Patches the critical shell-quote advisory (quote() does not escape
newlines in object .op values, CVSS 8.1). shell-quote is a dev/build-only
transitive dependency (react-dev-utils / launch-editor) and is not present
in the production image or the browser bundle, so there is no runtime
exposure; this clears the alert and the dev-time risk. Lockfile-only change
verified to install with shell-quote resolving to 1.8.4.
Manage highly-available virtual IPs backed by Keepalived (VRRP) directly from the OpenManager
UI — no more SSHing into nodes to install/configure Keepalived by hand. Builds on the agent
pull-architecture: define the VIP centrally, click Apply, and the agents converge.
Highlights:
- New "HA / VIP" tab: create a virtual IP, pick a per-node interface, select which pool nodes
participate (MASTER/BACKUP roles + priorities); live MASTER/BACKUP/FAULT per node.
- On Apply, agents install & configure Keepalived (unicast VRRP, cloud-safe default) across the
major distros (Debian/Ubuntu, RHEL/CentOS/Alma/Rocky, Fedora, SUSE/openSUSE, Alpine) with a
HAProxy health-check, so the VIP fails over automatically when HAProxy drops.
- Single-node (a managed floating IP without failover) and multi-node VRRP failover both work.
- VIP changes ride the standard Apply Management flow with the standard "View Change" diff.
- Approval-gated deletion (safety): deleting a running VIP is staged for approval and the VIP
keeps running, untouched, until you approve it — an agent never tears a VIP down without an
explicit human approval. Per-VIP Diagnostics view; opt-in package uninstall (only on nodes
where OpenManager installed it). A node already running a hand-managed Keepalived is detected
and never overwritten ("externally managed").
- Fully opt-in and backward compatible: nodes/clusters without a VIP are unaffected. Adds
vip_instances + vip_members tables (idempotent SCHEMA_VERSION bump; existing data and
passwords unaffected) and a `vip` RBAC permission group.
- Also includes a HAProxy config-generator robustness fix: auto-inject a stick-table when a
frontend uses a stick counter (track-sc / sc_*_rate) but declares none.
On-prem / L2 (VRRP) scope; the UI notes the cloud caveat.
Supersedes the v1.6.4 stable pin (1.30.2-alpine) with the mainline
patched release. No config, schema, or behavior changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The bundled nginx reverse proxy was flagged for the nginx 'poolslip' advisory
(affected: mainline <=1.31.0; fixed: stable 1.30.2+ / mainline 1.31.1+). The
config-level mitigation (named capture groups instead of $1/$2 in rewrite) does
not apply — the product's nginx config (nginx/nginx.conf and the k8s configmap)
has no rewrite capture-group directives, only prefix locations + proxy_pass. So
the fix is the version: pin nginx:alpine -> nginx:1.30.2-alpine in
docker-compose.yml and k8s/manifests/10-nginx.yaml.
No config/schema/behavior change (nginx only reverse-proxies). Version bumped to
1.6.4 across all layers. Verified in Docker: nginx -v=1.30.2; nginx -t OK on both
the compose and production configmap configs; all proxied routes work through
nginx; no nginx errors.
A backend server toggled OFF (is_active=false) vanished from the UI with no way
to reactivate it: GET /api/backends honored include_inactive for backends but the
server sub-queries hardcoded 'AND is_active = TRUE'.
- get_backends: server sub-queries now honor include_inactive (default callers
unchanged); added last_config_status to the server payload so the UI can tell a
DISABLED server (re-enableable) from a DELETION (pending delete).
- toggle_server: persists an entity snapshot so an Apply-Management Reject rolls
back is_active (previously left the server stuck disabled).
- BackendServers.js: requests include_inactive, shows disabled servers with the
ON/OFF switch + an 'Inactive' tag, hides only DELETION-pending servers, and
keeps soft-deleted BACKENDS hidden (so include_inactive doesn't resurface them).
- Config generation unchanged: disabled servers stay '# DISABLED:' comments and
convert back to live lines when re-enabled.
Startup migration hardening (multi-replica / rolling-deploy safety): create_essential_tables
fails fast on lock contention and retries; run_all_migrations is serialized by a
session advisory lock and gated by a schema_migrations version marker, so an
already-current schema is skipped instead of issuing lock-heavy DDL that a serving
replica's traffic could block at startup. Idempotent and fail-open.
Version reported consistently across all layers (version.json, backend fallback,
frontend package) -> 1.6.3.
Assigning a HAProxy agent failed with '401: Authorization header missing'
on GET /api/clusters. A cluster-read hardening had made GET /api/clusters and
GET /api/clusters/{id} accept only a user JWT in the Authorization header;
agents authenticate with their agent token in the X-API-Key header, so the
token was never read.
Both endpoints now accept either a user JWT (Authorization) or an agent token
(X-API-Key via validate_agent_api_key), mirroring the existing dual-auth on
POST /api/agents/generate-install-script. Anonymous access is still rejected,
so the original hardening is preserved. The auth guard is placed before the
try block so the failure surfaces as a clean 401 (not the 500-wrapped-401 in
the report). Agent install scripts now consistently send the token via
X-API-Key (pre-flight cluster check on linux/macos, and macOS get_cluster_paths
which previously used the wrong Authorization: Bearer header).
Also normalizes the platform in the uninstall-script generator so macOS agents
(which report platform 'darwin') no longer get a 400 from
GET /api/agents/generate-uninstall-script/darwin.
version 1.6.0 -> 1.6.2.
Adds opt-in TOTP-based Multi-Factor Authentication that is fully
backwards compatible with existing logins. Operators choose to enable
MFA per account; nothing changes for users who do not opt in.
Highlights
==========
* RFC 6238 TOTP (6 digits, 30s period, SHA1) with ±30s skew tolerance,
compatible with Microsoft / Google Authenticator, Authy, Duo, 1Password.
* Per-step replay protection (`mfa_last_used_totp_step`) so a captured
code cannot be reused inside the same window.
* Fernet-encrypted TOTP secrets at rest, key resolution via
`MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY` env (HKDF-derived from `SECRET_KEY` as fallback).
* 10 single-use, bcrypt-hashed backup codes per user, formatted
`XXXX-YYYY` from a confusion-free alphabet (no 0/O/1/I/L).
* Two-step login flow: `POST /api/auth/login` returns `mfa_required`
+ `mfa_token`, then `POST /api/auth/login/mfa-verify` accepts a TOTP
code OR a backup code. JWT is minted only after MFA succeeds.
* Self-service: users enable / disable MFA from their own row in the
Users page; admins reset (single user or bulk) but never enable on
behalf of someone else (matches AWS IAM / GitHub / Google Workspace).
* Bulk emergency reset CLI: `scripts/admin-mfa-reset-all.sh`.
Security hardening
==================
* Atomic transactions with `SELECT … FOR UPDATE` on `mfa_pending_logins`
and `users` rows so concurrent verify / enroll calls cannot race.
* `/api/mfa/enroll/start` refuses re-enrollment when MFA is already on
(prevents silent secret rotation via a stolen JWT).
* Pydantic `ValidationError` messages are sanitized before reaching the
audit log so request bodies (TOTP / backup codes in flight) never
appear in plaintext.
* Slowapi rate limits are per-USER, not per-IP, with a trusted-proxy
XFF strategy so a single ingress address cannot exhaust the bucket
for thousands of operators (`MFA_TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDRS`,
`MFA_RATE_LIMIT_*` env-overridable).
* Login query now scopes to `is_active = TRUE` so a soft-deleted row
with the same username can no longer occlude the active user
(also closes a small account-enumeration side channel).
Database
========
Additive migrations (idempotent `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS`,
`CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS`):
- users: mfa_enabled, mfa_method, mfa_secret_encrypted,
mfa_enrolled_at, mfa_last_used_at, mfa_last_used_totp_step
- mfa_backup_codes (user_id ON DELETE CASCADE)
- mfa_pending_logins (user_id ON DELETE CASCADE, challenge_token,
attempts, expires_at)
- mfa_pending_enrollments (user_id ON DELETE CASCADE)
Frontend
========
* Login page becomes a 3-phase state machine
(credentials → MFA → submitting); legacy single-step login is
preserved for users who haven't enrolled.
* New MFAEnrollModal (3-step wizard: QR + secret → verify → backup
codes) using `qrcode.react`.
* Users page shows MFA column + per-row enable/disable/reset actions.
Admins viewing other users with MFA off see a non-actionable info
icon explaining that only the user themselves can enable MFA.
Deployment
==========
* `MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY` is added to `k8s/manifests/03-secrets.yaml` as
a placeholder; `SECRET_KEY` is also placeholder-ized so both are
injected by the existing pipeline pattern (sed-replace + apply).
* No new build-time env vars are required for the frontend. The SPA
uses `window.location.host` for `/api/*` and is routed by the
existing nginx ingress configuration.
* `frontend/.dockerignore` ensures host `.env*` files cannot bleed
into the production bundle.
Tests
=====
* New unit suites:
- `test_mfa_service.py` (TOTP, encryption, backup codes)
- `test_mfa_backwards_compat.py` (regression — non-MFA flow unchanged)
- `test_mfa_rate_limits.py` (env override + dataclass immutability)
- `test_mfa_rate_limit_key.py` (JWT key, trusted-proxy XFF, fallbacks)
* All existing 1000+ unit tests continue to pass.
Documentation
=============
* README MFA section (overview, day-to-day operations, emergency
reset CLI, env variables, rate-limit tuning).
* `scripts/README.md` documents the bulk reset script.
Issue: #18
Closes#13, Closes#14.
This release squashes the v1.4.0 → v1.5.0 development line. v1.4.0
shipped the ACME stability & enterprise audit (Issues #10/#11/#12).
v1.5.0 builds on that foundation with two co-equal headline features
plus a 22-round audit campaign hardening the prior configuration
surface. License remains MIT for v1.5.0 (relicense to AGPL-3.0
lands in v1.5.2).
------------------------------------------------------------------
HEADLINE FEATURE A — ACME Diagnostic Panel (Issue #13)
------------------------------------------------------------------
A live pre-flight + post-failure diagnostic surface for every ACME
order, reachable from the ACME Automation page. The panel exists
to make ACME failures legible to operators who do NOT have shell
access to the API host.
Endpoints (`backend/routers/acme_diagnostics.py`):
POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics
Run the full 5-check suite (DNS / port-80 / routing /
account / agents) and humanize the order's `error_detail`
(>=11 RFC-8555 problem types, backwards compatible with
legacy plain-string failures).
POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics/
{check_id}/rerun
Re-run a single check in place — used by the "Re-run"
button on every row of the modal's pre-flight table.
GET /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/events
Merged event timeline combining the typed
`acme_order_events` rows with correlated
`user_activity_logs` entries (resource_type =
'letsencrypt_order' AND resource_id = order_id). The
diagnostic modal auto-tails this timeline every 5 seconds
while open.
Service-level checks (`backend/services/acme_diagnostics.py`):
* DNS resolution via stdlib socket.gethostbyname_ex through
run_in_executor (intentionally avoiding an aiodns runtime
dep for v1.5.0).
* Port-80 HEAD probe, target locked to the order's domains,
success on HTTP 200 OR 404, warns on egress timeout
(corp egress policies routinely blackhole outbound 80 —
fail-hard would be too noisy).
* SSRF guard: probe refuses non-public IPs and surfaces the
skip in the diagnostic result; IPv4-mapped IPv6 normalisation
closes the `::ffff:169.254.169.254` cloud-metadata vector.
* HAProxy routing presence check: matches the order's
cluster_ids to a port-80 HTTP frontend.
* ACME account validity check against `letsencrypt_accounts`.
* Agent presence check (>=1 active agent in target cluster).
* Every sub-check wrapped in a wall-clock timeout to bound
impact on the API event loop.
RBAC: ssl.read for run, ssl.read for events. Per-user 5/min rate
limit on both run and rerun, backed by the (user_id, action,
created_at DESC) composite index.
Frontend (`frontend/src/components/ACMEAutomation.js`):
* "Diagnose" button on every order row + the existing
"stuck order" warning row.
* Modal with two tabs:
- Pre-flight Checks (Antd Table with status pills + Re-run
buttons + humanized error banner)
- Event Log (Antd Timeline with auto-tail polling, scroll-
to-bottom, pause-on-hover)
* Correlation IDs surfaced in error banners and individual
check fail details for backend-log lookup.
------------------------------------------------------------------
HEADLINE FEATURE B — Site Setup Wizard (Issue #14)
------------------------------------------------------------------
A single guided flow that creates a Backend + Servers + HTTP
Frontend (and optional HTTPS Frontend) in one atomic transaction.
Endpoints (`backend/routers/site_wizard.py`):
POST /api/site-wizard/preview — diff-preview the changeset
POST /api/site-wizard/create — atomic execute
POST /api/site-wizard/reject — clean rollback (including
any wizard_staged ACME
orders)
GET /api/site-wizard/drafts — draft persistence
PUT /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id} — save/update
DELETE /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id}
Feature surface:
* One screen captures both backend (mode + servers) AND
frontend (http + optional https + SSL mode) inputs.
* SSL modes: ACME (new order, HTTP-01 only for v1.5.0),
Upload (existing PEM), Existing (link to a stored cert),
or None.
* ACME-staged path: wizard_staged_until watermark on the
`letsencrypt_orders` row defers finalisation until agent
confirmation; per-mode reject cleanly cancels and rolls
back the staged order.
* Live diff preview against the cluster's current generated
config (renderer-evolution noise stripped — track-sc<N>
dedup, per-server cookie strip, defaults-cookie
inheritance, listen-block flattening).
* Draft persistence with PEM stripped at save time (private
keys never round-trip through the drafts table).
* Per-cluster multi-tenancy: drafts and wizard_staged orders
are isolated to the creating user's cluster scope.
Frontend (`frontend/src/components/SiteWizard.js`):
* 4-step Antd Steps flow: Backend → Frontend → SSL → Review.
* Render the live diff preview inline before commit.
* Antd Form-level validation mirrors backend Pydantic
validators (numeric bounds, HAProxy reserved keywords, ALPN
consistency, IPv6 scope-id, domain regex, server name
dedup).
------------------------------------------------------------------
AUDIT CAMPAIGN — Rounds 1 → 22 (Bulgu #1 → #82)
------------------------------------------------------------------
v1.5.0 includes 22 adversarial review passes. Each round produced
its own commit set in the corporate development line; this squash
collapses those into the v1.5.0 release artefact. Highlights:
Round 1-4 Site Wizard core: dry-run parity, single-line
value injection guard, ACL -f pattern-file block,
SSL parity, timeout regex, form-state pin.
Round 5-7 defaults-cookie inheritance, server-named-cookie
guard, fe/be mode mismatch, duplicate server
names, health_check_uri + server_address
validators.
Round 8-10 cookie_name / cookie_options newline-injection
guard, dry-run parity (round 9), TCP-mode HTTP-only
feature blockers.
Round 11 SSL name path traversal + health-check >= 1.
Round 12-13 SSL & ACME deep dive (Bulgu #23-#32).
Round 14 single-line value injection (Bulgu #33).
Round 15-17 ACME multi-tenant UX, numeric bounds, HAProxy
reserved keywords, ALPN/TLS consistency,
all-backup, multi-domain & multi-user enterprise
edges, drain/HSTS/post-completion (Bulgu
#34-#53).
Round 18-21 concurrency, agent state, TCP-mode HTTP-only,
list size caps, IPv6 scope-id, preview account
validation, TCP backend + balance uri reject
(Bulgu #54-#61).
Round 22 FE error visibility + 3x stale-data lockouts,
referential integrity + cascade safety,
authentication & authorization, multi-cluster
isolation, apply_pending_changes concurrency,
script injection + bulk import multi-tenancy,
prefix-stripped signature comparison
(Bulgu #62-#82).
------------------------------------------------------------------
NO CORPORATE-SPECIFIC ARTIFACTS
------------------------------------------------------------------
This squash deliberately sanitises corporate hostnames, container
registry references, and TLS secret names into generic
placeholders (`your-registry.example.com/your-org`,
`haproxy-openmanager*.example.com`, `wildcard-tls`,
`taylanbakircioglu/haproxy-openmanager-*`) so the public artefact
contains no internal infrastructure detail. Pilot / development
history that retained those values stays in the corporate fork
and is NOT part of this commit.
taylanbakircioglu