts": "^2.5.0",
"moment": "^2.29.0",
"react18-json-view": "^0.2.9",
"monaco-editor": "^0.36.0",
"@monaco-editor/react": "^4.6.0",
"react-ace": "^10.1.0",
"ace-builds": "^1.23.4",
"react-window": "^1.8.10",
"qrcode.react": "^4.0.0"
},
"devDependencies": {
"@types/react": "^18.0.0",
"@types/react-dom": "^18.0.0",
"react-scripts": "5.0.1",
"typescript": "^4.9.0",
"@testing-library/react": "^13.4.0",
"@testing-library/jest-dom": "^5.16.4",
"@testing-library/user-event": "^14.4.3",
"@babel/plugin-proposal-private-property-in-object": "^7.21.0"
},
"scripts": {
"start": "react-scripts start",
"build": "react-scripts build",
"test": "react-scripts test",
"eject": "react-scripts eject"
},
"eslintConfig": {
"extends": [
"react-app",
"react-app/jest"
]
},
"browserslist": {
"production": [
">0.2%",
"not dead",
"not op_mini all"
],
"development": [
"last 1 chrome version",
"last 1 firefox version",
"last 1 safari version"
]
},
"proxy": "http://backend:8000"
}