Files
taylanbakircioglu 02b1cb2bca feat: v1.5.0 — Site Wizard (Issue #14) + ACME Diagnostic Panel (Issue #13)
Closes #13, Closes #14.

This release squashes the v1.4.0 → v1.5.0 development line. v1.4.0
shipped the ACME stability & enterprise audit (Issues #10/#11/#12).
v1.5.0 builds on that foundation with two co-equal headline features
plus a 22-round audit campaign hardening the prior configuration
surface. License remains MIT for v1.5.0 (relicense to AGPL-3.0
lands in v1.5.2).

------------------------------------------------------------------
HEADLINE FEATURE A — ACME Diagnostic Panel (Issue #13)
------------------------------------------------------------------
A live pre-flight + post-failure diagnostic surface for every ACME
order, reachable from the ACME Automation page. The panel exists
to make ACME failures legible to operators who do NOT have shell
access to the API host.

Endpoints (`backend/routers/acme_diagnostics.py`):
  POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics
       Run the full 5-check suite (DNS / port-80 / routing /
       account / agents) and humanize the order's `error_detail`
       (>=11 RFC-8555 problem types, backwards compatible with
       legacy plain-string failures).
  POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics/
                                {check_id}/rerun
       Re-run a single check in place — used by the "Re-run"
       button on every row of the modal's pre-flight table.
  GET  /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/events
       Merged event timeline combining the typed
       `acme_order_events` rows with correlated
       `user_activity_logs` entries (resource_type =
       'letsencrypt_order' AND resource_id = order_id). The
       diagnostic modal auto-tails this timeline every 5 seconds
       while open.

Service-level checks (`backend/services/acme_diagnostics.py`):
  * DNS resolution via stdlib socket.gethostbyname_ex through
    run_in_executor (intentionally avoiding an aiodns runtime
    dep for v1.5.0).
  * Port-80 HEAD probe, target locked to the order's domains,
    success on HTTP 200 OR 404, warns on egress timeout
    (corp egress policies routinely blackhole outbound 80 —
    fail-hard would be too noisy).
  * SSRF guard: probe refuses non-public IPs and surfaces the
    skip in the diagnostic result; IPv4-mapped IPv6 normalisation
    closes the `::ffff:169.254.169.254` cloud-metadata vector.
  * HAProxy routing presence check: matches the order's
    cluster_ids to a port-80 HTTP frontend.
  * ACME account validity check against `letsencrypt_accounts`.
  * Agent presence check (>=1 active agent in target cluster).
  * Every sub-check wrapped in a wall-clock timeout to bound
    impact on the API event loop.

RBAC: ssl.read for run, ssl.read for events. Per-user 5/min rate
limit on both run and rerun, backed by the (user_id, action,
created_at DESC) composite index.

Frontend (`frontend/src/components/ACMEAutomation.js`):
  * "Diagnose" button on every order row + the existing
    "stuck order" warning row.
  * Modal with two tabs:
    - Pre-flight Checks (Antd Table with status pills + Re-run
      buttons + humanized error banner)
    - Event Log (Antd Timeline with auto-tail polling, scroll-
      to-bottom, pause-on-hover)
  * Correlation IDs surfaced in error banners and individual
    check fail details for backend-log lookup.

------------------------------------------------------------------
HEADLINE FEATURE B — Site Setup Wizard (Issue #14)
------------------------------------------------------------------
A single guided flow that creates a Backend + Servers + HTTP
Frontend (and optional HTTPS Frontend) in one atomic transaction.

Endpoints (`backend/routers/site_wizard.py`):
  POST /api/site-wizard/preview     — diff-preview the changeset
  POST /api/site-wizard/create      — atomic execute
  POST /api/site-wizard/reject      — clean rollback (including
                                       any wizard_staged ACME
                                       orders)
  GET  /api/site-wizard/drafts      — draft persistence
  PUT  /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id} — save/update
  DELETE /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id}

Feature surface:
  * One screen captures both backend (mode + servers) AND
    frontend (http + optional https + SSL mode) inputs.
  * SSL modes: ACME (new order, HTTP-01 only for v1.5.0),
    Upload (existing PEM), Existing (link to a stored cert),
    or None.
  * ACME-staged path: wizard_staged_until watermark on the
    `letsencrypt_orders` row defers finalisation until agent
    confirmation; per-mode reject cleanly cancels and rolls
    back the staged order.
  * Live diff preview against the cluster's current generated
    config (renderer-evolution noise stripped — track-sc<N>
    dedup, per-server cookie strip, defaults-cookie
    inheritance, listen-block flattening).
  * Draft persistence with PEM stripped at save time (private
    keys never round-trip through the drafts table).
  * Per-cluster multi-tenancy: drafts and wizard_staged orders
    are isolated to the creating user's cluster scope.

Frontend (`frontend/src/components/SiteWizard.js`):
  * 4-step Antd Steps flow: Backend → Frontend → SSL → Review.
  * Render the live diff preview inline before commit.
  * Antd Form-level validation mirrors backend Pydantic
    validators (numeric bounds, HAProxy reserved keywords, ALPN
    consistency, IPv6 scope-id, domain regex, server name
    dedup).

------------------------------------------------------------------
AUDIT CAMPAIGN — Rounds 1 → 22 (Bulgu #1#82)
------------------------------------------------------------------
v1.5.0 includes 22 adversarial review passes. Each round produced
its own commit set in the corporate development line; this squash
collapses those into the v1.5.0 release artefact. Highlights:

  Round 1-4   Site Wizard core: dry-run parity, single-line
              value injection guard, ACL -f pattern-file block,
              SSL parity, timeout regex, form-state pin.
  Round 5-7   defaults-cookie inheritance, server-named-cookie
              guard, fe/be mode mismatch, duplicate server
              names, health_check_uri + server_address
              validators.
  Round 8-10  cookie_name / cookie_options newline-injection
              guard, dry-run parity (round 9), TCP-mode HTTP-only
              feature blockers.
  Round 11    SSL name path traversal + health-check >= 1.
  Round 12-13 SSL & ACME deep dive (Bulgu #23-#32).
  Round 14    single-line value injection (Bulgu #33).
  Round 15-17 ACME multi-tenant UX, numeric bounds, HAProxy
              reserved keywords, ALPN/TLS consistency,
              all-backup, multi-domain & multi-user enterprise
              edges, drain/HSTS/post-completion (Bulgu
              #34-#53).
  Round 18-21 concurrency, agent state, TCP-mode HTTP-only,
              list size caps, IPv6 scope-id, preview account
              validation, TCP backend + balance uri reject
              (Bulgu #54-#61).
  Round 22    FE error visibility + 3x stale-data lockouts,
              referential integrity + cascade safety,
              authentication & authorization, multi-cluster
              isolation, apply_pending_changes concurrency,
              script injection + bulk import multi-tenancy,
              prefix-stripped signature comparison
              (Bulgu #62-#82).

------------------------------------------------------------------
NO CORPORATE-SPECIFIC ARTIFACTS
------------------------------------------------------------------
This squash deliberately sanitises corporate hostnames, container
registry references, and TLS secret names into generic
placeholders (`your-registry.example.com/your-org`,
`haproxy-openmanager*.example.com`, `wildcard-tls`,
`taylanbakircioglu/haproxy-openmanager-*`) so the public artefact
contains no internal infrastructure detail. Pilot / development
history that retained those values stays in the corporate fork
and is NOT part of this commit.
2026-05-14 00:04:19 +03:00

1302 lines
50 KiB
Python

from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Header, Depends, Request
from typing import Optional, List
import logging
import json
from database.connection import get_database_connection, close_database_connection
from auth_middleware import get_current_user_from_token
from utils.activity_log import log_user_activity
from models.user import UserCreate, UserPasswordUpdate
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api", tags=["users", "servers"])
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@router.get("/users")
async def get_users(authorization: str = Header(None)):
"""Get all users"""
try:
# Verify authentication
current_user = await get_current_user_from_token(authorization)
# R18c audit fix (round 5 #1 — KRITIK info leak): the only
# caller in the UI today is the admin User Management page;
# the endpoint exposes username, email, phone, full_name,
# is_admin, roles[], cluster_ids and timestamps for every
# active operator on the platform. Pre-fix any
# authenticated user (cluster reader, ssl reader, etc.)
# could enumerate the full operator roster, including
# admin emails for phishing and is_admin flags for target
# selection. Restrict to admins.
if not current_user.get("is_admin"):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail="Listing all users requires administrator privileges."
)
conn = await get_database_connection()
# Get users with their roles (only active users)
try:
users = await conn.fetch("""
SELECT u.id, u.username, u.email, u.full_name, u.phone, u.role, u.is_active,
u.is_admin, u.is_verified, u.created_at, u.updated_at, u.last_login_at
FROM users u
WHERE u.is_active = TRUE
ORDER BY u.username
""")
except Exception as schema_error:
logger.warning(f"Schema error in users query, using fallback: {schema_error}")
# Fallback query with minimal columns
users = await conn.fetch("""
SELECT id, username, email, is_active, is_admin, created_at
FROM users
WHERE is_active = TRUE
ORDER BY username
""")
# Get user roles for each user
users_list = []
for user in users:
user_dict = dict(user)
# Remove password_hash if it exists
user_dict.pop('password_hash', None)
# Format datetime fields with UTC timezone indicator
if user_dict.get('created_at'):
user_dict['created_at'] = user_dict['created_at'].isoformat().replace('+00:00', 'Z')
if user_dict.get('updated_at'):
user_dict['updated_at'] = user_dict['updated_at'].isoformat().replace('+00:00', 'Z')
if user_dict.get('last_login_at'):
user_dict['last_login_at'] = user_dict['last_login_at'].isoformat().replace('+00:00', 'Z')
# Get user roles
try:
user_roles = await conn.fetch("""
SELECT r.id, r.name, r.display_name, r.description
FROM user_roles ur
JOIN roles r ON ur.role_id = r.id
WHERE ur.user_id = $1 AND r.is_active = true
ORDER BY r.display_name
""", user['id'])
user_dict['roles'] = [dict(role) for role in user_roles]
except Exception as role_error:
logger.warning(f"Could not fetch roles for user {user['id']}: {role_error}")
user_dict['roles'] = []
users_list.append(user_dict)
await close_database_connection(conn)
return {
"users": users_list,
"total": len(users_list)
}
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to get users: {e}")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to get users: {str(e)}")
@router.get("/roles")
async def get_roles(authorization: str = Header(None)):
"""Get all roles"""
try:
# Verify authentication
current_user = await get_current_user_from_token(authorization)
# R18c audit fix (round 5 #2 — KRITIK info leak): the role
# listing exposes the FULL `permissions` blob and
# `cluster_ids` for every role. Pre-fix any authenticated
# user could read the platform's RBAC layout — invaluable
# reconnaissance for an attacker planning a privilege
# escalation. Mutations on this endpoint are admin-only;
# the read path now matches.
if not current_user.get("is_admin"):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail="Listing roles requires administrator privileges."
)
conn = await get_database_connection()
# Check if roles table exists and get roles
try:
roles = await conn.fetch("""
SELECT id, name, display_name, description, permissions, cluster_ids,
is_active, is_system, created_at, updated_at
FROM roles
WHERE is_active = TRUE
ORDER BY name
""")
except Exception as schema_error:
logger.warning(f"Roles table not found or schema error: {schema_error}")
# Return default roles if table doesn't exist
roles = []
await close_database_connection(conn)
# Convert to list of dicts
roles_list = [dict(role) for role in roles]
return {
"roles": roles_list,
"total": len(roles_list)
}
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to get roles: {e}")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to get roles: {str(e)}")
@router.post("/users", summary="Create User", response_description="User created successfully")
async def create_user(user_data: UserCreate, authorization: str = Header(None)):
"""
# Create New User
Create a new user account with role assignments.
## Request Body
- **username**: Username (required, unique)
- **email**: Email address (required)
- **password**: Password (required, min 8 characters)
- **is_active**: Active status (default: true)
## Example Request
```bash
curl -X POST "{BASE_URL}/api/users/users" \\
-H "Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUz..." \\
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \\
-d '{
"username": "johndoe",
"email": "john@example.com",
"password": "securePass123",
"is_active": true
}'
```
## Example Response
```json
{
"message": "User 'johndoe' created successfully",
"user_id": 2
}
```
"""
try:
# Verify authentication
current_user = await get_current_user_from_token(authorization)
# SECURITY: Only admin users can create users
if not current_user.get("is_admin", False):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail="Only admin users can create new users"
)
conn = await get_database_connection()
# Check if username already exists (only active users)
existing = await conn.fetchrow(
"SELECT id FROM users WHERE username = $1 AND is_active = TRUE",
user_data.username
)
if existing:
await close_database_connection(conn)
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Username already exists")
# Check if email already exists (only active users)
if user_data.email:
existing_email = await conn.fetchrow(
"SELECT id FROM users WHERE email = $1 AND is_active = TRUE",
user_data.email
)
if existing_email:
await close_database_connection(conn)
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Email already exists")
# Hash password
import bcrypt
salt = bcrypt.gensalt()
hashed_password = bcrypt.hashpw(user_data.password.encode('utf-8'), salt)
# Check if user should be admin based on roles
is_admin = False
role_ids = getattr(user_data, 'role_ids', None)
if role_ids:
# Check if any of the assigned roles is super_admin
admin_roles = await conn.fetch("""
SELECT id FROM roles
WHERE id = ANY($1) AND name = 'super_admin'
""", role_ids)
is_admin = len(admin_roles) > 0
# Create user
user_id = await conn.fetchval("""
INSERT INTO users (username, email, full_name, phone, password_hash,
role, is_active, is_admin, is_verified)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9)
RETURNING id
""", user_data.username, user_data.email, user_data.full_name, user_data.phone,
hashed_password.decode('utf-8'), 'user', # Default role (actual roles assigned via role_ids)
user_data.is_active, is_admin, # is_admin determined by roles
user_data.is_verified)
# Assign roles if provided
if role_ids:
for role_id in role_ids:
await conn.execute("""
INSERT INTO user_roles (user_id, role_id)
VALUES ($1, $2)
ON CONFLICT (user_id, role_id) DO NOTHING
""", user_id, role_id)
await close_database_connection(conn)
# Log activity
await log_user_activity(
user_id=current_user["id"],
action='create',
resource_type='user',
resource_id=str(user_id),
details={'username': user_data.username}
)
return {
"message": f"User '{user_data.username}' created successfully",
"user_id": user_id
}
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to create user: {e}")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to create user: {str(e)}")
@router.put("/users/{user_id}")
async def update_user(user_id: int, user_data: dict, authorization: str = Header(None)):
"""Update a user"""
try:
current_user = await get_current_user_from_token(authorization)
# SECURITY: Only admin users can update other users
if not current_user.get("is_admin", False):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail="Only admin users can update user information"
)
conn = await get_database_connection()
# Check if user exists
existing_user = await conn.fetchrow("SELECT username, email FROM users WHERE id = $1", user_id)
if not existing_user:
await close_database_connection(conn)
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="User not found")
# Build update query dynamically
update_fields = []
params = [user_id]
param_count = 1
if 'username' in user_data:
param_count += 1
update_fields.append(f"username = ${param_count}")
params.append(user_data['username'])
if 'email' in user_data:
param_count += 1
update_fields.append(f"email = ${param_count}")
params.append(user_data['email'])
if 'full_name' in user_data:
param_count += 1
update_fields.append(f"full_name = ${param_count}")
params.append(user_data['full_name'])
if 'phone' in user_data:
param_count += 1
update_fields.append(f"phone = ${param_count}")
params.append(user_data['phone'])
if 'role' in user_data:
param_count += 1
update_fields.append(f"role = ${param_count}")
params.append(user_data['role'])
if 'is_active' in user_data:
param_count += 1
update_fields.append(f"is_active = ${param_count}")
params.append(user_data['is_active'])
if 'is_admin' in user_data:
param_count += 1
update_fields.append(f"is_admin = ${param_count}")
params.append(user_data['is_admin'])
if 'password' in user_data and user_data['password']:
import bcrypt
salt = bcrypt.gensalt()
hashed_password = bcrypt.hashpw(user_data['password'].encode('utf-8'), salt)
param_count += 1
update_fields.append(f"password_hash = ${param_count}")
params.append(hashed_password.decode('utf-8'))
# Handle role assignment if provided and auto-update is_admin flag
if 'role_ids' in user_data:
role_ids = user_data['role_ids'] or []
# Check if user should be admin based on new roles
if role_ids:
admin_roles = await conn.fetch("""
SELECT id FROM roles
WHERE id = ANY($1) AND name = 'super_admin'
""", role_ids)
is_admin = len(admin_roles) > 0
else:
is_admin = False
# Add is_admin to update fields based on roles
param_count += 1
update_fields.append(f"is_admin = ${param_count}")
params.append(is_admin)
# Clear existing user roles
await conn.execute("DELETE FROM user_roles WHERE user_id = $1", user_id)
# Assign new roles
if role_ids:
for role_id in role_ids:
await conn.execute("""
INSERT INTO user_roles (user_id, role_id)
VALUES ($1, $2)
ON CONFLICT (user_id, role_id) DO NOTHING
""", user_id, role_id)
if not update_fields:
await close_database_connection(conn)
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="No fields to update")
# Add updated_at
param_count += 1
update_fields.append(f"updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP")
# Execute update
query = f"UPDATE users SET {', '.join(update_fields)} WHERE id = $1"
await conn.execute(query, *params)
await close_database_connection(conn)
# Log activity
await log_user_activity(
user_id=current_user["id"],
action='update',
resource_type='user',
resource_id=str(user_id),
details={'updated_fields': list(user_data.keys())}
)
return {"message": f"User updated successfully"}
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to update user: {e}")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to update user: {str(e)}")
@router.put("/users/{user_id}/password")
async def change_user_password(
user_id: int,
password_data: UserPasswordUpdate,
authorization: str = Header(None)
):
"""
Change user password
Users can change their own password by providing current password.
Admins can change any user's password without current password.
"""
try:
current_user = await get_current_user_from_token(authorization)
conn = await get_database_connection()
# Check if target user exists
target_user = await conn.fetchrow(
"SELECT id, username, password_hash, is_active FROM users WHERE id = $1",
user_id
)
if not target_user:
await close_database_connection(conn)
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="User not found")
if not target_user['is_active']:
await close_database_connection(conn)
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="User is inactive")
# Check permissions
is_self = current_user["id"] == user_id
is_admin = current_user.get("is_admin", False)
if not is_self and not is_admin:
await close_database_connection(conn)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail="You can only change your own password"
)
# If changing own password, verify current password
if is_self:
import bcrypt
if not bcrypt.checkpw(
password_data.current_password.encode('utf-8'),
target_user['password_hash'].encode('utf-8')
):
await close_database_connection(conn)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="Current password is incorrect"
)
# Hash new password
import bcrypt
salt = bcrypt.gensalt()
hashed_password = bcrypt.hashpw(
password_data.new_password.encode('utf-8'),
salt
)
# Update password
await conn.execute("""
UPDATE users
SET password_hash = $1, updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
WHERE id = $2
""", hashed_password.decode('utf-8'), user_id)
await close_database_connection(conn)
# Log activity
await log_user_activity(
user_id=current_user["id"],
action='change_password',
resource_type='user',
resource_id=str(user_id),
details={
'target_username': target_user['username'],
'changed_by_self': is_self
}
)
return {
"message": "Password changed successfully",
"username": target_user['username']
}
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to change password: {e}")
raise HTTPException(
status_code=500,
detail=f"Failed to change password: {str(e)}"
)
@router.delete("/servers/{server_id}")
async def delete_server_global(server_id: int, request: Request, authorization: str = Header(None)):
"""Delete a server by ID - global endpoint for UI compatibility"""
try:
from auth_middleware import get_current_user_from_token, check_user_permission
current_user = await get_current_user_from_token(authorization)
# Risk-audit follow-up to Bulgu-#77: the legacy
# `delete_server` on `routers/backend.py` was upgraded to
# gate on `backends.update`, but BackendServers.js calls
# the compatibility alias `DELETE /api/servers/{id}` that
# routes here — so the FE delete path was still missing
# the per-action RBAC check. A read-only operator with
# `backends.read` and pool access could delete servers.
# Mirror the gate so both endpoints enforce the same
# contract.
has_permission = await check_user_permission(
current_user["id"], "backends", "update",
current_user=current_user,
)
if not has_permission:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail="You don't have permission to delete servers",
)
# Get request body for cluster_id validation
request_body = await request.json() if hasattr(request, 'json') else {}
expected_cluster_id = request_body.get('cluster_id')
conn = await get_database_connection()
# Get server info before deletion
server = await conn.fetchrow("""
SELECT id, server_name, backend_name, server_address, server_port, cluster_id, is_active
FROM backend_servers WHERE id = $1
""", server_id)
if not server:
await close_database_connection(conn)
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Server not found")
cluster_id = server['cluster_id']
backend_name = server['backend_name']
server_name = server['server_name']
# Validate cluster ownership for multi-cluster security
if expected_cluster_id and cluster_id != expected_cluster_id:
await close_database_connection(conn)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail=f"Server belongs to cluster {cluster_id}, not cluster {expected_cluster_id}"
)
# Check if cluster exists
cluster_exists = await conn.fetchval("""
SELECT id FROM haproxy_clusters WHERE id = $1
""", cluster_id)
if not cluster_exists:
await close_database_connection(conn)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=404,
detail="Cluster not found"
)
# Check if user_pool_access table exists (for backward compatibility)
table_exists = await conn.fetchval("""
SELECT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM information_schema.tables
WHERE table_name = 'user_pool_access'
)
""")
if table_exists:
# Check if expires_at column exists (for backward compatibility)
expires_at_exists = await conn.fetchval("""
SELECT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM information_schema.columns
WHERE table_name = 'user_pool_access' AND column_name = 'expires_at'
)
""")
# Proper user-pool access validation
if expires_at_exists:
user_access = await conn.fetchrow("""
SELECT upa.access_level, hc.id, hc.name
FROM haproxy_clusters hc
JOIN haproxy_cluster_pools hcp ON hc.pool_id = hcp.id
JOIN user_pool_access upa ON hcp.id = upa.pool_id
WHERE upa.user_id = $1 AND hc.id = $2 AND upa.is_active = TRUE
AND (upa.expires_at IS NULL OR upa.expires_at > CURRENT_TIMESTAMP)
""", current_user['id'], cluster_id)
else:
# Fallback query without expires_at column
user_access = await conn.fetchrow("""
SELECT upa.access_level, hc.id, hc.name
FROM haproxy_clusters hc
JOIN haproxy_cluster_pools hcp ON hc.pool_id = hcp.id
JOIN user_pool_access upa ON hcp.id = upa.pool_id
WHERE upa.user_id = $1 AND hc.id = $2 AND upa.is_active = TRUE
""", current_user['id'], cluster_id)
if not user_access:
await close_database_connection(conn)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail="You don't have access to this cluster"
)
logger.info(f"Global server delete: server_id={server_id}, name={server_name}, backend={backend_name}, cluster_id={cluster_id}")
# 1. Soft delete the server (mark as inactive and pending for deletion)
await conn.execute("""
UPDATE backend_servers
SET is_active = FALSE, last_config_status = 'PENDING', updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
WHERE id = $1
""", server_id)
# 2. Don't mark backend as PENDING - let Agent Sync work based on server version
# This matches the behavior of server add operations
# await conn.execute("""
# UPDATE backends
# SET last_config_status = 'PENDING', updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
# WHERE name = $1 AND cluster_id = $2
# """, backend_name, cluster_id)
# Create config version for server deletion (like frontend/SSL delete)
sync_results = []
if cluster_id:
try:
# Generate new HAProxy config without this server
from services.haproxy_config import generate_haproxy_config_for_cluster
import hashlib
import time
config_content = await generate_haproxy_config_for_cluster(cluster_id)
logger.info(f"SERVER DELETE DEBUG (user.py): Generated config content length: {len(config_content) if config_content else 0}")
if config_content:
logger.info(f"SERVER DELETE DEBUG (user.py): Config contains server line: {server_name in config_content}")
logger.info(f"SERVER DELETE DEBUG (user.py): Config contains 'DISABLED': {'DISABLED' in config_content}")
logger.info(f"SERVER DELETE DEBUG (user.py): Server marked for deletion - should be skipped in config")
else:
logger.error(f"SERVER DELETE DEBUG (user.py): Config content is empty or None!")
config_hash = hashlib.sha256(config_content.encode()).hexdigest()
version_name = f"server-{server_id}-delete-{int(time.time())}"
# Get system admin user ID for created_by
admin_user_id = await conn.fetchval("SELECT id FROM users WHERE username = 'admin' LIMIT 1") or 1
# Create new config version
config_version_id = await conn.fetchval("""
INSERT INTO config_versions
(cluster_id, version_name, config_content, checksum, created_by, is_active, status)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, FALSE, 'PENDING')
RETURNING id
""", cluster_id, version_name, config_content, config_hash, admin_user_id)
logger.info(f"Created PENDING config version {version_name} for server delete")
sync_results = [{'node': 'pending', 'success': True, 'version': version_name, 'status': 'PENDING', 'message': 'Server deletion created. Click Apply to activate.'}]
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Cluster config update failed for server {server_name}: {e}")
sync_results = [{'node': 'cluster', 'success': False, 'error': str(e)}]
await close_database_connection(conn)
# Log user activity
await log_user_activity(
user_id=current_user['id'],
action="delete_server",
resource_type="server",
resource_id=str(server_id),
details={
"server_name": server_name,
"backend_name": backend_name,
"cluster_id": cluster_id
}
)
return {
"message": f"Server '{server_name}' deleted successfully from backend '{backend_name}'",
"server": {
"id": server_id,
"name": server_name,
"backend": backend_name
},
"sync_results": sync_results
}
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to delete server {server_id}: {e}")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to delete server: {str(e)}")
@router.delete("/users/{user_id}")
async def delete_user(user_id: int, authorization: str = Header(None)):
"""Delete a user"""
try:
current_user = await get_current_user_from_token(authorization)
# SECURITY: Only admin users can delete users
if not current_user.get("is_admin", False):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail="Only admin users can delete users"
)
conn = await get_database_connection()
# Check if user exists and get details
user_info = await conn.fetchrow("SELECT username, email FROM users WHERE id = $1", user_id)
if not user_info:
await close_database_connection(conn)
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="User not found")
# Prevent self-deletion
if current_user["id"] == user_id:
await close_database_connection(conn)
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Cannot delete your own account")
# Prevent deletion of admin user
if user_info["username"] == "admin":
await close_database_connection(conn)
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Cannot delete admin user")
# Soft delete - mark as inactive instead of hard delete
await conn.execute("""
UPDATE users
SET is_active = FALSE, updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
WHERE id = $1
""", user_id)
await close_database_connection(conn)
# Log activity
await log_user_activity(
user_id=current_user["id"],
action='delete',
resource_type='user',
resource_id=str(user_id),
details={'username': user_info['username'], 'email': user_info['email']}
)
return {"message": f"User '{user_info['username']}' deleted successfully"}
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to delete user: {e}")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to delete user: {str(e)}")
@router.get("/users/{user_id}/pool-access")
async def get_user_pool_access(user_id: int, authorization: str = Header(None)):
"""Get user's pool access permissions"""
try:
from auth_middleware import get_current_user_from_token
current_user = await get_current_user_from_token(authorization)
# Only admin users or the user themselves can view pool access
if not current_user.get('is_admin') and current_user['id'] != user_id:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Access denied")
conn = await get_database_connection()
# Check if user_pool_access table exists
table_exists = await conn.fetchval("""
SELECT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM information_schema.tables
WHERE table_name = 'user_pool_access'
)
""")
if not table_exists:
await close_database_connection(conn)
return {"pool_access": [], "message": "user_pool_access table not found"}
# Get user's pool access
pool_access = await conn.fetch("""
SELECT upa.id, upa.pool_id, upa.access_level, upa.granted_at, upa.expires_at, upa.is_active,
hcp.name as pool_name, hcp.description as pool_description,
u.username as granted_by_username
FROM user_pool_access upa
JOIN haproxy_cluster_pools hcp ON upa.pool_id = hcp.id
LEFT JOIN users u ON upa.granted_by = u.id
WHERE upa.user_id = $1
ORDER BY upa.granted_at DESC
""", user_id)
await close_database_connection(conn)
return {
"pool_access": [dict(row) for row in pool_access]
}
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to get user pool access: {e}")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to get user pool access: {str(e)}")
@router.post("/users/{user_id}/pool-access")
async def grant_user_pool_access(
user_id: int,
access_data: dict,
authorization: str = Header(None)
):
"""Grant user access to pools"""
try:
from auth_middleware import get_current_user_from_token
current_user = await get_current_user_from_token(authorization)
# Only admin users can grant pool access
if not current_user.get('is_admin'):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Only admin users can grant pool access")
pool_ids = access_data.get('pool_ids', [])
access_level = access_data.get('access_level', 'read_write')
if not pool_ids:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="pool_ids is required")
conn = await get_database_connection()
# Check if user exists
user_exists = await conn.fetchval("SELECT id FROM users WHERE id = $1", user_id)
if not user_exists:
await close_database_connection(conn)
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="User not found")
# Check if user_pool_access table exists
table_exists = await conn.fetchval("""
SELECT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM information_schema.tables
WHERE table_name = 'user_pool_access'
)
""")
if not table_exists:
await close_database_connection(conn)
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="user_pool_access table not found")
# Grant access to multiple pools
granted_pools = []
for pool_id in pool_ids:
# Check if pool exists
pool_exists = await conn.fetchval("SELECT name FROM haproxy_cluster_pools WHERE id = $1", pool_id)
if not pool_exists:
continue
# Grant access
await conn.execute("""
INSERT INTO user_pool_access (user_id, pool_id, access_level, granted_by)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4)
ON CONFLICT (user_id, pool_id)
DO UPDATE SET
access_level = EXCLUDED.access_level,
granted_by = EXCLUDED.granted_by,
granted_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
is_active = TRUE
""", user_id, pool_id, access_level, current_user['id'])
granted_pools.append({"pool_id": pool_id, "pool_name": pool_exists})
await close_database_connection(conn)
return {
"message": f"Pool access granted successfully",
"user_id": user_id,
"granted_pools": granted_pools,
"access_level": access_level
}
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to grant user pool access: {e}")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to grant user pool access: {str(e)}")
@router.delete("/users/{user_id}/pool-access/{pool_id}")
async def revoke_user_pool_access(
user_id: int,
pool_id: int,
authorization: str = Header(None)
):
"""Revoke user access to a pool"""
try:
from auth_middleware import get_current_user_from_token
current_user = await get_current_user_from_token(authorization)
# Only admin users can revoke pool access
if not current_user.get('is_admin'):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Only admin users can revoke pool access")
conn = await get_database_connection()
# Check if user_pool_access table exists
table_exists = await conn.fetchval("""
SELECT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM information_schema.tables
WHERE table_name = 'user_pool_access'
)
""")
if not table_exists:
await close_database_connection(conn)
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="user_pool_access table not found")
# Revoke access (soft delete)
result = await conn.execute("""
UPDATE user_pool_access
SET is_active = FALSE
WHERE user_id = $1 AND pool_id = $2
""", user_id, pool_id)
await close_database_connection(conn)
return {
"message": f"Pool access revoked successfully",
"user_id": user_id,
"pool_id": pool_id
}
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to revoke user pool access: {e}")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to revoke user pool access: {str(e)}")
@router.get("/user-activity")
async def get_user_activity(
limit: int = 50,
offset: int = 0,
user_id: Optional[int] = None,
authorization: str = Header(None)
):
"""Get user activity logs"""
try:
current_user = await get_current_user_from_token(authorization)
# R18c audit fix (round 4 #21 — KRITIK info leak): pre-fix
# any authenticated user could:
# 1. Omit `user_id` and fetch the FULL activity log of
# every operator on the platform — including admin
# apply_changes, ACME orders, and (after R18b round 6)
# wizard `apply_error` / `acme_staging_error` blobs.
# 2. Pass an arbitrary `user_id` and read another
# operator's activity stream.
# The wizard's richer audit row makes this leak more
# consequential than before because the JSONB now carries
# operationally sensitive failure details. Restrict the
# endpoint to admins (full access) or to a user querying
# their own rows. Non-admin requests for someone else's
# activity → 403.
is_admin = bool(current_user.get("is_admin"))
own_id = current_user.get("id")
if not is_admin:
if user_id is None:
# Default to the caller's own rows for non-admins;
# the previous unfiltered listing is admin-only.
user_id = own_id
elif user_id != own_id:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail="Only administrators can view another user's activity log."
)
conn = await get_database_connection()
# Build query with optional user filter
where_clause = ""
params = [limit, offset]
if user_id:
where_clause = "WHERE ua.user_id = $3"
params.append(user_id)
# Get activity logs
activities = await conn.fetch(f"""
SELECT ua.id, ua.user_id, ua.action, ua.resource_type, ua.resource_id,
ua.details, ua.created_at, ua.ip_address,
u.username, u.email
FROM user_activity_logs ua
LEFT JOIN users u ON ua.user_id = u.id
{where_clause}
ORDER BY ua.created_at DESC
LIMIT $1 OFFSET $2
""", *params)
# Get total count
count_query = f"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM user_activity_logs ua {where_clause}"
if user_id:
total = await conn.fetchval(count_query, user_id)
else:
total = await conn.fetchval(count_query)
await close_database_connection(conn)
return {
"activities": [
{
"id": activity["id"],
"user_id": activity["user_id"],
"username": activity["username"],
"email": activity["email"],
"action": activity["action"],
"resource_type": activity["resource_type"],
"resource_id": activity["resource_id"],
"details": activity["details"],
"created_at": activity["created_at"].isoformat() if activity["created_at"] else None,
"ip_address": activity["ip_address"]
} for activity in activities
],
"total": total,
"limit": limit,
"offset": offset
}
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to get user activity: {e}")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to get user activity: {str(e)}")
# ==== ENHANCED ROLE MANAGEMENT ====
@router.post("/roles")
async def create_role(role_data: dict, authorization: str = Header(None)):
"""Create a new role with cluster-specific permissions"""
try:
# Verify authentication
current_user = await get_current_user_from_token(authorization)
# SECURITY: Only admin users can create roles
if not current_user.get("is_admin", False):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail="Only admin users can create roles"
)
conn = await get_database_connection()
# Check if role name already exists
existing = await conn.fetchrow("SELECT id FROM roles WHERE name = $1", role_data['name'])
if existing:
await close_database_connection(conn)
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Role name already exists")
# Create role with cluster_ids support
role_id = await conn.fetchval("""
INSERT INTO roles (name, display_name, description, permissions, cluster_ids, is_active)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6)
RETURNING id
""",
role_data['name'],
role_data['display_name'],
role_data.get('description'),
json.dumps(role_data.get('permissions', [])) if isinstance(role_data.get('permissions'), list) else role_data.get('permissions', []),
json.dumps(role_data.get('cluster_ids')) if role_data.get('cluster_ids') else None,
role_data.get('is_active', True)
)
await close_database_connection(conn)
# Log activity
await log_user_activity(
user_id=current_user["id"],
action='create',
resource_type='role',
resource_id=str(role_id),
details={
'role_name': role_data['name'],
'display_name': role_data['display_name'],
'permissions_count': len(role_data.get('permissions', [])),
'cluster_specific': bool(role_data.get('cluster_ids'))
}
)
return {
"message": f"Role '{role_data['display_name']}' created successfully",
"id": role_id
}
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to create role: {e}")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to create role: {str(e)}")
@router.put("/roles/{role_id}")
async def update_role(role_id: int, role_data: dict, authorization: str = Header(None)):
"""Update an existing role"""
try:
# Verify authentication
current_user = await get_current_user_from_token(authorization)
# SECURITY: Only admin users can update roles
if not current_user.get("is_admin", False):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail="Only admin users can update roles"
)
conn = await get_database_connection()
# Check if role exists
existing = await conn.fetchrow("SELECT * FROM roles WHERE id = $1", role_id)
if not existing:
await close_database_connection(conn)
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Role not found")
# Check if new name conflicts with other roles
if 'name' in role_data and role_data['name'] != existing['name']:
name_conflict = await conn.fetchrow("SELECT id FROM roles WHERE name = $1 AND id != $2", role_data['name'], role_id)
if name_conflict:
await close_database_connection(conn)
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Role name already exists")
# Update role
await conn.execute("""
UPDATE roles SET
name = $1, display_name = $2, description = $3,
permissions = $4, cluster_ids = $5, is_active = $6,
updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
WHERE id = $7
""",
role_data.get('name', existing['name']),
role_data.get('display_name', existing['display_name']),
role_data.get('description', existing['description']),
json.dumps(role_data.get('permissions', existing['permissions'])) if isinstance(role_data.get('permissions'), list) else role_data.get('permissions', existing['permissions']),
json.dumps(role_data.get('cluster_ids')) if 'cluster_ids' in role_data and role_data.get('cluster_ids') else (existing['cluster_ids'] if existing['cluster_ids'] else None),
role_data.get('is_active', existing['is_active']),
role_id
)
await close_database_connection(conn)
# Log activity
await log_user_activity(
user_id=current_user["id"],
action='update',
resource_type='role',
resource_id=str(role_id),
details={
'role_name': role_data.get('name', existing['name']),
'display_name': role_data.get('display_name', existing['display_name']),
'permissions_count': len(role_data.get('permissions', [])),
'cluster_specific': bool(role_data.get('cluster_ids'))
}
)
return {
"message": f"Role updated successfully"
}
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to update role: {e}")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to update role: {str(e)}")
@router.delete("/roles/{role_id}")
async def delete_role(role_id: int, authorization: str = Header(None)):
"""Delete a role (soft delete by setting is_active = false)"""
try:
# Verify authentication
current_user = await get_current_user_from_token(authorization)
# SECURITY: Only admin users can delete roles
if not current_user.get("is_admin", False):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail="Only admin users can delete roles"
)
conn = await get_database_connection()
# Check if role exists and is not system role
role = await conn.fetchrow("SELECT * FROM roles WHERE id = $1", role_id)
if not role:
await close_database_connection(conn)
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Role not found")
if role.get('is_system'):
await close_database_connection(conn)
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Cannot delete system roles")
# Soft delete role
await conn.execute("""
UPDATE roles SET is_active = FALSE, updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
WHERE id = $1
""", role_id)
await close_database_connection(conn)
# Log activity
await log_user_activity(
user_id=current_user["id"],
action='delete',
resource_type='role',
resource_id=str(role_id),
details={
'role_name': role['name'],
'display_name': role['display_name']
}
)
return {
"message": f"Role '{role['display_name']}' deleted successfully"
}
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to delete role: {e}")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to delete role: {str(e)}")
# ==== USER ROLE ASSIGNMENT ENDPOINTS ====
@router.post("/users/{user_id}/roles")
async def assign_user_roles(user_id: int, role_data: dict, authorization: str = Header(None)):
"""Assign roles to a user"""
try:
# Verify authentication
current_user = await get_current_user_from_token(authorization)
# SECURITY: Only admin users can assign roles to users
if not current_user.get("is_admin", False):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail="Only admin users can assign roles to users"
)
conn = await get_database_connection()
# Check if user exists
user = await conn.fetchrow("SELECT id, username FROM users WHERE id = $1", user_id)
if not user:
await close_database_connection(conn)
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="User not found")
role_ids = role_data.get('role_ids', [])
# Clear existing user roles
await conn.execute("DELETE FROM user_roles WHERE user_id = $1", user_id)
# Assign new roles
if role_ids:
for role_id in role_ids:
await conn.execute("""
INSERT INTO user_roles (user_id, role_id)
VALUES ($1, $2)
ON CONFLICT (user_id, role_id) DO NOTHING
""", user_id, role_id)
await close_database_connection(conn)
# Log activity
await log_user_activity(
user_id=current_user["id"],
action='update',
resource_type='user_roles',
resource_id=str(user_id),
details={
'target_user': user['username'],
'assigned_roles': len(role_ids),
'role_ids': role_ids
}
)
return {
"message": f"Roles assigned to user '{user['username']}' successfully",
"assigned_roles": len(role_ids)
}
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to assign roles to user {user_id}: {e}")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to assign roles: {str(e)}")
@router.post("/user-roles")
async def assign_roles_legacy(role_assignment: dict, authorization: str = Header(None)):
"""Legacy endpoint for role assignment (for compatibility)"""
try:
user_id = role_assignment.get('user_id')
role_ids = role_assignment.get('role_ids', [])
if not user_id:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="User ID is required")
return await assign_user_roles(user_id, {'role_ids': role_ids}, authorization)
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to assign roles (legacy): {e}")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to assign roles: {str(e)}")