fix(acme): scope ACME nonce per CA - fixes ZeroSSL registration (v1.8.2)

ZeroSSL/Google account registration failed with
`malformed: The Replay Nonce could not be base64url-decoded`: the ACME client
(a process-wide singleton) kept a single anti-replay nonce shared across
certificate authorities, so a nonce issued by one CA could be sent to another,
and the auto-retry only covered `badNonce`.

- Scope the nonce per CA (self._nonce_by_dir keyed by directory_url): a nonce
  from one CA is never sent to another; account registration always uses a fresh
  nonce from the target CA.
- Broaden the 400 retry to also recover from the nonce-malformed rejection.
- Fix _b64url_decode padding (used for the EAB HMAC key).

Backend-only; HTTP-01 and Let's Encrypt are unaffected.

Addresses #35.

README.md

@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ This architecture provides better security (no inbound connections to HAProxy se
 - **ACME Account Management**: Register, view, and deactivate ACME accounts from the UI
 - **Staging Mode**: Test certificate issuance with Let's Encrypt staging environment before production
 - **Custom Staging Endpoint** *(v1.4.0)*: Optional `staging_url_override` setting lets you point staging mode at a private ACME test CA (e.g. Pebble) without touching the production directory URL
-- **External Account Binding (EAB)**: Support for CAs that require EAB (ZeroSSL, Google Trust Services)
+- **External Account Binding (EAB)**: Support for CAs that require EAB (ZeroSSL, Google Trust Services). Enter the EAB Key ID and HMAC Key globally in Settings, or per-account in the Register Account dialog (a per-account value overrides the global setting; leave it blank to use the global one)
 - **Structured Error Diagnostics** *(v1.4.0)*: All ACME failures (challenge, finalize, download) persist structured JSON to `letsencrypt_orders.error_detail` for clear post-mortem analysis
 - **Audit Logging** *(v1.4.0)*: Every ACME operation (request, revoke, CA-chain import, account ops) is captured in `user_activity_logs` for compliance review
 - **ACME Diagnostic Panel** *(v1.5.0 — Issue #13)*: Live pre-flight + post-failure diagnostics (DNS / port-80 / routing / account / agents) and merged event timeline (`acme_order_events` + correlated `user_activity_logs`) accessible from the ACME Automation page; humanized error rendering for 11+ RFC8555 problem types with backwards-compatible fallback for legacy plain-string `error_detail`; per-user 5/min rate-limit
@@ -2415,6 +2415,8 @@ Developed with ❤️ for the HAProxy community
 
 ## Release Notes
 
+- **v1.8.2** (2026-06-25) — **ACME nonce fix** (Issue #35 follow-up): the ACME client now scopes the anti-replay nonce **per certificate authority** so a nonce issued by one CA is never sent to another. This fixes ZeroSSL/Google account registration failing with `malformed: The Replay Nonce could not be base64url-decoded` (the client previously shared one nonce across CAs and only auto-retried on `badNonce`). Account registration now always uses a fresh nonce from the target CA, and the retry covers this case too. Backend-only; HTTP-01 and Let's Encrypt are unaffected.
+- **v1.8.1** (2026-06-24) — **ACME DNS-01 fixes** (Issue #35 follow-up): Cloudflare API tokens are now sanitized so a pasted token with quotes/spaces no longer fails with "Invalid request headers"; ZeroSSL/Google **External Account Binding (EAB)** can be entered per-account in the register dialog and EAB-required failures show a clear message; and **Apply Management** now categorizes cluster ACME enable/disable changes under their own "ACME Challenge Routing" section and **Apply/Reject All** correctly process them (previously "Rejected 0 HA/VIP change(s)"), consistent with every other entity. Fully backward compatible.
 - **v1.8.0** (2026-06-23) — **ACME DNS-01 challenge support** (Issue #35): Auto SSL can now validate via a **DNS TXT record** (`_acme-challenge.<domain>`) instead of HTTP-01 on port 80, enabling certificates for **internal/isolated clusters with no public ingress** and **wildcard** certificates (`*.example.com`). Pluggable **per-account DNS provider** (Manual + Cloudflare to start; credentials verified on save and **encrypted at rest**, never returned by the API or logged), the same **PENDING → APPLIED** pipeline, a **bounded automatic retry** on propagation lag, and a **DNS-01 event timeline** in the order detail. **Opt-in** via Settings → ACME (global switch, default off); **HTTP-01 is byte-for-byte unchanged**, with **zero agent or rendered-config changes**. Manual DNS-01 certificates cannot auto-renew unattended; the UI states this and disables auto-renew for them.
 - **v1.7.8** (2026-06-07) — HA / VIP apply progress now shows **per-node** convergence: a multi-node VIP's apply popup reads "Syncing HA/VIP… 1/2 node(s) converged" (matching the HA/VIP table) instead of a coarse per-change count. Frontend-only.
 - **v1.7.7** (2026-06-07) — HA / VIP apply-progress consistency: applying a VIP change (or approving a delete) used to flash the progress popup green instantly while the HA/VIP page still showed `SYNCING (0/1)` for a couple of minutes. The popup now **keeps showing "Syncing HA/VIP… X/Y node(s) converged"** until each member node reports the VIP `ACTIVE` (create/edit) or fully torn down (delete) — exactly like the HAProxy agent-sync widget — then completes green. It's a fire-and-forget background poll (the Apply button is released immediately), bounded at ~5 min so an offline node can't spin forever (then it completes with an informational "still converging — track on the HA/VIP page"). Frontend-only; no backend/agent/schema change.

backend/main.py

@@ -8,7 +8,8 @@ import redis
 import asyncio
 from datetime import datetime, timedelta
 
-_version_info = {"version": "1.8.0", "releaseName": "ACME DNS-01 challenge support", "releaseDate": "2026-06-23"}
+# Build/deploy marker for the v1.8.x (Issue #35, DNS-01) rollout — ensures the pipeline ships this commit's image.
+_version_info = {"version": "1.8.2", "releaseName": "ACME nonce fix (ZeroSSL registration)", "releaseDate": "2026-06-25"}
 for _vpath in ["/app/version.json", os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "..", "version.json")]:
     try:
         with open(_vpath) as _vf:

backend/routers/cluster.py

@@ -5048,9 +5048,15 @@ async def reject_all_pending_changes(cluster_id: int, authorization: str = Heade
         # Get all pending config versions for this cluster (CRITICAL: Include metadata for rollback!)
         # HA/VIP (Issue #27): exclude vip-* versions — they are rejected/reverted by the
         # VIP reject endpoint (which restores keepalived state), not the generic rollback.
+        # ORDER BY created_at ASC: the rollback loop dedups per entity and keeps the FIRST-processed
+        # snapshot, so the OLDEST snapshot must win — its old_values hold the true pre-change state.
+        # Critical when one entity has multiple pending versions (e.g. cluster ACME enable->disable->enable):
+        # rolling back to the oldest restores the original acme_enabled. (Matches the apply SELECT, which
+        # already orders created_at ASC.)
         pending_versions = await conn.fetch("""
             SELECT id, version_name, metadata FROM config_versions
             WHERE cluster_id = $1 AND status = 'PENDING' AND version_name NOT LIKE 'vip-%'
+            ORDER BY created_at ASC
         """, cluster_id)
         
         # CRITICAL FIX: Detect and clean orphan config versions

backend/routers/letsencrypt.py

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Header
 from pydantic import BaseModel, Field, field_validator, model_validator
 from typing import Optional, List, Dict
+import base64
 import json
 import logging
 import re
@@ -59,8 +60,11 @@ class AccountCreate(BaseModel):
     email: str
     directory_url: Optional[str] = None
     tos_agreed: bool = True
-    eab_kid: Optional[str] = None
+    # EAB (External Account Binding) for CAs that require it (ZeroSSL, Google). The KID is opaque
-    eab_hmac_key: Optional[str] = None
+    # (bound only); the HMAC key must be base64url so newAccount's _b64url_decode won't raise a
+    # cryptic binascii error (a common copy mistake is standard-base64 '+'/'/' vs urlsafe '-'/'_').
+    eab_kid: Optional[str] = Field(default=None, max_length=256)
+    eab_hmac_key: Optional[str] = Field(default=None, max_length=512)
     # Issue #35: per-account default challenge method + DNS provider (for dns-01).
     challenge_type: str = "http-01"
     dns_provider: Optional[str] = None
@@ -72,6 +76,17 @@ class AccountCreate(BaseModel):
             raise ValueError(f"challenge_type must be one of {_CHALLENGE_TYPES}")
         return v
 
+    @field_validator('eab_hmac_key')
+    @classmethod
+    def _validate_eab_hmac_key(cls, v):
+        if not v:
+            return v
+        try:
+            base64.urlsafe_b64decode(v + '=' * (-len(v) % 4))
+        except Exception:
+            raise ValueError("eab_hmac_key is not valid base64; copy it exactly from your CA account.")
+        return v
+
     @model_validator(mode='after')
     def _require_provider_for_dns01(self):
         if self.challenge_type == 'dns-01' and not (self.dns_provider or '').strip():
@@ -216,8 +231,19 @@ async def create_account(body: AccountCreate, authorization: str = Header(None))
             dns_provider=(body.dns_provider or None),
         )
         return result
+    except HTTPException:
+        # Preserve deliberate status codes (e.g. 409 DNS-01 disabled, 422 unsupported provider) —
+        # the broad except below would otherwise downgrade them all to 400.
+        raise
     except Exception as e:
         logger.error(f"ACME account registration failed: {e}")
+        # Humanize the common EAB-required failure (ZeroSSL/Google). The ACME error propagates as a
+        # string ("Account registration failed: {<dict>}"), so match the URN substring in str(e).
+        if 'externalaccountrequired' in str(e).lower():
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=(
+                "This CA requires External Account Binding (EAB). Enter the EAB Key ID and HMAC Key "
+                "from your ZeroSSL/Google account and retry."
+            ))
         raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(e))
 
 

backend/services/acme_diagnostics.py

@@ -116,6 +116,10 @@ _PROBLEM_HUMANIZED: Dict[str, Dict[str, str]] = {
         "title": "HTTP-01 challenge response mismatch",
         "hint": "The CA fetched the challenge URL but received the wrong key authorization. Confirm the challenge was served from the right backend.",
     },
+    "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:externalAccountRequired": {
+        "title": "External Account Binding (EAB) required",
+        "hint": "This CA (e.g. ZeroSSL, Google) requires EAB. Enter the EAB Key ID and HMAC Key from your CA account when registering.",
+    },
     "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:invalidContact": {
         "title": "Invalid contact email",
         "hint": "The ACME account email is malformed. Update the LE account email.",

backend/services/acme_service.py

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ def _b64url(data: bytes) -> str:
 
 
 def _b64url_decode(s: str) -> bytes:
-    s += '=' * (4 - len(s) % 4)
+    s += '=' * (-len(s) % 4)  # pad to a multiple of 4 (0 pad when already aligned)
     return base64.urlsafe_b64decode(s)
 
 
@@ -37,7 +37,11 @@ class ACMEService:
 
     def __init__(self):
         self._directory_cache: Dict[str, dict] = {}
-        self._nonce: Optional[str] = None
+        # Anti-replay nonces are scoped PER CA (directory_url). A Replay-Nonce issued by one ACME
+        # server must never be sent in a JWS to another, or the second server rejects it (e.g. ZeroSSL
+        # "malformed: The Replay Nonce could not be base64url-decoded"). This client is a process-wide
+        # singleton shared across CAs, so a single shared nonce was leaking across them.
+        self._nonce_by_dir: Dict[str, str] = {}
 
     async def _get_settings(self) -> dict:
         conn = await get_database_connection()
@@ -71,17 +75,21 @@ class ACMEService:
                     raise Exception(f"Failed to fetch ACME directory: HTTP {resp.status}")
                 data = await resp.json()
                 if 'Replay-Nonce' in resp.headers:
-                    self._nonce = resp.headers['Replay-Nonce']
+                    self._nonce_by_dir[directory_url] = resp.headers['Replay-Nonce']
                 data['_fetched_at'] = time.time()
                 self._directory_cache[directory_url] = data
                 return data
 
     async def _get_nonce(self, directory_url: str) -> str:
-        if self._nonce:
+        # Use a cached nonce for THIS CA only; otherwise fetch a fresh one from THIS CA's newNonce.
-            nonce = self._nonce
+        cached = self._nonce_by_dir.pop(directory_url, None)
-            self._nonce = None
+        if cached:
-            return nonce
+            return cached
         directory = await self.get_directory(directory_url)
+        # get_directory may have just captured a nonce for this CA from the directory response.
+        cached = self._nonce_by_dir.pop(directory_url, None)
+        if cached:
+            return cached
         async with aiohttp.ClientSession() as session:
             async with session.head(directory['newNonce']) as resp:
                 return resp.headers['Replay-Nonce']
@@ -188,11 +196,17 @@ class ACMEService:
                     timeout=aiohttp.ClientTimeout(total=30),
                 ) as resp:
                     if 'Replay-Nonce' in resp.headers:
-                        self._nonce = resp.headers['Replay-Nonce']
+                        self._nonce_by_dir[directory_url] = resp.headers['Replay-Nonce']
 
-                    if resp.status == 400:
+                    if resp.status == 400 and attempt < 2:
                         err = await resp.json()
-                        if err.get('type') == 'urn:ietf:params:acme:error:badNonce' and attempt < 2:
+                        etype = (err.get('type') or '')
+                        edetail = (err.get('detail') or '').lower()
+                        # Retry on badNonce, and on any nonce-related malformed rejection (e.g.
+                        # "The Replay Nonce could not be base64url-decoded") — refetch a FRESH nonce
+                        # from the target CA and resign. With per-CA scoping the cross-CA cause is gone;
+                        # this is defense-in-depth so a stale/rejected nonce always self-heals.
+                        if etype.endswith('badNonce') or 'nonce' in edetail:
                             nonce = resp.headers.get('Replay-Nonce') or await self._get_nonce(directory_url)
                             protected['nonce'] = nonce
                             body = self._sign_jws(private_key, protected, payload)

backend/services/dns_providers/cloudflare.py

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ Token scope required: Zone:DNS:Edit + Zone:Read.
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import logging
+import re
 from typing import Dict, List, Optional, Tuple
 from urllib.parse import quote
 
@@ -22,6 +23,14 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 CLOUDFLARE_API_BASE = "https://api.cloudflare.com/client/v4"
 _TIMEOUT = aiohttp.ClientTimeout(total=20)
 
+# Characters NOT valid in an HTTP bearer credential (RFC 6750 token68: A-Za-z0-9-._~+/=).
+# Cloudflare API tokens are a strict subset of this set, so removing anything outside it can
+# never corrupt a valid token, but it does strip the paste artifacts that make Cloudflare
+# reject the Authorization header with HTTP 400 "Invalid request headers" (CF code 6003):
+# surrounding/embedded quotes, interior spaces/tabs, zero-width/unicode chars, and CR/LF
+# (the latter would otherwise make aiohttp raise client-side before the request is even sent).
+_NON_TOKEN68 = re.compile(r"[^A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]")
+
 
 def _strip_quotes(s: str) -> str:
     s = (s or "").strip()
@@ -30,6 +39,11 @@ def _strip_quotes(s: str) -> str:
     return s
 
 
+def _sanitize_token(s: str) -> str:
+    """Strip surrounding quotes/whitespace, then drop every character outside the token68 set."""
+    return _NON_TOKEN68.sub("", _strip_quotes(s))
+
+
 class CloudflareDNSProvider(DnsProvider):
     name = "cloudflare"
     label = "Cloudflare"
@@ -47,7 +61,10 @@ class CloudflareDNSProvider(DnsProvider):
 
     def __init__(self, credentials: Dict[str, str] | None = None):
         super().__init__(credentials)
-        self._token = (self.credentials.get("api_token") or "").strip()
+        self._raw_token = (self.credentials.get("api_token") or "").strip()
+        # Sanitize to the token68 set so a pasted token with quotes/spaces/control/unicode chars
+        # cannot produce an invalid Authorization header (CF 6003 "Invalid request headers").
+        self._token = _sanitize_token(self._raw_token)
 
     def _headers(self) -> Dict[str, str]:
         return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {self._token}", "Content-Type": "application/json"}
@@ -97,7 +114,13 @@ class CloudflareDNSProvider(DnsProvider):
                 detail = f"Cloudflare token valid; {total} zone(s) visible."
             return {"ok": True, "detail": detail}
         except DnsProviderError as exc:
-            return {"ok": False, "detail": str(exc)}
+            # Always surface the real Cloudflare reason (e.g. token scope). If sanitizing also changed
+            # the token, append a hint that stray characters were stripped (never echo the token).
+            detail = str(exc)
+            if self._raw_token != self._token:
+                detail += (" Note: the token contained characters that were stripped; if it still "
+                           "fails, re-copy it from Cloudflare without quotes or spaces.")
+            return {"ok": False, "detail": detail}
         except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001 — never leak an internal/transport error verbatim
             return {"ok": False, "detail": "Could not verify the Cloudflare token."}
 

backend/tests/test_acme_humanizer.py

@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ def test_legacy_plain_string_with_brace_but_invalid_json_falls_back():
     ("urn:ietf:params:acme:error:rejectedIdentifier", "blacklisted",    "rejected"),
     ("urn:ietf:params:acme:error:serverInternal", "internal err",       "ACME server"),
     ("urn:ietf:params:acme:error:userActionRequired", "agree to ToS",   "User action"),
+    ("urn:ietf:params:acme:error:externalAccountRequired", "EAB required", "External Account Binding"),
 ])
 def test_known_problem_types_are_humanized(problem_type, detail_text, expected_title_contains):
     payload = json.dumps({"type": problem_type, "detail": detail_text, "status": 400})

backend/tests/test_acme_pydantic_validation.py

@@ -8,7 +8,31 @@ from pydantic import ValidationError
 
 sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))))
 
-from routers.letsencrypt import CertificateRequest
+from routers.letsencrypt import CertificateRequest, AccountCreate
+
+
+class TestAccountCreateEAB:
+    """Issue #35 follow-up: EAB HMAC key must be valid base64url; empty/None passes through
+    (falls back to global Settings) so non-EAB accounts (HTTP-01 / LE / Cloudflare) are unaffected."""
+
+    def test_no_eab_is_allowed(self):
+        acc = AccountCreate(email="a@b.com")
+        assert acc.eab_hmac_key is None and acc.eab_kid is None
+
+    def test_valid_base64url_hmac_accepted(self):
+        # urlsafe base64, unpadded and padded — both accepted.
+        AccountCreate(email="a@b.com", eab_kid="kid-1", eab_hmac_key="YWJjZGVmZ2g")
+        AccountCreate(email="a@b.com", eab_kid="kid-1", eab_hmac_key="YWJjZA==")
+
+    def test_invalid_base64_hmac_rejected(self):
+        # 5 base64 chars (count ≡ 1 mod 4) is undecodable — the exact shape that would otherwise
+        # make register_account's _b64url_decode raise a cryptic binascii error.
+        with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+            AccountCreate(email="a@b.com", eab_kid="kid-1", eab_hmac_key="AAAAA")
+
+    def test_oversized_hmac_rejected(self):
+        with pytest.raises(ValidationError):
+            AccountCreate(email="a@b.com", eab_kid="kid-1", eab_hmac_key="A" * 600)
 
 
 class TestCertificateRequestDomains:

backend/tests/test_dns01.py

@@ -68,3 +68,45 @@ def test_provider_registry_and_allow_list():
     except ValueError:
         raised = True
     assert raised
+
+
+def test_cloudflare_token_sanitize():
+    # Issue #35 follow-up: a pasted token with quotes/spaces/control/unicode chars produced an
+    # invalid Authorization header (CF 6003 "Invalid request headers"). The sanitizer strips them.
+    from services.dns_providers.cloudflare import _sanitize_token, CloudflareDNSProvider
+
+    # Surrounding double quotes stripped.
+    assert _sanitize_token('"abc123-_def"') == 'abc123-_def'
+    # Interior spaces / tabs / newlines removed.
+    assert _sanitize_token('abc 123\tdef\n') == 'abc123def'
+    # A clean token68 string is unchanged (cannot corrupt a valid Cloudflare token).
+    clean = 'A1b2-_C3.d4~e5+f6/g7=='
+    assert _sanitize_token(clean) == clean
+    # Single quotes and a zero-width char removed.
+    assert _sanitize_token("'tok" + chr(0x200b) + "en'") == 'token'
+
+    # The provider constructor sanitizes into _token and keeps the raw input for diagnostics.
+    p = CloudflareDNSProvider({"api_token": '"my-token_123"'})
+    assert p._token == 'my-token_123'
+    assert p._raw_token == '"my-token_123"'
+
+
+def test_b64url_decode_padding_roundtrip():
+    # Issue #35 v1.8.2: _b64url_decode must round-trip for EVERY length, including base64url strings
+    # whose length is a multiple of 4 (the case the old padding formula '=' * (4 - len%4) over-padded).
+    from services.acme_service import _b64url as enc_fn, _b64url_decode as dec_fn
+    for n in range(0, 20):
+        data = bytes(range(n))
+        assert dec_fn(enc_fn(data)) == data, f"round-trip failed at byte length {n}"
+
+
+def test_nonce_scoped_per_directory():
+    # Issue #35 v1.8.2: a nonce cached for one CA (directory_url) must never be returned for another,
+    # and must be single-use. Both directories are pre-cached so _get_nonce returns without network.
+    import asyncio
+    svc = ACMEService()
+    svc._nonce_by_dir = {"https://a.example/dir": "NONCE_A", "https://b.example/dir": "NONCE_B"}
+    got = asyncio.run(svc._get_nonce("https://a.example/dir"))
+    assert got == "NONCE_A"                                            # returns THIS CA's nonce
+    assert svc._nonce_by_dir.get("https://a.example/dir") is None      # consumed (single-use)
+    assert svc._nonce_by_dir.get("https://b.example/dir") == "NONCE_B" # the other CA is untouched

frontend/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "haproxy-openmanager-frontend",
-  "version": "1.8.0",
+  "version": "1.8.2",
   "description": "HAProxy Load Balancer Management UI",
   "license": "AGPL-3.0-or-later",
   "dependencies": {

frontend/src/components/ACMEAutomation.js

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import React, { useState, useEffect, useCallback, useRef } from 'react';
 import {
   Card, Table, Button, Tag, Space, Modal, Form, Input, Select, Steps,
-  message, Row, Col, Statistic, Alert, Tooltip, Switch, theme, Segmented,
+  message, Row, Col, Statistic, Alert, Tooltip, Switch, theme, Segmented, Collapse,
   Tabs, Timeline, Spin, Empty, Typography, Divider
 } from 'antd';
 import {
@@ -18,8 +18,14 @@ import axios from 'axios';
 
 const { Option } = Select;
 
-const getErrorMsg = (err, fallback) =>
+const getErrorMsg = (err, fallback) => {
-  err?.response?.data?.error?.message || err?.response?.data?.detail || fallback;
+  const data = err?.response?.data;
+  // FastAPI/Pydantic 422s wrap the specific field message in error.details.validation_errors[];
+  // the top-level error.message is generic ("Validation error in request data"), so prefer the
+  // field-level message (e.g. the EAB base64 hint) when present.
+  const fieldMsg = data?.error?.details?.validation_errors?.[0]?.message;
+  return fieldMsg || data?.error?.message || data?.detail || fallback;
+};
 
 // Issue #35: humanize the dotted event_type tokens emitted for DNS-01 orders so the diagnostics
 // timeline reads as a step-by-step progress log rather than raw machine strings. Unknown types
@@ -561,6 +567,9 @@ const ACMEAutomation = () => {
         tos_agreed: values.tos_agreed,
         challenge_type: challengeType,
         dns_provider: dnsProvider,
+        // EAB for CAs that require it (ZeroSSL/Google). Empty → backend falls back to global Settings.
+        eab_kid: (values.eab_kid || '').trim() || undefined,
+        eab_hmac_key: (values.eab_hmac_key || '').trim() || undefined,
       });
       const accountId = res.data?.id;
       // For an automated DNS-01 provider, store the entered credentials (verified server-side).
@@ -1613,6 +1622,59 @@ const ACMEAutomation = () => {
               Let's Encrypt Subscriber Agreement
             </a>).
           </div>
+          {/* Issue #35: External Account Binding — required by ZeroSSL / Google Trust Services. */}
+          <Collapse
+            ghost
+            style={{ marginTop: 12 }}
+            items={[{
+              key: 'eab',
+              label: 'External Account Binding (EAB)',
+              children: (
+                <>
+                  <Alert
+                    type="info"
+                    showIcon
+                    style={{ marginBottom: 12 }}
+                    message="Required by some CAs (ZeroSSL, Google Trust Services). Copy the Key ID and HMAC Key from your CA account. Re-enter them on each registration; the HMAC key is not stored."
+                  />
+                  <Form.Item
+                    name="eab_kid"
+                    label="EAB Key ID"
+                    dependencies={['eab_hmac_key']}
+                    rules={[({ getFieldValue }) => ({
+                      validator(_, value) {
+                        const kid = (value || '').trim();
+                        const hmac = (getFieldValue('eab_hmac_key') || '').trim();
+                        if (!kid && hmac) {
+                          return Promise.reject(new Error('EAB Key ID is required when an HMAC Key is entered.'));
+                        }
+                        return Promise.resolve();
+                      },
+                    })]}
+                  >
+                    <Input placeholder="EAB Key Identifier" autoComplete="off" />
+                  </Form.Item>
+                  <Form.Item
+                    name="eab_hmac_key"
+                    label="EAB HMAC Key"
+                    dependencies={['eab_kid']}
+                    rules={[({ getFieldValue }) => ({
+                      validator(_, value) {
+                        const kid = (getFieldValue('eab_kid') || '').trim();
+                        const hmac = (value || '').trim();
+                        if (kid && !hmac) {
+                          return Promise.reject(new Error('EAB HMAC Key is required when a Key ID is entered.'));
+                        }
+                        return Promise.resolve();
+                      },
+                    })]}
+                  >
+                    <Input.Password placeholder="EAB HMAC Key (base64url)" autoComplete="new-password" />
+                  </Form.Item>
+                </>
+              ),
+            }]}
+          />
           {dns01Enabled && (
             <>
               <Divider style={{ margin: '16px 0 12px' }} />

frontend/src/components/ApplyManagement.js

@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ const ApplyManagement = () => {
       title: 'Apply All Configuration Changes',
       content: (
         <div>
-          <p>You are about to apply <strong>{effectiveTotal}</strong> pending changes:</p>
+          <p>You are about to apply <strong>{modalChangeCount}</strong> pending changes:</p>
           <ul style={{ marginTop: 10, marginBottom: 10 }}>
             {pendingChanges.frontends.length > 0 && (
               <li><strong>{pendingChanges.frontends.length}</strong> Frontend changes</li>
@@ -385,6 +385,12 @@ const ApplyManagement = () => {
             {(pendingChanges.vips || []).length > 0 && (
               <li><strong>{pendingChanges.vips.length}</strong> HA/VIP changes</li>
             )}
+            {acmeVersions.length > 0 && (
+              <li><strong>{acmeVersions.length}</strong> ACME Challenge Routing changes</li>
+            )}
+            {otherConfigVersions.length > 0 && (
+              <li><strong>{otherConfigVersions.length}</strong> Other configuration changes</li>
+            )}
           </ul>
           <Alert
             message="All changes will be applied together and sent to agents"
@@ -523,6 +529,10 @@ const ApplyManagement = () => {
       // async on their next agent poll) instead of looping on "Entities: 0/0".
       const vipCount = (pendingChanges.vips || []).length;
       const isVipOnly = totalEntities === 0 && !isRestoreOperation && nonVipPendingVersions.length === 0 && vipCount > 0;
+      // Config-version-only apply (e.g. cluster ACME enable/disable): no entity rows, not a restore,
+      // but there ARE non-vip config versions to push. Without this branch it falls to the "else" and
+      // shows a misleading "Entities: 0/0" while still syncing agents.
+      const isConfigVersionOnly = totalEntities === 0 && !isRestoreOperation && vipCount === 0 && nonVipPendingVersions.length > 0;
 
       if (isRestoreOperation) {
         // Restore operation: Show "Configuration" instead of "Entities"
@@ -534,6 +544,12 @@ const ApplyManagement = () => {
         setSyncProgress({ visible: true, step: `Applying ${vipCount} HA/VIP change(s)...`, progress: 20 });
         startProgress('apply', `Applying ${vipCount} HA/VIP change(s)...`);
         updateEntityCounts(0, vipCount, 0, 0, 0);
+      } else if (isConfigVersionOnly) {
+        // Config-version-only (ACME toggle, etc.): show "Configuration" instead of "Entities: 0/0".
+        const cfgCount = nonVipPendingVersions.length;
+        setSyncProgress({ visible: true, step: `Applying configuration change... Configuration: 0/${cfgCount}, Agents: ⏳`, progress: 20 });
+        startProgress('apply', `Applying configuration change... Configuration: 0/${cfgCount}, Agents: ⏳`);
+        updateEntityCounts(0, cfgCount, 0, totalAgents, disabledAgents);
       } else {
         // Normal operation: Show "Entities" as usual
         setSyncProgress({ visible: true, step: `Applying configuration changes... Entities: 0/${totalEntities}, Agents: ⏳`, progress: 20 });
@@ -556,10 +572,12 @@ const ApplyManagement = () => {
         }
       }
 
-      // Apply HAProxy changes only if there are any (avoids a no-op call when only VIPs are pending).
+      // Apply HAProxy changes if there are entity-level changes OR any non-vip config version
+      // (cluster ACME enable/disable, restore, bulk-import). Gating only on haproxyPending used to
+      // skip the call for config-version-only states, leaving those versions stuck PENDING.
       const haproxyPending = pendingChanges.frontends.length + pendingChanges.backends.length
         + pendingChanges.waf_rules.length + pendingChanges.ssl_certificates.length;
-      const response = haproxyPending > 0
+      const response = (haproxyPending > 0 || nonVipPendingVersions.length > 0)
         ? await axios.post(
             `/api/clusters/${selectedCluster.id}/apply-changes`,
             {},
@@ -805,7 +823,7 @@ const ApplyManagement = () => {
       title: 'Reject All Configuration Changes',
       content: (
         <div>
-          <p>You are about to reject <strong>{effectiveTotal}</strong> pending changes:</p>
+          <p>You are about to reject <strong>{modalChangeCount}</strong> pending changes:</p>
           <ul style={{ marginTop: 10, marginBottom: 10 }}>
             {pendingChanges.frontends.length > 0 && (
               <li><strong>{pendingChanges.frontends.length}</strong> Frontend changes</li>
@@ -822,6 +840,12 @@ const ApplyManagement = () => {
             {(pendingChanges.vips || []).length > 0 && (
               <li><strong>{pendingChanges.vips.length}</strong> HA/VIP changes</li>
             )}
+            {acmeVersions.length > 0 && (
+              <li><strong>{acmeVersions.length}</strong> ACME Challenge Routing changes</li>
+            )}
+            {otherConfigVersions.length > 0 && (
+              <li><strong>{otherConfigVersions.length}</strong> Other configuration changes</li>
+            )}
           </ul>
           <Alert
             message="All pending changes will be permanently discarded"
@@ -874,10 +898,16 @@ const ApplyManagement = () => {
         }
       }
 
-      // Reject HAProxy changes only if there are any.
+      // Reject HAProxy changes if there are entity-level changes OR any non-vip config version
+      // (e.g. cluster ACME enable/disable, restore, bulk-import) — the backend DELETE rejects all
+      // non-vip PENDING versions and rolls back their snapshots. Gating only on haproxyPending used
+      // to skip the call for config-version-only states, returning the misleading "Rejected 0 HA/VIP".
       const haproxyPending = pendingChanges.frontends.length + pendingChanges.backends.length
         + pendingChanges.waf_rules.length + pendingChanges.ssl_certificates.length;
-      const response = haproxyPending > 0
+      const nonVipPendingVersions = configVersions.filter(
+        v => v.status === 'PENDING' && !(v.version_name || '').startsWith('vip-')
+      );
+      const response = (haproxyPending > 0 || nonVipPendingVersions.length > 0)
         ? await axios.delete(
             `/api/clusters/${selectedCluster.id}/pending-changes`,
             { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } }
@@ -957,6 +987,23 @@ const ApplyManagement = () => {
   const appliedVersions = configVersions.filter(v => v.status === 'APPLIED');
   const rejectedVersions = configVersions.filter(v => v.status === 'REJECTED');
   const effectiveTotal = pendingChanges.total_count > 0 ? pendingChanges.total_count : pendingVersions.length;
+  // Issue #35: cluster ACME enable/disable produce `cluster-<id>-acme-<enable|disable>-<ts>` config
+  // versions that have NO entity-level pending flag, so they were neither categorized nor counted.
+  const ACME_VERSION_RE = /^cluster-\d+-acme-(enable|disable)-/;
+  const ENTITY_VERSION_PREFIXES = ['frontend-', 'backend-', 'server-', 'ssl-', 'waf-'];
+  const acmeVersions = pendingVersions.filter(v => ACME_VERSION_RE.test(v.version_name || ''));
+  // "Other" config versions for the confirm modal = non-vip, non-acme, non-entity-backed (i.e.
+  // restore-*/bulk-import-*/other cluster-level) — entity-backed versions are already counted via
+  // total_count, and vips are listed separately, so excluding them avoids double-counting.
+  const otherConfigVersions = pendingVersions.filter(v => {
+    const n = v.version_name || '';
+    if (n.startsWith('vip-') || ACME_VERSION_RE.test(n)) return false;
+    return !ENTITY_VERSION_PREFIXES.some(p => n.startsWith(p));
+  });
+  // Confirm-modal header count: entities+VIPs (total_count) + ACME + other config versions, so the
+  // header equals the sum of the listed <li> items in every state. The button-enable gate keeps
+  // using effectiveTotal (unchanged) so entity-only button/Alert behavior is byte-identical.
+  const modalChangeCount = (pendingChanges.total_count || 0) + acmeVersions.length + otherConfigVersions.length;
 
   const renderPendingItem = (item, type, icon) => {
     // For PENDING items, don't show sync status since they haven't been applied yet
@@ -1314,12 +1361,46 @@ const ApplyManagement = () => {
                     </div>
                   )}
 
+                  {/* Issue #35: ACME Challenge Routing (cluster-<id>-acme-*) versions have no entity
+                      flag. Render them in their own section REGARDLESS of whether entity sections are
+                      present, so a co-pending ACME toggle is never hidden in the left panel. */}
+                  {acmeVersions.length > 0 && (
+                    <div style={{ marginTop: 8, marginBottom: 8 }}>
+                      <Title level={5}>
+                        <SafetyCertificateOutlined style={{ marginRight: 8, color: '#1890ff' }} />
+                        ACME Challenge Routing ({acmeVersions.length})
+                      </Title>
+                      {acmeVersions.map(v => {
+                        const isEnable = /^cluster-\d+-acme-enable-/.test(v.version_name);
+                        return (
+                          <div key={v.id} style={{
+                            padding: 10, border: '1px dashed #1890ff', borderRadius: 6, marginBottom: 8,
+                            display: 'flex', alignItems: 'center', justifyContent: 'space-between', backgroundColor: '#f0f8ff'
+                          }}>
+                            <span style={{ fontFamily: 'monospace' }}>{v.version_name}</span>
+                            <span>
+                              <Tag color={isEnable ? 'green' : 'default'}>{isEnable ? 'ENABLE' : 'DISABLE'}</Tag>
+                              <Tag color="orange">PENDING</Tag>
+                            </span>
+                          </div>
+                        );
+                      })}
+                      <div style={{ fontSize: 12, color: token.colorTextSecondary, marginTop: 4 }}>
+                        ACME challenge routing change. Apply to push the updated HAProxy config to the agents.
+                      </div>
+                    </div>
+                  )}
+
                   {pendingChanges.frontends.length === 0 && pendingChanges.backends.length === 0 && pendingChanges.waf_rules.length === 0 && pendingChanges.ssl_certificates.length === 0 && (pendingChanges.vips || []).length === 0 && pendingVersions.length > 0 && (
                     <div style={{ marginTop: 8 }}>
                       {(() => {
                         const restoreVersions = pendingVersions.filter(v => v.version_name.startsWith('restore-'));
                         const bulkImportVersions = pendingVersions.filter(v => v.version_name.startsWith('bulk-import-'));
-                        const otherVersions = pendingVersions.filter(v => !v.version_name.startsWith('restore-') && !v.version_name.startsWith('bulk-import-'));
+                        // Exclude restore-/bulk-import- (own sections), vip-* (VIP section), and acme-*
+                        // (the dedicated ACME section above) so they aren't duplicated in "Other".
+                        const otherVersions = pendingVersions.filter(v =>
+                          !v.version_name.startsWith('restore-') && !v.version_name.startsWith('bulk-import-')
+                          && !v.version_name.startsWith('vip-') && !ACME_VERSION_RE.test(v.version_name));
                         
                         return (
                           <>

version.json

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 {
-  "version": "1.8.0",
+  "version": "1.8.2",
-  "releaseName": "ACME DNS-01 challenge support",
+  "releaseName": "ACME nonce fix (ZeroSSL registration)",
-  "releaseDate": "2026-06-23"
+  "releaseDate": "2026-06-25"
 }