mirror of
https://github.com/taylanbakircioglu/haproxy-openmanager.git
synced 2026-09-16 15:45:11 +00:00
02b1cb2bca
Closes #13, Closes #14. This release squashes the v1.4.0 → v1.5.0 development line. v1.4.0 shipped the ACME stability & enterprise audit (Issues #10/#11/#12). v1.5.0 builds on that foundation with two co-equal headline features plus a 22-round audit campaign hardening the prior configuration surface. License remains MIT for v1.5.0 (relicense to AGPL-3.0 lands in v1.5.2). ------------------------------------------------------------------ HEADLINE FEATURE A — ACME Diagnostic Panel (Issue #13) ------------------------------------------------------------------ A live pre-flight + post-failure diagnostic surface for every ACME order, reachable from the ACME Automation page. The panel exists to make ACME failures legible to operators who do NOT have shell access to the API host. Endpoints (`backend/routers/acme_diagnostics.py`): POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics Run the full 5-check suite (DNS / port-80 / routing / account / agents) and humanize the order's `error_detail` (>=11 RFC-8555 problem types, backwards compatible with legacy plain-string failures). POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics/ {check_id}/rerun Re-run a single check in place — used by the "Re-run" button on every row of the modal's pre-flight table. GET /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/events Merged event timeline combining the typed `acme_order_events` rows with correlated `user_activity_logs` entries (resource_type = 'letsencrypt_order' AND resource_id = order_id). The diagnostic modal auto-tails this timeline every 5 seconds while open. Service-level checks (`backend/services/acme_diagnostics.py`): * DNS resolution via stdlib socket.gethostbyname_ex through run_in_executor (intentionally avoiding an aiodns runtime dep for v1.5.0). * Port-80 HEAD probe, target locked to the order's domains, success on HTTP 200 OR 404, warns on egress timeout (corp egress policies routinely blackhole outbound 80 — fail-hard would be too noisy). * SSRF guard: probe refuses non-public IPs and surfaces the skip in the diagnostic result; IPv4-mapped IPv6 normalisation closes the `::ffff:169.254.169.254` cloud-metadata vector. * HAProxy routing presence check: matches the order's cluster_ids to a port-80 HTTP frontend. * ACME account validity check against `letsencrypt_accounts`. * Agent presence check (>=1 active agent in target cluster). * Every sub-check wrapped in a wall-clock timeout to bound impact on the API event loop. RBAC: ssl.read for run, ssl.read for events. Per-user 5/min rate limit on both run and rerun, backed by the (user_id, action, created_at DESC) composite index. Frontend (`frontend/src/components/ACMEAutomation.js`): * "Diagnose" button on every order row + the existing "stuck order" warning row. * Modal with two tabs: - Pre-flight Checks (Antd Table with status pills + Re-run buttons + humanized error banner) - Event Log (Antd Timeline with auto-tail polling, scroll- to-bottom, pause-on-hover) * Correlation IDs surfaced in error banners and individual check fail details for backend-log lookup. ------------------------------------------------------------------ HEADLINE FEATURE B — Site Setup Wizard (Issue #14) ------------------------------------------------------------------ A single guided flow that creates a Backend + Servers + HTTP Frontend (and optional HTTPS Frontend) in one atomic transaction. Endpoints (`backend/routers/site_wizard.py`): POST /api/site-wizard/preview — diff-preview the changeset POST /api/site-wizard/create — atomic execute POST /api/site-wizard/reject — clean rollback (including any wizard_staged ACME orders) GET /api/site-wizard/drafts — draft persistence PUT /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id} — save/update DELETE /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id} Feature surface: * One screen captures both backend (mode + servers) AND frontend (http + optional https + SSL mode) inputs. * SSL modes: ACME (new order, HTTP-01 only for v1.5.0), Upload (existing PEM), Existing (link to a stored cert), or None. * ACME-staged path: wizard_staged_until watermark on the `letsencrypt_orders` row defers finalisation until agent confirmation; per-mode reject cleanly cancels and rolls back the staged order. * Live diff preview against the cluster's current generated config (renderer-evolution noise stripped — track-sc<N> dedup, per-server cookie strip, defaults-cookie inheritance, listen-block flattening). * Draft persistence with PEM stripped at save time (private keys never round-trip through the drafts table). * Per-cluster multi-tenancy: drafts and wizard_staged orders are isolated to the creating user's cluster scope. Frontend (`frontend/src/components/SiteWizard.js`): * 4-step Antd Steps flow: Backend → Frontend → SSL → Review. * Render the live diff preview inline before commit. * Antd Form-level validation mirrors backend Pydantic validators (numeric bounds, HAProxy reserved keywords, ALPN consistency, IPv6 scope-id, domain regex, server name dedup). ------------------------------------------------------------------ AUDIT CAMPAIGN — Rounds 1 → 22 (Bulgu #1 → #82) ------------------------------------------------------------------ v1.5.0 includes 22 adversarial review passes. Each round produced its own commit set in the corporate development line; this squash collapses those into the v1.5.0 release artefact. Highlights: Round 1-4 Site Wizard core: dry-run parity, single-line value injection guard, ACL -f pattern-file block, SSL parity, timeout regex, form-state pin. Round 5-7 defaults-cookie inheritance, server-named-cookie guard, fe/be mode mismatch, duplicate server names, health_check_uri + server_address validators. Round 8-10 cookie_name / cookie_options newline-injection guard, dry-run parity (round 9), TCP-mode HTTP-only feature blockers. Round 11 SSL name path traversal + health-check >= 1. Round 12-13 SSL & ACME deep dive (Bulgu #23-#32). Round 14 single-line value injection (Bulgu #33). Round 15-17 ACME multi-tenant UX, numeric bounds, HAProxy reserved keywords, ALPN/TLS consistency, all-backup, multi-domain & multi-user enterprise edges, drain/HSTS/post-completion (Bulgu #34-#53). Round 18-21 concurrency, agent state, TCP-mode HTTP-only, list size caps, IPv6 scope-id, preview account validation, TCP backend + balance uri reject (Bulgu #54-#61). Round 22 FE error visibility + 3x stale-data lockouts, referential integrity + cascade safety, authentication & authorization, multi-cluster isolation, apply_pending_changes concurrency, script injection + bulk import multi-tenancy, prefix-stripped signature comparison (Bulgu #62-#82). ------------------------------------------------------------------ NO CORPORATE-SPECIFIC ARTIFACTS ------------------------------------------------------------------ This squash deliberately sanitises corporate hostnames, container registry references, and TLS secret names into generic placeholders (`your-registry.example.com/your-org`, `haproxy-openmanager*.example.com`, `wildcard-tls`, `taylanbakircioglu/haproxy-openmanager-*`) so the public artefact contains no internal infrastructure detail. Pilot / development history that retained those values stays in the corporate fork and is NOT part of this commit.
339 lines
12 KiB
Python
339 lines
12 KiB
Python
from fastapi import HTTPException, status
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from typing import Optional, Dict, Any
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from jose import jwt
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import logging
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from datetime import datetime, timedelta
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from config import JWT_SECRET_KEY, JWT_ALGORITHM
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from database.connection import get_database_connection, close_database_connection
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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async def get_current_user_from_token(authorization: Optional[str] = None) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
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"""Extract and validate user from JWT token"""
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if not authorization:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail="Authorization header missing"
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)
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try:
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# Remove 'Bearer ' prefix if present
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token = authorization.replace("Bearer ", "") if authorization.startswith("Bearer ") else authorization
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# Handle the case where frontend sends the string 'null' instead of null
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if token == 'null' or token == 'undefined' or not token:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail="Invalid token: null or undefined"
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)
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# Debug logging for token format issues
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logger.debug(f"Token received: {token[:50]}... (length: {len(token)})")
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# Check if token has proper JWT format (3 segments separated by dots)
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token_segments = token.split('.')
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if len(token_segments) != 3:
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logger.error(f"Invalid JWT format: token has {len(token_segments)} segments, expected 3")
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail=f"Invalid token format: expected 3 segments, got {len(token_segments)}"
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)
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# Decode JWT token
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payload = jwt.decode(token, JWT_SECRET_KEY, algorithms=[JWT_ALGORITHM])
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user_id = payload.get("sub") or payload.get("user_id") # Support both formats
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if not user_id:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail="Invalid token: missing user ID"
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)
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# Get user from database
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conn = await get_database_connection()
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user = await conn.fetchrow("""
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SELECT id, username, email, full_name, role, is_active, is_admin
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FROM users
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WHERE id = $1 AND is_active = TRUE
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""", int(user_id))
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await close_database_connection(conn)
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if not user:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail="User not found or inactive"
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)
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return {
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"id": user["id"],
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"username": user["username"],
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"email": user["email"],
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"full_name": user["full_name"],
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"role": user["role"],
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"is_admin": user.get("is_admin", False)
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}
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except jwt.ExpiredSignatureError:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail="Token has expired"
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)
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except (jwt.JWTError, AttributeError) as e:
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logger.error(f"JWT validation error: {e}")
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail="Invalid token"
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)
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except Exception as e:
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logger.error(f"Auth middleware error: {e}")
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail="Authentication failed"
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)
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async def get_current_user_from_token_no_exception(authorization: Optional[str] = None) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
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"""
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Get current user from JWT token without raising HTTPException.
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Returns None if authentication fails. Used for optional authentication in agent endpoints.
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"""
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if not authorization:
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return None
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try:
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# Remove 'Bearer ' prefix if present
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token = authorization.replace("Bearer ", "") if authorization.startswith("Bearer ") else authorization
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# Handle the case where frontend sends the string 'null' instead of null
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if token == 'null' or token == 'undefined' or not token:
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return None
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# Check if token has proper JWT format (3 segments separated by dots)
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token_segments = token.split('.')
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if len(token_segments) != 3:
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logger.debug(f"Invalid JWT format: token has {len(token_segments)} segments, expected 3")
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return None
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# Decode JWT token
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payload = jwt.decode(token, JWT_SECRET_KEY, algorithms=[JWT_ALGORITHM])
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user_id = payload.get("sub") or payload.get("user_id") # Support both formats
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if not user_id:
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return None
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# Get user from database
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conn = await get_database_connection()
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user = await conn.fetchrow("""
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SELECT id, username, email, full_name, is_active, is_admin
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FROM users
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WHERE id = $1 AND is_active = TRUE
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""", int(user_id))
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await close_database_connection(conn)
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if not user:
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return None
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return {
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"id": user["id"],
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"username": user["username"],
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"email": user["email"],
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"full_name": user["full_name"],
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"is_admin": user.get("is_admin", False)
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}
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except Exception as e:
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logger.debug(f"JWT validation failed (no exception): {e}")
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return None
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async def validate_agent_api_key(api_key: Optional[str] = None) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
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"""
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Validate agent API key for secure agent authentication.
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Returns agent info if valid, None otherwise.
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"""
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if not api_key:
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return None
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try:
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conn = await get_database_connection()
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# Check if API key exists and is valid
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agent = await conn.fetchrow("""
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SELECT id, name, pool_id, enabled, api_key_expires_at
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FROM agents
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WHERE api_key = $1 AND enabled = TRUE
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""", api_key)
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await close_database_connection(conn)
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if not agent:
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logger.warning(f"Invalid agent API key attempted: {api_key[:10]}...")
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return None
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# Check if API key has expired
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if agent['api_key_expires_at'] and agent['api_key_expires_at'] < datetime.utcnow():
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logger.warning(f"Expired agent API key for agent: {agent['name']}")
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return None
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return {
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"id": agent["id"],
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"name": agent["name"],
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"pool_id": agent["pool_id"],
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"type": "agent" # Mark as agent authentication
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}
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except Exception as e:
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logger.error(f"Agent API key validation error: {e}")
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return None
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async def get_user_permissions(user_id: int) -> Dict[str, Dict[str, bool]]:
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"""
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Get user permissions from their assigned roles
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Returns dict in format: {resource: {action: bool}}
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"""
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try:
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conn = await get_database_connection()
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# Get user roles and their permissions
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user_roles = await conn.fetch("""
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SELECT r.permissions
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FROM user_roles ur
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JOIN roles r ON ur.role_id = r.id
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WHERE ur.user_id = $1 AND r.is_active = true
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""", user_id)
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await close_database_connection(conn)
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# Combine all permissions from all roles
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combined_permissions = set()
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for role in user_roles:
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if role['permissions']:
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import json
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permissions = json.loads(role['permissions']) if isinstance(role['permissions'], str) else role['permissions']
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if isinstance(permissions, list):
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combined_permissions.update(permissions)
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# Convert flat permission list to nested dict format
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permissions_dict = {}
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for permission in combined_permissions:
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if '.' in permission:
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resource, action = permission.split('.', 1)
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if resource not in permissions_dict:
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permissions_dict[resource] = {}
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permissions_dict[resource][action] = True
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return permissions_dict
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except Exception as e:
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logger.error(f"Error getting user permissions for user {user_id}: {e}")
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return {}
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async def check_user_permission(
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user_id: int,
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resource: str,
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action: str,
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*,
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current_user: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
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) -> bool:
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"""
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Check if user has specific permission.
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R18c round 7 (Bulgu 1): system-wide admin bypass. A user with
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``users.is_admin = TRUE`` is the canonical super-admin and MUST pass
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every granular permission check, regardless of the role they're
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attached to. Otherwise enterprise admins were getting 403s on
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composite endpoints (e.g. wizard CREATE) when their role's
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``permissions`` JSONB didn't enumerate every individual action
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(backend.create, frontend.create, ssl.create, apply.execute).
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Two short-circuit paths:
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1. Caller already has ``current_user`` resolved (typical FastAPI
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endpoint) — pass it via the kwarg-only ``current_user`` to skip
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the DB roundtrip entirely.
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2. Caller doesn't have it — we run a single
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``SELECT is_admin FROM users WHERE id=$1 AND is_active=TRUE``
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before falling back to the role-based permission lookup.
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Backward-compat: positional 3-arg signature preserved.
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"""
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try:
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# Path 1: caller-provided current_user dict
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if current_user is not None and current_user.get("is_admin") is True:
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logger.debug(
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"Admin bypass for %s.%s (user_id=%s, via current_user)",
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resource, action, user_id,
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)
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return True
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# Path 2: cheap is_admin lookup before role-permissions join
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conn = await get_database_connection()
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try:
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row = await conn.fetchrow(
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"SELECT is_admin FROM users WHERE id = $1 AND is_active = TRUE",
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int(user_id),
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)
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finally:
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await close_database_connection(conn)
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if row and row.get("is_admin") is True:
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logger.debug(
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"Admin bypass for %s.%s (user_id=%s, via DB lookup)",
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resource, action, user_id,
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)
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return True
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permissions = await get_user_permissions(user_id)
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return permissions.get(resource, {}).get(action, False)
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except Exception as e:
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logger.error(f"Error checking permission for user {user_id}: {e}")
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return False
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async def get_current_user_with_permissions(authorization: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict[str, Any]:
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"""
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Get current user with their permissions included
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"""
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user = await get_current_user_from_token(authorization)
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permissions = await get_user_permissions(user["id"])
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return {
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**user,
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"permissions": permissions
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}
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def require_permission(resource: str, action: str):
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"""
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Decorator to require specific permission for endpoint access
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"""
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def decorator(func):
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import functools
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@functools.wraps(func)
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async def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
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# Extract authorization header from kwargs or function signature
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authorization = kwargs.get('authorization')
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if not authorization:
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# Try to find authorization in function arguments
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import inspect
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sig = inspect.signature(func)
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for param_name, param in sig.parameters.items():
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if param_name == 'authorization' and param_name in kwargs:
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authorization = kwargs[param_name]
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break
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# Get current user
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user = await get_current_user_from_token(authorization)
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# Check permission
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has_permission = await check_user_permission(user["id"], resource, action)
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if not has_permission:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
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detail=f"Insufficient permissions: {resource}.{action} required"
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)
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# Add user to kwargs for endpoint use
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kwargs['current_user'] = user
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return await func(*args, **kwargs)
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return wrapper
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return decorator |