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02b1cb2bca
Closes #13, Closes #14. This release squashes the v1.4.0 → v1.5.0 development line. v1.4.0 shipped the ACME stability & enterprise audit (Issues #10/#11/#12). v1.5.0 builds on that foundation with two co-equal headline features plus a 22-round audit campaign hardening the prior configuration surface. License remains MIT for v1.5.0 (relicense to AGPL-3.0 lands in v1.5.2). ------------------------------------------------------------------ HEADLINE FEATURE A — ACME Diagnostic Panel (Issue #13) ------------------------------------------------------------------ A live pre-flight + post-failure diagnostic surface for every ACME order, reachable from the ACME Automation page. The panel exists to make ACME failures legible to operators who do NOT have shell access to the API host. Endpoints (`backend/routers/acme_diagnostics.py`): POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics Run the full 5-check suite (DNS / port-80 / routing / account / agents) and humanize the order's `error_detail` (>=11 RFC-8555 problem types, backwards compatible with legacy plain-string failures). POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics/ {check_id}/rerun Re-run a single check in place — used by the "Re-run" button on every row of the modal's pre-flight table. GET /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/events Merged event timeline combining the typed `acme_order_events` rows with correlated `user_activity_logs` entries (resource_type = 'letsencrypt_order' AND resource_id = order_id). The diagnostic modal auto-tails this timeline every 5 seconds while open. Service-level checks (`backend/services/acme_diagnostics.py`): * DNS resolution via stdlib socket.gethostbyname_ex through run_in_executor (intentionally avoiding an aiodns runtime dep for v1.5.0). * Port-80 HEAD probe, target locked to the order's domains, success on HTTP 200 OR 404, warns on egress timeout (corp egress policies routinely blackhole outbound 80 — fail-hard would be too noisy). * SSRF guard: probe refuses non-public IPs and surfaces the skip in the diagnostic result; IPv4-mapped IPv6 normalisation closes the `::ffff:169.254.169.254` cloud-metadata vector. * HAProxy routing presence check: matches the order's cluster_ids to a port-80 HTTP frontend. * ACME account validity check against `letsencrypt_accounts`. * Agent presence check (>=1 active agent in target cluster). * Every sub-check wrapped in a wall-clock timeout to bound impact on the API event loop. RBAC: ssl.read for run, ssl.read for events. Per-user 5/min rate limit on both run and rerun, backed by the (user_id, action, created_at DESC) composite index. Frontend (`frontend/src/components/ACMEAutomation.js`): * "Diagnose" button on every order row + the existing "stuck order" warning row. * Modal with two tabs: - Pre-flight Checks (Antd Table with status pills + Re-run buttons + humanized error banner) - Event Log (Antd Timeline with auto-tail polling, scroll- to-bottom, pause-on-hover) * Correlation IDs surfaced in error banners and individual check fail details for backend-log lookup. ------------------------------------------------------------------ HEADLINE FEATURE B — Site Setup Wizard (Issue #14) ------------------------------------------------------------------ A single guided flow that creates a Backend + Servers + HTTP Frontend (and optional HTTPS Frontend) in one atomic transaction. Endpoints (`backend/routers/site_wizard.py`): POST /api/site-wizard/preview — diff-preview the changeset POST /api/site-wizard/create — atomic execute POST /api/site-wizard/reject — clean rollback (including any wizard_staged ACME orders) GET /api/site-wizard/drafts — draft persistence PUT /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id} — save/update DELETE /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id} Feature surface: * One screen captures both backend (mode + servers) AND frontend (http + optional https + SSL mode) inputs. * SSL modes: ACME (new order, HTTP-01 only for v1.5.0), Upload (existing PEM), Existing (link to a stored cert), or None. * ACME-staged path: wizard_staged_until watermark on the `letsencrypt_orders` row defers finalisation until agent confirmation; per-mode reject cleanly cancels and rolls back the staged order. * Live diff preview against the cluster's current generated config (renderer-evolution noise stripped — track-sc<N> dedup, per-server cookie strip, defaults-cookie inheritance, listen-block flattening). * Draft persistence with PEM stripped at save time (private keys never round-trip through the drafts table). * Per-cluster multi-tenancy: drafts and wizard_staged orders are isolated to the creating user's cluster scope. Frontend (`frontend/src/components/SiteWizard.js`): * 4-step Antd Steps flow: Backend → Frontend → SSL → Review. * Render the live diff preview inline before commit. * Antd Form-level validation mirrors backend Pydantic validators (numeric bounds, HAProxy reserved keywords, ALPN consistency, IPv6 scope-id, domain regex, server name dedup). ------------------------------------------------------------------ AUDIT CAMPAIGN — Rounds 1 → 22 (Bulgu #1 → #82) ------------------------------------------------------------------ v1.5.0 includes 22 adversarial review passes. Each round produced its own commit set in the corporate development line; this squash collapses those into the v1.5.0 release artefact. Highlights: Round 1-4 Site Wizard core: dry-run parity, single-line value injection guard, ACL -f pattern-file block, SSL parity, timeout regex, form-state pin. Round 5-7 defaults-cookie inheritance, server-named-cookie guard, fe/be mode mismatch, duplicate server names, health_check_uri + server_address validators. Round 8-10 cookie_name / cookie_options newline-injection guard, dry-run parity (round 9), TCP-mode HTTP-only feature blockers. Round 11 SSL name path traversal + health-check >= 1. Round 12-13 SSL & ACME deep dive (Bulgu #23-#32). Round 14 single-line value injection (Bulgu #33). Round 15-17 ACME multi-tenant UX, numeric bounds, HAProxy reserved keywords, ALPN/TLS consistency, all-backup, multi-domain & multi-user enterprise edges, drain/HSTS/post-completion (Bulgu #34-#53). Round 18-21 concurrency, agent state, TCP-mode HTTP-only, list size caps, IPv6 scope-id, preview account validation, TCP backend + balance uri reject (Bulgu #54-#61). Round 22 FE error visibility + 3x stale-data lockouts, referential integrity + cascade safety, authentication & authorization, multi-cluster isolation, apply_pending_changes concurrency, script injection + bulk import multi-tenancy, prefix-stripped signature comparison (Bulgu #62-#82). ------------------------------------------------------------------ NO CORPORATE-SPECIFIC ARTIFACTS ------------------------------------------------------------------ This squash deliberately sanitises corporate hostnames, container registry references, and TLS secret names into generic placeholders (`your-registry.example.com/your-org`, `haproxy-openmanager*.example.com`, `wildcard-tls`, `taylanbakircioglu/haproxy-openmanager-*`) so the public artefact contains no internal infrastructure detail. Pilot / development history that retained those values stays in the corporate fork and is NOT part of this commit.
151 lines
5.3 KiB
Python
151 lines
5.3 KiB
Python
"""
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v1.5.0 Feature B — preview helper unit tests.
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Validates pure helpers used by the wizard's /preview and /create flows:
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* _build_redirect_rules (M19): https_redirect=true expands to a single
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canonical scheme-redirect row; explicit redirect_rules pass through.
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* preview MUST not write — verified by counting writes against a mock conn.
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The preview endpoint itself relies on FastAPI dependency injection and DB
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state; those paths are exercised in the Docker compose smoke tests
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(t18). This file stays in pure-unit territory consistent with the rest of
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the test suite.
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"""
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from unittest.mock import AsyncMock
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import pytest
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from models.site_wizard import (
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BackendStep,
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FrontendStep,
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SiteCreate,
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ServerStep,
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SSLChoice,
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)
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from routers.site_wizard import _build_redirect_rules
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def _payload(**overrides):
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base = {
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"cluster_id": 1,
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"domains": ["www.example.com"],
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"backend": {"name": "be"},
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"servers": [{
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"server_name": "s1",
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"server_address": "10.0.0.1",
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"server_port": 80,
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}],
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"frontend": {"name": "fe", "bind_port": 80},
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"ssl": {"mode": "none"},
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}
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base.update(overrides)
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return SiteCreate(**base)
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# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# _build_redirect_rules
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# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_build_redirect_rules_emits_canonical_https_redirect():
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"""PR-1 R11.A-1 fix: pre-fix the row carried both ``type='scheme'``
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and a URL in ``location`` — but HAProxy ``redirect scheme`` only
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accepts a literal scheme name (``http``/``https``). The URL form
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of ``location`` is reserved for ``redirect location <URL>``. The
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canonical scheme-redirect now emits ``scheme: 'https'`` and
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drops the conflicting ``location`` field.
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Bulgu #28 (round-12 audit): SiteCreate now rejects
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https_redirect=true with ssl.mode='none' (self-bricking
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config — redirect points at a port with nothing listening).
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The test exercises `_build_redirect_rules` against a payload
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that uses ssl.mode='upload' with stub PEMs so the validator
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accepts the redirect combination.
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"""
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p = _payload(
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frontend={"name": "fe", "bind_port": 80, "https_redirect": True},
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ssl={
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"mode": "upload",
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"name": "stub-cert",
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"certificate_content": (
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"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nstub\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----"
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),
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"private_key_content": (
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"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\nstub\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----"
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),
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},
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)
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rules = _build_redirect_rules(p)
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assert len(rules) == 1
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rule = rules[0]
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assert rule["type"] == "scheme"
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assert rule["code"] == 301
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# PR-1 fix: scheme name (NOT a URL) — HAProxy `redirect scheme https`
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assert rule["scheme"] == "https"
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# The URL-bearing 'location' field must NOT be present on a
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# type=scheme rule (it is parser-fatal).
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assert "location" not in rule, (
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"R11.A-1 regression: type=scheme redirect must not carry a "
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"'location' URL — HAProxy `redirect scheme` parser rejects it."
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)
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# Negative ssl_fc condition — only redirect on plain HTTP requests.
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assert "!{ ssl_fc }" in rule["condition"]
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def test_build_redirect_rules_passes_explicit_rules_through():
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explicit = [
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{"type": "location", "code": 302, "location": "/new", "condition": ""},
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]
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p = _payload(frontend={
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"name": "fe", "bind_port": 80,
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"https_redirect": False,
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"redirect_rules": explicit,
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})
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rules = _build_redirect_rules(p)
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assert rules == explicit
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def test_build_redirect_rules_empty_when_neither_set():
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p = _payload(frontend={"name": "fe", "bind_port": 80})
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rules = _build_redirect_rules(p)
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assert rules == []
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def test_build_redirect_rules_returns_independent_list():
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"""Caller must not be able to mutate the model's redirect_rules through
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the returned list (defensive copy)."""
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explicit = [{"type": "location", "code": 302, "location": "/x", "condition": ""}]
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p = _payload(frontend={
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"name": "fe", "bind_port": 80,
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"https_redirect": False,
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"redirect_rules": explicit,
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})
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out = _build_redirect_rules(p)
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out.append({"injected": True})
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# The original model must remain unchanged
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assert len(p.frontend.redirect_rules) == 1
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# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Preview write-safety smoke
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# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_preview_does_not_invoke_create_helpers():
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"""Sanity check: importing the module doesn't trigger create_*_row at
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module-load time. The actual /preview endpoint must NEVER invoke any
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create helper — those are reserved for the POST endpoint.
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"""
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import services.backend_service as bs
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import services.frontend_service as fs
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import services.ssl_service as ss
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# Each create helper is an awaitable coroutine function — verify they
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# exist (regression guard: refactors that move them must not delete the
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# surface used by the wizard).
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assert callable(bs.create_backend_row)
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assert callable(bs.create_server_row)
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assert callable(fs.create_frontend_row)
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assert callable(ss.create_cert_row)
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