Files
certctl/docs/migration/cert-manager-coexistence.md
T
shankar0123 7c134d0575 docs: retire compliance subtree + sweep framework name-drops from prose
Per operator decision the framework-mapping docs are gone. They
were aspirational (no audit, no certification, no validated
mapping); keeping them around was misleading.

Files deleted (1,883 lines):
- docs/compliance/index.md
- docs/compliance/soc2.md
- docs/compliance/pci-dss.md
- docs/compliance/nist-sp-800-57.md

Hyperlinks removed:
- README.md: 'Auditor / compliance' row in the doc table; the
  '(compliance mapping included)' parenthetical in the
  positioning paragraph
- docs/README.md: the '## Compliance' section table; the
  'Auditor / compliance team' reading-order-by-role row

Prose name-drops swept across 24 files:
- README.md: 'FedRAMP boundary CAs / financial-services policy
  CAs' → '4-level boundary CAs / 3-level policy CAs';
  'Compliance-grade for PCI-DSS Level 1, FedRAMP Moderate / High,
  SOC 2 Type II, HIPAA' → cut entirely
- getting-started/{quickstart,concepts,examples,why-certctl,
  advanced-demo}.md: 'compliance' → 'audit' / 'policy';
  'PCI-DSS / SOC 2 / NIST SP 800-57' framework lists cut;
  ''pci': 'true'' tag example → ''environment': 'production''
- migration/cert-manager-coexistence.md: 'compliance rules' →
  'policy rules'
- operator/approval-workflow.md: 'Compliance customers (PCI-DSS
  Level 1, FedRAMP Moderate / High, SOC 2 Type II, HIPAA)' →
  'Operators'; entire 'Compliance control mapping' table
  (PCI-DSS §6.4.5 / NIST SP 800-53 SA-15 / SOC 2 Type II CC6.1
  / HIPAA §164.308(a)(4)) deleted; 'compliance contract' →
  'two-person-integrity contract'; 'compliance auditors' →
  'reviewers'
- operator/legacy-clients-tls-1.2.md: 'PCI-DSS v4.0 Req 4 §2.2.5'
  audit-reference → CWE-326 (kept); 'PCI-DSS Req 4 §2.2.5
  attestation' section retitled to 'TLS posture summary' and
  rewritten without framework framing; 'PCI-DSS, NIST, and
  major browsers will eventually deprecate TLS 1.2' →
  'Major browsers and OS vendors will eventually deprecate
  TLS 1.2'
- operator/database-tls.md: PCI-DSS Req 4 §2.2.5 audit-ref →
  CWE-319 only; 'PCI-DSS scope' → 'sensitive data'; PCI-DSS
  Req 4 v4.0 prose footing → cut
- operator/runbooks/disaster-recovery.md: 'SOC 2 / PCI
  procurement-team deliverable' → 'on-call deliverable';
  'compliance auditors' → 'reviewers'
- reference/connectors/{acme,aws-acm,azure-kv,globalsign,
  local-ca,openssl,ssh,index}.md: 'compliance reporting
  (PCI-DSS §3.6, HIPAA §164.312)' → 'audit reporting';
  'Compliance environments (PCI-DSS Level 1, FedRAMP High,
  HIPAA)' → 'Regulated environments'; 'compliance audits' →
  'audit'; 'FedRAMP boundary CA' pattern names →
  '4-level boundary CA' (technically descriptive)
- reference/protocols/est.md: 'compliance-hook seam' →
  'device-state hook seam'; 'compliance gating' → 'device-state
  gating'; 'est_compliance_failed' → 'est_device_state_failed'
- reference/protocols/scep-intune.md: 'Optional compliance
  check' → 'Optional device-state check'; failure-counter
  'compliance_failed' → 'device_state_failed'; 'Conditional
  Access compliance gating' → 'Conditional Access
  device-state gating'
- reference/intermediate-ca-hierarchy.md: 'FedRAMP boundary-CA
  deployments where the regulator requires...' →
  'Boundary-CA deployments where you want separation of policy
  and issuing authorities'; pattern A retitled '4-level FedRAMP
  boundary CA' → '4-level boundary CA'
- reference/architecture.md: broken Related-docs link to
  compliance.md removed; the rest of that block had stale
  pre-Phase-2 paths (quickstart.md, demo-advanced.md,
  connectors.md, openapi.md, testing-guide.md, test-env.md) —
  retargeted to current locations
- reference/deployment-model.md: 'SOC 2 evidence-report
  generator' → 'Audit-evidence report generator'
- reference/vendor-matrix.md: 'SOC 2 / PCI auditors paste this
  into evidence packs' → 'reviewers paste this into
  vendor-evaluation packs'
- contributor/qa-test-suite.md: 'compliance exist' coverage
  description cut; 'Compliance (PCI / SOC2 / HIPAA-relevant)'
  risk-class label → 'Audit-relevant'

What was kept:
- CWE references (legitimate technical pointers)
- Microsoft API/feature names that happen to use 'compliance'
  literally ('Microsoft Graph compliance API',
  'device-compliance validators' — these are MS product names,
  not framework name-drops)
- 'NIST PQC' on the landing page (Post-Quantum Cryptography is
  the actual NIST standard family, not a compliance framework)

Verified: zero hyperlinks into docs/compliance/ remain. All 24
ci-guards/*.sh pass locally. qa-doc-seed-count.sh clean.
Net diff: 26 files / -1,883 deletions in compliance/ + -32 net
across the prose sweep.

Companion edits in cowork/ (CLAUDE.md doc-tree summary +
WORKSPACE-CHANGELOG.md retirement note) land separately.
2026-05-05 05:26:44 +00:00

7.0 KiB

certctl for cert-manager Users

Last reviewed: 2026-05-05

You run cert-manager inside Kubernetes and it works well for in-cluster certificates. But you also have VMs, bare-metal servers, network appliances, and legacy systems outside the cluster. cert-manager can't reach those. This guide shows how certctl complements cert-manager to give you unified certificate visibility and automation across your entire infrastructure.

Not a Replacement

cert-manager is the right tool for in-cluster certs. It's tightly integrated with Kubernetes:

  • Native CRDs (Certificate, ClusterIssuer, Issuer)
  • Automatic cert injection into Ingress and Service objects
  • Controller-driven renewal within the cluster

certctl does not replace this. Instead, it extends your certificate management to everything outside Kubernetes: VMs, bare metal, network appliances, Windows servers, and legacy systems.

The Problem

Your setup:

  • cert-manager: handles all certs in Kubernetes (TLS for Ingress, service-to-service, internal services)
  • Everything else: NGINX/Apache on VMs, HAProxy load balancers on bare metal, network appliances, Windows servers with IIS — these are managed inconsistently. Maybe Certbot cron jobs, maybe manual renewal, maybe deprecated cert files sitting around.

Result:

  • No unified visibility — you don't know when non-Kubernetes certs expire
  • Renewal failures go unnoticed until the cert is already expired
  • Audit trail fragmented across multiple tools
  • Scaling to hundreds of machines becomes impossible

The Solution

Deploy certctl control plane once (Docker Compose, Kubernetes Helm chart, or self-hosted). Deploy agents on your VMs, bare metal, and network appliances. One dashboard shows:

  • All cert-manager certs via discovery scanning (agents find cert-manager-issued certs copied to target machines, or scan the cluster directly)
  • All certctl-managed certs issued by shared issuers (ACME, step-ca, Vault PKI (planned), private CA)
  • Unified renewal and deployment across both worlds
  • Single pane of glass with expiration timeline, renewal status, deployment verification, audit trail

How to Set Up

1. Install certctl Control Plane

Option A: Docker Compose (quickest for evaluation)

cd /opt/certctl
docker compose up -d
# Dashboard & API: https://localhost:8443 (self-signed cert — pin with --cacert ./deploy/test/certs/ca.crt)

Option B: Kubernetes (recommended for prod)

helm install certctl deploy/helm/certctl/ \
  --set auth.apiKey=YOUR_SECURE_KEY

2. Deploy Agents to Non-Kubernetes Infrastructure

On each VM, bare-metal server, or appliance (via proxy agent):

# Linux amd64
curl -sSL https://github.com/certctl-io/certctl/releases/download/v2.1.0/certctl-agent-linux-amd64 \
  -o /usr/local/bin/certctl-agent
chmod +x /usr/local/bin/certctl-agent

# Config
sudo tee /etc/certctl/agent.env > /dev/null <<EOF
CERTCTL_SERVER_URL=https://certctl-control-plane:8443
CERTCTL_SERVER_CA_BUNDLE_PATH=/etc/certctl/tls/ca.crt
CERTCTL_API_KEY=your-api-key
CERTCTL_DISCOVERY_DIRS=/etc/nginx/certs,/etc/ssl,/etc/letsencrypt/live
CERTCTL_KEY_DIR=/var/lib/certctl/keys
EOF
sudo chmod 600 /etc/certctl/agent.env

# Start
sudo systemctl start certctl-agent

3. Enable Discovery Scanning

Agents scan configured directories and report back all existing certs. In the dashboard:

  • Discovery page: all found certs grouped by agent
  • Claim cert-manager certs to link them with Kubernetes metadata
  • Dismiss obsolete certs

4. Configure Shared Issuers

Set up the same issuer certctl uses for non-Kubernetes certs:

  • ACME (Let's Encrypt, for public certs)
  • step-ca (Smallstep, for internal certs)
  • Vault PKI (HashiCorp Vault, for enterprise PKI)
  • Private CA (your own internal root CA)

No new CA infrastructure needed. If cert-manager already uses your CA, certctl points to the same one.

5. Create Policies for Non-Kubernetes Certs

Go to Policies+ New Policy to create enforcement rules:

  • Name: e.g., "VM Certificate Policy"
  • Type: expiration_window or key_algorithm (enforce renewal thresholds or crypto requirements)
  • Severity: high
  • Config: set your enforcement parameters

Certificates are linked to issuers and profiles when created or claimed from discovery. Policies add guardrails — enforcing key algorithm requirements, expiration windows, and other policy rules across your fleet.

6. View Unified Inventory

Dashboard shows:

  • Certificate status heatmap (all 1000 certs: cert-manager + certctl)
  • Renewal job trends (both types)
  • Expiration timeline (30/60/90 days)
  • Agent fleet status (all infrastructure)

Certificates page filters by issuer (show me all ACME certs, or all step-ca certs):

  • cert-manager certs discovered from Kubernetes nodes
  • certctl-managed certs on VMs
  • Network appliance certs auto-discovered

Shared Infrastructure

If cert-manager and certctl both use the same CA:

  • ACME: cert-manager uses ClusterIssuer + certctl uses ACME connector → same Let's Encrypt account, transparent coexistence
  • step-ca: cert-manager uses external issuer CRD + certctl uses step-ca connector → same provisioner, shared certificate inventory
  • Vault PKI: cert-manager uses external issuer CRD + certctl uses Vault connector → same mount, same audit trail

No conflict. They just issue certs through the same CA. certctl's discovery scanning finds cert-manager-issued certs and shows them alongside certctl-managed ones.

Key Differences from cert-manager

Feature cert-manager certctl
Target In-cluster (Kubernetes) Out-of-cluster (VMs, bare metal, appliances)
Configuration CRDs (Certificate, ClusterIssuer, Issuer) API + Dashboard (JSON REST)
Deployment Injected into Secret objects, mounted by pods Agent pulls work, deploys via target-specific API (file, service restart, proxy agent)
Renewal Controller watches Certificate CRDs, triggers renewal when needed Scheduler checks thresholds, agents poll for work
Audit Kubernetes event log Immutable append-only audit trail
Visibility Per-namespace, per-resource Fleet-wide, unified inventory

Future Integration

On the roadmap (V4): cert-manager external issuer — certctl acts as a ClusterIssuer backend for Kubernetes. This would allow cert-manager to request certificates from certctl, which could issue them via any of its connectors (step-ca, Vault, private CA, etc.). Pure integration play; no breaking changes.

For now: cert-manager handles Kubernetes, certctl handles everything else. They coexist seamlessly.

Next Steps

  1. Run through the Quick Start for a 5-minute demo
  2. Try the Multi-Issuer example — manages public and internal certs from one dashboard
  3. Explore Architecture for deployment patterns
  4. Check the Helm Chart for production Kubernetes deployment