Files
haproxy-openmanager/backend/routers/configuration.py
T
taylanbakircioglu 02b1cb2bca feat: v1.5.0 — Site Wizard (Issue #14) + ACME Diagnostic Panel (Issue #13)
Closes #13, Closes #14.

This release squashes the v1.4.0 → v1.5.0 development line. v1.4.0
shipped the ACME stability & enterprise audit (Issues #10/#11/#12).
v1.5.0 builds on that foundation with two co-equal headline features
plus a 22-round audit campaign hardening the prior configuration
surface. License remains MIT for v1.5.0 (relicense to AGPL-3.0
lands in v1.5.2).

------------------------------------------------------------------
HEADLINE FEATURE A — ACME Diagnostic Panel (Issue #13)
------------------------------------------------------------------
A live pre-flight + post-failure diagnostic surface for every ACME
order, reachable from the ACME Automation page. The panel exists
to make ACME failures legible to operators who do NOT have shell
access to the API host.

Endpoints (`backend/routers/acme_diagnostics.py`):
  POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics
       Run the full 5-check suite (DNS / port-80 / routing /
       account / agents) and humanize the order's `error_detail`
       (>=11 RFC-8555 problem types, backwards compatible with
       legacy plain-string failures).
  POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics/
                                {check_id}/rerun
       Re-run a single check in place — used by the "Re-run"
       button on every row of the modal's pre-flight table.
  GET  /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/events
       Merged event timeline combining the typed
       `acme_order_events` rows with correlated
       `user_activity_logs` entries (resource_type =
       'letsencrypt_order' AND resource_id = order_id). The
       diagnostic modal auto-tails this timeline every 5 seconds
       while open.

Service-level checks (`backend/services/acme_diagnostics.py`):
  * DNS resolution via stdlib socket.gethostbyname_ex through
    run_in_executor (intentionally avoiding an aiodns runtime
    dep for v1.5.0).
  * Port-80 HEAD probe, target locked to the order's domains,
    success on HTTP 200 OR 404, warns on egress timeout
    (corp egress policies routinely blackhole outbound 80 —
    fail-hard would be too noisy).
  * SSRF guard: probe refuses non-public IPs and surfaces the
    skip in the diagnostic result; IPv4-mapped IPv6 normalisation
    closes the `::ffff:169.254.169.254` cloud-metadata vector.
  * HAProxy routing presence check: matches the order's
    cluster_ids to a port-80 HTTP frontend.
  * ACME account validity check against `letsencrypt_accounts`.
  * Agent presence check (>=1 active agent in target cluster).
  * Every sub-check wrapped in a wall-clock timeout to bound
    impact on the API event loop.

RBAC: ssl.read for run, ssl.read for events. Per-user 5/min rate
limit on both run and rerun, backed by the (user_id, action,
created_at DESC) composite index.

Frontend (`frontend/src/components/ACMEAutomation.js`):
  * "Diagnose" button on every order row + the existing
    "stuck order" warning row.
  * Modal with two tabs:
    - Pre-flight Checks (Antd Table with status pills + Re-run
      buttons + humanized error banner)
    - Event Log (Antd Timeline with auto-tail polling, scroll-
      to-bottom, pause-on-hover)
  * Correlation IDs surfaced in error banners and individual
    check fail details for backend-log lookup.

------------------------------------------------------------------
HEADLINE FEATURE B — Site Setup Wizard (Issue #14)
------------------------------------------------------------------
A single guided flow that creates a Backend + Servers + HTTP
Frontend (and optional HTTPS Frontend) in one atomic transaction.

Endpoints (`backend/routers/site_wizard.py`):
  POST /api/site-wizard/preview     — diff-preview the changeset
  POST /api/site-wizard/create      — atomic execute
  POST /api/site-wizard/reject      — clean rollback (including
                                       any wizard_staged ACME
                                       orders)
  GET  /api/site-wizard/drafts      — draft persistence
  PUT  /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id} — save/update
  DELETE /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id}

Feature surface:
  * One screen captures both backend (mode + servers) AND
    frontend (http + optional https + SSL mode) inputs.
  * SSL modes: ACME (new order, HTTP-01 only for v1.5.0),
    Upload (existing PEM), Existing (link to a stored cert),
    or None.
  * ACME-staged path: wizard_staged_until watermark on the
    `letsencrypt_orders` row defers finalisation until agent
    confirmation; per-mode reject cleanly cancels and rolls
    back the staged order.
  * Live diff preview against the cluster's current generated
    config (renderer-evolution noise stripped — track-sc<N>
    dedup, per-server cookie strip, defaults-cookie
    inheritance, listen-block flattening).
  * Draft persistence with PEM stripped at save time (private
    keys never round-trip through the drafts table).
  * Per-cluster multi-tenancy: drafts and wizard_staged orders
    are isolated to the creating user's cluster scope.

Frontend (`frontend/src/components/SiteWizard.js`):
  * 4-step Antd Steps flow: Backend → Frontend → SSL → Review.
  * Render the live diff preview inline before commit.
  * Antd Form-level validation mirrors backend Pydantic
    validators (numeric bounds, HAProxy reserved keywords, ALPN
    consistency, IPv6 scope-id, domain regex, server name
    dedup).

------------------------------------------------------------------
AUDIT CAMPAIGN — Rounds 1 → 22 (Bulgu #1#82)
------------------------------------------------------------------
v1.5.0 includes 22 adversarial review passes. Each round produced
its own commit set in the corporate development line; this squash
collapses those into the v1.5.0 release artefact. Highlights:

  Round 1-4   Site Wizard core: dry-run parity, single-line
              value injection guard, ACL -f pattern-file block,
              SSL parity, timeout regex, form-state pin.
  Round 5-7   defaults-cookie inheritance, server-named-cookie
              guard, fe/be mode mismatch, duplicate server
              names, health_check_uri + server_address
              validators.
  Round 8-10  cookie_name / cookie_options newline-injection
              guard, dry-run parity (round 9), TCP-mode HTTP-only
              feature blockers.
  Round 11    SSL name path traversal + health-check >= 1.
  Round 12-13 SSL & ACME deep dive (Bulgu #23-#32).
  Round 14    single-line value injection (Bulgu #33).
  Round 15-17 ACME multi-tenant UX, numeric bounds, HAProxy
              reserved keywords, ALPN/TLS consistency,
              all-backup, multi-domain & multi-user enterprise
              edges, drain/HSTS/post-completion (Bulgu
              #34-#53).
  Round 18-21 concurrency, agent state, TCP-mode HTTP-only,
              list size caps, IPv6 scope-id, preview account
              validation, TCP backend + balance uri reject
              (Bulgu #54-#61).
  Round 22    FE error visibility + 3x stale-data lockouts,
              referential integrity + cascade safety,
              authentication & authorization, multi-cluster
              isolation, apply_pending_changes concurrency,
              script injection + bulk import multi-tenancy,
              prefix-stripped signature comparison
              (Bulgu #62-#82).

------------------------------------------------------------------
NO CORPORATE-SPECIFIC ARTIFACTS
------------------------------------------------------------------
This squash deliberately sanitises corporate hostnames, container
registry references, and TLS secret names into generic
placeholders (`your-registry.example.com/your-org`,
`haproxy-openmanager*.example.com`, `wildcard-tls`,
`taylanbakircioglu/haproxy-openmanager-*`) so the public artefact
contains no internal infrastructure detail. Pilot / development
history that retained those values stays in the corporate fork
and is NOT part of this commit.
2026-05-14 00:04:19 +03:00

383 lines
14 KiB
Python

from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Header, Query
from typing import Optional
from pydantic import BaseModel
import logging
from datetime import datetime, timedelta
from database.connection import get_database_connection, close_database_connection
from auth_middleware import get_current_user_from_token, validate_agent_api_key
from utils.activity_log import log_user_activity
router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/configuration", tags=["configuration"])
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# ====== REQUEST/RESPONSE MODELS ======
class ConfigResponse(BaseModel):
request_id: int
config_content: str
config_path: str
# ====== USER ENDPOINTS (Frontend -> Backend) ======
@router.post("/request")
async def create_config_request(
agent_name: str = Query(..., description="Agent name"),
cluster_id: int = Query(..., description="Cluster ID"),
request_type: str = Query(..., description="Request type: 'view' or 'download'"),
authorization: str = Header(None)
):
"""
Create a configuration request for an agent.
User initiates this from the Configuration Management page.
"""
try:
current_user = await get_current_user_from_token(authorization)
conn = await get_database_connection()
# Get agent info and verify it belongs to the cluster
agent_info = await conn.fetchrow("""
SELECT a.id, a.name, a.status, a.pool_id
FROM agents a
WHERE a.name = $1
""", agent_name)
if not agent_info:
await close_database_connection(conn)
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Agent '{agent_name}' not found")
# Verify cluster belongs to agent's pool
cluster_info = await conn.fetchrow("""
SELECT id, name, pool_id
FROM haproxy_clusters
WHERE id = $1
""", cluster_id)
if not cluster_info:
await close_database_connection(conn)
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Cluster ID {cluster_id} not found")
if cluster_info['pool_id'] != agent_info['pool_id']:
await close_database_connection(conn)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"Agent '{agent_name}' does not belong to cluster '{cluster_info['name']}'"
)
if agent_info['status'] != 'online':
await close_database_connection(conn)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"Agent '{agent_name}' is not online (status: {agent_info['status']})"
)
# Check for existing pending requests
existing_request = await conn.fetchrow("""
SELECT id FROM agent_config_requests
WHERE agent_name = $1 AND status IN ('pending', 'processing')
AND expires_at > CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
LIMIT 1
""", agent_name)
if existing_request:
await close_database_connection(conn)
return {
"request_id": existing_request['id'],
"status": "existing",
"message": "A config request is already pending for this agent"
}
# Create new request
request_id = await conn.fetchval("""
INSERT INTO agent_config_requests (
agent_id, agent_name, cluster_id, request_type, status, requested_by
) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, 'pending', $5)
RETURNING id
""", agent_info['id'], agent_name, cluster_id, request_type, current_user['id'])
await close_database_connection(conn)
# Log activity
await log_user_activity(
user_id=current_user['id'],
action='config_request',
resource_type='agent',
resource_id=str(agent_info['id']),
details={
'agent_name': agent_name,
'cluster_id': cluster_id,
'cluster_name': cluster_info['name'],
'request_type': request_type,
'request_id': request_id
}
)
logger.info(f"📄 CONFIG REQUEST: Created request #{request_id} for agent '{agent_name}' in cluster '{cluster_info['name']}' (type: {request_type})")
return {
"request_id": request_id,
"agent_name": agent_name,
"request_type": request_type,
"status": "pending",
"message": "Configuration request created successfully. Agent will process it on next heartbeat."
}
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to create config request: {e}")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=str(e))
@router.get("/response/{request_id}")
async def get_config_response(request_id: int, authorization: str = Header(None)):
"""
Get configuration response for a request.
Frontend polls this endpoint to check if agent has responded.
"""
try:
current_user = await get_current_user_from_token(authorization)
conn = await get_database_connection()
# Get request info
request_info = await conn.fetchrow("""
SELECT acr.id, acr.agent_name, acr.request_type, acr.status,
acr.requested_at, acr.expires_at,
acresp.config_content, acresp.config_path, acresp.file_size,
acresp.response_at
FROM agent_config_requests acr
LEFT JOIN agent_config_responses acresp ON acr.id = acresp.request_id
WHERE acr.id = $1
""", request_id)
await close_database_connection(conn)
if not request_info:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Config request not found")
# Check if request expired
if request_info['expires_at'] < datetime.now():
return {
"request_id": request_id,
"status": "expired",
"message": "Request expired. Agent did not respond in time."
}
# Check if response is available
if request_info['config_content']:
return {
"request_id": request_id,
"agent_name": request_info['agent_name'],
"request_type": request_info['request_type'],
"status": "completed",
"config_content": request_info['config_content'],
"config_path": request_info['config_path'],
"file_size": request_info['file_size'],
"response_at": request_info['response_at'].isoformat() if request_info['response_at'] else None
}
else:
# Still pending
return {
"request_id": request_id,
"status": request_info['status'],
"message": "Waiting for agent response..."
}
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to get config response: {e}")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=str(e))
# ====== AGENT ENDPOINTS (Agent -> Backend) ======
@router.get("/agents/{agent_name}/pending-requests")
async def get_pending_config_requests(agent_name: str, x_api_key: Optional[str] = Header(None)):
"""
Agent calls this endpoint to check for pending config requests.
Called during heartbeat.
"""
try:
# Validate agent API key
agent_auth = await validate_agent_api_key(x_api_key)
if x_api_key and not agent_auth:
logger.warning(f"Invalid API key provided by agent '{agent_name}' for pending requests")
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid API key")
conn = await get_database_connection()
# Get pending requests
requests = await conn.fetch("""
SELECT id, request_type, requested_at
FROM agent_config_requests
WHERE agent_name = $1
AND status = 'pending'
AND expires_at > CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
ORDER BY requested_at ASC
LIMIT 5
""", agent_name)
# Mark found requests as processing
if requests:
request_ids = [r['id'] for r in requests]
await conn.execute("""
UPDATE agent_config_requests
SET status = 'processing', updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
WHERE id = ANY($1)
""", request_ids)
logger.info(f"📄 CONFIG REQUEST: Agent '{agent_name}' picked up {len(requests)} pending request(s)")
await close_database_connection(conn)
return {
"agent_name": agent_name,
"pending_requests": [
{
"request_id": r['id'],
"request_type": r['request_type'],
"requested_at": r['requested_at'].isoformat()
}
for r in requests
]
}
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to get pending config requests for agent '{agent_name}': {e}")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=str(e))
@router.post("/agents/{agent_name}/config-response")
async def submit_config_response(
agent_name: str,
response: ConfigResponse,
x_api_key: Optional[str] = Header(None)
):
"""
Agent submits the haproxy.cfg content in response to a request.
"""
try:
# Bulgu #75 (round-22 audit) — same auth-bypass fix as in
# `routers/agent.py`. Pre-fix the `if x_api_key and not
# agent_auth` short-circuited when no header was sent at
# all, letting an unauthenticated caller post arbitrary
# HAProxy-config content claiming to come from an agent.
agent_auth = await validate_agent_api_key(x_api_key)
if not agent_auth:
logger.warning(
f"Rejected config-response call for agent {agent_name!r}: "
f"missing or invalid x-api-key"
)
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid or missing API key")
conn = await get_database_connection()
# Verify request exists and belongs to this agent
request_info = await conn.fetchrow("""
SELECT id, agent_name, status FROM agent_config_requests
WHERE id = $1 AND agent_name = $2
""", response.request_id, agent_name)
if not request_info:
await close_database_connection(conn)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=404,
detail="Config request not found or does not belong to this agent"
)
# Insert response
file_size = len(response.config_content.encode('utf-8'))
await conn.execute("""
INSERT INTO agent_config_responses (
request_id, agent_name, config_content, config_path, file_size
) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5)
ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING
""", response.request_id, agent_name, response.config_content, response.config_path, file_size)
# Update request status
await conn.execute("""
UPDATE agent_config_requests
SET status = 'completed', updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
WHERE id = $1
""", response.request_id)
await close_database_connection(conn)
logger.info(f"CONFIG RESPONSE: Agent '{agent_name}' submitted config for request #{response.request_id} (size: {file_size} bytes)")
return {
"status": "ok",
"message": "Configuration response received successfully",
"request_id": response.request_id
}
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to submit config response from agent '{agent_name}': {e}")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=str(e))
# ====== CLEANUP ENDPOINT ======
@router.delete("/cleanup-expired")
async def cleanup_expired_requests(authorization: str = Header(None)):
"""
Cleanup expired config requests and responses.
Called by scheduled job or manually.
Bulgu #78 (round-22 audit) — pre-fix this endpoint had NO
auth at all. Any unauthenticated caller could DROP rows
from `agent_config_requests` / `agent_config_responses`,
which directly drives the cluster's "what did the operator
ask the agent to fetch" history. Restrict to admin users —
legitimate callers are an internal scheduled job (which
can supply an admin bearer) or a human admin pressing
Maintenance → Cleanup in the UI.
"""
try:
from auth_middleware import get_current_user_from_token
current_user = await get_current_user_from_token(authorization)
if not current_user.get("is_admin", False):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail="Only admin users can run cleanup-expired"
)
conn = await get_database_connection()
# Delete expired responses
deleted_responses = await conn.fetchval("""
DELETE FROM agent_config_responses
WHERE expires_at < CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
RETURNING count(*)
""")
# Delete expired requests
deleted_requests = await conn.fetchval("""
DELETE FROM agent_config_requests
WHERE expires_at < CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
RETURNING count(*)
""")
await close_database_connection(conn)
logger.info(f"🧹 CLEANUP: Deleted {deleted_responses or 0} expired responses and {deleted_requests or 0} expired requests")
return {
"status": "ok",
"deleted_responses": deleted_responses or 0,
"deleted_requests": deleted_requests or 0
}
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to cleanup expired data: {e}")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=str(e))