The deploy report is the server's only evidence that a member node applied its
keepalived.conf, and it was sent on the write path alone. Once the rendered
config was on disk the agent took the idempotency early return every cycle and
never reported again, so a single lost report - a backend restart, a 5xx, a
network blip - left the VIP reading SYNCING with an empty "Last ack" forever
while the node was demonstrably running the right config. Nothing would ever
reconcile the two; the only escape was to change the rendered config so the
agent wrote it again, which means touching a live VIP to fix a display problem.
The agent now re-asserts its state on that path too: one request per node per
poll cycle (~2.5 min), nothing written, keepalived not reloaded.
This gap dates from the original HA/VIP work rather than this release series;
it only became visible when acknowledgements were dropped for an unrelated
reason. A test pins that both daemon copies report BEFORE the early return,
since placing it after would silently restore the old behaviour.
Verified end to end on a real HA pair: discovery, instance-based adoption of
both nodes, PENDING, Apply, agent pull, the validation gate, the hash-pinned
takeover, the acknowledgement, and retirement of the one-shot authorisation.
Two agent-side fixes found while taking the VIP adoption flow through a real
HA pair, released together.
1. A VALID CONFIG WAS REJECTED BY ITS OWN WARNING (v1.10.12)
Before writing a rendered keepalived.conf the agent validates it with
keepalived -t and, on failure, keeps the running config and does not restart
keepalived. That fail-safe is right, but it treated ANY non-zero exit as
invalid - and keepalived's config-test exit code does not separate fatal from
benign. Measured on 2.2.8:
clean config ..................... 0
auth_pass longer than 8 chars .... 5 "Truncating auth_pass to 8 characters"
missing '}' ...................... 5 "There are 1 missing '}'s"
unknown keyword .................. 5 "Unknown keyword '...'"
script without script_security ... 6 "SECURITY VIOLATION ..."
Exit 5 covers both a harmless truncation and a broken file, so a VRRP password
over eight characters was enough to block every apply - including on a node
whose own running config emits the same warning and had been serving the VIP
for weeks. Accepting exit 5 would have accepted broken configs, so the gate now
judges the OUTPUT: known-benign messages are dropped and anything remaining
still fails. It fails CLOSED - an unrecognised message, or a non-zero exit with
no readable output at all, is fatal - and the filter is an allowlist, never a
denylist. The agent also reports what keepalived said, in its log and in the
status the HA/VIP page shows; discarding it left a correct refusal that nobody
could act on.
2. EVERY DEPLOY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT WAS DROPPED
The takeover-retirement clause on POST /agents/{name}/keepalived-status reused
one placeholder for both the assignment `last_deploy_hash=$n` and the
comparison inside its CASE. PostgreSQL types a placeholder per USE, so it came
out as text in one and character varying in the other and asyncpg rejected the
statement with AmbiguousParameterError. The whole UPDATE never ran, so no
member recorded an acknowledgement: VIPs sat at SYNCING with an empty Last ack
while the nodes were verifiably running the config, and teardown acks were lost
the same way. The hash now has its own placeholder, compared only against the
column.
Verified against real keepalived and a real PostgreSQL rather than by
inspection, including on busybox and bash 3.2, and a test asserts every $n in
those statements is bound exactly once.
Found during an impact analysis of the agent-script change in PR #58.
linux_install.sh contains TWO daemon implementations and which one runs depends
on how the agent reached its current state:
- Fresh install: the heredoc at lines 923-2646 is written to
/usr/local/bin/haproxy-agent and systemd runs that file.
- Self-upgrade: perform_agent_upgrade copies the downloaded INSTALLER script
over that same path (`cp "$temp_script" "$current_script"` with
current_script=/usr/local/bin/haproxy-agent). systemd then runs the
installer with `daemon` + SKIP_TO_DAEMON=true, which takes the separate
in-script daemon that lives after the heredoc.
PR #58 added _kp_discover and the one-shot takeover only to the heredoc copy, so
both were absent from the path that self-upgraded agents actually run — and
self-upgrade is exactly the path the release notes tell operators to rely on
("nodes will pull the new script through the normal agent-upgrade path"). The
feature would have worked on a freshly installed node and been silently inert on
every upgraded one.
The file's own banner warns about this ("check_agent_upgrade() - Multiple
locations ... TIP: Search for function name to find all occurrences!"), and
send_heartbeat / fetch_and_deploy_keepalived_config / get_haproxy_stats_csv are
already maintained as parallel copies for the same reason.
Verified empirically rather than by reading: the script was instrumented and run
in a container exactly as systemd invokes it after an upgrade
(SKIP_TO_DAEMON=true, `bash linux_install.sh daemon`), inspecting the live
`declare -f fetch_and_deploy_keepalived_config`.
before: DISCOVERY_YOK TAKEOVER_YOK
after: DISCOVERY_VAR TAKEOVER_VAR ENDPOINT_VAR
Both blocks are ported verbatim from the heredoc copy with indentation adjusted;
no logic changed, so the guard semantics are identical in both paths — takeover
still requires allow_takeover AND a non-empty expected hash AND a matching
on-disk md5, and anything else falls through to the existing "externally managed
— refusing to overwrite" branch.
`bash -n` passes. Backend suite unchanged at 1263 passed.
Correcting a wrong ACME challenge backend was impossible without a shell, and
even with one the correction did not reach the nodes.
The mint gate only fired when `acme_enabled` flipped. `acme_backend_url` was
written to the DB and minted nothing, so Apply answered "No pending changes to
apply" and the nodes kept the old address forever. It is now decided by
comparing the rendered `server _acme_mgmt` line against the active version —
the one line that answers "would the nodes talk to a different address?".
Comparing whole configs would flag every unrelated pending edit.
The field had no UI at all. Added to the cluster form with validation that
mirrors the backend rules, and keyed on `model_fields_set` so clearing it
reverts to the global setting — with a plain `is not None` test an empty box is
indistinguishable from "not submitted", so a value could never be removed.
Validation is asymmetric on purpose (utils/acme_backend_url):
- at the write boundary, reject what cannot express a reachable target —
including the two silent traps: a scheme-less value became `localhost`, and
an out-of-range port raised inside the generator and destroyed the config
- at render time, never reject. The shipped defaults are themselves loopback,
so refusing to render would make every acme_enabled cluster unappliable,
including for changes unrelated to ACME. Problems are logged and surfaced.
The port-less default stays 8080 rather than moving to HTTP's 80: the bundled
compose publishes nginx on 8080, so installs relying on it work today and the
first sign of breaking them would be the unattended renewal loop months later.
The omission is warned about instead.
RFC1918 is allowed and is usually the right answer here, and no DNS resolution
is performed — both deliberate departures from utils/ssrf_guard, whose policy
is the opposite of what this address needs. What the management host can
resolve says nothing about what the HAProxy node can reach.
Diagnostics stop reporting success on a dead path:
- check_port80 uses GET instead of HEAD and classifies the body. A proxy that
has lost its /.well-known/acme-challenge/ location serves its SPA with HTTP
200, which `status in (200, 404)` accepted as healthy. Warnings also surface
when other domains pass, which previously hid the most diagnostic outcome.
- check_routing filters `mode`, joins `acme_enabled` and reads the APPLIED
config instead of counting database rows, and reports a loopback target.
- every new condition is `warn`, never `fail`: the site wizard blocks submit on
any fail, so a new failing condition would lock every install on upgrade day.
Also: normalise `frontends.mode` once per frontend. It is nullable, and the
raw value was interpolated into `mode {}`, emitting a literal `mode None` that
HAProxy rejects — taking down the whole cluster config. The ACME gate and the
backend-mode check now read the same normalised value.
And stop hardcoding PUBLIC_URL / MANAGEMENT_BASE_URL in docker-compose, which
silently ignored the operator's .env and made the wrong default load-bearing.
Two additions to the Linux agent, both inside the existing keepalived converge
function so no new poll or timer is introduced.
Discovery is strictly read-only: when the node has a keepalived.conf without
OpenManager's ownership marker, the agent posts it so an existing VIP can be
adopted from the UI. Nothing is written to the node. It is rate-limited by
content - the md5 of the last report is cached next to the config, so a file
that may carry the VRRP password is posted only when it actually changes rather
than every cycle. Once we own the file there is nothing left to adopt, so the
record is cleared exactly once. The content is JSON-encoded with `jq -Rs` so
newlines survive verbatim and the hash the server pins the takeover to is the
hash of what is really on disk.
The ownership guard now has exactly one exception, and it does not weaken it.
Previously any file without the marker was refused, which is what protects a
hand-maintained setup - and also what would block adoption forever. The server
authorises a single takeover of a specific file by sending the md5 the operator
adopted from, and the agent overwrites only when the on-disk hash still matches.
If the file changed in between, the agent refuses again and reports why, so an
edit made after adoption wins over the stale adoption instead of being
destroyed.
The fallback latest Linux agent version moves 2.0.0 -> 2.1.0 so nodes pull the
new script through the normal upgrade path. Discovery simply does not happen on
a node that has not upgraded yet.
Closes the follow-up filed during the v1.9.0 CSR review. The private key of a
PENDING CSR is now Fernet-encrypted in the database instead of being stored as
a raw PEM.
Why this key specifically: it is the one key in the system that sits idle. It
is generated at CSR creation, waits for an external CA to sign the request
(days to weeks), and is destroyed the moment the signed certificate is
imported. It is never transmitted to an agent and never leaves the server.
ssl_certificates.private_key_content and the ACME order keys are deliberately
NOT covered, because agents must receive those in plaintext on every poll, so
encrypting them at rest buys nothing without an end-to-end redesign.
Implementation follows the pattern already used for the VRRP secret, TOTP
secrets and DNS provider credentials: a new utils/csr_key_crypto.py with its
own CSR_ENCRYPTION_KEY env var and its own HKDF info string
("csr-private-key-v1"), so rotating one secret class never affects another.
No schema change and deliberately NO SCHEMA_VERSION bump: the Fernet token
replaces the PEM inside the existing ssl_csrs.private_key_pem TEXT column. A
bump would re-run the migration sequence and re-seed the four built-in roles to
their defaults, which is a needless side effect for a storage-format change.
Backward compatible with no data migration. Rows written before this release
hold a raw PEM and are still read unchanged; the discriminator is exact rather
than a heuristic, since a Fernet token is base64url and can never contain the
"-----BEGIN" marker. Legacy rows drain naturally because a CSR's key copy is
NULLed on import.
A key that cannot be decrypted (SECRET_KEY rotated while CSR_ENCRYPTION_KEY was
unset) now fails with an explicit "delete this CSR and create a new one" error.
Previously that situation would have surfaced as the far more confusing
"certificate does not match this CSR's private key".
Also documents all four per-purpose encryption keys in .env.template. Only
VIP_ENCRYPTION_KEY was listed; MFA_ENCRYPTION_KEY and
DNS_PROVIDER_ENCRYPTION_KEY had been missing since v1.6.0 and v1.8.0.
Verified before release, on a corporate pre-production environment and locally:
- Full backend suite 1234 -> 1243 passed (+9 new tests), 0 failed.
- Against a real Postgres: a CSR created through the API stores a Fernet token
with no PEM header in the column, and imports successfully.
- Full 1.10.0 -> 1.10.1 -> 1.10.0 drill on one database volume. The upgrade
logs "Schema already at version 10 (>= 10); skipping migration run", so no
migration executes and the built-in roles are not re-seeded. A CSR created on
1.10.0 with a plaintext key imports successfully after the upgrade, which is
the backward-compatibility guarantee proven against a real row rather than a
mock.
- rsa-2048, rsa-4096 and ecdsa-p384 all round-trip through create, encrypt,
decrypt and import.
- Key derivation is stable across processes: two independent containers sharing
SECRET_KEY decrypt each other's tokens (required for UVICORN_WORKERS > 1 and
multi-replica deployments), while a different SECRET_KEY yields None rather
than a wrong key or an exception.
- Downgrade behaviour was measured, not assumed: 1.10.0 cannot parse the token
and fails with HTTP 500 "key parse failed (encrypted?)" rather than pairing a
wrong key. The rollback note states the measured behaviour.
- No CSR endpoint returns the key in any form: list and detail responses
contain neither a PEM nor a Fernet token.
Not changed here, from the issue's "worth folding in" list: the create rate
limit is not a concurrency guard, create_csr holds a pooled connection across
RSA key generation, detail=str(e) echoes internal error text (a repo-wide
convention), and is_global skips cluster validation in both routers/ssl.py and
routers/csr.py. None are storage concerns and each is a separate change.
Addresses three reported advisories, all verified against the code. Fixes are
entirely server-side — deployed agents already send a valid X-API-Key on every
call, so enforcing it does not require any agent-script change or upgrade.
GHSA-7rhv-c5pc-69r8 (CRITICAL RCE — agent script-template poisoning):
- POST/GET /api/agents/script-templates/{platform} now require the agents.version
permission (was authentication-only), matching POST /versions. Blocks a viewer
JWT from overwriting the root install/upgrade script.
GHSA-3p5c-m5m4-mjpx (missing authentication):
- Agent data-plane endpoints now REQUIRE a valid X-API-Key (was optional/skipped
when the header was absent), checked before any DB access: config,
ssl-certificates (private keys!), upgrade-status, heartbeat (by-name and the
previously auth-less by-id), configuration pending-requests. Removes keyless
heartbeat spoofing and keyless rogue-agent auto-registration.
- Operator/UI endpoints now require a JWT: GET /api/agents, the entire
/api/dashboard-stats router, /api/health/{deep,agents,clusters}, and
/api/ssl/certificates/{id}/config-versions. The simple /api/health liveness
probe stays public. Adds shared auth_middleware.require_authenticated_user.
GHSA-3vh4-gvxx-wm2p (SSRF via ACME directory_url):
- New utils/ssrf_guard.py (https-only + public-IP-only, IPv4-pinned, no redirects),
applied to settings test-connection, acme_service.get_directory and
_signed_request, and validated at Let's Encrypt account creation. The
test-connection response no longer reflects arbitrary upstream JSON keys
(information-disclosure oracle) — only fixed ACME field names.
Verified: full pytest tests/ (1128 passed, 0 failed) + live localtest stack smoke
(valid JWT/key paths return 200/404 as expected; anonymous requests 401; SSRF to
metadata/private/loopback refused). No changes to backend/utils/agent_scripts/*.
Bulk import / manual edit silently dropped `filter spoe engine ...` (Coraza WAF)
and frontend `log-format` because the parser recognised only a fixed directive
set. The regenerated config then missed the SPOE engine, so HAProxy failed with
"unable to find SPOE engine 'coraza' used by the send-spoe-group".
- parser: capture `filter` + `log-format`/`log-format-sd` into new ParsedFrontend fields
- db: additive nullable `log_format` + `filters` TEXT columns on frontends (SCHEMA_VERSION 8->9)
- generator: new `filter` bucket flushed before http-request rules so `filter` precedes
`send-spoe-group`; `log-format` kept in prelude
- bulk import: preview dict, change-detection, persist (create + merge-update); cluster-aware
SPOE pre-flight advisories (missing-filter + host-prerequisite) surfaced in the UI
- manual CRUD: full round-trip (get/create/update) incl. React form fields (no null-wipe)
- reject/rollback: restore the new columns; restore path + wizard helper kept in parity
- backend `option spop-check` recognised (suppresses spurious warning for coraza-spoa)
- tests: test_spoe_filter_import.py; full suite green (1079 passed)
The Linux/macOS agent installer could abort during "pre-installation cleanup"
(terminal showed `Killing processes matching: haproxy-agent` then `Killed`,
returning to the prompt) when the install script's own command line contained
"haproxy-agent". The cleanup killed processes via `pgrep -f "$pattern"` starting
with the bare string "haproxy-agent", which also matched the running installer's
own command line and a sudo/PAM ancestor that the $$/$PPID self-exclusion did not
cover, so the installer terminated itself before installing.
- linux_install.sh / macos_install.sh: the cleanup kill loop now targets ONLY
the installed agent - "$INSTALL_DIR/haproxy-agent" (the daemon binary path) and
the agent service/label ("haproxy-agent.service" / "com.haproxy.agent") - never
the bare "haproxy-agent" substring. Neither pattern can match the installer's
own command line. The redundant bare pattern is dropped (the service is stopped
separately, and the binary-path pattern still catches a running daemon).
- frontend (AgentManagement.js): name the downloaded scripts
install-agent-<platform>.sh / uninstall-agent-<platform>.sh (matching the
backend's suggested filename) - defense in depth so this cannot resurface.
Installer-only change. The running agent and its privilege model are unchanged
(it runs as root for HAProxy reload, config writes, keepalived, and self-upgrade).
The cleanup runs only on a full interactive install (gated by SKIP_TO_DAEMON), so
daemon mode, self-upgrade, and config/version apply are unaffected. Both agent
scripts kept in sync. Scripts parse on bash 4.2-5.2; full backend suite green.
Addresses #31.
A self-hosted agent could fail every heartbeat with HTTP 400
`Invalid JSON: Expecting property name enclosed in double quotes` when the
system-info block it collects came back empty on an unusual host. The agent
builds the heartbeat JSON as text, so an empty `$system_info` collapsed the
`$system_info,` line to a bare comma and broke the payload.
- Agent script (linux + macos, kept in sync): guard the fragment-form
register_agent and send_heartbeat builders so an empty system_info falls back
to a valid key and can never emit a bare comma. Uses the most portable bash
glob test (no POSIX class / pattern substitution; verified on bash 3.2-5.2 and
on Ubuntu/Debian/Rocky/Alpine/Amazon Linux). True no-op for healthy agents.
- Backend heartbeat endpoint: parse the body as-is first and only run the
malformed-JSON repair when parsing fails, so a valid heartbeat from any agent
version is byte-for-byte untouched. The repair (now a testable helper) recovers
a leading or doubled comma (the empty-system_info artifact) in addition to the
existing empty-value / trailing-comma fixes.
No agent version bump; self-upgrade and daemon mode are unaffected. Healthy
agents of every version behave identically. Full backend suite green.
Addresses #31.
Add ACME DNS-01 (TXT-record) validation alongside the existing HTTP-01,
for internal/isolated clusters with no public port 80 and for wildcard
certificates. Opt-in via a global kill-switch (default off); HTTP-01 is
byte-for-byte unchanged, with zero agent or rendered-config changes.
- Pluggable DNS provider interface (Manual + Cloudflare). Per-account
credentials are Fernet-encrypted at rest, verified on save, and never
returned by the API or written to logs/events/error_detail.
- Non-blocking per-cycle orchestrator: publish (CAS) -> propagation grace
(across cycles, no in-loop sleep) -> respond -> finalize/download, with a
bounded fresh-order retry chain (1 original + 3 retries) on propagation lag.
- Manual flow: user publishes the TXT record and confirms; manual DNS-01
cannot auto-renew unattended (auto-renew forced off and surfaced in the UI).
- Migration v8: additive, idempotent columns on letsencrypt_accounts/orders
and acme_challenges, plus a new letsencrypt_account_dns_credentials table.
- Challenge-type-aware diagnostics (port80/routing/DNS checks skipped for
DNS-01) and a DNS-01 event timeline in the order detail.
- Frontend: DNS-01 account + credentials management, cert wizard adaptation,
order-detail TXT records + verify, orders/renewal Method columns, and a
Settings kill-switch. README, release notes, and API docs updated.
Implements #35.
Manage highly-available virtual IPs backed by Keepalived (VRRP) directly from the OpenManager
UI — no more SSHing into nodes to install/configure Keepalived by hand. Builds on the agent
pull-architecture: define the VIP centrally, click Apply, and the agents converge.
Highlights:
- New "HA / VIP" tab: create a virtual IP, pick a per-node interface, select which pool nodes
participate (MASTER/BACKUP roles + priorities); live MASTER/BACKUP/FAULT per node.
- On Apply, agents install & configure Keepalived (unicast VRRP, cloud-safe default) across the
major distros (Debian/Ubuntu, RHEL/CentOS/Alma/Rocky, Fedora, SUSE/openSUSE, Alpine) with a
HAProxy health-check, so the VIP fails over automatically when HAProxy drops.
- Single-node (a managed floating IP without failover) and multi-node VRRP failover both work.
- VIP changes ride the standard Apply Management flow with the standard "View Change" diff.
- Approval-gated deletion (safety): deleting a running VIP is staged for approval and the VIP
keeps running, untouched, until you approve it — an agent never tears a VIP down without an
explicit human approval. Per-VIP Diagnostics view; opt-in package uninstall (only on nodes
where OpenManager installed it). A node already running a hand-managed Keepalived is detected
and never overwritten ("externally managed").
- Fully opt-in and backward compatible: nodes/clusters without a VIP are unaffected. Adds
vip_instances + vip_members tables (idempotent SCHEMA_VERSION bump; existing data and
passwords unaffected) and a `vip` RBAC permission group.
- Also includes a HAProxy config-generator robustness fix: auto-inject a stick-table when a
frontend uses a stick counter (track-sc / sc_*_rate) but declares none.
On-prem / L2 (VRRP) scope; the UI notes the cloud caveat.
Assigning a HAProxy agent failed with '401: Authorization header missing'
on GET /api/clusters. A cluster-read hardening had made GET /api/clusters and
GET /api/clusters/{id} accept only a user JWT in the Authorization header;
agents authenticate with their agent token in the X-API-Key header, so the
token was never read.
Both endpoints now accept either a user JWT (Authorization) or an agent token
(X-API-Key via validate_agent_api_key), mirroring the existing dual-auth on
POST /api/agents/generate-install-script. Anonymous access is still rejected,
so the original hardening is preserved. The auth guard is placed before the
try block so the failure surfaces as a clean 401 (not the 500-wrapped-401 in
the report). Agent install scripts now consistently send the token via
X-API-Key (pre-flight cluster check on linux/macos, and macOS get_cluster_paths
which previously used the wrong Authorization: Bearer header).
Also normalizes the platform in the uninstall-script generator so macOS agents
(which report platform 'darwin') no longer get a 400 from
GET /api/agents/generate-uninstall-script/darwin.
version 1.6.0 -> 1.6.2.
Closes#13, Closes#14.
This release squashes the v1.4.0 → v1.5.0 development line. v1.4.0
shipped the ACME stability & enterprise audit (Issues #10/#11/#12).
v1.5.0 builds on that foundation with two co-equal headline features
plus a 22-round audit campaign hardening the prior configuration
surface. License remains MIT for v1.5.0 (relicense to AGPL-3.0
lands in v1.5.2).
------------------------------------------------------------------
HEADLINE FEATURE A — ACME Diagnostic Panel (Issue #13)
------------------------------------------------------------------
A live pre-flight + post-failure diagnostic surface for every ACME
order, reachable from the ACME Automation page. The panel exists
to make ACME failures legible to operators who do NOT have shell
access to the API host.
Endpoints (`backend/routers/acme_diagnostics.py`):
POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics
Run the full 5-check suite (DNS / port-80 / routing /
account / agents) and humanize the order's `error_detail`
(>=11 RFC-8555 problem types, backwards compatible with
legacy plain-string failures).
POST /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/diagnostics/
{check_id}/rerun
Re-run a single check in place — used by the "Re-run"
button on every row of the modal's pre-flight table.
GET /api/letsencrypt/orders/{order_id}/events
Merged event timeline combining the typed
`acme_order_events` rows with correlated
`user_activity_logs` entries (resource_type =
'letsencrypt_order' AND resource_id = order_id). The
diagnostic modal auto-tails this timeline every 5 seconds
while open.
Service-level checks (`backend/services/acme_diagnostics.py`):
* DNS resolution via stdlib socket.gethostbyname_ex through
run_in_executor (intentionally avoiding an aiodns runtime
dep for v1.5.0).
* Port-80 HEAD probe, target locked to the order's domains,
success on HTTP 200 OR 404, warns on egress timeout
(corp egress policies routinely blackhole outbound 80 —
fail-hard would be too noisy).
* SSRF guard: probe refuses non-public IPs and surfaces the
skip in the diagnostic result; IPv4-mapped IPv6 normalisation
closes the `::ffff:169.254.169.254` cloud-metadata vector.
* HAProxy routing presence check: matches the order's
cluster_ids to a port-80 HTTP frontend.
* ACME account validity check against `letsencrypt_accounts`.
* Agent presence check (>=1 active agent in target cluster).
* Every sub-check wrapped in a wall-clock timeout to bound
impact on the API event loop.
RBAC: ssl.read for run, ssl.read for events. Per-user 5/min rate
limit on both run and rerun, backed by the (user_id, action,
created_at DESC) composite index.
Frontend (`frontend/src/components/ACMEAutomation.js`):
* "Diagnose" button on every order row + the existing
"stuck order" warning row.
* Modal with two tabs:
- Pre-flight Checks (Antd Table with status pills + Re-run
buttons + humanized error banner)
- Event Log (Antd Timeline with auto-tail polling, scroll-
to-bottom, pause-on-hover)
* Correlation IDs surfaced in error banners and individual
check fail details for backend-log lookup.
------------------------------------------------------------------
HEADLINE FEATURE B — Site Setup Wizard (Issue #14)
------------------------------------------------------------------
A single guided flow that creates a Backend + Servers + HTTP
Frontend (and optional HTTPS Frontend) in one atomic transaction.
Endpoints (`backend/routers/site_wizard.py`):
POST /api/site-wizard/preview — diff-preview the changeset
POST /api/site-wizard/create — atomic execute
POST /api/site-wizard/reject — clean rollback (including
any wizard_staged ACME
orders)
GET /api/site-wizard/drafts — draft persistence
PUT /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id} — save/update
DELETE /api/site-wizard/drafts/{id}
Feature surface:
* One screen captures both backend (mode + servers) AND
frontend (http + optional https + SSL mode) inputs.
* SSL modes: ACME (new order, HTTP-01 only for v1.5.0),
Upload (existing PEM), Existing (link to a stored cert),
or None.
* ACME-staged path: wizard_staged_until watermark on the
`letsencrypt_orders` row defers finalisation until agent
confirmation; per-mode reject cleanly cancels and rolls
back the staged order.
* Live diff preview against the cluster's current generated
config (renderer-evolution noise stripped — track-sc<N>
dedup, per-server cookie strip, defaults-cookie
inheritance, listen-block flattening).
* Draft persistence with PEM stripped at save time (private
keys never round-trip through the drafts table).
* Per-cluster multi-tenancy: drafts and wizard_staged orders
are isolated to the creating user's cluster scope.
Frontend (`frontend/src/components/SiteWizard.js`):
* 4-step Antd Steps flow: Backend → Frontend → SSL → Review.
* Render the live diff preview inline before commit.
* Antd Form-level validation mirrors backend Pydantic
validators (numeric bounds, HAProxy reserved keywords, ALPN
consistency, IPv6 scope-id, domain regex, server name
dedup).
------------------------------------------------------------------
AUDIT CAMPAIGN — Rounds 1 → 22 (Bulgu #1 → #82)
------------------------------------------------------------------
v1.5.0 includes 22 adversarial review passes. Each round produced
its own commit set in the corporate development line; this squash
collapses those into the v1.5.0 release artefact. Highlights:
Round 1-4 Site Wizard core: dry-run parity, single-line
value injection guard, ACL -f pattern-file block,
SSL parity, timeout regex, form-state pin.
Round 5-7 defaults-cookie inheritance, server-named-cookie
guard, fe/be mode mismatch, duplicate server
names, health_check_uri + server_address
validators.
Round 8-10 cookie_name / cookie_options newline-injection
guard, dry-run parity (round 9), TCP-mode HTTP-only
feature blockers.
Round 11 SSL name path traversal + health-check >= 1.
Round 12-13 SSL & ACME deep dive (Bulgu #23-#32).
Round 14 single-line value injection (Bulgu #33).
Round 15-17 ACME multi-tenant UX, numeric bounds, HAProxy
reserved keywords, ALPN/TLS consistency,
all-backup, multi-domain & multi-user enterprise
edges, drain/HSTS/post-completion (Bulgu
#34-#53).
Round 18-21 concurrency, agent state, TCP-mode HTTP-only,
list size caps, IPv6 scope-id, preview account
validation, TCP backend + balance uri reject
(Bulgu #54-#61).
Round 22 FE error visibility + 3x stale-data lockouts,
referential integrity + cascade safety,
authentication & authorization, multi-cluster
isolation, apply_pending_changes concurrency,
script injection + bulk import multi-tenancy,
prefix-stripped signature comparison
(Bulgu #62-#82).
------------------------------------------------------------------
NO CORPORATE-SPECIFIC ARTIFACTS
------------------------------------------------------------------
This squash deliberately sanitises corporate hostnames, container
registry references, and TLS secret names into generic
placeholders (`your-registry.example.com/your-org`,
`haproxy-openmanager*.example.com`, `wildcard-tls`,
`taylanbakircioglu/haproxy-openmanager-*`) so the public artefact
contains no internal infrastructure detail. Pilot / development
history that retained those values stays in the corporate fork
and is NOT part of this commit.
- Agent scripts now detect and send ip_address in DAEMON heartbeat (Linux: ip route, macOS: ifconfig)
- Backend validates agent-reported IPs via ipaddress stdlib, COALESCE preserves existing on NULL
- IP/VIP change logging (non-critical, try/except wrapped) for operational visibility
- New source_file_hash column on agent_script_templates for reliable update detection
- Migration changed to ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING to prevent overwriting UI-customized scripts on restart
- GET /versions returns script_update_available flag (disk hash vs DB hash comparison with fallback)
- Frontend Alert banner warns users of new agent script versions and directs to Reset to Defaults
- Reset to Defaults and Popconfirm modals explicitly warn about custom script edit loss
- Full backward compatibility: old agents without ip_address field continue working unchanged
Made-with: Cursor
Bulk import accepted dots in frontend/backend/server names but UI and
backend validators rejected them with ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$. After import,
entities with dots could not be edited. HAProxy itself allows dots in
section names, so the regex is expanded to ^[a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+$ across
all 12 validation points (5 React form rules, 1 ACL char-strip,
3 Pydantic validators, 1 WAF validator, 2 config-validator warnings).
When a backend block in haproxy.cfg does not specify explicit timeout
values, the bulk import was injecting hardcoded defaults (connect 10s,
server 60s, queue 60s) into the database. These then appeared in the
generated config and overrode the agent's defaults section. Now, only
explicitly declared timeouts are stored; omitted ones remain NULL so
the agent's existing defaults section stays in effect.
- Step 3 (Enable ACME on Cluster) now shows a process icon instead of
a misleading green checkmark when ACME is enabled but not yet applied.
Per-cluster "(pending apply)" annotation for multi-cluster setups.
- Step 4 button and all /apply-management navigation buttons now say
"Apply Changes" instead of "Configure" for clearer guidance.
- Setup Guide auto-selects the correct cluster before navigating to
Apply Management, showing pending cluster names in alerts.
- Pending ACME disable changes are now correctly detected in Step 4
even when acme_enabled is already FALSE in the database.
- Entity snapshot rollback for cluster ACME settings: reject correctly
restores acme_enabled/acme_backend_url to pre-change values.
- Deduplication logic prevents "last wins" bug when multiple ACME
toggles are rejected in sequence.
- Connection leak prevention with try/finally around conn2 in ACME
config version creation.
- Step 4 branching uses boolean has_enabled instead of fragile string
truthiness check.
Made-with: Cursor
Agent startup left HAPROXY_CONFIG_PATH empty when the /api/clusters jq
select() returned no output (e.g. transient API failure or cluster_id
mismatch). This caused "No existing HAProxy config found at: " errors
and partial config merge failures for newly added agents.
Three-layer fix:
1. Load HAProxy paths from config.json as baseline before get_cluster_paths()
2. Use local variables in get_cluster_paths() - only override globals when
API returns non-empty values (defensive against jq select() empty output)
3. Dynamically update paths from /api/agents/{name}/config response in
check_config_updates() - allows cluster path changes without reinstall
Applied to both linux_install.sh and macos_install.sh.
Made-with: Cursor
- Fix DB: COALESCE(NULLIF) prevented clearing stale MASTER/BACKUP state.
Use CASE WHEN IS NOT NULL to distinguish absent fields (old agents)
from empty fields (keepalived stopped) and properly clear to NULL.
- Fix Redis: explicitly delete cache key when keepalived stops instead
of relying on 90s TTL expiry, preventing stale dashboard data.
- Fix agent scripts: SKIP_TO_DAEMON send_heartbeat now always sends
keepalive_state/keepalive_ip fields (even empty) so backend can
detect stopped keepalived and clear stale data.
- Fix legacy heartbeat endpoint: POST /{agent_id}/heartbeat now also
updates keepalive_state and keepalive_ip fields.
- UI: add horizontal scroll to ClusterManagement table to prevent
column overflow with new Keepalive column.
- UI: add VIP tooltip to Dashboard AgentStatusCard keepalive tag.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
- Add keepalive_state and keepalive_ip columns to agents table (migration + schema)
- Add keepalive fields to AgentHeartbeat Pydantic model (backward compatible)
- Update heartbeat endpoint to persist keepalive data to DB and cache in Redis
- Add multi-method keepalived detection in agent scripts (journalctl, log files, VIP check)
- Update dashboard-stats agents/status API with Redis-first keepalive lookup
- Update GET /api/agents to include keepalive_state and keepalive_ip
- Show MASTER/BACKUP tag in Dashboard AgentStatusCard
- Show keepalive info in Agent Management registered agents table
- Add Keepalive column to Cluster Management table with VIP search support
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Root cause: SSL update passes expiry_date as Python datetime object in
new_values. json.dumps() fails on datetime, causing save_entity_snapshot
to return {} (empty). Entity snapshot is never saved in config_version
metadata, so reject/rollback can never find it to restore old values.
Fix: Apply same JSON serialization to new_values as old_values. Only
affects SSL certificates (only entity with datetime in new_values).
All other entity types (frontend, backend, server, waf) are unaffected
as their new_values contain only JSON-serializable types.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
- Add per-cluster SSL sync status tracking with APPLYING/SYNCED/PARTIAL states
- Add timeout detection (10min) for stalled SSL deployments showing PARTIAL status
- Add SSL-specific info in Apply Management dialog (cluster count, auto-apply notice)
- Add Deployment Status tab in SSL details showing per-cluster agent sync progress
- Implement SSL auto-reject (reject propagates to all clusters) and auto-undo
- Add conditional entity rollback for SSL reject (time-window based safety check)
- Filter REJECTED status from SSL last_config_status display
- Add pending_cluster_names to SSL list API response
- Optimize agent SSL reload: only trigger HAProxy reload when changed cert is
actually referenced in the cluster's HAProxy config (grep -qF check), preventing
unnecessary reloads on clusters that don't use the updated certificate
- Applied to all 4 SSL deploy paths: Linux/macOS standalone and daemon embedded modes
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Root cause: After agent self-upgrade, the embedded daemon (SKIP_TO_DAEMON
block) runs instead of run_daemon(). HAPROXY_BIN and HAPROXY_CONFIG
variables were uninitialized before the daemon loop, causing SSL-triggered
HAProxy reloads to silently fail with empty path validation.
Changes:
- Initialize HAPROXY_BIN/HAPROXY_CONFIG before embedded daemon loop
- Add md5 checksum comparison in deploy_ssl_certificates() to detect
actual cert file changes (avoid unnecessary writes and reloads)
- Add check_ssl_updates() for independent SSL sync every ~2.5 min
in run_daemon(), independent of config version changes
- Add SSL-aware reload in check_config_updates(): if config validation
fails but SSL certs changed, reload HAProxy with existing config
- Add "full" fetch mode to fetch_and_deploy_ssl_certificates() to
bypass incremental timestamp filter for standalone SSL checks
Applied to both linux_install.sh and macos_install.sh.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
- Replace immediate exit 1 with retry-with-backoff in all daemon mode paths
(dependency checks: 5 retries, 30/60/90/120/150s; config file: 5 retries, 15/30/45/60/75s)
- Make socat missing non-fatal in daemon mode (agent continues without stats)
- Add SystemD StartLimitBurst=5/StartLimitIntervalSec=120 for new installs
- Add macOS launchd ThrottleInterval=30 for new installs
- Fix Linux daemon fallback to installer mode (would hang on interactive read)
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Move jq dependency check to run before cluster validation which requires
it. Auto-install jq via the detected package manager (apt, dnf, yum,
zypper, apk for Linux; brew for macOS). Exit with clear manual install
instructions if automatic installation fails.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Same pgrep self-kill bug as uninstall scripts. When user downloads
install script as install-haproxy-agent.sh, pgrep -f "haproxy-agent"
matches the installer's own bash process and kills it before
installation starts. Now filters out INSTALLER_PID and PPID.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Instead of a hardcoded PROTECTED_PATHS list (varies per environment):
- safe_rm() blocks any path not containing "haproxy-agent"
- Process killer verifies ps output contains "haproxy-agent"
- Pre/post HAProxy integrity check via md5 hash comparison of config
and service status diff (was running -> still running?)
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
pgrep -f "haproxy-agent" was matching the uninstall script's own
process (uninstall-haproxy-agent-linux.sh contains "haproxy-agent"),
causing the script to terminate itself at step 1/7 before reaching
file cleanup. Now filters out $$ (own PID) and $PPID from kill lists.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
CRITICAL BUG FIX:
- Previous pattern `/^defaults[[:space:]]/` required whitespace after keyword
- HAProxy allows `defaults` without a name (no trailing whitespace)
- Pattern failed to match, causing global extraction to include defaults section
New pattern uses `([[:space:]]|$)`:
- Matches keyword followed by whitespace OR end of line
- `defaults` (no name) now correctly triggers exit
- `defaults http` (named) also correctly triggers exit
Test results:
- Old pattern: extracted 8 lines (included defaults) ❌
- New pattern: extracted 4 lines (stopped at defaults) ✅
CRITICAL BUG FIX:
- Previous awk pattern allowed multiple defaults sections to be captured
- Pattern `!/^defaults/` meant "don't exit if line IS defaults"
- This caused duplicate defaults when config had listen before defaults
New pattern uses `started` flag:
- First `defaults` line: set started=1, begin capturing
- Second `defaults` line: started is set, EXIT immediately
- Any `frontend/backend/listen`: started is set, EXIT
Also includes: debug logging for validation error storage with fallback
Tested scenarios:
- Normal config (defaults → listen → frontend): ✓
- Listen before defaults: ✓
- Two defaults sections: ✓ Only first captured
- No defaults section: ✓ Empty output
- Defaults at end of file: ✓
- Empty defaults section: ✓
Bug: When haproxy.cfg has 'listen stats' BEFORE 'defaults' section,
the global extraction incorrectly included listen stats because it
only stopped at 'defaults', not at any section header.
Fix: Changed extraction to stop at ANY section (defaults/listen/frontend/backend)
This prevents duplicate listen blocks in merged config.
Root cause of 'proxy stats has same name as proxy stats' HAProxy validation error.
- /api/agents/{name}/config now returns haproxy_bin_path, haproxy_config_path, stats_socket_path from cluster
- Agent daemon uses these dynamic paths from API response for validation
- Fallback to local config file if API values not present
- Allows cluster admin to change paths without reinstalling agents
This fixes validation when HAProxy binary is in non-standard location
- Updated SUGGESTION_TEMPLATES in haproxy_error_parser.py
- Fixed fallback error messages in cluster.py
- Product language should be English throughout
When config content doesn't look like valid HAProxy config (missing
global/defaults/frontend/backend/listen keywords), agent now reports
this to backend via config-validation-failed endpoint.
This catches backend-side config generation errors (like Python
exceptions) that prevented actual HAProxy config from being generated.
Changes:
- Add invalid config format detection and reporting in daemon mode
- Use same curl pattern as existing HAProxy validation failure reporting
- Same endpoint, headers, error handling, and spam prevention
- Follows exact existing pattern for consistency
- Does not affect self-upgrade flow (runs before upgrade check)
Both linux and macos scripts updated identically.
- Copy uninstall-agent-linux.sh and uninstall-agent-macos.sh to
backend/utils/agent_scripts/ (same location as install scripts)
- Update generate-uninstall-script endpoint to use the same path
pattern as working install script endpoint
- Add container-specific fallback paths for robustness
- Add debug logging to track which path is used
Fixes 404 error when fetching uninstall script in production
where /utils/ directory at project root is not deployed.
- Add haproxy_error_parser.py: Parses HAProxy validation errors with
confidence scoring, extracts entity type/name, line number, error type
- Add ValidationErrorModal.js: Rich modal with parsed error summary,
quick fix suggestions, and manual troubleshooting guide
- Update cluster.py: Integrate error parser into agent-sync and
config-versions endpoints with graceful fallback
- Update ApplyManagement.js: Add validation error banner with quick
navigation buttons and error detail modal
- Update FrontendManagement.js & BackendServers.js: Handle URL params
for deep-linking to entity edit forms with field highlighting
Enables users to see actionable validation failure details directly
in the UI without needing server access for debugging.
- Add 'random' and 'first' options to backend balance method selector
- Add balance method validation in config parser with warning for unknown methods
- Update API documentation with all supported balance algorithms
- Add haproxy_version field to heartbeat payload in Linux agent script
- Add haproxy_version field to heartbeat payload in macOS agent script
- Display HAProxy version below IP address in Registered Agents list
- Safe extraction with fallback to 'unknown' if haproxy command fails
- Version is updated on every heartbeat (30s interval)
- Green color styling for easy visibility
Backend already supports haproxy_version field in AgentHeartbeat model
and saves it to database on each heartbeat.
taylanbakircioglu