Files
haproxy-openmanager/backend/tests/test_haproxy_validator_timeout_units.py
taylanbakircioglu 02b1cb2bca feat: v1.5.0 — Site Wizard (Issue #14) + ACME Diagnostic Panel (Issue #13)
Closes #13, Closes #14.

This release squashes the v1.4.0 → v1.5.0 development line. v1.4.0
shipped the ACME stability & enterprise audit (Issues #10/#11/#12).
v1.5.0 builds on that foundation with two co-equal headline features
plus a 22-round audit campaign hardening the prior configuration
surface. License remains MIT for v1.5.0 (relicense to AGPL-3.0
lands in v1.5.2).

------------------------------------------------------------------
HEADLINE FEATURE A — ACME Diagnostic Panel (Issue #13)
------------------------------------------------------------------
A live pre-flight + post-failure diagnostic surface for every ACME
order, reachable from the ACME Automation page. The panel exists
to make ACME failures legible to operators who do NOT have shell
access to the API host.

Endpoints (`backend/routers/acme_diagnostics.py`):
  POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics
       Run the full 5-check suite (DNS / port-80 / routing /
       account / agents) and humanize the order's `error_detail`
       (>=11 RFC-8555 problem types, backwards compatible with
       legacy plain-string failures).
  POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics/
                                {check_id}/rerun
       Re-run a single check in place — used by the "Re-run"
       button on every row of the modal's pre-flight table.
  GET  /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/events
       Merged event timeline combining the typed
       `acme_order_events` rows with correlated
       `user_activity_logs` entries (resource_type =
       'letsencrypt_order' AND resource_id = order_id). The
       diagnostic modal auto-tails this timeline every 5 seconds
       while open.

Service-level checks (`backend/services/acme_diagnostics.py`):
  * DNS resolution via stdlib socket.gethostbyname_ex through
    run_in_executor (intentionally avoiding an aiodns runtime
    dep for v1.5.0).
  * Port-80 HEAD probe, target locked to the order's domains,
    success on HTTP 200 OR 404, warns on egress timeout
    (corp egress policies routinely blackhole outbound 80 —
    fail-hard would be too noisy).
  * SSRF guard: probe refuses non-public IPs and surfaces the
    skip in the diagnostic result; IPv4-mapped IPv6 normalisation
    closes the `::ffff:169.254.169.254` cloud-metadata vector.
  * HAProxy routing presence check: matches the order's
    cluster_ids to a port-80 HTTP frontend.
  * ACME account validity check against `letsencrypt_accounts`.
  * Agent presence check (>=1 active agent in target cluster).
  * Every sub-check wrapped in a wall-clock timeout to bound
    impact on the API event loop.

RBAC: ssl.read for run, ssl.read for events. Per-user 5/min rate
limit on both run and rerun, backed by the (user_id, action,
created_at DESC) composite index.

Frontend (`frontend/src/components/ACMEAutomation.js`):
  * "Diagnose" button on every order row + the existing
    "stuck order" warning row.
  * Modal with two tabs:
    - Pre-flight Checks (Antd Table with status pills + Re-run
      buttons + humanized error banner)
    - Event Log (Antd Timeline with auto-tail polling, scroll-
      to-bottom, pause-on-hover)
  * Correlation IDs surfaced in error banners and individual
    check fail details for backend-log lookup.

------------------------------------------------------------------
HEADLINE FEATURE B — Site Setup Wizard (Issue #14)
------------------------------------------------------------------
A single guided flow that creates a Backend + Servers + HTTP
Frontend (and optional HTTPS Frontend) in one atomic transaction.

Endpoints (`backend/routers/site_wizard.py`):
  POST /api/site-wizard/preview     — diff-preview the changeset
  POST /api/site-wizard/create      — atomic execute
  POST /api/site-wizard/reject      — clean rollback (including
                                       any wizard_staged ACME
                                       orders)
  GET  /api/site-wizard/drafts      — draft persistence
  PUT  /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id} — save/update
  DELETE /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id}

Feature surface:
  * One screen captures both backend (mode + servers) AND
    frontend (http + optional https + SSL mode) inputs.
  * SSL modes: ACME (new order, HTTP-01 only for v1.5.0),
    Upload (existing PEM), Existing (link to a stored cert),
    or None.
  * ACME-staged path: wizard_staged_until watermark on the
    `letsencrypt_orders` row defers finalisation until agent
    confirmation; per-mode reject cleanly cancels and rolls
    back the staged order.
  * Live diff preview against the cluster's current generated
    config (renderer-evolution noise stripped — track-sc<N>
    dedup, per-server cookie strip, defaults-cookie
    inheritance, listen-block flattening).
  * Draft persistence with PEM stripped at save time (private
    keys never round-trip through the drafts table).
  * Per-cluster multi-tenancy: drafts and wizard_staged orders
    are isolated to the creating user's cluster scope.

Frontend (`frontend/src/components/SiteWizard.js`):
  * 4-step Antd Steps flow: Backend → Frontend → SSL → Review.
  * Render the live diff preview inline before commit.
  * Antd Form-level validation mirrors backend Pydantic
    validators (numeric bounds, HAProxy reserved keywords, ALPN
    consistency, IPv6 scope-id, domain regex, server name
    dedup).

------------------------------------------------------------------
AUDIT CAMPAIGN — Rounds 1 → 22 (Bulgu #1#82)
------------------------------------------------------------------
v1.5.0 includes 22 adversarial review passes. Each round produced
its own commit set in the corporate development line; this squash
collapses those into the v1.5.0 release artefact. Highlights:

  Round 1-4   Site Wizard core: dry-run parity, single-line
              value injection guard, ACL -f pattern-file block,
              SSL parity, timeout regex, form-state pin.
  Round 5-7   defaults-cookie inheritance, server-named-cookie
              guard, fe/be mode mismatch, duplicate server
              names, health_check_uri + server_address
              validators.
  Round 8-10  cookie_name / cookie_options newline-injection
              guard, dry-run parity (round 9), TCP-mode HTTP-only
              feature blockers.
  Round 11    SSL name path traversal + health-check >= 1.
  Round 12-13 SSL & ACME deep dive (Bulgu #23-#32).
  Round 14    single-line value injection (Bulgu #33).
  Round 15-17 ACME multi-tenant UX, numeric bounds, HAProxy
              reserved keywords, ALPN/TLS consistency,
              all-backup, multi-domain & multi-user enterprise
              edges, drain/HSTS/post-completion (Bulgu
              #34-#53).
  Round 18-21 concurrency, agent state, TCP-mode HTTP-only,
              list size caps, IPv6 scope-id, preview account
              validation, TCP backend + balance uri reject
              (Bulgu #54-#61).
  Round 22    FE error visibility + 3x stale-data lockouts,
              referential integrity + cascade safety,
              authentication & authorization, multi-cluster
              isolation, apply_pending_changes concurrency,
              script injection + bulk import multi-tenancy,
              prefix-stripped signature comparison
              (Bulgu #62-#82).

------------------------------------------------------------------
NO CORPORATE-SPECIFIC ARTIFACTS
------------------------------------------------------------------
This squash deliberately sanitises corporate hostnames, container
registry references, and TLS secret names into generic
placeholders (`your-registry.example.com/your-org`,
`haproxy-openmanager*.example.com`, `wildcard-tls`,
`taylanbakircioglu/haproxy-openmanager-*`) so the public artefact
contains no internal infrastructure detail. Pilot / development
history that retained those values stays in the corporate fork
and is NOT part of this commit.
2026-05-14 00:04:19 +03:00

108 lines
3.9 KiB
Python

"""
Phase K Phase D follow-up (Bulgu #10) — HAProxy heuristic
validator timeout-value regex must accept the FULL set of HAProxy
time unit suffixes, not just single-character ones.
Per the HAProxy docs (Time format chapter), accepted units are:
us microseconds
ms milliseconds
s seconds
m minutes
h hours
d days
A bare integer (no suffix) is also accepted and interpreted as
milliseconds. Pre-fix the regex was `^\\d+[smhd]?$`, which rejected
`ms` and `us` outright. The Site Wizard's config synthesis emits
`timeout connect 10000ms` / `timeout server 60000ms` / `timeout
client 100ms`, so the dry-run preview surfaced 10+ FALSE-POSITIVE
errors on the wizard's own defaults and the operator could not
reach Create even though the real HAProxy `-c` parse was happy.
These tests pin the regex (or its semantic) so a future
"simplification" cannot regress us back to the buggy form.
"""
import pytest
from utils.haproxy_validator import HAProxyConfigValidator, ValidationLevel
def _validate_timeout_only(args):
"""Run the validator's private `_validate_timeout_directive`
method and return the list of results so we can assert on the
exact error messages without coupling to the public surface.
"""
v = HAProxyConfigValidator()
v._validate_timeout_directive(args)
return v.results
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"value",
[
"10000ms",
"60000ms",
"100ms",
"30000ms",
"5s",
"1m",
"1h",
"1d",
"500us", # microseconds — also valid per HAProxy docs
"0", # bare integer (= ms)
"10000", # bare integer (= ms)
],
)
def test_timeout_regex_accepts_all_haproxy_time_units(value):
"""All HAProxy-valid time formats must produce ZERO ERROR-level
results from the timeout heuristic. (WARNING-level results from
OTHER checks — unknown timeout type, etc. — are allowed but
must not be raised by these well-formed examples.)
"""
results = _validate_timeout_only(["connect", value])
errors = [r for r in results if r.level == ValidationLevel.ERROR]
assert errors == [], (
f"Bulgu #10 regression: timeout value '{value}' was flagged "
f"as ERROR by the heuristic validator, but HAProxy `-c` "
f"accepts it. Errors: {[e.message for e in errors]}"
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"value",
[
"10000xx", # bogus suffix
"abc", # not a number
"-100ms", # negative
"1.5s", # decimal not supported
"ms", # suffix only
],
)
def test_timeout_regex_still_rejects_invalid_formats(value):
"""Real malformed timeout values must still surface as ERROR —
the regex relaxation must NOT degenerate into "accept anything".
"""
results = _validate_timeout_only(["connect", value])
errors = [r for r in results if r.level == ValidationLevel.ERROR]
assert any("Invalid timeout value" in e.message for e in errors), (
f"Bulgu #10 over-relaxation regression: timeout value '{value}' "
f"slipped past the heuristic. HAProxy would reject this at parse."
)
def test_timeout_regex_rejects_legacy_ms_was_pre_fix_failure_mode():
"""Documentary pin — the EXACT failure mode reported by the
operator (Image #8 of Phase K Phase D Bulgu #10): the wizard's
default `timeout connect 10000ms` flagged ERROR on Step 4. Pin
that the value is accepted post-fix.
"""
for tval in ("10000ms", "60000ms", "100ms"):
results = _validate_timeout_only(["connect", tval])
for r in results:
if r.level == ValidationLevel.ERROR:
assert "Invalid timeout value" not in r.message, (
f"Bulgu #10 post-fix pin: the wizard-default "
f"timeout value '{tval}' must be accepted by "
f"the heuristic validator. Got error: {r.message}"
)