haproxy-openmanager/UPGRADE_GUIDE.md

Upgrade Notes — v1.10.3 (Multi-account ACME wizard fix)

Frontend only. Nothing to do on upgrade. No schema, no SCHEMA_VERSION bump, no API change, no environment variable, zero agent impact. Installations with a single ACME account behave exactly as before.

• What was broken: with more than one ACME account registered, the Request ACME Certificate wizard did not honour the account you selected. Choosing an HTTP-01 account still submitted a DNS-01 request, which the API rejected with The selected ACME account has no DNS provider configured for DNS-01. The Review step also named the default account rather than the chosen one, so the mismatch was invisible before submitting.
• Default account: the wizard previously previewed the oldest valid account while the backend uses the newest (ORDER BY created_at DESC). If you never picked an account explicitly and have several, requests were already going to the newest one — only the preview was wrong. The wizard now previews that same account, marks it (default), and sends account_id explicitly so the two can no longer diverge.
• Wildcard guard: the client-side "wildcard requires a DNS-01 account" block silently stopped applying on the Review step. Requests were still rejected by the backend, so nothing incorrect was ever issued — you now get the warning before submitting instead of an error after.
• No action needed on existing certificates or orders. Nothing about issuance, renewal or the stored accounts changes; only how the wizard resolves which account a new request uses.
• Rollback: downgrade freely. This release changes frontend behaviour only.

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Upgrade Notes — v1.10.2 (Dark mode fixes on Apply Management)

Frontend only. Nothing to do on upgrade. No schema, no SCHEMA_VERSION bump, no API change, no environment variable, zero agent impact. Light mode is byte-identical: every colour swapped in this release resolves, under the default algorithm, to exactly the literal it replaced (colorWarningBg → #fffbe6, colorSuccessBg → #f6ffed, colorErrorBg → #fff2f0, …), so only dark mode changes.

• Apply Management panels were painted with light-mode colour literals, so in dark mode the "Pending Changes" box rendered as a cream panel with light text on it. Measured contrast was 1.03:1 — effectively invisible. It is now 11.50:1. The same class of bug affected the diff rows in View Change (2.21:1 and 2.99:1, now 5.49:1 and 4.01:1), the ACME/pending version panels, the VIP pending-delete row and the agent-error recommendation box.
• Static confirm dialogs came up white in dark mode. In Ant Design 5 the static Modal.confirm / message / notification APIs render into their own detached root and never see the app's ConfigProvider, so they always used the light algorithm. This release registers ConfigProvider.config({ holderRender }) once at the app root, which fixes every static dialog in the app (12 components use them), not just Apply Management.
• Rollback: downgrade freely. This release changes rendering only.

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Upgrade Notes — v1.10.1 (CSR private key encrypted at rest)

Backward compatible. Nothing to do on upgrade, and nothing changes for existing clusters, agents or certificates:

• Schema: no SCHEMA_VERSION bump and no migration. The Fernet token replaces the PEM inside the existing ssl_csrs.private_key_pem TEXT column. As in v1.10.0, this means the four built-in roles are not re-seeded, so any customization of super_admin / operator / security_admin / viewer survives.
• Existing pending CSRs keep working. Rows written before this release hold a raw PEM and are still read transparently, so a CSR that is already out for signature can be imported normally after the upgrade. There is no data migration and no downtime step. Those rows stay plaintext until they are imported (which NULLs the key) — if you want everything encrypted immediately, delete and re-create any long-pending CSRs.
• Scope: this covers the PENDING CSR key only. It is the one key in the system that sits idle for the whole signing window and is never transmitted. ssl_certificates.private_key_content and the ACME order keys are unchanged, because agents must receive those in plaintext on every poll.
• Optional env: CSR_ENCRYPTION_KEY (see .env.template). If unset, the key is derived from SECRET_KEY via HKDF with its own info string, so it is independent of the VIP, MFA and DNS provider keys.
  • ⚠️ Rotating SECRET_KEY while CSR_ENCRYPTION_KEY is unset makes pending CSR keys unrecoverable. Import then fails with an explicit "delete this CSR and create a new one" error rather than a misleading key-mismatch. Set an explicit CSR_ENCRYPTION_KEY if you rotate SECRET_KEY. Certificates already imported are unaffected — their key lives on the certificate row.
• API / UI / agents: unchanged. No CSR endpoint ever returned the private key before or now, and nothing about the CSR tab changes.
• Rollback: the application downgrades cleanly — 1.10.0 starts normally against the same database and every other feature is unaffected. The one casualty is a CSR created on 1.10.1 and still pending: 1.10.0 has no decrypt step, so it hands the Fernet token straight to the key-pairing check. Measured on a real downgrade, the import then fails with HTTP 500 — Could not verify the certificate/key pair: key parse failed (encrypted?); it does not silently pair the wrong key, and it does not corrupt anything. Import or delete CSRs created on 1.10.1 before downgrading. Certificates already imported are unaffected, since their key lives on the certificate row, and CSRs created before 1.10.1 are plaintext and still work.

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Upgrade Notes — v1.10.0 (GoDaddy DNS-01 provider)

Backward compatible & additive. Nothing changes unless you select GoDaddy as an ACME account's DNS provider:

• Schema: no SCHEMA_VERSION bump. The GoDaddy credentials (API Key + Secret) are stored as two keys inside the existing encrypted letsencrypt_account_dns_credentials.credentials_encrypted blob — no new table, no new column, no migration.
• ✅ Built-in roles are NOT re-seeded. The re-seed warning in the v1.9.0 notes below is triggered by a SCHEMA_VERSION bump. This release does not bump it, so any customization you made to super_admin / operator / security_admin / viewer survives untouched.
• Permissions / API shape: unchanged. GET /api/letsencrypt/dns-providers simply returns one extra entry in its providers array; every request and response shape is identical, and the credential form is rendered from that schema, so there is no frontend behaviour change either.
• Environment: no new variable. GoDaddy credentials use the same Fernet-at-rest path as Cloudflare (DNS_PROVIDER_ENCRYPTION_KEY, falling back to a key derived from SECRET_KEY).
• Agents: zero agent changes. DNS-01 is invisible to agents; an issued certificate follows the normal PENDING → Apply Management → agent pull pipeline exactly as before.
• Using it: the API Key must be a Production key from developer.godaddy.com/keys (the first key that dashboard issues is an OTE/test key and is rejected), the zone must be in the same GoDaddy account, and that account needs at least one registered domain before GoDaddy permits DNS API access. A Personal Access Token also works — paste it as the Key and leave the Secret blank. Credentials are checked against the GoDaddy API before they are stored, so an invalid, OTE or ineligible key fails at save time. Note the check is a read: a Personal Access Token that has domains.domain:read but not domains.dns:update saves successfully and only fails at the first publish, with a 403 in the order timeline.
• Rollback: don't select GoDaddy. Existing Manual and Cloudflare accounts and all HTTP-01 issuance are untouched. Downgrading after adopting GoDaddy is not a no-op: on 1.9.0 godaddy is not a known provider, so any account still set to it degrades to the manual-confirm path (in-flight DNS-01 orders wait for a confirmation nobody can give and expire after 48h, and renewals stop), and the cleanup sweep marks published TXT records cleaned without removing them. Before downgrading, switch affected accounts back to Manual or Cloudflare and let the reconcile sweep remove outstanding _acme-challenge records first. The stored credential row itself is inert — an encrypted blob for an unknown provider.

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Upgrade Notes — v1.9.0 (CSR creation)

Backward compatible & additive. Upgrading to v1.9.0 changes nothing for existing clusters/agents until you create a CSR:

• Schema: SCHEMA_VERSION bumps to 10, so on first start the (idempotent) migration sequence re-runs once and adds one new table (ssl_csrs) plus its indexes. No existing table is altered, existing rows are untouched, and the admin password is not reset (the default-user seeding is guarded by an existence check, not an upsert). No new permission strings are introduced — all CSR endpoints are governed by the existing ssl.create / ssl.read / ssl.delete permissions.
• ⚠️ Built-in roles are re-seeded to their defaults (pre-existing behaviour of every SCHEMA_VERSION bump — verified in a v1.8.10 → v1.9.0 upgrade drill). Because the version gate re-runs the whole sequence, update_system_roles_to_enterprise_rbac() issues an unconditional UPDATE roles SET … permissions = <defaults> WHERE name = … for the four built-in roles (super_admin, operator, security_admin, viewer). Any customization you made to a built-in role is reverted. In the drill, an operator role that had been narrowed by removing apply.execute and config.bulk_import came back with both restored (57 → 59 permissions).
  • Roles you created yourself are NOT affected — the re-seed matches on the four built-in names only.
  • This is not new in v1.9.0: it happens on every release that bumps SCHEMA_VERSION (v1.7.0, v1.8.0, v1.8.8 …). It is documented as intentional at backend/database/migrations.py (the "BUMP THIS … OR seeded/role data" note) — the migration is treated as the authority on built-in-role contents.
  • If you have hardened a built-in role, do this: export it before upgrading (GET /api/roles), then re-apply your changes after the first start (PUT /api/roles/{id}) — or, preferably, move your customization into a purpose-made custom role, which survives every upgrade.
• Key storage: CSR private keys are stored in the database like every other key in the system (ssl_certificates.private_key_content and the ACME order keys). The key is never returned by any CSR API endpoint, and after a successful import the CSR row's key copy is set to NULL (the key then lives only on the certificate row).
• Agents: zero agent changes. Agents never read the new table; a CSR becomes visible to agents only after its signed certificate is imported and applied via Apply Management (the standard PENDING pipeline).
• Rollback: simply don't use the CSR tab. The ssl_csrs table is inert when empty; downgrading the application leaves it as an ignored extra table.

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Upgrade Notes — v1.7.0 (HA / VIP Keepalived management, Issue #27)

Backward compatible & opt-in. Upgrading to v1.7.0 changes nothing for existing clusters/agents until you create a VIP:

• Schema: SCHEMA_VERSION bumps to 3, so on first start the (idempotent) migration sequence re-runs once and adds two new tables (vip_instances, vip_members) plus an additive vip_instances.applied_snapshot column (enables rejecting a pending VIP change and restoring the previous applied state). No existing table is altered. Existing rows and the admin password are not reset (default users are create-if-missing). The only data effect is that the four built-in system roles (super_admin/operator/security_admin/viewer) are re-seeded to their canonical permission sets plus the new vip.* permissions — this is the long-standing behavior of the role seeder; custom roles are untouched.
• Agents: the agent script gains an opt-in keepalived deploy that is a no-op on any node without an applied VIP, and it never overwrites a hand-managed /etc/keepalived/keepalived.conf (it reports "externally managed" instead).
• Scope: VRRP VIPs target bare-metal / VMware / on-prem L2 networks. On AWS/Azure/GCP the cloud fabric doesn't honor VRRP/gratuitous-ARP; the UI surfaces this. Ensure host firewalls permit VRRP (IP protocol 112).
• Optional env: VIP_ENCRYPTION_KEY (see .env.template) — if unset, the VRRP secret encryption key is derived from SECRET_KEY (like MFA).

No rollback steps are required to disable the feature: simply don't create VIPs (or delete them — agents tear down their managed keepalived on the next poll).

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Agent Upgrade Guide - Dashboard Stats Fix

Problem

Dashboard showing 0 metrics after agent auto-upgrade due to missing environment variables (SOCAT_BIN, STATS_SOCKET_PATH) when agent restarts in daemon mode.

Solution

Implemented lazy initialization in both get_haproxy_stats_csv() and get_server_statuses() functions. These functions now initialize their dependencies on first call, making them completely independent of global variable initialization.

Deployment Steps

Step 1: Wait for Pipeline ⏳

# Pipeline is currently running after git push
# Check status: https://[your-azure-devops]/pipeline
# Wait for deployment to complete (~3-5 minutes)

Step 2: Verify Backend Deployment ✅

# Check backend logs for successful deployment
kubectl logs -f deployment/backend -n haproxy-manager | head -20

# Expected: New pod started with latest code

Step 3: Update Agent Version in UI 🔄

Option A: Automatic Script Sync (Recommended)

# Get admin token
TOKEN=$(curl -k -s -X POST "https://haproxy-manager.example.com/api/auth/login" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username": "admin", "password": "admin123"}' | jq -r '.access_token')

# Sync scripts from files to database (creates version 1.0.0)
curl -k -X POST "https://haproxy-manager.example.com/api/agents/sync-scripts-from-files" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq .

# Expected: {"status": "success", "synced": ["linux", "macos"]}

Option B: Manual UI Update

1. Go to Agent Management page
2. Click Settings → Agent Versions
3. For Linux platform:
   • Click Edit Script
   • Version: Keep current or increment (e.g., 1.0.3)
   • Changelog: Add "Fixed stats collection after upgrade"
   • Click Save (this syncs file content to database)
4. Repeat for macOS platform

Step 4: Upgrade Agents 🚀

Option A: UI (Single Agent)

1. Go to Agent Management page
2. Select agent (e.g., demo-agent)
3. Click Upgrade button
4. Wait 30 seconds for agent to restart

Option B: API (Batch Upgrade)

# Get all agents
curl -k -s -X GET "https://haproxy-manager.example.com/api/agents" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq '.agents[] | {id, name, version}'

# Upgrade specific agent (replace {agent_id})
curl -k -X POST "https://haproxy-manager.example.com/api/agents/{agent_id}/upgrade" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq .

Step 5: Verify Stats Collection 📊

Backend Logs (30 seconds after upgrade):

kubectl logs -f deployment/backend -n haproxy-manager | grep -E "haproxy_stats_csv|demo-agent"

# Expected logs:
# ✅ "Has haproxy_stats_csv: True"
# ✅ "CSV preview: IyBweG..." (base64 data)
# ✅ "STATS: Parsed 15 rows for cluster demo-cluster1"

Agent Logs (on agent server):

sudo tail -f /var/log/haproxy-agent/agent.log | grep STATS

# Expected logs:
# ✅ "STATS: Initialized socat: /usr/bin/socat"
# ✅ "STATS: Using default socket path: /var/run/haproxy/admin.sock"
# ✅ "STATS: Fetched CSV: 2121 bytes, 9 lines, base64: 2828 chars"

Dashboard UI:

1. Open Dashboard page
2. Refresh page (F5)
3. Check metrics:
   • ✅ Frontend/Backend filters populated
   • ✅ Overview metrics showing real data (not 0)
   • ✅ Charts showing data points
   • ✅ "Waiting for Agent Data" warning gone

Troubleshooting

Issue: Backend still shows "Has haproxy_stats_csv: False"

Cause: Agent hasn't upgraded yet or using old script version

Solution:

# Check agent version on agent server
grep "AGENT_VERSION" /usr/local/bin/haproxy-agent | head -1

# Force agent restart
sudo systemctl restart haproxy-agent

# Check logs immediately
sudo tail -20 /var/log/haproxy-agent/agent.log

Issue: "STATS: socat not available"

Cause: socat not installed

Solution:

# Install socat
sudo yum install -y socat  # RHEL/CentOS
sudo apt install -y socat  # Debian/Ubuntu

# Restart agent
sudo systemctl restart haproxy-agent

Issue: "STATS: Socket not found: /var/run/haproxy/admin.sock"

Cause: HAProxy stats socket not configured

Solution:

# Check HAProxy config for stats socket
grep "stats socket" /etc/haproxy/haproxy.cfg

# Add if missing (in global section):
# stats socket /var/run/haproxy/admin.sock mode 666 level admin

# Reload HAProxy
sudo systemctl reload haproxy

Verification Checklist

• Pipeline completed successfully
• Backend pod restarted with new code
• Agent scripts synced to database (version visible in UI)
• Agents upgraded to new version
• Backend logs show "Has haproxy_stats_csv: True"
• Agent logs show STATS messages
• Dashboard showing real metrics
• Charts populated with data
• No "Waiting for Agent Data" warning

Next Upgrades

This fix is permanent. Future agent upgrades will NOT break stats collection because:

1. ✅ Functions are self-contained with lazy initialization
2. ✅ No dependency on global variable initialization order
3. ✅ Works in any restart scenario (systemd, daemon mode, upgrade)
4. ✅ Backward compatible with existing agents

No manual intervention needed for future upgrades! 🎉