mirror of
https://github.com/taylanbakircioglu/haproxy-openmanager.git
synced 2026-09-21 01:53:24 +00:00
02b1cb2bca
Closes #13, Closes #14. This release squashes the v1.4.0 → v1.5.0 development line. v1.4.0 shipped the ACME stability & enterprise audit (Issues #10/#11/#12). v1.5.0 builds on that foundation with two co-equal headline features plus a 22-round audit campaign hardening the prior configuration surface. License remains MIT for v1.5.0 (relicense to AGPL-3.0 lands in v1.5.2). ------------------------------------------------------------------ HEADLINE FEATURE A — ACME Diagnostic Panel (Issue #13) ------------------------------------------------------------------ A live pre-flight + post-failure diagnostic surface for every ACME order, reachable from the ACME Automation page. The panel exists to make ACME failures legible to operators who do NOT have shell access to the API host. Endpoints (`backend/routers/acme_diagnostics.py`): POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics Run the full 5-check suite (DNS / port-80 / routing / account / agents) and humanize the order's `error_detail` (>=11 RFC-8555 problem types, backwards compatible with legacy plain-string failures). POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics/ {check_id}/rerun Re-run a single check in place — used by the "Re-run" button on every row of the modal's pre-flight table. GET /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/events Merged event timeline combining the typed `acme_order_events` rows with correlated `user_activity_logs` entries (resource_type = 'letsencrypt_order' AND resource_id = order_id). The diagnostic modal auto-tails this timeline every 5 seconds while open. Service-level checks (`backend/services/acme_diagnostics.py`): * DNS resolution via stdlib socket.gethostbyname_ex through run_in_executor (intentionally avoiding an aiodns runtime dep for v1.5.0). * Port-80 HEAD probe, target locked to the order's domains, success on HTTP 200 OR 404, warns on egress timeout (corp egress policies routinely blackhole outbound 80 — fail-hard would be too noisy). * SSRF guard: probe refuses non-public IPs and surfaces the skip in the diagnostic result; IPv4-mapped IPv6 normalisation closes the `::ffff:169.254.169.254` cloud-metadata vector. * HAProxy routing presence check: matches the order's cluster_ids to a port-80 HTTP frontend. * ACME account validity check against `letsencrypt_accounts`. * Agent presence check (>=1 active agent in target cluster). * Every sub-check wrapped in a wall-clock timeout to bound impact on the API event loop. RBAC: ssl.read for run, ssl.read for events. Per-user 5/min rate limit on both run and rerun, backed by the (user_id, action, created_at DESC) composite index. Frontend (`frontend/src/components/ACMEAutomation.js`): * "Diagnose" button on every order row + the existing "stuck order" warning row. * Modal with two tabs: - Pre-flight Checks (Antd Table with status pills + Re-run buttons + humanized error banner) - Event Log (Antd Timeline with auto-tail polling, scroll- to-bottom, pause-on-hover) * Correlation IDs surfaced in error banners and individual check fail details for backend-log lookup. ------------------------------------------------------------------ HEADLINE FEATURE B — Site Setup Wizard (Issue #14) ------------------------------------------------------------------ A single guided flow that creates a Backend + Servers + HTTP Frontend (and optional HTTPS Frontend) in one atomic transaction. Endpoints (`backend/routers/site_wizard.py`): POST /api/site-wizard/preview — diff-preview the changeset POST /api/site-wizard/create — atomic execute POST /api/site-wizard/reject — clean rollback (including any wizard_staged ACME orders) GET /api/site-wizard/drafts — draft persistence PUT /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id} — save/update DELETE /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id} Feature surface: * One screen captures both backend (mode + servers) AND frontend (http + optional https + SSL mode) inputs. * SSL modes: ACME (new order, HTTP-01 only for v1.5.0), Upload (existing PEM), Existing (link to a stored cert), or None. * ACME-staged path: wizard_staged_until watermark on the `letsencrypt_orders` row defers finalisation until agent confirmation; per-mode reject cleanly cancels and rolls back the staged order. * Live diff preview against the cluster's current generated config (renderer-evolution noise stripped — track-sc<N> dedup, per-server cookie strip, defaults-cookie inheritance, listen-block flattening). * Draft persistence with PEM stripped at save time (private keys never round-trip through the drafts table). * Per-cluster multi-tenancy: drafts and wizard_staged orders are isolated to the creating user's cluster scope. Frontend (`frontend/src/components/SiteWizard.js`): * 4-step Antd Steps flow: Backend → Frontend → SSL → Review. * Render the live diff preview inline before commit. * Antd Form-level validation mirrors backend Pydantic validators (numeric bounds, HAProxy reserved keywords, ALPN consistency, IPv6 scope-id, domain regex, server name dedup). ------------------------------------------------------------------ AUDIT CAMPAIGN — Rounds 1 → 22 (Bulgu #1 → #82) ------------------------------------------------------------------ v1.5.0 includes 22 adversarial review passes. Each round produced its own commit set in the corporate development line; this squash collapses those into the v1.5.0 release artefact. Highlights: Round 1-4 Site Wizard core: dry-run parity, single-line value injection guard, ACL -f pattern-file block, SSL parity, timeout regex, form-state pin. Round 5-7 defaults-cookie inheritance, server-named-cookie guard, fe/be mode mismatch, duplicate server names, health_check_uri + server_address validators. Round 8-10 cookie_name / cookie_options newline-injection guard, dry-run parity (round 9), TCP-mode HTTP-only feature blockers. Round 11 SSL name path traversal + health-check >= 1. Round 12-13 SSL & ACME deep dive (Bulgu #23-#32). Round 14 single-line value injection (Bulgu #33). Round 15-17 ACME multi-tenant UX, numeric bounds, HAProxy reserved keywords, ALPN/TLS consistency, all-backup, multi-domain & multi-user enterprise edges, drain/HSTS/post-completion (Bulgu #34-#53). Round 18-21 concurrency, agent state, TCP-mode HTTP-only, list size caps, IPv6 scope-id, preview account validation, TCP backend + balance uri reject (Bulgu #54-#61). Round 22 FE error visibility + 3x stale-data lockouts, referential integrity + cascade safety, authentication & authorization, multi-cluster isolation, apply_pending_changes concurrency, script injection + bulk import multi-tenancy, prefix-stripped signature comparison (Bulgu #62-#82). ------------------------------------------------------------------ NO CORPORATE-SPECIFIC ARTIFACTS ------------------------------------------------------------------ This squash deliberately sanitises corporate hostnames, container registry references, and TLS secret names into generic placeholders (`your-registry.example.com/your-org`, `haproxy-openmanager*.example.com`, `wildcard-tls`, `taylanbakircioglu/haproxy-openmanager-*`) so the public artefact contains no internal infrastructure detail. Pilot / development history that retained those values stays in the corporate fork and is NOT part of this commit.
184 lines
6.0 KiB
Python
184 lines
6.0 KiB
Python
"""
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v1.5.0 service extraction parity — apply_service.
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Asserts:
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- _resolve_user_id falls back to the first active admin user using the
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CORRECT schema columns (is_admin, is_active) — NOT the non-existent
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is_super_admin (M46/R65).
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- _mint_internal_jwt passes user_id under both `sub` and `user_id` claims so
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it round-trips through get_current_user_from_token.
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- apply_cluster_pending delegates to routers.cluster.apply_pending_changes
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with a Bearer header (i.e. NEVER duplicates the ~800-line apply pipeline).
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"""
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from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, patch
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import pytest
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from services.apply_service import (
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_mint_internal_jwt,
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_resolve_user_id,
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apply_cluster_pending,
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)
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# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# _resolve_user_id
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# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_resolve_user_id_passthrough_when_user_still_valid():
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"""Bulgu #27: a still-active user_id is returned as-is after re-validation."""
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fake_conn = AsyncMock()
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# First fetchval validates the requested user, returns its id.
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fake_conn.fetchval.return_value = 42
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with patch(
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"services.apply_service.get_database_connection",
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AsyncMock(return_value=fake_conn),
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), patch(
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"services.apply_service.close_database_connection",
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AsyncMock(),
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):
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out = await _resolve_user_id(42)
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assert out == 42
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_resolve_user_id_falls_back_when_requested_user_inactive():
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"""Bulgu #27: deleted/deactivated created_by must NOT mint a ghost JWT —
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fall back to the admin user instead."""
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fake_conn = AsyncMock()
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# Validation lookup returns None (user gone/inactive); admin fallback returns 1.
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fake_conn.fetchval.side_effect = [None, 1]
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with patch(
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"services.apply_service.get_database_connection",
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AsyncMock(return_value=fake_conn),
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), patch(
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"services.apply_service.close_database_connection",
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AsyncMock(),
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):
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out = await _resolve_user_id(99)
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assert out == 1
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assert fake_conn.fetchval.await_count == 2
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_resolve_user_id_falls_back_to_active_admin():
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fake_conn = AsyncMock()
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fake_conn.fetchval.return_value = 1 # admin id
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with patch(
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"services.apply_service.get_database_connection",
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AsyncMock(return_value=fake_conn),
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), patch(
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"services.apply_service.close_database_connection",
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AsyncMock(),
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):
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out = await _resolve_user_id(None)
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assert out == 1
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sql, *_ = fake_conn.fetchval.call_args.args
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# Schema accuracy: is_admin AND is_active (NOT is_super_admin)
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assert "is_admin" in sql
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assert "is_active" in sql
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assert "is_super_admin" not in sql
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_resolve_user_id_returns_none_when_no_admin():
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fake_conn = AsyncMock()
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fake_conn.fetchval.return_value = None
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with patch(
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"services.apply_service.get_database_connection",
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AsyncMock(return_value=fake_conn),
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), patch(
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"services.apply_service.close_database_connection",
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AsyncMock(),
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):
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out = await _resolve_user_id(None)
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assert out is None
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# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# _mint_internal_jwt
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# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_mint_internal_jwt_includes_both_claim_shapes():
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"""sub + user_id ensures compat with get_current_user_from_token."""
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captured = {}
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def fake_create(payload, expires_delta=None):
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captured.update(payload)
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captured["__expires"] = expires_delta
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return "fake-jwt-token"
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with patch("services.apply_service.create_access_token", side_effect=fake_create):
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token = _mint_internal_jwt(99)
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assert token == "fake-jwt-token"
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assert captured["sub"] == "99"
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assert captured["user_id"] == 99
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assert captured["__expires"] is not None
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# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# apply_cluster_pending
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# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_apply_cluster_pending_raises_when_no_admin_available():
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with patch(
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"services.apply_service._resolve_user_id",
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AsyncMock(return_value=None),
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):
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with pytest.raises(RuntimeError, match="no admin user available"):
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await apply_cluster_pending(cluster_id=1)
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_apply_cluster_pending_delegates_to_router_with_bearer():
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"""Delegate, don't duplicate. We pass through cluster_id, apply_request,
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and a Bearer auth header.
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"""
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apply_mock = AsyncMock(return_value={"applied_count": 3})
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# Patch the local-imported symbol via routers.cluster
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with patch(
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"services.apply_service._resolve_user_id",
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AsyncMock(return_value=42),
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), patch(
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"services.apply_service._mint_internal_jwt",
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return_value="fake.jwt.token",
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), patch("routers.cluster.apply_pending_changes", apply_mock):
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out = await apply_cluster_pending(
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cluster_id=7,
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apply_request={"force": True},
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)
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assert out == {"applied_count": 3}
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kwargs = apply_mock.call_args.kwargs
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assert kwargs["cluster_id"] == 7
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assert kwargs["apply_request"] == {"force": True}
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assert kwargs["authorization"].startswith("Bearer ")
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assert "fake.jwt.token" in kwargs["authorization"]
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_apply_cluster_pending_default_empty_apply_request():
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apply_mock = AsyncMock(return_value={})
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with patch(
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"services.apply_service._resolve_user_id",
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AsyncMock(return_value=1),
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), patch(
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"services.apply_service._mint_internal_jwt",
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return_value="t",
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), patch("routers.cluster.apply_pending_changes", apply_mock):
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await apply_cluster_pending(cluster_id=1)
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kwargs = apply_mock.call_args.kwargs
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assert kwargs["apply_request"] == {}
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