certctl/docs/legacy-est-scep.md

Legacy EST / SCEP Clients — TLS 1.2 Reverse-Proxy Runbook

Audit reference: Bundle F / M-023. PCI-DSS v4.0 Req 4 §2.2.5; CWE-326.

certctl's control plane pins tls.Config.MinVersion = tls.VersionTLS13 (cmd/server/tls.go:131). Some embedded EST (RFC 7030) and SCEP (RFC 8894) clients only speak TLS 1.0/1.1/1.2 — those clients cannot complete the handshake against certctl directly. This runbook documents the supported operator pattern: terminate the legacy TLS version at a front-door reverse proxy and pass the request through to certctl over TLS 1.3.

Why TLS 1.3 minimum

certctl's audit posture, the SOC 2 / PCI-DSS / NIST SP 800-57 compliance mappings, and the M-001 PBKDF2 work factor all assume modern transport crypto. TLS 1.2 with the cipher suites still in the wild has known attack surface (BEAST, POODLE, ROBOT, raccoon — all CVE-categorized); allowing TLS 1.2 directly on the certctl listener would invalidate the guarantee that the server-side encryption chain is the strongest the ecosystem currently supports.

When this runbook applies

You need this if all three are true:

1. You operate certctl with EST or SCEP enabled (CERTCTL_EST_ENABLED=true or CERTCTL_SCEP_ENABLED=true).
2. Your enrolling clients are embedded devices (printers, network appliances, IoT boards, legacy MFPs, point-of-sale terminals) whose TLS stack pre-dates 2018 and only speaks TLS 1.2 or older.
3. Replacing those clients is not feasible on a 6-month horizon.

If your enrolling clients are modern (any current Linux/Windows/macOS host, anything Go-based, anything Rust/Python/Node from 2019 onward), they speak TLS 1.3 natively and this runbook is unnecessary — point them straight at certctl on :8443.

Architecture

                          ┌─── TLS 1.2/1.3 ────┐         ┌─── TLS 1.3 ───┐
[legacy EST/SCEP client]──>│ nginx / HAProxy   │────────>│ certctl :8443 │
                          │ reverse proxy      │         │               │
                          └────────────────────┘         └───────────────┘
        Allowed TLS 1.2                  Re-encrypts as TLS 1.3

The reverse proxy:

• Terminates the legacy-version TLS handshake on the public-facing port.
• Forwards the request to certctl over TLS 1.3 on a private network.
• (For EST mTLS) forwards the client certificate via an X-SSL-Client-Cert header that certctl reads only when the connection arrives from a configured-trusted source IP.

nginx config

upstream certctl_backend {
    # Private-network address; not reachable from outside the proxy host.
    server 10.0.0.10:8443;
}

server {
    listen 443 ssl http2;
    server_name est.example.com;

    # Public-facing legacy listener. ssl_protocols includes TLSv1.2 explicitly.
    # Keep ssl_ciphers conservative — only the strong AEAD suites that
    # PCI-DSS Req 4 §2.2.5 still allows under TLS 1.2.
    ssl_certificate     /etc/nginx/certs/est.example.com.fullchain.pem;
    ssl_certificate_key /etc/nginx/certs/est.example.com.key;
    ssl_protocols       TLSv1.2 TLSv1.3;
    ssl_ciphers         ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256;
    ssl_prefer_server_ciphers on;

    # mTLS for EST: optional client cert, verified against the EST CA.
    ssl_client_certificate /etc/nginx/certs/est-clients-ca.pem;
    ssl_verify_client      optional;

    location ~ ^/\.well-known/(est|pki) {
        # Forward the client cert (if presented) to certctl over the
        # private hop. The current certctl implementation IGNORES the
        # X-SSL-Client-Cert header (header-agnostic by default — see
        # the certctl-side configuration section below). EST/SCEP
        # authentication still works correctly because both protocols
        # carry their own auth (CSR signature for EST, challengePassword
        # for SCEP) inside the request body.
        proxy_set_header X-SSL-Client-Cert  $ssl_client_escaped_cert;
        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For    $remote_addr;
        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto  $scheme;

        # The proxy-to-certctl hop is itself TLS 1.3.
        proxy_pass https://certctl_backend;
        proxy_ssl_protocols TLSv1.3;
        proxy_ssl_verify    on;
        proxy_ssl_trusted_certificate /etc/nginx/certs/certctl-internal-ca.pem;
    }

    # SCEP endpoints — same pattern, no client-cert requirement
    # (SCEP authenticates via challengePassword inside the CSR).
    location ^~ /scep {
        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For    $remote_addr;
        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto  $scheme;
        proxy_pass https://certctl_backend;
        proxy_ssl_protocols TLSv1.3;
        proxy_ssl_verify    on;
        proxy_ssl_trusted_certificate /etc/nginx/certs/certctl-internal-ca.pem;
    }
}

HAProxy config (alternative)

frontend est_legacy
    bind *:443 ssl crt /etc/haproxy/certs/est.example.com.pem alpn h2,http/1.1 \
        ssl-min-ver TLSv1.2 \
        ciphers ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384

    acl is_est_path  path_beg /.well-known/est
    acl is_pki_path  path_beg /.well-known/pki
    acl is_scep_path path_beg /scep
    use_backend certctl_backend if is_est_path or is_pki_path or is_scep_path
    default_backend certctl_modern

backend certctl_backend
    server certctl 10.0.0.10:8443 ssl verify required \
        ca-file /etc/haproxy/certs/certctl-internal-ca.pem \
        ssl-min-ver TLSv1.3
    http-request set-header X-Forwarded-For %[src]
    http-request set-header X-Forwarded-Proto https

certctl-side configuration

The current implementation is header-agnostic: certctl ignores any X-SSL-Client-Cert / X-Forwarded-For headers from the proxy. EST authentication still happens via in-protocol CSR signature + profile policy (RFC 7030 §3.2.3); SCEP authentication still happens via the challengePassword attribute embedded in the CSR (RFC 8894 §3.2). Both mechanisms are inside the request body and survive the reverse-proxy hop without server-side header trust.

Why this is the correct default: trusting a proxy-supplied header for client identity opens a header-spoofing attack surface that requires careful design (CIDR allowlist of trusted proxies, fail-closed defaults, explicit operator opt-in). The Bundle F closure of M-023 ships the TLS-bridge guidance as documentation only; a future commit can extend certctl with proxy-header trust if and when an operator demonstrates a deployment shape that requires it. Until that lands, the runbook above is operationally complete: legacy EST and SCEP clients continue to authenticate via their in-protocol mechanisms, and the reverse proxy is purely a TLS-version bridge.

If your deployment requires proxy-supplied client identity (e.g., the proxy terminates mTLS and you want certctl to record the client-cert subject in the audit trail beyond what the CSR carries), open an issue and a future commit will add a header-trust contract behind two fail-closed env vars: a CIDR allowlist of trusted proxies, plus an explicit opt-in toggle. Both knobs would be required together; setting only one would fail loud at startup. Until that work ships, the header-agnostic default described above is the only supported configuration.

PCI-DSS Req 4 §2.2.5 attestation

PCI-DSS v4.0 §2.2.5 ("strong cryptography for authentication/transmission of cardholder data") considers TLS 1.2 with strong cipher suites acceptable for the foreseeable future, with the explicit caveat that NIST or the PCI Council may shorten the deprecation window if a TLS 1.2 weakness is published. The configuration above:

• Pins TLS 1.2 + TLS 1.3 only (no SSLv3, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1).
• Uses only AEAD cipher suites with forward secrecy (ECDHE-* with GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305).
• Re-encrypts to TLS 1.3 on the proxy-to-certctl hop.

This is PCI-DSS Req 4 v4.0 compliant. Auditors looking for the attestation should be pointed at this section + the proxy's TLS config.

What this runbook does NOT cover

• Replacing the legacy clients. That's the long-term fix; this runbook is the bridge while you're migrating.
• Network segmentation. The reverse proxy assumes the proxy-to-certctl hop is on a network that an external attacker can't reach. If it's not, you need a deeper architecture review.
• Client-cert revocation. EST mTLS revocation is the relying party's responsibility. certctl's EST handler accepts the cert; the proxy can enforce CRL/OCSP via ssl_crl_path (nginx) or crl-file (HAProxy).

When TLS 1.2 itself sunsets

PCI-DSS, NIST, and major browsers will eventually deprecate TLS 1.2. When that happens, this runbook becomes obsolete; the only path forward will be to replace the legacy clients. Subscribe to RSS feeds at the following sources to catch the deprecation announcement before it becomes a compliance failure:

• https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/news_events/
• https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/ (SP 800-52 revisions)

SCEP RFC 8894 native implementation (post-2026-04-29)

Prior to this bundle, certctl's SCEP server parsed PKCS#7 SignedData and treated the encapsulated content as a raw PKCS#10 CSR (the file-internal "MVP" comment at internal/api/handler/scep.go:217 flagged this). That worked for lightweight MDM agents but failed against ChromeOS and most production MDM clients which expect full RFC 8894 wire format: SignedData wrapping an EnvelopedData encrypting the CSR to the RA cert's public key, with signerInfo POPO over the auth-attrs.

The new RFC 8894 path runs FIRST; on any parse failure it falls through to the legacy MVP raw-CSR path so existing operators see no behavior change for their lightweight clients.

Required: RA cert + key

The RFC 8894 path requires a Registration Authority cert + key pair. Clients encrypt their CSR to the RA cert's public key (RFC 8894 §3.2.2); the certctl server uses the RA key to decrypt and to sign the outbound CertRep PKIMessage signerInfo (RFC 8894 §3.3.2).

Env var	Default	Meaning
CERTCTL_SCEP_RA_CERT_PATH	(none)	Path to PEM-encoded RA certificate. Required when CERTCTL_SCEP_ENABLED=true.
CERTCTL_SCEP_RA_KEY_PATH	(none)	Path to PEM-encoded RA private key matching CERTCTL_SCEP_RA_CERT_PATH. File MUST be mode 0600 (preflight refuses world-readable).

Generate the RA pair (any RSA-2048+ or ECDSA-P256+ pair signed by your root or sub-CA works):

# RSA-2048 RA pair, valid 1 year, signed by your root.
openssl req -new -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout ra.key -out ra.csr \
  -subj "/CN=corp-ca-RA"
openssl x509 -req -in ra.csr -days 365 \
  -CA root.crt -CAkey root.key -CAcreateserial \
  -extfile <(printf "extendedKeyUsage=emailProtection,1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4") \
  -out ra.crt

chmod 0600 ra.key       # required — preflight rejects world-readable keys
chmod 0644 ra.crt
mv ra.key ra.crt /etc/certctl/scep/

export CERTCTL_SCEP_ENABLED=true
export CERTCTL_SCEP_RA_CERT_PATH=/etc/certctl/scep/ra.crt
export CERTCTL_SCEP_RA_KEY_PATH=/etc/certctl/scep/ra.key
export CERTCTL_SCEP_CHALLENGE_PASSWORD=$(openssl rand -hex 32)

The startup preflight in cmd/server/main.go::preflightSCEPRACertKey validates: file existence, key file mode 0600, cert/key match, cert non-expired, RSA-or-ECDSA public-key algorithm. Failures os.Exit(1) with a structured log line identifying the offending profile.

Capability advertisement (GetCACaps)

POSTPKIOperation
SHA-256
SHA-512
AES
SCEPStandard
Renewal

ChromeOS specifically looks for POSTPKIOperation (non-base64 POST), AES (the now-implemented CBC content encryption), SCEPStandard (RFC 8894 conformance), and Renewal (RenewalReq messageType-17 support). Older Cisco IOS clients also accept SHA-256 and SHA-512 per RFC 8894 §3.5.2.

Supported messageTypes

Type	RFC 8894 §	Behavior
PKCSReq (19)	§3.3.1	Initial enrollment. Signer cert is the device's transient self-signed key.
RenewalReq (17)	§3.3.1.2	Re-enrollment. Signer cert MUST be a previously-issued cert from this issuer; service-side verifyRenewalSignerCertChain enforces.
GetCertInitial (20)	§3.3.3	Polling for pending requests. v1 returns FAILURE+badCertID because deferred-issuance isn't supported (every PKCSReq either succeeds or fails synchronously).
CertRep (3)	§3.3.2	Server response — never inbound.

MVP backward-compatibility path

Lightweight clients that send a stripped SignedData containing a raw CSR (no EnvelopedData wrapper, no signerInfo POPO) keep working: the handler tries the RFC 8894 path FIRST; on any parse failure it falls through to the legacy extractCSRFromPKCS7 path. The legacy path uses the CSR's challengePassword attribute the same way as the RFC 8894 path. Operators with existing lightweight-client deploys see zero behavior change.

Multi-profile dispatch (/scep/<pathID>)

Real enterprise deploys run multiple SCEP endpoints from one certctl instance — corp-laptop CA, IoT CA, server CA — each with its own issuer + RA pair + challenge password. Configure via the indexed env-var form documented in features.md: set CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILES=corp,iot,server (a comma-separated list of profile names), then for each name supply the per-profile env-vars prefixed with CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_ followed by the suffix keys _ISSUER_ID, _PROFILE_ID, _CHALLENGE_PASSWORD, _RA_CERT_PATH, _RA_KEY_PATH. The <NAME> token resolves to the upper-cased profile name from the list. Each profile is independently validated at startup; per-profile failures log the offending PathID.

The router exposes /scep/corp, /scep/iot, /scep/server. The legacy /scep root remains for the single-profile flat-env-var case (when CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILES is unset). Per-profile preflight validates each RA pair independently; failures log the offending PathID.

ChromeOS Admin Console pointer

In Google Admin Console → Devices → Networks → Certificates, register certctl's /scep[/<pathID>] URL as the SCEP server. Enter the challenge password from CERTCTL_SCEP_CHALLENGE_PASSWORD (or per-profile CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_CHALLENGE_PASSWORD). ChromeOS pulls GetCACert first to retrieve the RA cert, then enrolls via PKIOperation.

RA cert rotation

The RA cert is loaded once at startup and persisted in the handler's struct field; rotation requires a server restart (mirrors the CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_CERT_PATH precedent in cmd/server/tls.go). The recommended cadence is annual rotation with a 30-day overlap during which both old + new RA certs are listed in GetCACert's response (set the cert chain accordingly in your sub-CA hierarchy).

Must-staple per-profile policy (RFC 7633)

When a CertificateProfile has MustStaple = true, the local issuer adds the id-pe-tlsfeature extension (OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.24, non-critical, value SEQUENCE OF INTEGER {5}) to every issued cert. Browsers + modern TLS libraries that see this extension fail-closed on missing OCSP stapling responses — defense against revocation-bypass via OCSP blackholing.

Default policy: false. Operators opt in once they've confirmed the TLS reverse proxy / load balancer staples OCSP responses. NGINX, HAProxy, Envoy all support stapling but it requires explicit config — turning must-staple on without verifying the TLS path will hard-fail browsers.

Recommended for: Intune-deployed device certs (modern TLS clients); SCEP profiles serving general / legacy clients (ChromeOS, IoT) should stay false until the TLS path is verified.

mTLS sibling route (Phase 6.5, opt-in)

SCEP is documented as application-layer-auth — the challenge password is the authentication boundary per RFC 8894 §3.2. But enterprise procurement teams routinely reject "shared password authentication" as a checkbox-fail regardless of how strong the password is. The clean answer: a sibling route at /scep-mtls/<pathID> that requires client-cert auth at the handler layer AND ALSO accepts the challenge password (defense in depth, not replacement). Devices present a bootstrap cert from a trusted CA (e.g. a manufacturing-time cert), then SCEP-enroll for their long-lived cert. Same model Apple's MDM and Cisco's BRSKI use.

Opt in per profile by setting two env vars:

CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_MTLS_ENABLED=true
CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_MTLS_CLIENT_CA_TRUST_BUNDLE_PATH=/etc/certctl/scep/<name>-bootstrap-cas.pem

The trust bundle is a PEM file containing the bootstrap-CA certs the operator allows to enroll. Operators with multiple bootstrap CAs concatenate them. The startup preflight (cmd/server/main.go::preflightSCEPMTLSTrustBundle) validates: file exists, parses as PEM, contains ≥1 cert, none expired. Failures os.Exit(1) with a structured log identifying the offending PathID.

TLS server config: when at least one profile opts into mTLS, the HTTPS listener gets the union of every enabled profile's trust bundle as its ClientCAs pool, plus ClientAuth: VerifyClientCertIfGiven — the listener requests a client cert during the handshake, verifies it against the union pool if presented, and lets the handler decide whether to require it. This means the SAME listener serves both /scep[/<pathID>] (no client cert required) and /scep-mtls/<pathID> (cert required). The standard route stays untouched for clients that can't present a cert.

Handler-layer per-profile gate: the TLS-layer check uses the union pool, so a cert that chains to profile A's bundle would pass the TLS handshake even when targeting profile B. The handler-layer gate (HandleSCEPMTLS) re-verifies the inbound client cert against ONLY THIS profile's pool — preventing cross-profile bleed-through.

Auth chain on the mTLS sibling route:

1. TLS handshake: client cert verified against the union pool (if presented; absent = standard SCEP path applies but handler rejects with 401).
2. Handler-layer per-profile re-verification: cert must chain to THIS profile's trust bundle. Mismatch = 401.
3. Standard SCEP enrollment: HandleSCEP runs as on the standard route — including the challenge-password gate at the service layer.

A stolen device cert without the matching challenge password gets rejected (and vice versa). Both layers are independently required.

Operator workflow for migrating from challenge-password-only to challenge+mTLS:

1. Generate a bootstrap CA + issue a bootstrap cert per device (out of band — typically manufacturing-time, MDM-pushed, or a separate PKI flow).
2. Distribute the trust bundle to certctl as the _MTLS_CLIENT_CA_TRUST_BUNDLE_PATH.
3. Set _MTLS_ENABLED=true for the profile, restart certctl.
4. Devices now have TWO valid enrollment URLs: /scep/<pathID> (challenge-password-only, legacy) and /scep-mtls/<pathID> (cert + challenge, new).
5. Roll out config to fleet that switches devices to the new URL.
6. Once the fleet has migrated, remove _CHALLENGE_PASSWORD from the profile (Validate() will keep the gate when MTLSEnabled=true so the password requirement doesn't go away — the password is still the application-layer auth boundary).

Microsoft Intune dynamic-challenge dispatcher (Phase 8, opt-in)

When SCEP sits behind the Microsoft Intune Certificate Connector, devices present an Intune-issued signed challenge (a JWT-like blob over a JSON claim payload) instead of the static _CHALLENGE_PASSWORD. Phase 8 wires a per-profile dispatcher that validates these signed challenges against the Connector's signing-cert trust anchor and binds the asserted device identity to the inbound CSR. Static challenge passwords still work as a fallback so heterogeneous fleets (some Intune-enrolled, some not) keep working.

Per-profile env vars (all default to off; legacy/static-only profiles need no changes):

CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_INTUNE_ENABLED=true
CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_INTUNE_CONNECTOR_CERT_PATH=/etc/certctl/intune-corp.pem
CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_INTUNE_AUDIENCE=https://certctl.example.com/scep/corp
CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_INTUNE_CHALLENGE_VALIDITY=60m
CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_INTUNE_PER_DEVICE_RATE_LIMIT_24H=3

Trust-anchor extraction: the operator extracts the Connector installation's signing cert (from the Connector's certificate store on the Windows host running the Connector — Microsoft does not publish a direct download) and writes a PEM bundle to the configured path. Multiple Connectors in HA = concatenate their certs.

Trust-anchor reload: the holder re-reads the bundle on SIGHUP (the same signal that rotates the server's TLS cert). A bad reload (parse error, expired cert) keeps the OLD pool in place — operators get a recoverable failure window rather than a service-down. Rotate the file on disk, then kill -HUP <certctl-pid> to apply with no restart.

Replay protection: in-memory cache of seen challenge nonces with TTL = _CHALLENGE_VALIDITY (default 60m). Sized for 100k entries, which covers a ~25 RPS Intune fleet's steady-state. The same challenge submitted twice within the TTL is rejected with ErrChallengeReplay.

Per-device rate limit: sliding-window-log limiter keyed by (claim.Subject, claim.Issuer). Default 3 enrollments per 24h covers legitimate first-cert + recovery + post-wipe re-enrollment but blocks a compromised Connector signing key from issuing many DIFFERENT valid challenges for the same device. Set the var to 0 to disable.

Audit + observability: Intune enrollments emit audit_event.action="scep_pkcsreq_intune" (or "scep_renewalreq_intune") so operators can grep the audit log to count Intune-vs-static enrollments. Per-failure-mode reason flows into the log line; the metric label set is success / signature_invalid / expired / not_yet_valid / wrong_audience / replay / rate_limited / claim_mismatch / unknown_version / malformed.

Compliance-state hook (V3-Pro plug-in seam): a nil-default ComplianceCheck field on SCEPService lets a future Pro module plug in a Microsoft Graph compliance API call between challenge validation and certificate issuance. V2 ships the seam (one struct field + one setter + one nil-guarded call site) so Pro is plug-in code, not a dispatcher refactor.

Mixed-mode (recommended): keep _CHALLENGE_PASSWORD set even when Intune is enabled. Devices that don't go through Intune (manual enrollment, on-prem MDM bridges) continue to enroll via the static path; the dispatcher routes Intune-shaped challenges (length > 200 + exactly two dots) to the validator and falls through to the static compare otherwise.

Operational notes

• Audit: every enrollment emits an audit_event row with action scep_pkcsreq (initial) or scep_renewalreq (renewal); operators can grep the audit log to distinguish. Intune-dispatched enrollments use scep_pkcsreq_intune and scep_renewalreq_intune respectively.
• Body-size cap: http.MaxBytesReader middleware caps request bodies at CERTCTL_MAX_BODY_SIZE (default 1MB); SCEP PKIMessages are typically <50KB so the default cap is generous.
• HTTPS-only: the SCEP endpoint inherits the TLS-1.3-pinned control plane; there is no plaintext fallback.
• Forward reference: for the deeper Intune integration writeup (architecture, migration playbook, troubleshooting, Microsoft-support-statement), see scep-intune.md (Phase 11 of the master bundle).

Related docs

• tls.md — the certctl-internal TLS configuration (HTTPS-only control plane, MinVersion pin)
• security.md — overall security posture
• database-tls.md — Postgres TLS opt-in (Bundle B / M-018)