Files
haproxy-openmanager/backend/tests/test_haproxy_config_ssl_verify.py
taylanbakircioglu 02b1cb2bca feat: v1.5.0 — Site Wizard (Issue #14) + ACME Diagnostic Panel (Issue #13)
Closes #13, Closes #14.

This release squashes the v1.4.0 → v1.5.0 development line. v1.4.0
shipped the ACME stability & enterprise audit (Issues #10/#11/#12).
v1.5.0 builds on that foundation with two co-equal headline features
plus a 22-round audit campaign hardening the prior configuration
surface. License remains MIT for v1.5.0 (relicense to AGPL-3.0
lands in v1.5.2).

------------------------------------------------------------------
HEADLINE FEATURE A — ACME Diagnostic Panel (Issue #13)
------------------------------------------------------------------
A live pre-flight + post-failure diagnostic surface for every ACME
order, reachable from the ACME Automation page. The panel exists
to make ACME failures legible to operators who do NOT have shell
access to the API host.

Endpoints (`backend/routers/acme_diagnostics.py`):
  POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics
       Run the full 5-check suite (DNS / port-80 / routing /
       account / agents) and humanize the order's `error_detail`
       (>=11 RFC-8555 problem types, backwards compatible with
       legacy plain-string failures).
  POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics/
                                {check_id}/rerun
       Re-run a single check in place — used by the "Re-run"
       button on every row of the modal's pre-flight table.
  GET  /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/events
       Merged event timeline combining the typed
       `acme_order_events` rows with correlated
       `user_activity_logs` entries (resource_type =
       'letsencrypt_order' AND resource_id = order_id). The
       diagnostic modal auto-tails this timeline every 5 seconds
       while open.

Service-level checks (`backend/services/acme_diagnostics.py`):
  * DNS resolution via stdlib socket.gethostbyname_ex through
    run_in_executor (intentionally avoiding an aiodns runtime
    dep for v1.5.0).
  * Port-80 HEAD probe, target locked to the order's domains,
    success on HTTP 200 OR 404, warns on egress timeout
    (corp egress policies routinely blackhole outbound 80 —
    fail-hard would be too noisy).
  * SSRF guard: probe refuses non-public IPs and surfaces the
    skip in the diagnostic result; IPv4-mapped IPv6 normalisation
    closes the `::ffff:169.254.169.254` cloud-metadata vector.
  * HAProxy routing presence check: matches the order's
    cluster_ids to a port-80 HTTP frontend.
  * ACME account validity check against `letsencrypt_accounts`.
  * Agent presence check (>=1 active agent in target cluster).
  * Every sub-check wrapped in a wall-clock timeout to bound
    impact on the API event loop.

RBAC: ssl.read for run, ssl.read for events. Per-user 5/min rate
limit on both run and rerun, backed by the (user_id, action,
created_at DESC) composite index.

Frontend (`frontend/src/components/ACMEAutomation.js`):
  * "Diagnose" button on every order row + the existing
    "stuck order" warning row.
  * Modal with two tabs:
    - Pre-flight Checks (Antd Table with status pills + Re-run
      buttons + humanized error banner)
    - Event Log (Antd Timeline with auto-tail polling, scroll-
      to-bottom, pause-on-hover)
  * Correlation IDs surfaced in error banners and individual
    check fail details for backend-log lookup.

------------------------------------------------------------------
HEADLINE FEATURE B — Site Setup Wizard (Issue #14)
------------------------------------------------------------------
A single guided flow that creates a Backend + Servers + HTTP
Frontend (and optional HTTPS Frontend) in one atomic transaction.

Endpoints (`backend/routers/site_wizard.py`):
  POST /api/site-wizard/preview     — diff-preview the changeset
  POST /api/site-wizard/create      — atomic execute
  POST /api/site-wizard/reject      — clean rollback (including
                                       any wizard_staged ACME
                                       orders)
  GET  /api/site-wizard/drafts      — draft persistence
  PUT  /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id} — save/update
  DELETE /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id}

Feature surface:
  * One screen captures both backend (mode + servers) AND
    frontend (http + optional https + SSL mode) inputs.
  * SSL modes: ACME (new order, HTTP-01 only for v1.5.0),
    Upload (existing PEM), Existing (link to a stored cert),
    or None.
  * ACME-staged path: wizard_staged_until watermark on the
    `letsencrypt_orders` row defers finalisation until agent
    confirmation; per-mode reject cleanly cancels and rolls
    back the staged order.
  * Live diff preview against the cluster's current generated
    config (renderer-evolution noise stripped — track-sc<N>
    dedup, per-server cookie strip, defaults-cookie
    inheritance, listen-block flattening).
  * Draft persistence with PEM stripped at save time (private
    keys never round-trip through the drafts table).
  * Per-cluster multi-tenancy: drafts and wizard_staged orders
    are isolated to the creating user's cluster scope.

Frontend (`frontend/src/components/SiteWizard.js`):
  * 4-step Antd Steps flow: Backend → Frontend → SSL → Review.
  * Render the live diff preview inline before commit.
  * Antd Form-level validation mirrors backend Pydantic
    validators (numeric bounds, HAProxy reserved keywords, ALPN
    consistency, IPv6 scope-id, domain regex, server name
    dedup).

------------------------------------------------------------------
AUDIT CAMPAIGN — Rounds 1 → 22 (Bulgu #1#82)
------------------------------------------------------------------
v1.5.0 includes 22 adversarial review passes. Each round produced
its own commit set in the corporate development line; this squash
collapses those into the v1.5.0 release artefact. Highlights:

  Round 1-4   Site Wizard core: dry-run parity, single-line
              value injection guard, ACL -f pattern-file block,
              SSL parity, timeout regex, form-state pin.
  Round 5-7   defaults-cookie inheritance, server-named-cookie
              guard, fe/be mode mismatch, duplicate server
              names, health_check_uri + server_address
              validators.
  Round 8-10  cookie_name / cookie_options newline-injection
              guard, dry-run parity (round 9), TCP-mode HTTP-only
              feature blockers.
  Round 11    SSL name path traversal + health-check >= 1.
  Round 12-13 SSL & ACME deep dive (Bulgu #23-#32).
  Round 14    single-line value injection (Bulgu #33).
  Round 15-17 ACME multi-tenant UX, numeric bounds, HAProxy
              reserved keywords, ALPN/TLS consistency,
              all-backup, multi-domain & multi-user enterprise
              edges, drain/HSTS/post-completion (Bulgu
              #34-#53).
  Round 18-21 concurrency, agent state, TCP-mode HTTP-only,
              list size caps, IPv6 scope-id, preview account
              validation, TCP backend + balance uri reject
              (Bulgu #54-#61).
  Round 22    FE error visibility + 3x stale-data lockouts,
              referential integrity + cascade safety,
              authentication & authorization, multi-cluster
              isolation, apply_pending_changes concurrency,
              script injection + bulk import multi-tenancy,
              prefix-stripped signature comparison
              (Bulgu #62-#82).

------------------------------------------------------------------
NO CORPORATE-SPECIFIC ARTIFACTS
------------------------------------------------------------------
This squash deliberately sanitises corporate hostnames, container
registry references, and TLS secret names into generic
placeholders (`your-registry.example.com/your-org`,
`haproxy-openmanager*.example.com`, `wildcard-tls`,
`taylanbakircioglu/haproxy-openmanager-*`) so the public artefact
contains no internal infrastructure detail. Pilot / development
history that retained those values stays in the corporate fork
and is NOT part of this commit.
2026-05-14 00:04:19 +03:00

113 lines
4.3 KiB
Python

"""R11.A-2 (PR-1 hotfix) — bind-side ssl_verify safeguard parity.
Pre-fix HISTORY:
R18 audit added literal ``bind_line += f" verify {ssl_verify}"`` on
both the multi-cert and single-cert HTTPS bind branches so that the
inbound mTLS column would reach the rendered HAProxy config (it
was previously a placebo).
Pre-PR-1 BUG (the reason these assertions were inverted):
Emitting ``verify required|optional`` on a `bind` line WITHOUT a
``ca-file <path>`` argument makes HAProxy fail with the fatal
ALERT::
Proxy 'X': verify is enabled but no CA file specified for bind '...'
The `frontends` schema does not have a client-CA bundle column yet
(planned for PR-7 via ``ssl_client_ca_certificate_id``), so EVERY
frontend with ``ssl_verify ∈ {required, optional}`` (the column
DEFAULT was ``'optional'`` until PR-2) broke ``haproxy -c`` reload
the moment the consolidated config touched it. The user's reported
bug was exactly this: pre-existing entities they had not modified
failed validation after a wizard reject + apply cycle.
PR-1 fix in haproxy_config.py:
Both bind branches now route through `_apply_bind_ssl_verify`, which
resolves a client-CA bundle path via `_resolve_frontend_client_ca_path`
and only appends ``ca-file <path> verify <mode>`` when the path is
resolvable. Until PR-7 lands the resolver always returns ``None``,
so ``verify`` is silently skipped with an ERROR log — preventing the
fatal ALERT while preserving the operator's intent in audit
diagnostics.
These tests are static source assertions; integration coverage lives
in tests/test_site_wizard_round11.py.
"""
import re
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
_GEN = (
Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
/ "services" / "haproxy_config.py"
)
def _src():
if not _GEN.exists():
pytest.skip("services/haproxy_config.py not present in this env")
return _GEN.read_text()
def test_legacy_verbatim_verify_emit_removed():
"""The pre-PR-1 verbatim ``bind_line += f" verify {ssl_verify}"``
must NOT remain in the generator. This pattern is the one that
caused the fatal HAProxy ALERT 'verify is enabled but no CA file
specified' when the frontend lacked a client-CA bundle.
"""
src = _src()
matches = re.findall(
r'bind_line\s*\+=\s*f"\s+verify\s+\{[^}]*ssl_verify[^}]*\}"',
src,
)
assert not matches, (
"PR-1 R11.A-2 regression: legacy verbatim ssl_verify emit "
"pattern reappeared — bind line will trigger fatal HAProxy "
"ALERT when ssl_verify=required|optional and no client-CA is "
"configured. Use `_apply_bind_ssl_verify` instead."
)
def test_apply_bind_ssl_verify_helper_called_in_both_branches():
"""Both the multi-cert (NEW mode) and single-cert (OLD mode)
HTTPS bind branches must route ssl_verify through the safeguard
helper, ensuring symmetric treatment of the directive."""
src = _src()
matches = re.findall(
r"bind_line\s*=\s*_apply_bind_ssl_verify\(\s*bind_line\s*,",
src,
)
assert len(matches) >= 2, (
f"PR-1 R11.A-2 regression: expected `_apply_bind_ssl_verify(...)` "
f"in BOTH bind branches (multi-cert + single-cert); found "
f"{len(matches)} occurrence(s)"
)
def test_apply_bind_ssl_verify_skips_when_no_client_ca():
"""The helper must skip the `verify` directive when no client-CA
bundle is resolvable, logging an ERROR for diagnostics. This is
the explicit safeguard against the fatal HAProxy ALERT."""
src = _src()
assert "BIND SSL_VERIFY DOWNGRADE" in src, (
"PR-1 R11.A-2 regression: missing diagnostic ERROR log when "
"ssl_verify is skipped due to absent client-CA bundle"
)
assert "_resolve_frontend_client_ca_path" in src, (
"PR-1 R11.A-2 regression: missing client-CA path resolver "
"(forward-path placeholder for PR-7 ssl_client_ca_certificate_id)"
)
def test_strict_sni_still_emitted_unchanged():
"""Sanity check: the existing `strict-sni` directive emission must
not have been damaged by the PR-1 hotfix changes."""
src = _src()
cnt = src.count('bind_line += " strict-sni"')
assert cnt >= 2, (
"PR-1 regression: `strict-sni` directive emission count "
"dropped — the safeguard refactor was destructive"
)