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02b1cb2bca
Closes #13, Closes #14. This release squashes the v1.4.0 → v1.5.0 development line. v1.4.0 shipped the ACME stability & enterprise audit (Issues #10/#11/#12). v1.5.0 builds on that foundation with two co-equal headline features plus a 22-round audit campaign hardening the prior configuration surface. License remains MIT for v1.5.0 (relicense to AGPL-3.0 lands in v1.5.2). ------------------------------------------------------------------ HEADLINE FEATURE A — ACME Diagnostic Panel (Issue #13) ------------------------------------------------------------------ A live pre-flight + post-failure diagnostic surface for every ACME order, reachable from the ACME Automation page. The panel exists to make ACME failures legible to operators who do NOT have shell access to the API host. Endpoints (`backend/routers/acme_diagnostics.py`): POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics Run the full 5-check suite (DNS / port-80 / routing / account / agents) and humanize the order's `error_detail` (>=11 RFC-8555 problem types, backwards compatible with legacy plain-string failures). POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics/ {check_id}/rerun Re-run a single check in place — used by the "Re-run" button on every row of the modal's pre-flight table. GET /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/events Merged event timeline combining the typed `acme_order_events` rows with correlated `user_activity_logs` entries (resource_type = 'letsencrypt_order' AND resource_id = order_id). The diagnostic modal auto-tails this timeline every 5 seconds while open. Service-level checks (`backend/services/acme_diagnostics.py`): * DNS resolution via stdlib socket.gethostbyname_ex through run_in_executor (intentionally avoiding an aiodns runtime dep for v1.5.0). * Port-80 HEAD probe, target locked to the order's domains, success on HTTP 200 OR 404, warns on egress timeout (corp egress policies routinely blackhole outbound 80 — fail-hard would be too noisy). * SSRF guard: probe refuses non-public IPs and surfaces the skip in the diagnostic result; IPv4-mapped IPv6 normalisation closes the `::ffff:169.254.169.254` cloud-metadata vector. * HAProxy routing presence check: matches the order's cluster_ids to a port-80 HTTP frontend. * ACME account validity check against `letsencrypt_accounts`. * Agent presence check (>=1 active agent in target cluster). * Every sub-check wrapped in a wall-clock timeout to bound impact on the API event loop. RBAC: ssl.read for run, ssl.read for events. Per-user 5/min rate limit on both run and rerun, backed by the (user_id, action, created_at DESC) composite index. Frontend (`frontend/src/components/ACMEAutomation.js`): * "Diagnose" button on every order row + the existing "stuck order" warning row. * Modal with two tabs: - Pre-flight Checks (Antd Table with status pills + Re-run buttons + humanized error banner) - Event Log (Antd Timeline with auto-tail polling, scroll- to-bottom, pause-on-hover) * Correlation IDs surfaced in error banners and individual check fail details for backend-log lookup. ------------------------------------------------------------------ HEADLINE FEATURE B — Site Setup Wizard (Issue #14) ------------------------------------------------------------------ A single guided flow that creates a Backend + Servers + HTTP Frontend (and optional HTTPS Frontend) in one atomic transaction. Endpoints (`backend/routers/site_wizard.py`): POST /api/site-wizard/preview — diff-preview the changeset POST /api/site-wizard/create — atomic execute POST /api/site-wizard/reject — clean rollback (including any wizard_staged ACME orders) GET /api/site-wizard/drafts — draft persistence PUT /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id} — save/update DELETE /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id} Feature surface: * One screen captures both backend (mode + servers) AND frontend (http + optional https + SSL mode) inputs. * SSL modes: ACME (new order, HTTP-01 only for v1.5.0), Upload (existing PEM), Existing (link to a stored cert), or None. * ACME-staged path: wizard_staged_until watermark on the `letsencrypt_orders` row defers finalisation until agent confirmation; per-mode reject cleanly cancels and rolls back the staged order. * Live diff preview against the cluster's current generated config (renderer-evolution noise stripped — track-sc<N> dedup, per-server cookie strip, defaults-cookie inheritance, listen-block flattening). * Draft persistence with PEM stripped at save time (private keys never round-trip through the drafts table). * Per-cluster multi-tenancy: drafts and wizard_staged orders are isolated to the creating user's cluster scope. Frontend (`frontend/src/components/SiteWizard.js`): * 4-step Antd Steps flow: Backend → Frontend → SSL → Review. * Render the live diff preview inline before commit. * Antd Form-level validation mirrors backend Pydantic validators (numeric bounds, HAProxy reserved keywords, ALPN consistency, IPv6 scope-id, domain regex, server name dedup). ------------------------------------------------------------------ AUDIT CAMPAIGN — Rounds 1 → 22 (Bulgu #1 → #82) ------------------------------------------------------------------ v1.5.0 includes 22 adversarial review passes. Each round produced its own commit set in the corporate development line; this squash collapses those into the v1.5.0 release artefact. Highlights: Round 1-4 Site Wizard core: dry-run parity, single-line value injection guard, ACL -f pattern-file block, SSL parity, timeout regex, form-state pin. Round 5-7 defaults-cookie inheritance, server-named-cookie guard, fe/be mode mismatch, duplicate server names, health_check_uri + server_address validators. Round 8-10 cookie_name / cookie_options newline-injection guard, dry-run parity (round 9), TCP-mode HTTP-only feature blockers. Round 11 SSL name path traversal + health-check >= 1. Round 12-13 SSL & ACME deep dive (Bulgu #23-#32). Round 14 single-line value injection (Bulgu #33). Round 15-17 ACME multi-tenant UX, numeric bounds, HAProxy reserved keywords, ALPN/TLS consistency, all-backup, multi-domain & multi-user enterprise edges, drain/HSTS/post-completion (Bulgu #34-#53). Round 18-21 concurrency, agent state, TCP-mode HTTP-only, list size caps, IPv6 scope-id, preview account validation, TCP backend + balance uri reject (Bulgu #54-#61). Round 22 FE error visibility + 3x stale-data lockouts, referential integrity + cascade safety, authentication & authorization, multi-cluster isolation, apply_pending_changes concurrency, script injection + bulk import multi-tenancy, prefix-stripped signature comparison (Bulgu #62-#82). ------------------------------------------------------------------ NO CORPORATE-SPECIFIC ARTIFACTS ------------------------------------------------------------------ This squash deliberately sanitises corporate hostnames, container registry references, and TLS secret names into generic placeholders (`your-registry.example.com/your-org`, `haproxy-openmanager*.example.com`, `wildcard-tls`, `taylanbakircioglu/haproxy-openmanager-*`) so the public artefact contains no internal infrastructure detail. Pilot / development history that retained those values stays in the corporate fork and is NOT part of this commit.
113 lines
4.3 KiB
Python
113 lines
4.3 KiB
Python
"""R11.A-2 (PR-1 hotfix) — bind-side ssl_verify safeguard parity.
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Pre-fix HISTORY:
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R18 audit added literal ``bind_line += f" verify {ssl_verify}"`` on
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both the multi-cert and single-cert HTTPS bind branches so that the
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inbound mTLS column would reach the rendered HAProxy config (it
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was previously a placebo).
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Pre-PR-1 BUG (the reason these assertions were inverted):
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Emitting ``verify required|optional`` on a `bind` line WITHOUT a
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``ca-file <path>`` argument makes HAProxy fail with the fatal
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ALERT::
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Proxy 'X': verify is enabled but no CA file specified for bind '...'
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The `frontends` schema does not have a client-CA bundle column yet
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(planned for PR-7 via ``ssl_client_ca_certificate_id``), so EVERY
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frontend with ``ssl_verify ∈ {required, optional}`` (the column
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DEFAULT was ``'optional'`` until PR-2) broke ``haproxy -c`` reload
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the moment the consolidated config touched it. The user's reported
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bug was exactly this: pre-existing entities they had not modified
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failed validation after a wizard reject + apply cycle.
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PR-1 fix in haproxy_config.py:
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Both bind branches now route through `_apply_bind_ssl_verify`, which
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resolves a client-CA bundle path via `_resolve_frontend_client_ca_path`
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and only appends ``ca-file <path> verify <mode>`` when the path is
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resolvable. Until PR-7 lands the resolver always returns ``None``,
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so ``verify`` is silently skipped with an ERROR log — preventing the
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fatal ALERT while preserving the operator's intent in audit
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diagnostics.
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These tests are static source assertions; integration coverage lives
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in tests/test_site_wizard_round11.py.
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"""
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import re
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from pathlib import Path
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import pytest
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_GEN = (
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Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
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/ "services" / "haproxy_config.py"
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)
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def _src():
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if not _GEN.exists():
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pytest.skip("services/haproxy_config.py not present in this env")
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return _GEN.read_text()
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def test_legacy_verbatim_verify_emit_removed():
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"""The pre-PR-1 verbatim ``bind_line += f" verify {ssl_verify}"``
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must NOT remain in the generator. This pattern is the one that
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caused the fatal HAProxy ALERT 'verify is enabled but no CA file
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specified' when the frontend lacked a client-CA bundle.
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"""
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src = _src()
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matches = re.findall(
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r'bind_line\s*\+=\s*f"\s+verify\s+\{[^}]*ssl_verify[^}]*\}"',
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src,
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)
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assert not matches, (
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"PR-1 R11.A-2 regression: legacy verbatim ssl_verify emit "
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"pattern reappeared — bind line will trigger fatal HAProxy "
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"ALERT when ssl_verify=required|optional and no client-CA is "
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"configured. Use `_apply_bind_ssl_verify` instead."
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)
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def test_apply_bind_ssl_verify_helper_called_in_both_branches():
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"""Both the multi-cert (NEW mode) and single-cert (OLD mode)
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HTTPS bind branches must route ssl_verify through the safeguard
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helper, ensuring symmetric treatment of the directive."""
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src = _src()
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matches = re.findall(
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r"bind_line\s*=\s*_apply_bind_ssl_verify\(\s*bind_line\s*,",
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src,
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)
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assert len(matches) >= 2, (
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f"PR-1 R11.A-2 regression: expected `_apply_bind_ssl_verify(...)` "
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f"in BOTH bind branches (multi-cert + single-cert); found "
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f"{len(matches)} occurrence(s)"
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)
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def test_apply_bind_ssl_verify_skips_when_no_client_ca():
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"""The helper must skip the `verify` directive when no client-CA
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bundle is resolvable, logging an ERROR for diagnostics. This is
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the explicit safeguard against the fatal HAProxy ALERT."""
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src = _src()
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assert "BIND SSL_VERIFY DOWNGRADE" in src, (
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"PR-1 R11.A-2 regression: missing diagnostic ERROR log when "
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"ssl_verify is skipped due to absent client-CA bundle"
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)
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assert "_resolve_frontend_client_ca_path" in src, (
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"PR-1 R11.A-2 regression: missing client-CA path resolver "
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"(forward-path placeholder for PR-7 ssl_client_ca_certificate_id)"
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)
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def test_strict_sni_still_emitted_unchanged():
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"""Sanity check: the existing `strict-sni` directive emission must
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not have been damaged by the PR-1 hotfix changes."""
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src = _src()
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cnt = src.count('bind_line += " strict-sni"')
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assert cnt >= 2, (
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"PR-1 regression: `strict-sni` directive emission count "
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"dropped — the safeguard refactor was destructive"
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)
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