Files
certctl/docs
shankar0123 1279172e9b loadtest: close Phase 8 SCALE-H2 — add scale-tier scenarios
Phase 8 of the certctl architecture diligence remediation closes
SCALE-H2 by adding three new k6 scenarios that exercise the scale-
relevant load surfaces the API tier + connector tier left uncovered:
fleet-scale bulk renewal, ACME enrollment burst, and agent heartbeat
storm.

Audit miscount + path correction (live-grep at Phase 8 audit time)
==================================================================
- The Phase 8 prompt referenced both `deploy/test/load/` and
  `deploy/test/loadtest/`. Repo truth: the existing harness lives at
  `deploy/test/loadtest/`. New scenarios land there.
- The audit's prior framing "k6 covers the API tier at 50 req/s
  only" omitted Bundle 10 (2026-05-02) which added four connector-
  tier handshake scenarios (nginx/apache/haproxy/f5) at 100 conns/min
  each, plus the Phase 5 ACME directory/nonce/ARI scenario at 100 VUs
  in `k6/acme_flow.js`. Phase 8 appends to what's there rather than
  rewriting.

What ships
==========

Three new k6 scenario files under deploy/test/loadtest/k6/:

  bulk_renewal.js — 10K-cert seed + 5 req/s POST /bulk-renew × 5min
                    p99 < 5s, p95 < 2s, errors < 1%
  acme_burst.js   — 200 VU sustained × directory/nonce/ARI × 5min
                    directory p95 < 500ms, nonce p95 < 300ms,
                    renewal-info p95 < 800ms, 5xx-only < 0.1%
                    Pins RFC 7807 rate-limit response shape via
                    acme_rate_limit_shape_ok Counter.
  agent_storm.js  — 5K-agent seed + 167 req/s POST /heartbeat × 5min
                    p99 < 1s, p95 < 500ms, errors < 0.1%

Two seed SQL fixtures under deploy/test/loadtest/seed/:

  01_bulk_renewal_certs.sql — 10,000 managed_certificates rows
    linked to seed_demo.sql FKs (iss-local, o-alice, t-platform,
    rp-standard). status='active', expires_at distributed across
    next 30 days, name prefix `loadtest-bulk-` so the scenario
    can scope its criteria. Idempotent via
    ON CONFLICT (name) DO NOTHING.

  02_agent_fleet.sql — 5,000 agents rows with name prefix
    `loadtest-agent-`. status='Online', last_heartbeat_at
    staggered across prior 60s, OS distribution 80%/10%/10%
    linux/windows/darwin. Idempotent via
    ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING.

Plus seed/README.md documenting the opt-in profile + when these
run vs the default `make loadtest` fast path.

Compose + Makefile + CI wiring
==============================

deploy/test/loadtest/docker-compose.yml gains four new services,
all gated behind the `scale` compose profile so the default
`make loadtest` is unchanged:

  scale-seed       — one-shot postgres:16-alpine container that runs
                     every ./seed/*.sql in lexical order against the
                     same postgres the server uses. Depends on
                     postgres healthy + certctl-server healthy (so
                     migrations + seed_demo.sql have already run).
  k6-scale-bulk    — grafana/k6:0.54.0 driver running bulk_renewal.js
  k6-scale-acme    — grafana/k6:0.54.0 driver running acme_burst.js
  k6-scale-agent   — grafana/k6:0.54.0 driver running agent_storm.js

Each driver depends_on scale-seed completed_successfully so the
scenarios never run against an unseeded DB (the acme scenario
doesn't need the seed itself but uses the same dependency chain for
ordering predictability).

Makefile gains four new phony targets:

  loadtest-scale-bulk   - runs bulk_renewal.js via compose --profile scale
  loadtest-scale-acme   - runs acme_burst.js
  loadtest-scale-agent  - runs agent_storm.js
  loadtest-scale        - all three serially

.github/workflows/loadtest.yml gains a new k6-scale matrix job that
runs after the existing k6 job (needs: k6) with a matrix on the
three scenarios — fail-fast: false so a regression in one scenario
doesn't cancel the others. Same workflow_dispatch + weekly cron
cadence as the existing API + connector tier job.

Documentation
=============

docs/operator/scale.md gains a new "Scale-tier scenarios (SCALE-H2,
Phase 8)" section between the cursor-pagination subsection and the
profiling-production subsection. Documents:
  - Scenario + seed + sustained load table
  - Threshold contract (regression guards, NOT measured baselines)
  - Measured-baseline table with TBD placeholders + the canonical-
    hardware capture procedure
  - How to run the scale tier locally
  - Four documented limitations (JWS-signed ACME, scheduler renewal
    scan throughput, production-sized Postgres, pull-only deployment
    model)

deploy/test/loadtest/README.md gains a short "Scale tier (Phase 8
SCALE-H2, 2026-05-14)" section pointing at scale.md as the canonical
operator-facing baseline source. Avoids duplication; the README
remains the harness-mechanics doc.

Deliberate deviations from the prompt
======================================

The Phase 8 prompt's "concrete deliverables" section referenced
`deploy/test/load/` (no -test) for the new k6 files. The actual
harness lives at `deploy/test/loadtest/` — the new files land there
to match existing convention. The prompt's audit-questions section
also referenced `deploy/test/loadtest/` so the prompt was internally
inconsistent on this; repo truth wins.

The prompt described the ACME burst as "200 concurrent ACME orders
against /acme/profile/<id>/new-order ... pin the rate-limit response
shape." new-order is JWS-signed (RFC 8555 §7.4 requires JWS for
every POST except newAccount-pre-account-key flows). k6 doesn't
ship JWS and bundling a signer (e.g. lego) into the k6 container
would obscure the server-side latency the scenario is trying to
measure. Same trade-off the existing Phase 5 acme_flow.js made.
Phase 8's acme_burst.js measures the unauthenticated
directory + nonce + ARI surface at burst rate AND pins the 429
rate-limit response shape via a custom Counter that increments only
when the response is `application/problem+json` with the
`urn:ietf:params:acme:error:rateLimited` type. End-to-end JWS
conformance under load remains a follow-up; the canonical JWS
correctness gate is `make acme-rfc-conformance-test` (lego-based,
non-load).

Deferred (operator-side, not engineering)
==========================================

Canonical-hardware baseline capture. The TBD placeholders in
docs/operator/scale.md's measured-baseline table are intentional —
sandbox-captured numbers from a developer laptop are misleading
(same anti-pattern the original loadtest README guards against).
Operator triggers loadtest.yml from the Actions tab, waits for the
k6-scale matrix jobs to complete, downloads the per-scenario
summary artifacts, copies p50/p95/p99 into the table, commits the
captured numbers alongside the date + commit SHA.

Files changed (10):
  .github/workflows/loadtest.yml                            (+72 -1)
  Makefile                                                  (+47 -1)
  deploy/test/loadtest/README.md                            (+28 -1)
  deploy/test/loadtest/docker-compose.yml                   (+108 -1)
  deploy/test/loadtest/k6/bulk_renewal.js                   (new, 106 lines)
  deploy/test/loadtest/k6/acme_burst.js                     (new, 192 lines)
  deploy/test/loadtest/k6/agent_storm.js                    (new, 124 lines)
  deploy/test/loadtest/seed/01_bulk_renewal_certs.sql       (new, 95 lines)
  deploy/test/loadtest/seed/02_agent_fleet.sql              (new, 92 lines)
  deploy/test/loadtest/seed/README.md                       (new, 86 lines)
  docs/operator/scale.md                                    (+109 -0)

Verification (sandbox-runnable):
  python3 -c 'import yaml; yaml.safe_load(open("deploy/test/loadtest/docker-compose.yml"))'
    → compose YAML OK
  python3 -c 'import yaml; yaml.safe_load(open(".github/workflows/loadtest.yml"))'
    → workflow YAML OK
  grep -E 'bulk_renewal|acme_burst|agent_storm' deploy/test/loadtest/k6/*.js
    → all three scenarios + tags present
  grep loadtest-scale Makefile
    → 4 new targets registered in .PHONY + 3 recipes + 1 aggregate

Runtime verification (deferred — requires docker on canonical hardware):
  make loadtest-scale-bulk    # 10K cert fixture + 5 req/s × 5min
  make loadtest-scale-acme    # 200 VU × 5min
  make loadtest-scale-agent   # 5K agent fixture + 167 req/s × 5min
  make loadtest-scale         # all three serially

Closes: cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-SCALE-H2
2026-05-14 03:25:15 +00:00
..

certctl Documentation

Last reviewed: 2026-05-12

The full docs index, organized by audience. Pick the section that matches what you need to do; each link below opens a focused doc rather than a wall of text.

For the elevator pitch and quickstart commands, see the repo README.md at the root. For the marketing site, see certctl.io.


Getting Started

You're new to certctl, just cloned the repo, or want to understand what it does before installing.

Doc What it covers
Concepts TLS certificates explained for beginners — CAs, ACME, EST, private keys, the full glossary
Quickstart Five-minute setup with Docker Compose, dashboard tour, API tour
Examples Five turnkey scenarios — ACME+NGINX, wildcard DNS-01, private CA+Traefik, step-ca+HAProxy, multi-issuer
Advanced demo End-to-end certificate lifecycle with technical depth at each step
Why certctl Positioning vs ACME clients, agent-based SaaS, enterprise platforms; when to look elsewhere

Reference

You're operating certctl in production or building integrations and need authoritative technical detail.

Doc What it covers
Architecture System design, data flow, security model, deployment topologies
Profiles CertificateProfile policy object — issuer wiring, EKUs, RequiresApproval gate (with profile-edit closure)
API OpenAPI 3.1 spec, integration patterns, client SDK generation
CLI certctl-cli command reference and CI/CD integration patterns
Configuration CERTCTL_* environment variable reference (scheduler, rate limits, deploy verify, audit, agent)
MCP server Model Context Protocol integration for AI assistants
Release verification Cosign / SLSA / SBOM verification procedure
Intermediate CA hierarchy Multi-level CA tree management — RFC 5280 §3.2/§4.2.1.9/§4.2.1.10 enforcement
Auth standards implemented RFC + CWE evidence for the API-key + RBAC + OIDC + sessions + break-glass surface (NOT a compliance-mapping doc)
Deployment model Atomic write, post-deploy verify, rollback semantics across all targets
Vendor matrix Tested vendor versions per target connector

Connectors

The connector index is the canonical catalog (interfaces, registry, scanners, plus an inline reference per built-in). Per-connector deep-dive siblings cover operator-grade material — vendor edges, troubleshooting, rotation playbooks, when-to-use vs alternatives.

Issuers (13 deep-dives): ACME · ADCS · AWS ACM Private CA · DigiCert · EJBCA / Keyfactor · Entrust · GlobalSign Atlas HVCA · Google CAS · Local CA · OpenSSL / Custom CA · Sectigo SCM · step-ca / Smallstep · Vault PKI

Targets (15 deep-dives): Apache · AWS Certificate Manager · Azure Key Vault · Caddy · Envoy · F5 BIG-IP · HAProxy · IIS · Java Keystore · Kubernetes Secrets · NGINX · Postfix / Dovecot · SSH (agentless) · Traefik · Windows Certificate Store

Protocols

Doc What it covers
ACME server Run certctl as an RFC 8555 + RFC 9773 ARI ACME server
ACME server threat model Security posture for the ACME server endpoint
SCEP server RFC 8894 native SCEP server — RA cert config, multi-profile dispatch, must-staple, mTLS sibling route
SCEP for Microsoft Intune Intune-specific deployment guide — NDES replacement playbook
EST server RFC 7030 EST server — 802.1X / Wi-Fi enrollment, IoT bootstrap, channel binding
CRL & OCSP RFC 5280 CRL + RFC 6960 OCSP responder for relying parties
Async CA polling Bounded polling for async-CA issuer connectors

Operator

You're running certctl in production and need operational guidance.

Doc What it covers
Security posture Auth, rate limits, encryption at rest, key rotation, RBAC + OIDC + sessions + break-glass, bootstrap
Secret custody Where private keys live; FileDriver vs HSM/KMS; encryption wire format; env-seeded vs DB-seeded plaintext policy
Observability Metrics surface, Prometheus exposition vs client_golang, tracing scope, log structure, rate-limit semantics across restarts/replicas
RBAC operator reference Roles, permissions, scopes, scope-down + day-0 bootstrap
Auth threat model API-key + RBAC + OIDC + sessions + break-glass — token forgery, session hijacking, IdP compromise, role-grant abuse, bootstrap-token leak, audit-mutation
OIDC / SSO runbooks Per-IdP setup guides — Keycloak, Authentik, Okta, Auth0, Entra ID, Google Workspace
Control plane TLS Self-signed bootstrap, operator-supplied Secret, cert-manager Certificate CR
Database TLS PostgreSQL transport encryption
Approval workflow Two-person integrity gate for high-stakes issuance + profile-edit closure
Helm deployment Kubernetes installation via the bundled chart
Performance baselines Operator-runnable benchmarks for regression spot checks
Auth benchmarks Session + OIDC validation p99 targets and measured baselines
Legacy clients (TLS 1.2) Reverse-proxy runbook for embedded EST/SCEP clients on TLS 1.2

Runbooks

Runbook When
Cloud targets AWS ACM + Azure Key Vault deployment, debugging, rollback
Expiry alerts Per-policy multi-channel routing matrix, severity tiers
Disaster recovery CRL cache, OCSP responder cert, CA private-key rotation, Postgres restore
Config-encryption upgrade Force v1/v2 → v3 re-seal across the database; passphrase rotation procedure
PostgreSQL backup Operator-run backup recipe (docker-compose + Kubernetes); recommended cadence; quarterly DR dry-run

Migration

You're moving from another cert-management tool to certctl, or running both in parallel.

From Doc
Certbot migration/from-certbot.md
acme.sh migration/from-acmesh.md
cert-manager (coexistence, not replacement) migration/cert-manager-coexistence.md
Caddy ACME (point Caddy at certctl) migration/acme-from-caddy.md
cert-manager ACME (point cert-manager at certctl) migration/acme-from-cert-manager.md
Traefik ACME (point Traefik at certctl) migration/acme-from-traefik.md
API keys → RBAC (v2.0.x → v2.1.0) migration/api-keys-to-rbac.mdAUDIT YOUR API KEYS post-upgrade
Enable OIDC SSO migration/oidc-enable.md — step-by-step OIDC onboarding for an existing API-key + RBAC deployment

Contributor

You're contributing to certctl, running tests locally, or trying to understand the CI pipeline.

Doc What it covers
Testing strategy What we test and why; per-PR fast gates vs daily deep-scan
Test environment Local environment with real CAs (Pebble, step-ca, etc.)
QA prerequisites Before running QA: stack boot, demo data baseline, env vars
QA test suite qa_test.go reference for release QA
GUI QA checklist Manual GUI verification pass for release
Release sign-off Release-day checklist — code state, automated gates, manual QA, artefact verification
CI pipeline CI shape, regression guards, adding new checks
CI guards Per-class CI guards (code-shape, contract-parity, build/dep, operational); how to add one

Archive

Historical docs preserved for reference. Most operators don't need these.

Doc Why archived
Upgrade to TLS (v2.2) Pre-v2.2 HTTPS-everywhere upgrade procedure
Upgrade past v2 JWT removal G-1 milestone JWT auth removal procedure

Reading order by role

First-time operator: ConceptsQuickstartExamples. About 90 minutes end to end.

Production operator: ArchitectureSecurity postureControl plane TLSDisaster recovery runbook. About 4 hours end to end.

PKI engineer: ACME serverSCEP serverEST serverIntermediate CA hierarchy. About 6 hours end to end.

Contributor: ArchitectureTesting strategyTest environmentCI pipeline. About 3 hours end to end.