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shankar0123
b0fc067317
Two CodeQL alerts in one sweep — both medium-impact follow-ups
on already-merged guards.
Alert #17 — go/log-injection (CWE-117) at
internal/api/middleware/middleware.go:58:
log.Printf("[%s] %s %s %d %v", requestID, r.Method, r.URL.Path, ...)
r.Method and r.URL.Path are attacker-controllable (Go's net/http
percent-decodes path segments before they reach handlers, so
r.URL.Path can contain CR/LF in the decoded form even though raw
HTTP request lines cannot). An attacker who controls a URL can
forge new log entries by embedding %0A%0Afake-log-line.
Fix: introduce scrubLogValue helper that replaces CR/LF/NUL with
spaces. Apply to both r.Method and r.URL.Path. Replacement is
structural (collapse to space) not destructive (drop) so an
operator scanning the log still sees the field was present, just
neutralized. Cheap fast path when the value contains no control
chars (the common case).
The deprecation comment on this function recommends NewLogging
(slog with structured fields) where the logger escapes per-field
natively. The Logging function is preserved for back-compat
callers; the scrubber is the load-bearing CWE-117 defense for the
legacy path.
Alert #23 — go/request-forgery (CWE-918) at scep_probe.go:271:
CodeQL reopened the alert after commit e6919cd. The commit's
in-function validator dispatch went through a function-pointer
override hook:
validateURL := s.scepValidateURL // could be anything
if validateURL == nil {
validateURL = validation.ValidateSafeURL
}
if err := validateURL(rawURL); err != nil { ... }
CodeQL's taint tracker doesn't trust the if-nil branch — the
override field could be set to a permissive validator, and the
analyzer can't prove the production validator runs.
Fix: invert the dispatch. Always call validation.ValidateSafeURL
literally first; only consult the test-override hook to grant an
EXEMPTION when the production validator rejects:
if err := validation.ValidateSafeURL(rawURL); err != nil {
if s.scepValidateURL == nil || s.scepValidateURL(rawURL) != nil {
return ... validate url error
}
}
Same applies to ProbeSCEP's entry-point validator. Both call sites
now have the literal validation.ValidateSafeURL call in-scope of
the sink (client.Do), which CodeQL recognizes as a sanitizer.
Production behavior is unchanged: scepValidateURL is nil in
production, so the production validator's rejection is the only
gate.
Test ergonomics are preserved: scepValidateURL still grants the
test-only exemption for httptest loopback URLs (only difference:
the override now grants exemption from production validator's
rejection rather than replacing the validator entirely; identical
net effect).
Verified locally:
gofmt: clean (strings is already imported in middleware.go).
go vet ./internal/api/middleware/... + ./internal/service/...:
exit 0.
go test -short ./internal/api/middleware/...: ok 0.244s.
go test -short ./internal/service/...: ok 4.965s
(every existing scep_probe test still green — production +
httptest paths both work).
References:
https://github.com/certctl-io/certctl/security/code-scanning/17
https://github.com/certctl-io/certctl/security/code-scanning/23
Closes CodeQL #17. Re-closes CodeQL #23 with a fix CodeQL's taint
tracker can verify.