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taylanbakircioglu 02b1cb2bca feat: v1.5.0 — Site Wizard (Issue #14) + ACME Diagnostic Panel (Issue #13)
Closes #13, Closes #14.

This release squashes the v1.4.0 → v1.5.0 development line. v1.4.0
shipped the ACME stability & enterprise audit (Issues #10/#11/#12).
v1.5.0 builds on that foundation with two co-equal headline features
plus a 22-round audit campaign hardening the prior configuration
surface. License remains MIT for v1.5.0 (relicense to AGPL-3.0
lands in v1.5.2).

------------------------------------------------------------------
HEADLINE FEATURE A — ACME Diagnostic Panel (Issue #13)
------------------------------------------------------------------
A live pre-flight + post-failure diagnostic surface for every ACME
order, reachable from the ACME Automation page. The panel exists
to make ACME failures legible to operators who do NOT have shell
access to the API host.

Endpoints (`backend/routers/acme_diagnostics.py`):
  POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics
       Run the full 5-check suite (DNS / port-80 / routing /
       account / agents) and humanize the order's `error_detail`
       (>=11 RFC-8555 problem types, backwards compatible with
       legacy plain-string failures).
  POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics/
                                {check_id}/rerun
       Re-run a single check in place — used by the "Re-run"
       button on every row of the modal's pre-flight table.
  GET  /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/events
       Merged event timeline combining the typed
       `acme_order_events` rows with correlated
       `user_activity_logs` entries (resource_type =
       'letsencrypt_order' AND resource_id = order_id). The
       diagnostic modal auto-tails this timeline every 5 seconds
       while open.

Service-level checks (`backend/services/acme_diagnostics.py`):
  * DNS resolution via stdlib socket.gethostbyname_ex through
    run_in_executor (intentionally avoiding an aiodns runtime
    dep for v1.5.0).
  * Port-80 HEAD probe, target locked to the order's domains,
    success on HTTP 200 OR 404, warns on egress timeout
    (corp egress policies routinely blackhole outbound 80 —
    fail-hard would be too noisy).
  * SSRF guard: probe refuses non-public IPs and surfaces the
    skip in the diagnostic result; IPv4-mapped IPv6 normalisation
    closes the `::ffff:169.254.169.254` cloud-metadata vector.
  * HAProxy routing presence check: matches the order's
    cluster_ids to a port-80 HTTP frontend.
  * ACME account validity check against `letsencrypt_accounts`.
  * Agent presence check (>=1 active agent in target cluster).
  * Every sub-check wrapped in a wall-clock timeout to bound
    impact on the API event loop.

RBAC: ssl.read for run, ssl.read for events. Per-user 5/min rate
limit on both run and rerun, backed by the (user_id, action,
created_at DESC) composite index.

Frontend (`frontend/src/components/ACMEAutomation.js`):
  * "Diagnose" button on every order row + the existing
    "stuck order" warning row.
  * Modal with two tabs:
    - Pre-flight Checks (Antd Table with status pills + Re-run
      buttons + humanized error banner)
    - Event Log (Antd Timeline with auto-tail polling, scroll-
      to-bottom, pause-on-hover)
  * Correlation IDs surfaced in error banners and individual
    check fail details for backend-log lookup.

------------------------------------------------------------------
HEADLINE FEATURE B — Site Setup Wizard (Issue #14)
------------------------------------------------------------------
A single guided flow that creates a Backend + Servers + HTTP
Frontend (and optional HTTPS Frontend) in one atomic transaction.

Endpoints (`backend/routers/site_wizard.py`):
  POST /api/site-wizard/preview     — diff-preview the changeset
  POST /api/site-wizard/create      — atomic execute
  POST /api/site-wizard/reject      — clean rollback (including
                                       any wizard_staged ACME
                                       orders)
  GET  /api/site-wizard/drafts      — draft persistence
  PUT  /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id} — save/update
  DELETE /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id}

Feature surface:
  * One screen captures both backend (mode + servers) AND
    frontend (http + optional https + SSL mode) inputs.
  * SSL modes: ACME (new order, HTTP-01 only for v1.5.0),
    Upload (existing PEM), Existing (link to a stored cert),
    or None.
  * ACME-staged path: wizard_staged_until watermark on the
    `letsencrypt_orders` row defers finalisation until agent
    confirmation; per-mode reject cleanly cancels and rolls
    back the staged order.
  * Live diff preview against the cluster's current generated
    config (renderer-evolution noise stripped — track-sc<N>
    dedup, per-server cookie strip, defaults-cookie
    inheritance, listen-block flattening).
  * Draft persistence with PEM stripped at save time (private
    keys never round-trip through the drafts table).
  * Per-cluster multi-tenancy: drafts and wizard_staged orders
    are isolated to the creating user's cluster scope.

Frontend (`frontend/src/components/SiteWizard.js`):
  * 4-step Antd Steps flow: Backend → Frontend → SSL → Review.
  * Render the live diff preview inline before commit.
  * Antd Form-level validation mirrors backend Pydantic
    validators (numeric bounds, HAProxy reserved keywords, ALPN
    consistency, IPv6 scope-id, domain regex, server name
    dedup).

------------------------------------------------------------------
AUDIT CAMPAIGN — Rounds 1 → 22 (Bulgu #1#82)
------------------------------------------------------------------
v1.5.0 includes 22 adversarial review passes. Each round produced
its own commit set in the corporate development line; this squash
collapses those into the v1.5.0 release artefact. Highlights:

  Round 1-4   Site Wizard core: dry-run parity, single-line
              value injection guard, ACL -f pattern-file block,
              SSL parity, timeout regex, form-state pin.
  Round 5-7   defaults-cookie inheritance, server-named-cookie
              guard, fe/be mode mismatch, duplicate server
              names, health_check_uri + server_address
              validators.
  Round 8-10  cookie_name / cookie_options newline-injection
              guard, dry-run parity (round 9), TCP-mode HTTP-only
              feature blockers.
  Round 11    SSL name path traversal + health-check >= 1.
  Round 12-13 SSL & ACME deep dive (Bulgu #23-#32).
  Round 14    single-line value injection (Bulgu #33).
  Round 15-17 ACME multi-tenant UX, numeric bounds, HAProxy
              reserved keywords, ALPN/TLS consistency,
              all-backup, multi-domain & multi-user enterprise
              edges, drain/HSTS/post-completion (Bulgu
              #34-#53).
  Round 18-21 concurrency, agent state, TCP-mode HTTP-only,
              list size caps, IPv6 scope-id, preview account
              validation, TCP backend + balance uri reject
              (Bulgu #54-#61).
  Round 22    FE error visibility + 3x stale-data lockouts,
              referential integrity + cascade safety,
              authentication & authorization, multi-cluster
              isolation, apply_pending_changes concurrency,
              script injection + bulk import multi-tenancy,
              prefix-stripped signature comparison
              (Bulgu #62-#82).

------------------------------------------------------------------
NO CORPORATE-SPECIFIC ARTIFACTS
------------------------------------------------------------------
This squash deliberately sanitises corporate hostnames, container
registry references, and TLS secret names into generic
placeholders (`your-registry.example.com/your-org`,
`haproxy-openmanager*.example.com`, `wildcard-tls`,
`taylanbakircioglu/haproxy-openmanager-*`) so the public artefact
contains no internal infrastructure detail. Pilot / development
history that retained those values stays in the corporate fork
and is NOT part of this commit.
2026-05-14 00:04:19 +03:00

273 lines
10 KiB
Python

import asyncio
import json
import logging
from datetime import datetime
from typing import Optional, Dict, Any
from database.connection import get_database_connection, close_database_connection
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
async def log_user_activity(
user_id: int,
action: str,
resource_type: str,
resource_id: Optional[str] = None,
details: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
ip_address: Optional[str] = None,
user_agent: Optional[str] = None
):
"""Log user activity to the database"""
try:
conn = await get_database_connection()
# Serialize details to JSON if it's a dict
details_json = json.dumps(details) if details and isinstance(details, dict) else details
# Try with created_at column first, then fallback
try:
await conn.execute("""
INSERT INTO user_activity_logs
(user_id, action, resource_type, resource_id, details, ip_address, user_agent, created_at)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8)
""", user_id, action, resource_type, resource_id,
details_json, ip_address, user_agent, datetime.utcnow())
except Exception as column_error:
logger.warning(f"created_at column not found, trying fallback: {column_error}")
# Fallback without created_at column
await conn.execute("""
INSERT INTO user_activity_logs
(user_id, action, resource_type, resource_id, details, ip_address, user_agent)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7)
""", user_id, action, resource_type, resource_id,
details_json, ip_address, user_agent)
await close_database_connection(conn)
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to log user activity: {e}")
# Don't raise exception - activity logging should not break the main flow
async def get_user_activity_logs(
user_id: Optional[int] = None,
limit: int = 100,
offset: int = 0
) -> list:
"""Get user activity logs"""
try:
conn = await get_database_connection()
# Schema-safe activity log queries
try:
if user_id:
logs = await conn.fetch("""
SELECT ual.*, u.username
FROM user_activity_logs ual
LEFT JOIN users u ON ual.user_id = u.id
WHERE ual.user_id = $1
ORDER BY ual.created_at DESC
LIMIT $2 OFFSET $3
""", user_id, limit, offset)
else:
logs = await conn.fetch("""
SELECT ual.*, u.username
FROM user_activity_logs ual
LEFT JOIN users u ON ual.user_id = u.id
ORDER BY ual.created_at DESC
LIMIT $1 OFFSET $2
""", limit, offset)
except Exception as schema_error:
logger.warning(f"Schema error in activity logs, using fallback: {schema_error}")
# Fallback without ORDER BY created_at
if user_id:
logs = await conn.fetch("""
SELECT ual.*, u.username
FROM user_activity_logs ual
LEFT JOIN users u ON ual.user_id = u.id
WHERE ual.user_id = $1
LIMIT $2 OFFSET $3
""", user_id, limit, offset)
else:
logs = await conn.fetch("""
SELECT ual.*, u.username
FROM user_activity_logs ual
LEFT JOIN users u ON ual.user_id = u.id
LIMIT $1 OFFSET $2
""", limit, offset)
await close_database_connection(conn)
return logs
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Failed to get user activity logs: {e}")
return []
# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
# v1.5.0 Feature A (Issue #13): typed ACME order event log helper
# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
async def record_event(
order_id: int,
event_type: str,
*,
severity: str = "INFO",
message: Optional[str] = None,
details: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
correlation_id: Optional[str] = None,
conn=None,
) -> Optional[int]:
"""Insert a typed event row into acme_order_events.
Wrapped in try/except so that an event-log DB failure NEVER breaks the
main ACME flow (Section 5.2 of the v1.5.0 plan).
M24: when `conn` is passed in (e.g. inside the
complete_pending_acme_orders pool-pressure-sensitive task), reuse the
existing connection instead of acquiring a new one from the pool.
Returns the inserted row id, or None on failure.
"""
own_conn = False
try:
if conn is None:
conn = await get_database_connection()
own_conn = True
details_json = json.dumps(details or {}) if not isinstance(details, str) else details
try:
row_id = await conn.fetchval(
"""
INSERT INTO acme_order_events (
order_id, event_type, severity, message, details, correlation_id
) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5::jsonb, $6)
RETURNING id
""",
order_id,
event_type,
severity.upper() if severity else "INFO",
message,
details_json,
correlation_id,
)
return row_id
except Exception as e:
# Most likely cause: acme_order_events table missing in older
# deployments (migration not yet run). NEVER raise.
logger.debug(
f"record_event: insert failed (order_id={order_id}, "
f"event_type={event_type}): {e}"
)
return None
except Exception as e:
logger.debug(f"record_event: outer failure (order_id={order_id}): {e}")
return None
finally:
if own_conn and conn is not None:
try:
await close_database_connection(conn)
except Exception:
pass
async def prune_acme_events_and_drafts_if_due() -> Dict[str, int]:
"""Daily-watermarked TTL prune (M30 / Section 5.3 of v1.5.0 plan).
- acme_order_events: 90d retention.
- wizard_drafts: 30d retention (also pruned by expires_at < NOW() since
that column exists explicitly).
Watermarking via system_settings (dot-notation keys —
`acme.events_last_pruned_at` / `wizard.drafts_last_pruned_at`)
ensures multi-replica deployments only run the prune once per day.
Always returns a dict with the (possibly zero) prune counts. Never raises.
"""
counts = {"acme_events": 0, "wizard_drafts": 0}
conn = None
try:
conn = await get_database_connection()
async def _maybe_run(setting_key: str, ttl_query: str) -> int:
"""Returns # rows pruned, or 0 if not yet due."""
try:
row = await conn.fetchrow(
"SELECT value FROM system_settings WHERE key = $1",
setting_key,
)
last_at: Optional[datetime] = None
if row and row["value"] is not None:
raw = row["value"]
if isinstance(raw, str):
try:
raw = json.loads(raw)
except json.JSONDecodeError:
raw = None
if isinstance(raw, str):
try:
last_at = datetime.fromisoformat(raw.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
except ValueError:
last_at = None
if last_at is not None:
age_seconds = (datetime.utcnow() - last_at.replace(tzinfo=None)).total_seconds()
if age_seconds < 24 * 3600:
return 0
result = await conn.execute(ttl_query)
count = 0
if isinstance(result, str) and result.startswith("DELETE "):
try:
count = int(result.split()[-1])
except (ValueError, IndexError):
count = 0
ts_value = json.dumps(datetime.utcnow().isoformat() + "Z")
await conn.execute(
"""
INSERT INTO system_settings (key, value, category, description)
VALUES ($1, $2::jsonb, $3, $4)
ON CONFLICT (key) DO UPDATE
SET value = EXCLUDED.value, updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
""",
setting_key,
ts_value,
"acme" if setting_key.startswith("acme.") else "wizard",
"Internal: last daily prune timestamp (v1.5.0)",
)
return count
except Exception as inner:
logger.debug(f"prune watermark step failed for {setting_key}: {inner}")
return 0
# acme_order_events 90d
counts["acme_events"] = await _maybe_run(
"acme.events_last_pruned_at",
"DELETE FROM acme_order_events WHERE created_at < NOW() - INTERVAL '90 days'",
)
# wizard_drafts 30d (also catches expires_at-passed rows)
counts["wizard_drafts"] = await _maybe_run(
"wizard.drafts_last_pruned_at",
"""
DELETE FROM wizard_drafts
WHERE created_at < NOW() - INTERVAL '30 days'
OR expires_at < NOW()
""",
)
if counts["acme_events"] or counts["wizard_drafts"]:
logger.info(
f"v1.5.0 daily prune: acme_events={counts['acme_events']} "
f"wizard_drafts={counts['wizard_drafts']}"
)
return counts
except Exception as e:
logger.debug(f"prune_acme_events_and_drafts_if_due: {e}")
return counts
finally:
if conn is not None:
try:
await close_database_connection(conn)
except Exception:
pass