Files
certctl/internal/service/profile.go
T
shankar0123 1b4de3fb2d Bundle E: Mechanical sweeps & defensive polish — 6 findings closed; L-004 deferred
Closes L-009 + L-010 + L-011 + L-013 + L-020 + L-021 from
comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25. L-004 deferred — recon found NO
rotation infrastructure exists at all; building it from scratch is
a feature project, not a Bundle-E mechanical sweep.

L-009 — ZeroSSL EAB URL configurable
  Audit's 'no timeout' claim was wrong: ari.go:329 has 15s timeout.
  internal/connector/issuer/acme/acme.go: zeroSSLEABEndpoint now
  lazily reads CERTCTL_ZEROSSL_EAB_URL from env at package init;
  defaults to ZeroSSL public endpoint. Pre-existing test override
  path preserved.

L-010 — Verified-already-clean
  grep -rn 'mock\.Anything' --include='*_test.go' . returned 0.
  certctl uses hand-rolled struct mocks (mockJobRepo, mockAuditRepo,
  etc.) with explicit method bodies; no testify-style mocks anywhere.

L-011 — IPv6 bracket-aware dialing pinned
  Every production net.Dial / DialTimeout site audited:
    cmd/agent/main.go:293 — intentional IPv4 literal '8.8.8.8:80'
    verify.go / tlsprobe / network_scan — net.Dialer (no string addr)
    email.go — net.JoinHostPort (bracket-aware)
    ssh.go — addr derives from JoinHostPort upstream
    ssrf.go — net.Dialer
  internal/connector/notifier/email/email_ipv6_test.go (NEW):
    TestJoinHostPort_IPv6BracketsRoundTrip pins IPv4/IPv6/zone variants;
    TestSMTPDialerUsesJoinHostPort source-greps email.go and fails CI
    if a future refactor swaps in 'host:port' concatenation.

L-013 — Verified-already-clean (monotonic-safe)
  Only one site uses now.Sub: middleware.go:393 in tokenBucket.allow().
  Both 'now' and tb.lastRefill come from time.Now() which carries
  monotonic-clock readings per Go's time package contract;
  intra-process now.Sub is monotonic-safe by construction. Doc
  comment block added above the call to make the invariant explicit.

L-020 (CWE-563) — ineffassign sweep, 8 unique sites
  certificate.go:135 — sortDir initial value dropped (set
    unconditionally below by SortDesc branch).
  certificate.go:169,175 — argCount post-increments dropped (var
    not read past the LIMIT/OFFSET formatting).
  agent_group.go, profile.go — page/perPage truly vestigial,
    replaced with _ = page; _ = perPage.
  issuer.go:633, owner.go:131, target.go:267, team.go:131 — same
    treatment for the audit-flagged second-function ListXxx clamps.
  First-function List() in issuer/owner/target/team KEEPS its
    clamp because page/perPage is used for in-memory slice
    pagination — ineffassign correctly didn't flag those.
  Build + tests green post-sweep.

L-021 — Transitive CVE bump
  go get golang.org/x/crypto@v0.45.0 golang.org/x/net@v0.47.0
    (crypto required net@0.47.0). go-text@v0.31.0 transitively
    bumped.
  Per tool-output govulncheck-verbose: x/net@v0.45.0 fixes
    GO-2026-4441 + GO-2026-4440; x/crypto@v0.45.0 fixes
    GO-2025-4134 + GO-2025-4135 + GO-2025-4116 — all 5 advisories
    cleared. Bundle B's ISV grep guard + Bundle D's release-time
    govulncheck step are the going-forward monitor + bump pass.

L-004 — Deferred to dedicated bundle
  Recon: zero hits for RotateAPIKey / rotated_at / key_status
    anywhere in source. API keys configured via
    CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED env var; rotation is operator-managed
    (edit env + restart). Building rotation infrastructure from
    scratch is a feature project, not a mechanical sweep.
  Documented in audit-report.md with scope-pivot note.

Audit deliverables:
  audit-report.md: score 46/55 -> 52/55 closed
    (Low 14/19 -> 19/19 — 100% Low closed except L-004 deferred)
  findings.yaml: 6 status flips
  certctl/CHANGELOG.md: Bundle E section

Verification:
  go test -count=1 -short ./internal/service ./internal/connector/issuer/acme
    ./internal/connector/notifier/email                      green
  go vet on changed packages                                  clean
2026-04-27 01:17:15 +00:00

182 lines
5.5 KiB
Go

package service
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"time"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/repository"
)
// ProfileService provides business logic for certificate profile management.
type ProfileService struct {
profileRepo repository.CertificateProfileRepository
auditService *AuditService
}
// NewProfileService creates a new profile service.
func NewProfileService(
profileRepo repository.CertificateProfileRepository,
auditService *AuditService,
) *ProfileService {
return &ProfileService{
profileRepo: profileRepo,
auditService: auditService,
}
}
// ListProfiles returns all profiles (handler interface method).
func (s *ProfileService) ListProfiles(ctx context.Context, page, perPage int) ([]domain.CertificateProfile, int64, error) {
// Bundle E / Audit L-020: page/perPage are unused; the underlying repo
// List() does not yet take pagination params. Marked explicitly so
// ineffassign sees no dead store and future maintainers see the
// vestigial params rather than a misleading default-applied clamp.
_ = page
_ = perPage
profiles, err := s.profileRepo.List(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to list profiles: %w", err)
}
total := int64(len(profiles))
var result []domain.CertificateProfile
for _, p := range profiles {
if p != nil {
result = append(result, *p)
}
}
return result, total, nil
}
// GetProfile returns a single profile (handler interface method).
func (s *ProfileService) GetProfile(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.CertificateProfile, error) {
return s.profileRepo.Get(ctx, id)
}
// CreateProfile creates a new profile with validation (handler interface method).
func (s *ProfileService) CreateProfile(ctx context.Context, profile domain.CertificateProfile) (*domain.CertificateProfile, error) {
if err := validateProfile(&profile); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if profile.ID == "" {
profile.ID = generateID("prof")
}
now := time.Now()
if profile.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
profile.CreatedAt = now
}
if profile.UpdatedAt.IsZero() {
profile.UpdatedAt = now
}
// Apply defaults if not set
if len(profile.AllowedKeyAlgorithms) == 0 {
profile.AllowedKeyAlgorithms = domain.DefaultKeyAlgorithms()
}
if len(profile.AllowedEKUs) == 0 {
profile.AllowedEKUs = domain.DefaultEKUs()
}
if err := s.profileRepo.Create(ctx, &profile); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create profile: %w", err)
}
if s.auditService != nil {
if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEvent(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), "api", domain.ActorTypeUser,
"create_profile", "certificate_profile", profile.ID, nil); auditErr != nil {
slog.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", auditErr)
}
}
return &profile, nil
}
// UpdateProfile modifies an existing profile (handler interface method).
func (s *ProfileService) UpdateProfile(ctx context.Context, id string, profile domain.CertificateProfile) (*domain.CertificateProfile, error) {
if err := validateProfile(&profile); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
profile.ID = id
if err := s.profileRepo.Update(ctx, &profile); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to update profile: %w", err)
}
if s.auditService != nil {
if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEvent(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), "api", domain.ActorTypeUser,
"update_profile", "certificate_profile", id, nil); auditErr != nil {
slog.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", auditErr)
}
}
return &profile, nil
}
// DeleteProfile removes a profile (handler interface method).
func (s *ProfileService) DeleteProfile(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
if err := s.profileRepo.Delete(ctx, id); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to delete profile: %w", err)
}
if s.auditService != nil {
if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEvent(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), "api", domain.ActorTypeUser,
"delete_profile", "certificate_profile", id, nil); auditErr != nil {
slog.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", auditErr)
}
}
return nil
}
// Get retrieves a profile by ID (used by other services like RenewalService).
func (s *ProfileService) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.CertificateProfile, error) {
return s.profileRepo.Get(ctx, id)
}
// validateProfile checks that a profile's configuration is valid.
func validateProfile(p *domain.CertificateProfile) error {
if p.Name == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("profile name is required")
}
if len(p.Name) > 255 {
return fmt.Errorf("profile name exceeds 255 characters")
}
// Validate key algorithms
for _, alg := range p.AllowedKeyAlgorithms {
if !domain.ValidKeyAlgorithms[alg.Algorithm] {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid key algorithm: %s (allowed: RSA, ECDSA, Ed25519)", alg.Algorithm)
}
if alg.Algorithm == domain.KeyAlgorithmRSA && alg.MinSize < 2048 {
return fmt.Errorf("RSA minimum key size must be at least 2048, got %d", alg.MinSize)
}
if alg.Algorithm == domain.KeyAlgorithmECDSA && alg.MinSize < 256 {
return fmt.Errorf("ECDSA minimum key size must be at least 256, got %d", alg.MinSize)
}
}
// Validate EKUs
for _, eku := range p.AllowedEKUs {
if !domain.ValidEKUs[eku] {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid EKU: %s", eku)
}
}
// Validate max TTL
if p.MaxTTLSeconds < 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("max_ttl_seconds cannot be negative")
}
// Validate short-lived consistency
if p.AllowShortLived && p.MaxTTLSeconds >= 3600 {
return fmt.Errorf("allow_short_lived is true but max_ttl_seconds (%d) is >= 3600; short-lived certs must have TTL under 1 hour", p.MaxTTLSeconds)
}
return nil
}