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02b1cb2bca
Closes #13, Closes #14. This release squashes the v1.4.0 → v1.5.0 development line. v1.4.0 shipped the ACME stability & enterprise audit (Issues #10/#11/#12). v1.5.0 builds on that foundation with two co-equal headline features plus a 22-round audit campaign hardening the prior configuration surface. License remains MIT for v1.5.0 (relicense to AGPL-3.0 lands in v1.5.2). ------------------------------------------------------------------ HEADLINE FEATURE A — ACME Diagnostic Panel (Issue #13) ------------------------------------------------------------------ A live pre-flight + post-failure diagnostic surface for every ACME order, reachable from the ACME Automation page. The panel exists to make ACME failures legible to operators who do NOT have shell access to the API host. Endpoints (`backend/routers/acme_diagnostics.py`): POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics Run the full 5-check suite (DNS / port-80 / routing / account / agents) and humanize the order's `error_detail` (>=11 RFC-8555 problem types, backwards compatible with legacy plain-string failures). POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics/ {check_id}/rerun Re-run a single check in place — used by the "Re-run" button on every row of the modal's pre-flight table. GET /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/events Merged event timeline combining the typed `acme_order_events` rows with correlated `user_activity_logs` entries (resource_type = 'letsencrypt_order' AND resource_id = order_id). The diagnostic modal auto-tails this timeline every 5 seconds while open. Service-level checks (`backend/services/acme_diagnostics.py`): * DNS resolution via stdlib socket.gethostbyname_ex through run_in_executor (intentionally avoiding an aiodns runtime dep for v1.5.0). * Port-80 HEAD probe, target locked to the order's domains, success on HTTP 200 OR 404, warns on egress timeout (corp egress policies routinely blackhole outbound 80 — fail-hard would be too noisy). * SSRF guard: probe refuses non-public IPs and surfaces the skip in the diagnostic result; IPv4-mapped IPv6 normalisation closes the `::ffff:169.254.169.254` cloud-metadata vector. * HAProxy routing presence check: matches the order's cluster_ids to a port-80 HTTP frontend. * ACME account validity check against `letsencrypt_accounts`. * Agent presence check (>=1 active agent in target cluster). * Every sub-check wrapped in a wall-clock timeout to bound impact on the API event loop. RBAC: ssl.read for run, ssl.read for events. Per-user 5/min rate limit on both run and rerun, backed by the (user_id, action, created_at DESC) composite index. Frontend (`frontend/src/components/ACMEAutomation.js`): * "Diagnose" button on every order row + the existing "stuck order" warning row. * Modal with two tabs: - Pre-flight Checks (Antd Table with status pills + Re-run buttons + humanized error banner) - Event Log (Antd Timeline with auto-tail polling, scroll- to-bottom, pause-on-hover) * Correlation IDs surfaced in error banners and individual check fail details for backend-log lookup. ------------------------------------------------------------------ HEADLINE FEATURE B — Site Setup Wizard (Issue #14) ------------------------------------------------------------------ A single guided flow that creates a Backend + Servers + HTTP Frontend (and optional HTTPS Frontend) in one atomic transaction. Endpoints (`backend/routers/site_wizard.py`): POST /api/site-wizard/preview — diff-preview the changeset POST /api/site-wizard/create — atomic execute POST /api/site-wizard/reject — clean rollback (including any wizard_staged ACME orders) GET /api/site-wizard/drafts — draft persistence PUT /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id} — save/update DELETE /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id} Feature surface: * One screen captures both backend (mode + servers) AND frontend (http + optional https + SSL mode) inputs. * SSL modes: ACME (new order, HTTP-01 only for v1.5.0), Upload (existing PEM), Existing (link to a stored cert), or None. * ACME-staged path: wizard_staged_until watermark on the `letsencrypt_orders` row defers finalisation until agent confirmation; per-mode reject cleanly cancels and rolls back the staged order. * Live diff preview against the cluster's current generated config (renderer-evolution noise stripped — track-sc<N> dedup, per-server cookie strip, defaults-cookie inheritance, listen-block flattening). * Draft persistence with PEM stripped at save time (private keys never round-trip through the drafts table). * Per-cluster multi-tenancy: drafts and wizard_staged orders are isolated to the creating user's cluster scope. Frontend (`frontend/src/components/SiteWizard.js`): * 4-step Antd Steps flow: Backend → Frontend → SSL → Review. * Render the live diff preview inline before commit. * Antd Form-level validation mirrors backend Pydantic validators (numeric bounds, HAProxy reserved keywords, ALPN consistency, IPv6 scope-id, domain regex, server name dedup). ------------------------------------------------------------------ AUDIT CAMPAIGN — Rounds 1 → 22 (Bulgu #1 → #82) ------------------------------------------------------------------ v1.5.0 includes 22 adversarial review passes. Each round produced its own commit set in the corporate development line; this squash collapses those into the v1.5.0 release artefact. Highlights: Round 1-4 Site Wizard core: dry-run parity, single-line value injection guard, ACL -f pattern-file block, SSL parity, timeout regex, form-state pin. Round 5-7 defaults-cookie inheritance, server-named-cookie guard, fe/be mode mismatch, duplicate server names, health_check_uri + server_address validators. Round 8-10 cookie_name / cookie_options newline-injection guard, dry-run parity (round 9), TCP-mode HTTP-only feature blockers. Round 11 SSL name path traversal + health-check >= 1. Round 12-13 SSL & ACME deep dive (Bulgu #23-#32). Round 14 single-line value injection (Bulgu #33). Round 15-17 ACME multi-tenant UX, numeric bounds, HAProxy reserved keywords, ALPN/TLS consistency, all-backup, multi-domain & multi-user enterprise edges, drain/HSTS/post-completion (Bulgu #34-#53). Round 18-21 concurrency, agent state, TCP-mode HTTP-only, list size caps, IPv6 scope-id, preview account validation, TCP backend + balance uri reject (Bulgu #54-#61). Round 22 FE error visibility + 3x stale-data lockouts, referential integrity + cascade safety, authentication & authorization, multi-cluster isolation, apply_pending_changes concurrency, script injection + bulk import multi-tenancy, prefix-stripped signature comparison (Bulgu #62-#82). ------------------------------------------------------------------ NO CORPORATE-SPECIFIC ARTIFACTS ------------------------------------------------------------------ This squash deliberately sanitises corporate hostnames, container registry references, and TLS secret names into generic placeholders (`your-registry.example.com/your-org`, `haproxy-openmanager*.example.com`, `wildcard-tls`, `taylanbakircioglu/haproxy-openmanager-*`) so the public artefact contains no internal infrastructure detail. Pilot / development history that retained those values stays in the corporate fork and is NOT part of this commit.
108 lines
3.9 KiB
Python
108 lines
3.9 KiB
Python
"""
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Phase K Phase D follow-up (Bulgu #10) — HAProxy heuristic
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validator timeout-value regex must accept the FULL set of HAProxy
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time unit suffixes, not just single-character ones.
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Per the HAProxy docs (Time format chapter), accepted units are:
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us microseconds
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ms milliseconds
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s seconds
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m minutes
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h hours
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d days
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A bare integer (no suffix) is also accepted and interpreted as
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milliseconds. Pre-fix the regex was `^\\d+[smhd]?$`, which rejected
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`ms` and `us` outright. The Site Wizard's config synthesis emits
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`timeout connect 10000ms` / `timeout server 60000ms` / `timeout
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client 100ms`, so the dry-run preview surfaced 10+ FALSE-POSITIVE
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errors on the wizard's own defaults and the operator could not
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reach Create even though the real HAProxy `-c` parse was happy.
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These tests pin the regex (or its semantic) so a future
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"simplification" cannot regress us back to the buggy form.
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"""
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import pytest
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from utils.haproxy_validator import HAProxyConfigValidator, ValidationLevel
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def _validate_timeout_only(args):
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"""Run the validator's private `_validate_timeout_directive`
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method and return the list of results so we can assert on the
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exact error messages without coupling to the public surface.
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"""
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v = HAProxyConfigValidator()
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v._validate_timeout_directive(args)
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return v.results
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"value",
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[
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"10000ms",
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"60000ms",
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"100ms",
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"30000ms",
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"5s",
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"1m",
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"1h",
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"1d",
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"500us", # microseconds — also valid per HAProxy docs
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"0", # bare integer (= ms)
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"10000", # bare integer (= ms)
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],
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)
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def test_timeout_regex_accepts_all_haproxy_time_units(value):
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"""All HAProxy-valid time formats must produce ZERO ERROR-level
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results from the timeout heuristic. (WARNING-level results from
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OTHER checks — unknown timeout type, etc. — are allowed but
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must not be raised by these well-formed examples.)
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"""
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results = _validate_timeout_only(["connect", value])
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errors = [r for r in results if r.level == ValidationLevel.ERROR]
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assert errors == [], (
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f"Bulgu #10 regression: timeout value '{value}' was flagged "
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f"as ERROR by the heuristic validator, but HAProxy `-c` "
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f"accepts it. Errors: {[e.message for e in errors]}"
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)
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"value",
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[
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"10000xx", # bogus suffix
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"abc", # not a number
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"-100ms", # negative
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"1.5s", # decimal not supported
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"ms", # suffix only
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],
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)
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def test_timeout_regex_still_rejects_invalid_formats(value):
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"""Real malformed timeout values must still surface as ERROR —
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the regex relaxation must NOT degenerate into "accept anything".
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"""
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results = _validate_timeout_only(["connect", value])
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errors = [r for r in results if r.level == ValidationLevel.ERROR]
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assert any("Invalid timeout value" in e.message for e in errors), (
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f"Bulgu #10 over-relaxation regression: timeout value '{value}' "
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f"slipped past the heuristic. HAProxy would reject this at parse."
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)
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def test_timeout_regex_rejects_legacy_ms_was_pre_fix_failure_mode():
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"""Documentary pin — the EXACT failure mode reported by the
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operator (Image #8 of Phase K Phase D Bulgu #10): the wizard's
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default `timeout connect 10000ms` flagged ERROR on Step 4. Pin
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that the value is accepted post-fix.
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"""
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for tval in ("10000ms", "60000ms", "100ms"):
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results = _validate_timeout_only(["connect", tval])
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for r in results:
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if r.level == ValidationLevel.ERROR:
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assert "Invalid timeout value" not in r.message, (
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f"Bulgu #10 post-fix pin: the wizard-default "
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f"timeout value '{tval}' must be accepted by "
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f"the heuristic validator. Got error: {r.message}"
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)
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