Files
certctl/internal/auth/oidc/coverage_fill_test.go
T
shankar0123 fefeccfa59 harden(oidc): relax alg-downgrade IdP-bind check to intersection-empty (Keycloak compat)
Phase-10 live-IdP smoke (Keycloak 26.x via testcontainers-go) revealed
the IdP-bind alg-downgrade check was too strict for real-world IdPs.
6 of the integration tests in internal/auth/oidc/integration_keycloak*_test.go
were failing with:

  oidc: IdP advertises weak signing algorithms (HS*/none);
  refusing to use as defense against downgrade attacks: HS256

Keycloak 26.x (and several other real-world IdPs — Auth0 when HS-mode is
enabled, some Authentik configs) advertise EVERY alg they're capable of
in the discovery doc's id_token_signing_alg_values_supported field, even
when the realm only signs with RS256 in practice. Pre-fix the IdP-bind
check refused on ANY HS* or 'none' advertisement → no real Keycloak deploy
could ever bind a provider row, hence the integration-test failures.

The strict-deny check was defense-in-depth on top of the load-bearing
per-token alg-pin at sig-verify time (isDisallowedAlg, service.go L1177):
that check rejects every ID token whose JWS header carries an alg outside
DefaultAllowedAlgs, regardless of what the discovery doc advertises.
A forged HS256 token signed with the IdP's RS256 pubkey as HMAC secret
is rejected at sig-verify time → the actual algorithm-confusion attack
is closed by the per-token pin, NOT by the discovery-doc check.

Fix: relax the IdP-bind check to refuse only when the intersection of
advertised vs DefaultAllowedAlgs is EMPTY (the pathological all-weak-alg
IdP case). Keycloak (RS256 + HS256 advertised) now binds successfully;
an HS-only IdP still fails closed.

Changes:
- internal/auth/oidc/service.go: rewrite the alg-check loop at L1067 in
  getOrLoad / RefreshKeys to compute the intersection set; refuse only
  when no acceptable alg is advertised. ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised
  docstring updated to reflect new contract. DefaultAllowedAlgs
  docstring + the package-level design-comment block at L40-72 updated
  with v2.1.0-relaxed semantics callouts.
- internal/auth/oidc/test_discovery.go: TestDiscovery dry-run validator
  rewritten to surface HS*/none alongside RS* as an informational note
  ('note: IdP advertises weak algorithms %v alongside acceptable ones')
  rather than a hard-fail error. HS-only / none-only still hard-fails.
- internal/auth/oidc/service_test.go: TestService_IdPDowngradeDefense_*
  tests updated. Renamed:
  - RejectsHSAdvertised → RS256PlusHS256_BindsSuccessfully (positive)
  - RejectsNoneAdvertised → RejectsHSOnlyAdvertised (intersection-empty)
  - RefreshKeys_CatchesPostLoadDowngrade rotated to HS-only post-load
- internal/auth/oidc/coverage_fill_test.go: TestTestDiscovery_AlgDowngradeDetected
  split into _HS256AlongsideRS256_BindsWithNote (positive, asserts note
  but no hard-fail) + _HSOnly_StillTrips_HardFail (intersection-empty).
- docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md: OIDC token-validation alg-allow-list
  section rewritten to call out the load-bearing-defense hierarchy
  (per-token pin first, IdP-bind check defense-in-depth) and document
  the v2.1.0 relaxation rationale.
- CHANGELOG.md: ### Security entry under Unreleased.

Verify: go test ./internal/auth/oidc/ -short PASS; gofmt clean; go vet
clean. The Keycloak integration tests should now pass when the operator
re-runs 'make keycloak-integration-test'.
2026-05-11 15:34:59 +00:00

292 lines
10 KiB
Go

package oidc
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
)
// Coverage fill — v2.1.0 release gate Phase 3.
//
// Targets two service-level functions added by post-merge fixes that
// shipped without unit tests:
//
// - Service.JWKSStatus — added in audit 2026-05-10 MED-7 closure
// (per-provider JWKS counters + cache state).
// - Service.TestDiscovery — added in audit 2026-05-10 MED-5 closure
// (dry-run /api/v1/auth/oidc/test endpoint).
// TestJWKSStatus_ReturnsLoadError_WhenProviderUnknown asserts that
// JWKSStatus forwards the getOrLoad error verbatim when the requested
// providerID is not in the repo. This is the entry-point fail-closed
// branch.
func TestJWKSStatus_ReturnsLoadError_WhenProviderUnknown(t *testing.T) {
svc := newServiceForUnitTest(t)
snap, err := svc.JWKSStatus(context.Background(), "rp-does-not-exist")
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error for unknown provider, got nil")
}
if snap != nil {
t.Errorf("expected nil snapshot on error, got %+v", snap)
}
}
// TestJWKSStatus_ReturnsSnapshot_AfterAuthRequestPopulatesEntry pre-
// warms the provider cache via HandleAuthRequest (which calls
// getOrLoad → populates s.cache) and then asserts JWKSStatus returns
// a non-nil snapshot reflecting the entry's stats.
func TestJWKSStatus_ReturnsSnapshot_AfterAuthRequestPopulatesEntry(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
svc, _ := newServiceWithProviderAndPL(t, idp.URL(), "rp-jwks-status")
// Pre-warm the cache.
if _, _, _, err := svc.HandleAuthRequest(context.Background(), "rp-jwks-status", "10.0.0.1", "test/1.0"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("HandleAuthRequest: %v", err)
}
snap, err := svc.JWKSStatus(context.Background(), "rp-jwks-status")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("JWKSStatus: %v", err)
}
if snap == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected non-nil snapshot")
}
// CurrentKIDs is intentionally empty (go-oidc doesn't expose its
// JWKS cache). Test the shape rather than the kids.
if snap.CurrentKIDs == nil {
t.Errorf("CurrentKIDs must be non-nil (empty slice OK)")
}
}
// TestTestDiscovery_DiscoveryFailure_ReturnsErrorsSlice points
// TestDiscovery at a URL that doesn't serve a discovery doc; the
// function MUST return res with DiscoverySucceeded=false and a
// non-empty Errors slice, and a nil err (per the documented "non-
// fatal at this layer; per-leg failure carried in res.Errors"
// contract).
func TestTestDiscovery_DiscoveryFailure_ReturnsErrorsSlice(t *testing.T) {
svc := newServiceForUnitTest(t)
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
http.NotFound(w, r)
}))
defer srv.Close()
res, err := svc.TestDiscovery(context.Background(), srv.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("TestDiscovery (non-fatal): %v", err)
}
if res == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected non-nil result")
}
if res.DiscoverySucceeded {
t.Errorf("expected DiscoverySucceeded=false when discovery doc is missing")
}
if len(res.Errors) == 0 {
t.Errorf("expected non-empty Errors slice")
}
if !strings.Contains(strings.Join(res.Errors, "|"), "discovery fetch failed") {
t.Errorf("expected 'discovery fetch failed' in errors; got %v", res.Errors)
}
}
// TestTestDiscovery_HappyPath_AgainstMockIdP exercises the
// success path: discovery doc fetch, claims parse, alg-downgrade
// check (RS256 → not denied), JWKS reachability.
func TestTestDiscovery_HappyPath_AgainstMockIdP(t *testing.T) {
idp := newMockIdP(t)
svc := newServiceForUnitTest(t)
res, err := svc.TestDiscovery(context.Background(), idp.URL())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("TestDiscovery: %v", err)
}
if !res.DiscoverySucceeded {
t.Errorf("expected DiscoverySucceeded=true")
}
if res.IssuerEcho != idp.URL() {
t.Errorf("expected IssuerEcho=%q, got %q", idp.URL(), res.IssuerEcho)
}
if res.AuthorizationURL == "" || res.TokenURL == "" {
t.Errorf("expected non-empty AuthorizationURL+TokenURL; got %q / %q", res.AuthorizationURL, res.TokenURL)
}
if !res.JWKSReachable {
t.Errorf("expected JWKSReachable=true; got Errors=%v", res.Errors)
}
if len(res.SupportedAlgValues) == 0 {
t.Errorf("expected non-empty SupportedAlgValues")
}
// Mock IdP advertises RS256; no downgrade-defense trip.
for _, e := range res.Errors {
if strings.Contains(e, "alg-downgrade defense tripped") {
t.Errorf("unexpected alg-downgrade trip: %s", e)
}
}
}
// TestTestDiscovery_AlgDowngrade_HS256AlongsideRS256_BindsWithNote runs
// against a stub IdP that advertises both HS256 + RS256 (Keycloak-shape).
// Under v2.1.0-relaxed semantics this must SUCCEED (DiscoverySucceeded=true,
// JWKSReachable=true) and surface only an informational note about the
// weak-alg advertisement — NOT a hard "alg-downgrade defense tripped" error.
// The per-token alg pin at sig-verify time remains the load-bearing defense.
func TestTestDiscovery_AlgDowngrade_HS256AlongsideRS256_BindsWithNote(t *testing.T) {
svc := newServiceForUnitTest(t)
mux := http.NewServeMux()
srv := httptest.NewServer(mux)
defer srv.Close()
mux.HandleFunc("/.well-known/openid-configuration", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]interface{}{
"issuer": srv.URL,
"authorization_endpoint": srv.URL + "/authorize",
"token_endpoint": srv.URL + "/token",
"jwks_uri": srv.URL + "/jwks",
"id_token_signing_alg_values_supported": []string{"HS256", "RS256"},
})
})
mux.HandleFunc("/jwks", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"keys":[]}`))
})
res, err := svc.TestDiscovery(context.Background(), srv.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("TestDiscovery: %v", err)
}
if !res.DiscoverySucceeded {
t.Errorf("expected DiscoverySucceeded=true; got Errors=%v", res.Errors)
}
// The Keycloak-shape advertisement must NOT trip the hard fail.
for _, e := range res.Errors {
if strings.Contains(e, "alg-downgrade defense tripped") {
t.Errorf("v2.1.0-relaxed semantics: HS256+RS256 must NOT trip hard fail; got %q", e)
}
}
// Informational note must be present.
noteFound := false
for _, e := range res.Errors {
if strings.Contains(e, "note:") && strings.Contains(e, "HS256") {
noteFound = true
}
}
if !noteFound {
t.Errorf("expected informational note about HS256 in errors; got %v", res.Errors)
}
}
// TestTestDiscovery_AlgDowngrade_HSOnly_StillTrips_HardFail asserts the
// pathological intersection-empty case still hard-fails.
func TestTestDiscovery_AlgDowngrade_HSOnly_StillTrips_HardFail(t *testing.T) {
svc := newServiceForUnitTest(t)
mux := http.NewServeMux()
srv := httptest.NewServer(mux)
defer srv.Close()
mux.HandleFunc("/.well-known/openid-configuration", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]interface{}{
"issuer": srv.URL,
"authorization_endpoint": srv.URL + "/authorize",
"token_endpoint": srv.URL + "/token",
"jwks_uri": srv.URL + "/jwks",
"id_token_signing_alg_values_supported": []string{"HS256", "HS384"}, // no RS
})
})
mux.HandleFunc("/jwks", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"keys":[]}`))
})
res, err := svc.TestDiscovery(context.Background(), srv.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("TestDiscovery: %v", err)
}
found := false
for _, e := range res.Errors {
if strings.Contains(e, "alg-downgrade defense tripped") && strings.Contains(e, "only weak algorithms") {
found = true
break
}
}
if !found {
t.Errorf("expected hard-fail for HS-only IdP; got %v", res.Errors)
}
}
// TestTestDiscovery_MissingJWKSURI surfaces the "discovery doc omits
// jwks_uri" branch.
func TestTestDiscovery_MissingJWKSURI(t *testing.T) {
svc := newServiceForUnitTest(t)
mux := http.NewServeMux()
srv := httptest.NewServer(mux)
defer srv.Close()
mux.HandleFunc("/.well-known/openid-configuration", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]interface{}{
"issuer": srv.URL,
"authorization_endpoint": srv.URL + "/authorize",
"token_endpoint": srv.URL + "/token",
"id_token_signing_alg_values_supported": []string{"RS256"},
// jwks_uri intentionally omitted
})
})
res, err := svc.TestDiscovery(context.Background(), srv.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("TestDiscovery: %v", err)
}
if res.JWKSReachable {
t.Errorf("expected JWKSReachable=false when jwks_uri is missing")
}
found := false
for _, e := range res.Errors {
if strings.Contains(e, "omits jwks_uri") {
found = true
}
}
if !found {
t.Errorf("expected 'omits jwks_uri' in errors; got %v", res.Errors)
}
}
// TestTestDiscovery_JWKSFetchFails covers the jwksReachable error
// branch (non-2xx JWKS response).
func TestTestDiscovery_JWKSFetchFails(t *testing.T) {
svc := newServiceForUnitTest(t)
mux := http.NewServeMux()
srv := httptest.NewServer(mux)
defer srv.Close()
mux.HandleFunc("/.well-known/openid-configuration", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]interface{}{
"issuer": srv.URL,
"authorization_endpoint": srv.URL + "/authorize",
"token_endpoint": srv.URL + "/token",
"jwks_uri": srv.URL + "/jwks",
"id_token_signing_alg_values_supported": []string{"RS256"},
})
})
mux.HandleFunc("/jwks", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
http.Error(w, "internal", http.StatusInternalServerError)
})
res, err := svc.TestDiscovery(context.Background(), srv.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("TestDiscovery: %v", err)
}
if res.JWKSReachable {
t.Errorf("expected JWKSReachable=false on 500")
}
found := false
for _, e := range res.Errors {
if strings.Contains(e, "JWKS endpoint returned non-200") {
found = true
}
}
if !found {
t.Errorf("expected 'JWKS endpoint returned non-200' in errors; got %v", res.Errors)
}
}