Files
Anand d9b2519b75 Fleet audit fixes: PBS page, shared SSE, safer ops, deep links + comment cleanup
- New PBS Backups page (/pbs): datastore usage, group browser, per-group
  prune, GC with live status, sync/verify jobs with admin-gated run
- Shared single-connection SSE store (lib/sse.ts) feeding NotificationBell
  and the telemetry pill; global offline banner with reconnect invalidation
- Correctness: CIFS storage credentials sent in JSON body; per-row alert
  silencing + unsilence endpoint; graceful stop-and-delete for running
  guests; accent/shadow token fixes for all look presets
- Safer operations: confirms for SDN apply and host upgrade-all; Refresh
  control on every page; 30s polling added to previously-static pages
- Wayfinding: guests deep-linkable via /inventory?focusGuest, scoped
  inventory views, topology guest click-through, Overview links
- Forms/consistency: node storage/bridge pick-lists in CreateGuestDialog,
  backup schedule validation, BulkOperationsPage on shared DataTable,
  progressive pagination on cluster access lists, shared Timestamp and
  chartToneFor helpers, editable alert rules and webhooks
- Security/tests: CSRF, authz-matrix, redaction and PBS test coverage;
  webhook outbox + connection TLS fingerprint migrations (00032/00033,
  sqlite + postgres)
- Comment audit: removed stale, duplicated and orphaned comments; corrected
  inaccurate doc comments (UpdateGuestConfig, InvalidateAll, breakpoint
  references); no behavior changes
2026-09-13 23:29:33 +05:30

186 lines
6.2 KiB
Go

package api
import (
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"sync"
"time"
"ferrum/internal/auth"
)
// oidcPending bridges the redirect to the provider and the callback: it
// proves the callback belongs to a login we actually started (state) and
// that the returned ID token was minted for this exact login (nonce),
// mirroring the pendingLogin pattern used for the TOTP step-up in totp.go.
type oidcPending struct {
nonce string
expires time.Time
}
var (
oidcPendingMu sync.Mutex
oidcPendingM = map[string]oidcPending{}
)
func newOIDCState() (state, nonce string) {
state, nonce = randomHex(16), randomHex(16)
now := time.Now()
oidcPendingMu.Lock()
for id, p := range oidcPendingM {
if now.After(p.expires.Add(10 * time.Minute)) {
delete(oidcPendingM, id)
}
}
oidcPendingM[state] = oidcPending{nonce: nonce, expires: now.Add(5 * time.Minute)}
oidcPendingMu.Unlock()
return state, nonce
}
func consumeOIDCState(state string) (nonce string, ok bool) {
oidcPendingMu.Lock()
defer oidcPendingMu.Unlock()
p, found := oidcPendingM[state]
delete(oidcPendingM, state)
if !found || time.Now().After(p.expires) {
return "", false
}
return p.nonce, true
}
func randomHex(n int) string {
b := make([]byte, n)
_, _ = rand.Read(b)
return hex.EncodeToString(b)
}
// oidcStateCookie binds the /oidc/callback round-trip to the browser that
// started it: the state is planted in this cookie at /oidc/login and must
// come back with the callback's query state, so one user's login redirect
// can't be replayed against another's session (CSRF on the callback). The
// server-side state map remains the nonce store — the cookie is only the
// "same browser that started this" check.
const oidcStateCookie = "ferrum_oidc_state"
// oidcStateCookiePath scopes the state cookie to the OIDC route tree it
// belongs to; it's also the Path both set and clear must use to match.
const oidcStateCookiePath = "/api/v1/auth/oidc"
func (s *Server) setOIDCStateCookie(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, state string) {
http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
Name: oidcStateCookie,
Value: state,
Path: oidcStateCookiePath,
HttpOnly: true,
Secure: s.cookieSecure(r),
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
MaxAge: 600, // outlives the server-side state's 5-minute TTL slightly
})
}
func (s *Server) clearOIDCStateCookie(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
Name: oidcStateCookie,
Value: "",
Path: oidcStateCookiePath,
HttpOnly: true,
Secure: s.cookieSecure(r),
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
MaxAge: -1,
})
}
// oidcConfig tells the frontend whether to show an SSO button, without
// exposing any secret — the login page needs this before the user has
// authenticated, so it's intentionally not behind requireAuth.
func (s *Server) oidcConfig(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
oidc := s.getOIDC()
if oidc == nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"enabled": false})
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"enabled": true, "displayName": oidc.DisplayName()})
}
func (s *Server) oidcLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
oidc := s.getOIDC()
if oidc == nil {
writeErrorMsg(w, http.StatusNotFound, "SSO is not configured")
return
}
state, nonce := newOIDCState()
authURL, err := oidc.AuthURL(state, nonce)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("building OIDC auth URL", "error", err)
writeErrorMsg(w, http.StatusBadGateway, "could not reach the SSO provider")
return
}
s.setOIDCStateCookie(w, r, state)
http.Redirect(w, r, authURL, http.StatusFound)
}
// oidcCallback completes the flow: verify state/nonce, exchange the code,
// verify the ID token, provision/link the local user, and start a normal
// Ferrum session exactly as password login would.
func (s *Server) oidcCallback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
oidc := s.getOIDC()
if oidc == nil {
writeErrorMsg(w, http.StatusNotFound, "SSO is not configured")
return
}
if errParam := r.URL.Query().Get("error"); errParam != "" {
slog.Warn("OIDC provider returned an error", "error", errParam, "description", r.URL.Query().Get("error_description"))
http.Redirect(w, r, "/login?sso_error=1", http.StatusFound)
return
}
state := r.URL.Query().Get("state")
cookieState, cookieErr := r.Cookie(oidcStateCookie)
nonce, ok := consumeOIDCState(state)
// The callback must be the same browser that started the login: the
// state cookie has to be present and carry exactly the query state.
// Both sides are consumed either way so a replayed URL never validates.
if !ok || cookieErr != nil || cookieState.Value != state {
s.clearOIDCStateCookie(w, r)
slog.Warn("OIDC callback with unknown, expired, or mismatched state")
http.Redirect(w, r, "/login?sso_error=1", http.StatusFound)
return
}
// The state has served its purpose — drop the cookie before continuing,
// so it's gone regardless of how the rest of the flow ends.
s.clearOIDCStateCookie(w, r)
code := r.URL.Query().Get("code")
claims, err := oidc.Exchange(code, nonce)
if err != nil {
slog.Error("OIDC token exchange/verification failed", "error", err)
http.Redirect(w, r, "/login?sso_error=1", http.StatusFound)
return
}
user, err := s.auth.FindOrCreateOIDCUser(r.Context(), claims.Subject, claims.Email, claims.PreferredUsername, claims.EmailVerified, oidc.AllowAutoProvision())
if errors.Is(err, auth.ErrOIDCUserNotProvisioned) {
slog.Warn("OIDC login refused: no matching local account and auto-provisioning is disabled", "subject", claims.Subject, "email", claims.Email)
http.Redirect(w, r, "/login?sso_error=no_account", http.StatusFound)
return
}
if err != nil {
slog.Error("provisioning OIDC user", "error", err)
http.Redirect(w, r, "/login?sso_error=1", http.StatusFound)
return
}
token, err := s.auth.CreateOIDCSession(r.Context(), user.ID, claims.RawIDToken, r.RemoteAddr, r.UserAgent())
if err != nil {
slog.Error("creating session for OIDC user", "error", err)
http.Redirect(w, r, "/login?sso_error=1", http.StatusFound)
return
}
slog.Info("login succeeded (sso)", "username", user.Username)
auth.SetSessionCookie(w, token, s.cookieSecure(r), s.auth.SessionTTL())
http.Redirect(w, r, "/", http.StatusFound)
}