Files
haproxy-openmanager/backend/tests/test_mfa_backwards_compat.py
taylanbakircioglu bd6a31cb0d feat: v1.6.0 — Multi-Factor Authentication (Issue #18)
Adds opt-in TOTP-based Multi-Factor Authentication that is fully
backwards compatible with existing logins. Operators choose to enable
MFA per account; nothing changes for users who do not opt in.

Highlights
==========

* RFC 6238 TOTP (6 digits, 30s period, SHA1) with ±30s skew tolerance,
  compatible with Microsoft / Google Authenticator, Authy, Duo, 1Password.
* Per-step replay protection (`mfa_last_used_totp_step`) so a captured
  code cannot be reused inside the same window.
* Fernet-encrypted TOTP secrets at rest, key resolution via
  `MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY` env (HKDF-derived from `SECRET_KEY` as fallback).
* 10 single-use, bcrypt-hashed backup codes per user, formatted
  `XXXX-YYYY` from a confusion-free alphabet (no 0/O/1/I/L).
* Two-step login flow: `POST /api/auth/login` returns `mfa_required`
  + `mfa_token`, then `POST /api/auth/login/mfa-verify` accepts a TOTP
  code OR a backup code. JWT is minted only after MFA succeeds.
* Self-service: users enable / disable MFA from their own row in the
  Users page; admins reset (single user or bulk) but never enable on
  behalf of someone else (matches AWS IAM / GitHub / Google Workspace).
* Bulk emergency reset CLI: `scripts/admin-mfa-reset-all.sh`.

Security hardening
==================

* Atomic transactions with `SELECT … FOR UPDATE` on `mfa_pending_logins`
  and `users` rows so concurrent verify / enroll calls cannot race.
* `/api/mfa/enroll/start` refuses re-enrollment when MFA is already on
  (prevents silent secret rotation via a stolen JWT).
* Pydantic `ValidationError` messages are sanitized before reaching the
  audit log so request bodies (TOTP / backup codes in flight) never
  appear in plaintext.
* Slowapi rate limits are per-USER, not per-IP, with a trusted-proxy
  XFF strategy so a single ingress address cannot exhaust the bucket
  for thousands of operators (`MFA_TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDRS`,
  `MFA_RATE_LIMIT_*` env-overridable).
* Login query now scopes to `is_active = TRUE` so a soft-deleted row
  with the same username can no longer occlude the active user
  (also closes a small account-enumeration side channel).

Database
========

Additive migrations (idempotent `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS`,
`CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS`):

  - users: mfa_enabled, mfa_method, mfa_secret_encrypted,
    mfa_enrolled_at, mfa_last_used_at, mfa_last_used_totp_step
  - mfa_backup_codes (user_id ON DELETE CASCADE)
  - mfa_pending_logins (user_id ON DELETE CASCADE, challenge_token,
    attempts, expires_at)
  - mfa_pending_enrollments (user_id ON DELETE CASCADE)

Frontend
========

* Login page becomes a 3-phase state machine
  (credentials → MFA → submitting); legacy single-step login is
  preserved for users who haven't enrolled.
* New MFAEnrollModal (3-step wizard: QR + secret → verify → backup
  codes) using `qrcode.react`.
* Users page shows MFA column + per-row enable/disable/reset actions.
  Admins viewing other users with MFA off see a non-actionable info
  icon explaining that only the user themselves can enable MFA.

Deployment
==========

* `MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY` is added to `k8s/manifests/03-secrets.yaml` as
  a placeholder; `SECRET_KEY` is also placeholder-ized so both are
  injected by the existing pipeline pattern (sed-replace + apply).
* No new build-time env vars are required for the frontend. The SPA
  uses `window.location.host` for `/api/*` and is routed by the
  existing nginx ingress configuration.
* `frontend/.dockerignore` ensures host `.env*` files cannot bleed
  into the production bundle.

Tests
=====

* New unit suites:
  - `test_mfa_service.py` (TOTP, encryption, backup codes)
  - `test_mfa_backwards_compat.py` (regression — non-MFA flow unchanged)
  - `test_mfa_rate_limits.py` (env override + dataclass immutability)
  - `test_mfa_rate_limit_key.py` (JWT key, trusted-proxy XFF, fallbacks)
* All existing 1000+ unit tests continue to pass.

Documentation
=============

* README MFA section (overview, day-to-day operations, emergency
  reset CLI, env variables, rate-limit tuning).
* `scripts/README.md` documents the bulk reset script.

Issue: #18
2026-05-19 04:35:16 +03:00

151 lines
5.3 KiB
Python

"""Backwards-compatibility regression tests for the MFA rollout (Issue #18).
These tests don't hit a real database — they exercise the authoritative
contract surfaces (login response shape, auth_middleware behaviour) using
mocks where needed so the suite stays fast and deterministic.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import sys
from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock, patch
import pytest
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))))
class TestAuthMiddlewareUnchanged:
"""auth_middleware MUST NOT look for MFA claims — Madde 2 of the plan."""
def test_decoder_imports_without_mfa_dependencies(self):
import auth_middleware
# The middleware's verification function exists and is callable.
assert callable(getattr(auth_middleware, "get_current_user_from_token", None))
def test_middleware_source_has_no_mfa_claim_check(self):
"""The middleware source must not reference ``mfa`` claims directly."""
with open(
os.path.join(
os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))),
"auth_middleware.py",
),
"r",
encoding="utf-8",
) as fh:
source = fh.read()
# Allow incidental occurrences (e.g. comments); but never a claim lookup.
assert "payload.get('mfa'" not in source
assert 'payload.get("mfa"' not in source
assert "claims['mfa'" not in source
assert 'claims["mfa"' not in source
class TestMfaModelsCoexistWithUserModels:
def test_models_user_module_unchanged_pydantic_shape(self):
from models import user as user_mod
# Ensure that User / UserUpdate / LoginRequest still load and still
# don't expose mfa-related fields (kept in models.mfa).
for cls in (user_mod.User, user_mod.UserUpdate, user_mod.LoginRequest):
fields = set(cls.model_fields.keys())
assert not {"mfa_enabled", "mfa_required", "mfa_token"} & fields, (
f"{cls.__name__} unexpectedly exposes MFA field; should stay byte-identical."
)
def test_models_mfa_module_exposes_expected_models(self):
from models import mfa as mfa_mod
for name in (
"MfaVerifyRequest",
"MfaEnrollStartResponse",
"MfaEnrollConfirmRequest",
"MfaEnrollConfirmResponse",
"MfaDisableRequest",
"MfaRegenerateBackupRequest",
"MfaRegenerateBackupResponse",
"MfaAdminResetRequest",
"MfaAdminResetAllRequest",
"MfaStatusResponse",
):
assert hasattr(mfa_mod, name), f"Missing model: {name}"
class TestRouterIncluded:
def test_main_includes_mfa_router(self):
with open(
os.path.join(
os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))),
"main.py",
),
"r",
encoding="utf-8",
) as fh:
source = fh.read()
assert "from routers.mfa import router as mfa_router" in source
assert "app.include_router(mfa_router)" in source
class TestLoginResponseShapeForNonMfaUser:
"""When MFA columns are missing or mfa_enabled=FALSE, /login returns the
pre-MFA response shape — no ``mfa_required`` / ``mfa_token`` keys leak through.
"""
def test_login_without_mfa_returns_legacy_shape(self):
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from main import app
client = TestClient(app)
async def _fetch_mfa_state_none(conn, user_id):
return None
async def _no_log(*args, **kwargs):
return None
fake_user = {
"id": 1,
"username": "admin",
"email": "admin@example.com",
"password_hash": "$2b$12$placeholder",
"is_active": True,
"role": "admin",
"created_at": None,
"updated_at": None,
"last_login_at": None,
}
mock_conn = MagicMock()
mock_conn.fetchrow = AsyncMock(return_value=fake_user)
mock_conn.fetch = AsyncMock(return_value=[])
mock_conn.execute = AsyncMock(return_value=None)
async def _get_conn():
return mock_conn
async def _close(conn):
return None
with patch(
"routers.auth.get_database_connection", _get_conn
), patch("routers.auth.close_database_connection", _close), patch(
"routers.auth._fetch_mfa_state", _fetch_mfa_state_none
), patch("routers.auth.log_user_activity", _no_log), patch(
"bcrypt.checkpw", return_value=True
):
resp = client.post(
"/api/auth/login",
json={"username": "admin", "password": "anything"},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
body = resp.json()
assert "access_token" in body
assert "token_type" in body
assert "expires_in" in body
assert "user" in body
assert "roles" in body
assert "permissions" in body
# CRITICAL — pre-MFA contract must not be polluted with MFA fields.
assert "mfa_required" not in body
assert "mfa_token" not in body
assert "methods" not in body