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https://github.com/taylanbakircioglu/haproxy-openmanager.git
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taylanbakircioglu
bd6a31cb0d
Adds opt-in TOTP-based Multi-Factor Authentication that is fully
backwards compatible with existing logins. Operators choose to enable
MFA per account; nothing changes for users who do not opt in.
Highlights
==========
* RFC 6238 TOTP (6 digits, 30s period, SHA1) with ±30s skew tolerance,
compatible with Microsoft / Google Authenticator, Authy, Duo, 1Password.
* Per-step replay protection (`mfa_last_used_totp_step`) so a captured
code cannot be reused inside the same window.
* Fernet-encrypted TOTP secrets at rest, key resolution via
`MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY` env (HKDF-derived from `SECRET_KEY` as fallback).
* 10 single-use, bcrypt-hashed backup codes per user, formatted
`XXXX-YYYY` from a confusion-free alphabet (no 0/O/1/I/L).
* Two-step login flow: `POST /api/auth/login` returns `mfa_required`
+ `mfa_token`, then `POST /api/auth/login/mfa-verify` accepts a TOTP
code OR a backup code. JWT is minted only after MFA succeeds.
* Self-service: users enable / disable MFA from their own row in the
Users page; admins reset (single user or bulk) but never enable on
behalf of someone else (matches AWS IAM / GitHub / Google Workspace).
* Bulk emergency reset CLI: `scripts/admin-mfa-reset-all.sh`.
Security hardening
==================
* Atomic transactions with `SELECT … FOR UPDATE` on `mfa_pending_logins`
and `users` rows so concurrent verify / enroll calls cannot race.
* `/api/mfa/enroll/start` refuses re-enrollment when MFA is already on
(prevents silent secret rotation via a stolen JWT).
* Pydantic `ValidationError` messages are sanitized before reaching the
audit log so request bodies (TOTP / backup codes in flight) never
appear in plaintext.
* Slowapi rate limits are per-USER, not per-IP, with a trusted-proxy
XFF strategy so a single ingress address cannot exhaust the bucket
for thousands of operators (`MFA_TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDRS`,
`MFA_RATE_LIMIT_*` env-overridable).
* Login query now scopes to `is_active = TRUE` so a soft-deleted row
with the same username can no longer occlude the active user
(also closes a small account-enumeration side channel).
Database
========
Additive migrations (idempotent `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS`,
`CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS`):
- users: mfa_enabled, mfa_method, mfa_secret_encrypted,
mfa_enrolled_at, mfa_last_used_at, mfa_last_used_totp_step
- mfa_backup_codes (user_id ON DELETE CASCADE)
- mfa_pending_logins (user_id ON DELETE CASCADE, challenge_token,
attempts, expires_at)
- mfa_pending_enrollments (user_id ON DELETE CASCADE)
Frontend
========
* Login page becomes a 3-phase state machine
(credentials → MFA → submitting); legacy single-step login is
preserved for users who haven't enrolled.
* New MFAEnrollModal (3-step wizard: QR + secret → verify → backup
codes) using `qrcode.react`.
* Users page shows MFA column + per-row enable/disable/reset actions.
Admins viewing other users with MFA off see a non-actionable info
icon explaining that only the user themselves can enable MFA.
Deployment
==========
* `MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY` is added to `k8s/manifests/03-secrets.yaml` as
a placeholder; `SECRET_KEY` is also placeholder-ized so both are
injected by the existing pipeline pattern (sed-replace + apply).
* No new build-time env vars are required for the frontend. The SPA
uses `window.location.host` for `/api/*` and is routed by the
existing nginx ingress configuration.
* `frontend/.dockerignore` ensures host `.env*` files cannot bleed
into the production bundle.
Tests
=====
* New unit suites:
- `test_mfa_service.py` (TOTP, encryption, backup codes)
- `test_mfa_backwards_compat.py` (regression — non-MFA flow unchanged)
- `test_mfa_rate_limits.py` (env override + dataclass immutability)
- `test_mfa_rate_limit_key.py` (JWT key, trusted-proxy XFF, fallbacks)
* All existing 1000+ unit tests continue to pass.
Documentation
=============
* README MFA section (overview, day-to-day operations, emergency
reset CLI, env variables, rate-limit tuning).
* `scripts/README.md` documents the bulk reset script.
Issue: #18
94 lines
3.0 KiB
Python
94 lines
3.0 KiB
Python
"""Tests for middleware.mfa_rate_limits — env-driven MFA rate-limit config."""
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import importlib
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import logging
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import pytest
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@pytest.fixture
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def reload_module(monkeypatch):
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"""Helper: reload the module after env mutation so dataclass defaults
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pick up the new values."""
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def _reload(**env):
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for key in list(globals().get('_OVERRIDDEN_ENVS', set())):
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monkeypatch.delenv(key, raising=False)
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for key, value in env.items():
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monkeypatch.setenv(key, value)
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from middleware import mfa_rate_limits as m
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return importlib.reload(m)
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return _reload
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def test_defaults_when_no_env(reload_module, monkeypatch):
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"""No env var set → secure defaults applied (user-aware key assumption)."""
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for key in (
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"MFA_RATE_LIMIT_ENROLL_START",
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"MFA_RATE_LIMIT_ENROLL_CONFIRM",
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"MFA_RATE_LIMIT_DISABLE",
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"MFA_RATE_LIMIT_REGENERATE_BACKUP_CODES",
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"MFA_RATE_LIMIT_ADMIN_RESET",
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"MFA_RATE_LIMIT_ADMIN_RESET_ALL",
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):
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monkeypatch.delenv(key, raising=False)
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m = reload_module()
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assert m.MFA_LIMITS.enroll_start == "10/minute"
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assert m.MFA_LIMITS.enroll_confirm == "10/minute"
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assert m.MFA_LIMITS.disable == "10/minute"
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assert m.MFA_LIMITS.regenerate_backup_codes == "5/hour"
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assert m.MFA_LIMITS.admin_reset == "60/hour"
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assert m.MFA_LIMITS.admin_reset_all == "1/day"
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def test_env_override_per_endpoint(reload_module):
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m = reload_module(
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MFA_RATE_LIMIT_ENROLL_START="100/hour",
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MFA_RATE_LIMIT_ADMIN_RESET_ALL="3/day",
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)
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assert m.MFA_LIMITS.enroll_start == "100/hour"
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assert m.MFA_LIMITS.admin_reset_all == "3/day"
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# Untouched values still default.
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assert m.MFA_LIMITS.disable == "10/minute"
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"bad",
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[
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"totally-bogus",
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"5/lightyear",
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"abc/minute",
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"5",
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"/minute",
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"5//minute",
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"",
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],
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)
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def test_invalid_format_falls_back_to_default(reload_module, caplog, bad):
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with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING, logger="middleware.mfa_rate_limits"):
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m = reload_module(MFA_RATE_LIMIT_ENROLL_START=bad)
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# Falls back to the secure default for enroll_start.
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assert m.MFA_LIMITS.enroll_start == "10/minute"
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assert any("not a valid slowapi limit string" in r.message for r in caplog.records)
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def test_whitespace_around_value_is_tolerated(reload_module):
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m = reload_module(MFA_RATE_LIMIT_DISABLE=" 30/minute ")
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assert m.MFA_LIMITS.disable == "30/minute"
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"valid",
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["1/second", "100/minute", "1000/hour", "10/day"],
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)
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def test_all_valid_periods_accepted(reload_module, valid):
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m = reload_module(MFA_RATE_LIMIT_DISABLE=valid)
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assert m.MFA_LIMITS.disable == valid
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def test_dataclass_is_frozen(reload_module):
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"""Frozen dataclass guards against accidental mutation after import."""
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m = reload_module()
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with pytest.raises((AttributeError, Exception)):
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m.MFA_LIMITS.disable = "999/second" # type: ignore[misc]
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