Files
certctl/internal/service/job_test.go
T
shankar0123 3287e174dc Unify API auth + RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP (M-002 + M-003 + M-006, auto-closes M-001)
Closes the remaining P1 gaps from coverage-gap-audit.md (M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006)
on top of the C-001/C-002 ownership + agent-FK contract fixes landed in
a53a4b8. The work lands as a single commit spanning server, docs, tests,
and the React client.

M-002 — Named API keys with per-key actor propagation
  * Migration 000014 adds the 'api_keys' table (id, name, hash,
    principal, role, created_at, last_used_at, disabled_at) so every
    credential carries an identifiable principal instead of the
    opaque 'anonymous'/'api-key' sentinel.
  * Auth middleware now rotates through configured keys, performs
    constant-time hash comparison, stamps 'last_used_at', and emits
    an actor struct via contextWithActor(). The audit middleware,
    bulk-revocation handler, approval handlers, and MCP tool layer
    now read the principal off the context and persist it on every
    audit_events row.
  * Regression coverage:
      - internal/api/middleware/audit_test.go — actor propagation,
        principal redaction for disabled keys, anonymous fallback for
        unauthenticated endpoints.
      - internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go,
        job_handler_test.go — principal-on-audit assertions.

M-003 — Authorization gates (Phase B)
  * Approval handler rejects self-approval / self-rejection with 403
    when the actor principal equals the job's requested_by field.
  * Bulk revocation is gated behind the 'admin' role; operators and
    viewers receive 403.
  * Regression coverage:
      - internal/service/job_test.go — TestApproveJob_NotSelf,
        TestRejectJob_NotSelf.
      - internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go —
        TestBulkRevoke_RequiresAdmin, TestBulkRevoke_AdminSucceeds.

M-006 — RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP on the unauthenticated .well-known mux
  * Per RFC 8615, relying parties cannot reasonably be asked to
    authenticate against the issuing certctl instance to retrieve
    revocation material. CRL and OCSP move off the authenticated
    '/api/v1/crl*' and '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths onto:
        GET /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}
            Content-Type: application/pkix-crl   (RFC 5280 §5)
        GET /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial}
            Content-Type: application/ocsp-response  (RFC 6960)
  * Non-standard JSON CRL shape is removed; only DER is served.
  * Short-lived certificate exemption (profile TTL < 1h → skip
    CRL/OCSP) is preserved; the response simply omits the serial.
  * Routes are registered on the unauthenticated 'finalHandler' mux
    in cmd/server/main.go alongside EST ('/.well-known/est/*') and
    SCEP ('/scep'). Legacy authenticated paths return 404.
  * Regression coverage:
      - internal/api/handler/certificate_handler_test.go — content
        type, DER parseability, 404 for unknown issuer.
      - internal/api/handler/adversarial_path_test.go — unauthenticated
        access asserted for CRL, OCSP, EST, SCEP.
      - internal/api/router/router_test.go — route-table assertion
        that '.well-known/pki/*', '.well-known/est/*', and '/scep' are
        mounted on the unauthenticated branch.

M-001 — Auto-closed by M-002
  EST and SCEP were already registered on the unauthenticated
  'finalHandler' mux; the router comment at
  internal/api/router/router.go:247 now matches reality. The
  adversarial-path tests above lock the behavior in.

Verification (all gates green):
  * go vet ./...                                           — clean
  * go build ./...                                         — ok
  * go test -short ./... (55+ packages)                    — all pass
  * web/ : npm test (225 Vitest tests)                     — all pass
  * web/ : npx tsc --noEmit                                — clean
  * grep sweep for '/api/v1/(crl|ocsp)' — 13 surviving hits,
    all intentional M-006 tombstone/relocation comments.

Documentation:
  * coverage-gap-audit.md — status flips M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006 →
    Fixed, with per-finding resolution paragraphs citing regression
    test IDs. (Audit file lives outside this repo; see cowork root.)
  * CLAUDE.md Project Status line updated with the auth-unification
    closure note.
  * docs/features.md, docs/architecture.md, docs/quickstart.md,
    docs/concepts.md, docs/connectors.md, docs/test-env.md,
    docs/testing-guide.md, docs/compliance-*.md, docs/demo-advanced.md
    — refreshed for the new '.well-known/pki/*' namespace and named
    API keys.
  * api/openapi.yaml — documents the new unauthenticated endpoints
    and removes the legacy '/api/v1/crl*' + '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths.

.gitignore: adds '/.gocache/' and '/.gomodcache/' for the session-
scoped Go caches so they never enter the tree.
2026-04-18 18:17:41 +00:00

401 lines
12 KiB
Go

package service
import (
"context"
"errors"
"log/slog"
"os"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
)
// helper to build job service with proper constructor signatures
func newTestJobService(jobRepo *mockJobRepo) *JobService {
svc, _, _ := newTestJobServiceWithRepos(jobRepo)
return svc
}
// newTestJobServiceWithRepos returns the service along with the cert+owner
// repos so self-approval tests can seed owner linkage without rebuilding the
// whole dependency graph.
func newTestJobServiceWithRepos(jobRepo *mockJobRepo) (*JobService, *mockCertRepo, *mockOwnerRepo) {
logger := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelInfo}))
certRepo := &mockCertRepo{
Certs: make(map[string]*domain.ManagedCertificate),
Versions: make(map[string][]*domain.CertificateVersion),
}
ownerRepo := newMockOwnerRepository()
renewalPolicyRepo := &mockRenewalPolicyRepo{
Policies: make(map[string]*domain.RenewalPolicy),
}
auditRepo := &mockAuditRepo{}
auditService := NewAuditService(auditRepo)
notifRepo := newMockNotificationRepository()
notifService := NewNotificationService(notifRepo, make(map[string]Notifier))
targetRepo := &mockTargetRepo{Targets: make(map[string]*domain.DeploymentTarget)}
agentRepo := &mockAgentRepo{Agents: make(map[string]*domain.Agent)}
issuerRegistry := NewIssuerRegistry(logger)
renewalService := NewRenewalService(certRepo, jobRepo, renewalPolicyRepo, nil, auditService, notifService, issuerRegistry, "server")
deploymentService := NewDeploymentService(jobRepo, targetRepo, agentRepo, certRepo, auditService, notifService)
return NewJobService(jobRepo, certRepo, ownerRepo, renewalService, deploymentService, logger), certRepo, ownerRepo
}
func TestProcessPendingJobs_Renewal(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
now := time.Now()
job := &domain.Job{
ID: "job-001",
Type: domain.JobTypeRenewal,
CertificateID: "cert-001",
Status: domain.JobStatusPending,
Attempts: 0,
MaxAttempts: 3,
CreatedAt: now,
ScheduledAt: now,
}
jobRepo := &mockJobRepo{
Jobs: map[string]*domain.Job{"job-001": job},
StatusUpdates: make(map[string]domain.JobStatus),
}
jobService := newTestJobService(jobRepo)
err := jobService.ProcessPendingJobs(ctx)
if err != nil {
t.Logf("ProcessPendingJobs returned error (expected for renewal without cert): %v", err)
}
}
func TestProcessPendingJobs_NoJobs(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
jobRepo := &mockJobRepo{
Jobs: make(map[string]*domain.Job),
StatusUpdates: make(map[string]domain.JobStatus),
}
jobService := newTestJobService(jobRepo)
err := jobService.ProcessPendingJobs(ctx)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ProcessPendingJobs failed: %v", err)
}
}
func TestCancelJob(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
now := time.Now()
job := &domain.Job{
ID: "job-001",
Type: domain.JobTypeDeployment,
CertificateID: "cert-001",
Status: domain.JobStatusPending,
CreatedAt: now,
ScheduledAt: now,
}
jobRepo := &mockJobRepo{
Jobs: map[string]*domain.Job{"job-001": job},
StatusUpdates: make(map[string]domain.JobStatus),
}
jobService := newTestJobService(jobRepo)
err := jobService.CancelJob(ctx, "job-001")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CancelJob failed: %v", err)
}
if jobRepo.StatusUpdates["job-001"] != domain.JobStatusCancelled {
t.Errorf("expected status Cancelled, got %s", jobRepo.StatusUpdates["job-001"])
}
}
func TestCancelJob_AlreadyCompleted(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
now := time.Now()
job := &domain.Job{
ID: "job-001",
Type: domain.JobTypeDeployment,
CertificateID: "cert-001",
Status: domain.JobStatusCompleted,
CreatedAt: now,
ScheduledAt: now,
}
jobRepo := &mockJobRepo{
Jobs: map[string]*domain.Job{"job-001": job},
StatusUpdates: make(map[string]domain.JobStatus),
}
jobService := newTestJobService(jobRepo)
err := jobService.CancelJob(ctx, "job-001")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for completed job")
}
}
func TestGetJob(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
now := time.Now()
job := &domain.Job{
ID: "job-001",
Type: domain.JobTypeDeployment,
CertificateID: "cert-001",
Status: domain.JobStatusPending,
CreatedAt: now,
ScheduledAt: now,
}
jobRepo := &mockJobRepo{
Jobs: map[string]*domain.Job{"job-001": job},
StatusUpdates: make(map[string]domain.JobStatus),
}
jobService := newTestJobService(jobRepo)
retrieved, err := jobService.GetJob(ctx, "job-001")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GetJob failed: %v", err)
}
if retrieved.ID != "job-001" {
t.Errorf("expected job ID job-001, got %s", retrieved.ID)
}
if retrieved.Type != domain.JobTypeDeployment {
t.Errorf("expected job type Deployment, got %s", retrieved.Type)
}
}
func TestListJobs(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
now := time.Now()
job1 := &domain.Job{
ID: "job-001",
Type: domain.JobTypeDeployment,
CertificateID: "cert-001",
Status: domain.JobStatusCompleted,
CreatedAt: now,
ScheduledAt: now,
}
job2 := &domain.Job{
ID: "job-002",
Type: domain.JobTypeRenewal,
CertificateID: "cert-002",
Status: domain.JobStatusPending,
CreatedAt: now,
ScheduledAt: now,
}
jobRepo := &mockJobRepo{
Jobs: map[string]*domain.Job{"job-001": job1, "job-002": job2},
StatusUpdates: make(map[string]domain.JobStatus),
}
jobService := newTestJobService(jobRepo)
jobs, total, err := jobService.ListJobs(ctx, "", "", 1, 50)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ListJobs failed: %v", err)
}
if len(jobs) != 2 {
t.Errorf("expected 2 jobs, got %d", len(jobs))
}
if total != 2 {
t.Errorf("expected total 2, got %d", total)
}
}
func TestListJobs_FilterByStatus(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
now := time.Now()
job1 := &domain.Job{
ID: "job-001",
Type: domain.JobTypeDeployment,
CertificateID: "cert-001",
Status: domain.JobStatusCompleted,
CreatedAt: now,
ScheduledAt: now,
}
job2 := &domain.Job{
ID: "job-002",
Type: domain.JobTypeRenewal,
CertificateID: "cert-002",
Status: domain.JobStatusPending,
CreatedAt: now,
ScheduledAt: now,
}
jobRepo := &mockJobRepo{
Jobs: map[string]*domain.Job{"job-001": job1, "job-002": job2},
StatusUpdates: make(map[string]domain.JobStatus),
}
jobService := newTestJobService(jobRepo)
jobs, total, err := jobService.ListJobs(ctx, string(domain.JobStatusPending), "", 1, 50)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ListJobs failed: %v", err)
}
if len(jobs) != 1 {
t.Errorf("expected 1 pending job, got %d", len(jobs))
}
if total != 1 {
t.Errorf("expected total 1, got %d", total)
}
}
// --- M-003: not-self approval (separation of duties) ---
//
// These regression tests enforce that ApproveJob returns ErrSelfApproval when
// the actor matches the certificate owner's Name or Email (case-insensitive).
// Rejection is intentionally NOT gated — owners may cancel their own pending
// renewals. Handlers map ErrSelfApproval to HTTP 403.
// seedSelfApprovalFixtures populates the mock repos with a realistic
// AwaitingApproval renewal job owned by "alice" and returns the service under
// test. The cert points at owner "o-alice" so checkNotSelf has a full resolution
// path.
func seedSelfApprovalFixtures(t *testing.T) (*JobService, *mockJobRepo) {
t.Helper()
now := time.Now()
job := &domain.Job{
ID: "job-self",
Type: domain.JobTypeRenewal,
CertificateID: "cert-self",
Status: domain.JobStatusAwaitingApproval,
CreatedAt: now,
ScheduledAt: now,
}
jobRepo := &mockJobRepo{
Jobs: map[string]*domain.Job{job.ID: job},
StatusUpdates: make(map[string]domain.JobStatus),
}
svc, certRepo, ownerRepo := newTestJobServiceWithRepos(jobRepo)
certRepo.AddCert(&domain.ManagedCertificate{
ID: "cert-self",
OwnerID: "o-alice",
CreatedAt: now,
UpdatedAt: now,
})
ownerRepo.AddOwner(&domain.Owner{
ID: "o-alice",
Name: "alice",
Email: "alice@example.com",
CreatedAt: now,
UpdatedAt: now,
})
return svc, jobRepo
}
func TestApproveJob_SelfApprovalForbidden_NameMatch(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
svc, jobRepo := seedSelfApprovalFixtures(t)
err := svc.ApproveJob(ctx, "job-self", "alice")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected ErrSelfApproval, got nil")
}
if !errors.Is(err, ErrSelfApproval) {
t.Fatalf("expected errors.Is(err, ErrSelfApproval), got %v", err)
}
if _, flipped := jobRepo.StatusUpdates["job-self"]; flipped {
t.Error("expected job status unchanged after self-approval block")
}
}
func TestApproveJob_SelfApprovalForbidden_EmailMatch(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
svc, jobRepo := seedSelfApprovalFixtures(t)
err := svc.ApproveJob(ctx, "job-self", "alice@example.com")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected ErrSelfApproval, got nil")
}
if !errors.Is(err, ErrSelfApproval) {
t.Fatalf("expected errors.Is(err, ErrSelfApproval), got %v", err)
}
if _, flipped := jobRepo.StatusUpdates["job-self"]; flipped {
t.Error("expected job status unchanged after self-approval block")
}
}
func TestApproveJob_SelfApprovalForbidden_CaseInsensitive(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
svc, _ := seedSelfApprovalFixtures(t)
// Uppercase name should still collide — the check must be case-insensitive.
if err := svc.ApproveJob(ctx, "job-self", "ALICE"); !errors.Is(err, ErrSelfApproval) {
t.Fatalf("expected ErrSelfApproval for uppercase name match, got %v", err)
}
// Mixed-case email should also collide.
if err := svc.ApproveJob(ctx, "job-self", "Alice@Example.COM"); !errors.Is(err, ErrSelfApproval) {
t.Fatalf("expected ErrSelfApproval for mixed-case email match, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestApproveJob_DifferentActor_Permitted(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
svc, jobRepo := seedSelfApprovalFixtures(t)
// A different named key must be allowed to approve.
if err := svc.ApproveJob(ctx, "job-self", "bob"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected approval to succeed for non-owner actor, got %v", err)
}
if jobRepo.StatusUpdates["job-self"] != domain.JobStatusPending {
t.Errorf("expected status Pending after approval, got %s",
jobRepo.StatusUpdates["job-self"])
}
}
func TestApproveJob_EmptyActor_Permitted(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
svc, jobRepo := seedSelfApprovalFixtures(t)
// Empty actor represents an internal/system caller. The handler layer
// enforces authenticated-only, so this branch exists only for defensive
// in-process paths (scheduler-driven auto-approval, tests, etc.).
if err := svc.ApproveJob(ctx, "job-self", ""); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected empty actor to be permitted, got %v", err)
}
if jobRepo.StatusUpdates["job-self"] != domain.JobStatusPending {
t.Errorf("expected status Pending after approval, got %s",
jobRepo.StatusUpdates["job-self"])
}
}
func TestRejectJob_SelfRejection_Permitted(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
svc, jobRepo := seedSelfApprovalFixtures(t)
// Owner must be able to reject their own pending renewal — M-003 scopes the
// not-self rule to approval only.
if err := svc.RejectJob(ctx, "job-self", "no longer needed", "alice"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected owner to reject own job, got %v", err)
}
if jobRepo.StatusUpdates["job-self"] != domain.JobStatusCancelled {
t.Errorf("expected status Cancelled after rejection, got %s",
jobRepo.StatusUpdates["job-self"])
}
}