Files
certctl/internal/service/audit.go
T
shankar0123 912ec3f547 fix(audit): ship streaming NDJSON audit export endpoint (HIGH-9 / HIGH-11)
Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-9 + HIGH-11 closure. HIGH-10 deferred to v3.

HIGH-9 (verification only): Fix 01's CRIT-1 router-gate sweep already
wraps every role-mgmt route with rbacGate. Verified via grep:
  - GET    /api/v1/auth/roles                          → auth.role.list
  - POST   /api/v1/auth/roles                          → auth.role.create
  - GET    /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}                     → auth.role.list
  - PUT    /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}                     → auth.role.edit
  - DELETE /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}                     → auth.role.delete
  - POST   /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions         → auth.role.edit
  - DELETE /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions/{perm}  → auth.role.edit
  - POST   /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles                → auth.role.assign
  - DELETE /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles/{role_id}      → auth.role.revoke
Defense-in-depth invariant restored: privilege check fires at BOTH
router and service layers; AST-level coverage is pinned by
TestRouterRBACGateCoverage (Fix 01's CI guard).

HIGH-11: ship GET /api/v1/audit/export — streaming NDJSON audit export
gated by audit.export. Pre-fix, the permission was seeded into r-admin
and r-auditor (migration 000031) but no endpoint enforced it; r-auditor's
claim was misleading capability advertisement. Post-fix:

  - internal/api/handler/audit.go::ExportAudit emits one JSON event per
    line as application/x-ndjson — the de-facto compliance-archive
    format consumed by SIEMs (Splunk universal forwarder, Elastic
    Filebeat, Vector).
  - Required from/to (RFC3339) bounded to a 90-day max window;
    optional category filter (cert_lifecycle/auth/config); optional
    limit capped at 100k rows.
  - Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="certctl-audit-<from>_to_<to>.ndjson"
    so curl + browser downloads land with a sensible filename.
  - Recursively self-audits: every successful export emits an
    audit.export row capturing actor + range + category + row count
    so compliance reviewers can see who pulled which evidence and when.
  - Service layer: AuditService.ExportEventsByFilter reuses the
    existing repository.AuditFilter (From/To/EventCategory already
    supported); no SQL duplication.
  - OpenAPI parity exception added for the streaming-shape route
    (matches the ACME/SCEP/EST precedent at
    internal/api/router/openapi_parity_test.go::SpecParityExceptions).

Regression matrix in audit_export_test.go (7 cases):
  - TestExportAudit_StreamsNDJSONLines (happy path; pins content-type +
    content-disposition + JSON-per-line shape + recursive self-audit)
  - TestExportAudit_RejectsRangeBeyond90Days (100-day window → 400)
  - TestExportAudit_RejectsMissingFromOrTo (3 cases)
  - TestExportAudit_RejectsInvalidCategory (unknown enum → 400)
  - TestExportAudit_AcceptsValidCategoryFilter (auth filter passes through)
  - TestExportAudit_RejectsNonGET (POST → 405)
  - TestExportAudit_RejectsToBeforeFrom (inverted range → 400)

The auditor role's surface is now complete (read + export). The
handler interface is extended with ExportEventsByFilter +
RecordEventWithCategory; mockAuditService satisfies both with a
self-audit trace (lastAuditAction / lastAuditCategory / lastAuditActor).

HIGH-10 (scope + expiry on assignRoleRequest): DEFERRED to v3.
Schema column already exists (ActorRole.ExpiresAt); load-bearing wire
remains v3 work. Documented carve-out at HIGH-10's annotation.

Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-9 HIGH-11
Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/12-high-9-10-11-role-mgmt-cleanup.md
2026-05-10 21:36:01 +00:00

306 lines
10 KiB
Go

package service
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"time"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
)
// AuditService provides business logic for recording and retrieving audit events.
type AuditService struct {
auditRepo repository.AuditRepository
}
// NewAuditService creates a new audit service.
func NewAuditService(auditRepo repository.AuditRepository) *AuditService {
return &AuditService{
auditRepo: auditRepo,
}
}
// RecordEvent records an audit event with actor, action, and resource information.
//
// Bundle-6 / Audit H-008 + M-022 / CWE-532: every details map flows through
// RedactDetailsForAudit BEFORE marshaling. The redactor scrubs credential
// keys (api_key, password, token, *_pem, eab_secret, ...) and PII keys
// (email, phone, ssn, name, address, ip_address, ...) and surfaces a
// `redacted_keys` array so operators can audit the redactor itself during
// a compliance review. See internal/service/audit_redact.go.
func (s *AuditService) RecordEvent(ctx context.Context, actor string, actorType domain.ActorType, action string, resourceType string, resourceID string, details map[string]interface{}) error {
return s.RecordEventWithCategory(ctx, actor, actorType, action, "", resourceType, resourceID, details)
}
// RecordEventWithCategory is the Bundle 1 Phase 8 categorized variant
// of RecordEvent. eventCategory is one of
// domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle, domain.EventCategoryAuth,
// domain.EventCategoryConfig — empty defaults to cert_lifecycle in
// the persistence layer + DB CHECK constraint.
//
// Existing 90+ call sites that don't yet pass a category route
// through the legacy RecordEvent and inherit the cert_lifecycle
// default; new callers (auth handlers, bootstrap, config-mutation
// handlers) call this method directly with their explicit category.
// Both paths share the same redaction + marshaling contract.
func (s *AuditService) RecordEventWithCategory(ctx context.Context, actor string, actorType domain.ActorType, action, eventCategory, resourceType, resourceID string, details map[string]interface{}) error {
redacted := RedactDetailsForAudit(details)
detailsJSON, err := json.Marshal(redacted)
if err != nil {
detailsJSON = []byte("{}")
}
event := &domain.AuditEvent{
ID: generateID("audit"),
Timestamp: time.Now(),
Actor: actor,
ActorType: actorType,
Action: action,
ResourceType: resourceType,
ResourceID: resourceID,
Details: json.RawMessage(detailsJSON),
EventCategory: eventCategory,
}
if err := s.auditRepo.Create(ctx, event); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to record audit event: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// RecordEventWithTx records an audit event using the supplied repository.Querier.
//
// Pass *sql.Tx (typically obtained from postgres.WithinTx) to participate in
// a caller's transaction so the audit row is atomic with the operation that
// triggered it. Closes the #3 acquisition-readiness blocker from the
// 2026-05-01 issuer coverage audit (audit row not transactional with the
// operation it audits).
//
// Same redaction + marshalling contract as RecordEvent; only the database
// handle changes.
func (s *AuditService) RecordEventWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, actor string, actorType domain.ActorType, action string, resourceType string, resourceID string, details map[string]interface{}) error {
redacted := RedactDetailsForAudit(details)
detailsJSON, err := json.Marshal(redacted)
if err != nil {
detailsJSON = []byte("{}")
}
event := &domain.AuditEvent{
ID: generateID("audit"),
Timestamp: time.Now(),
Actor: actor,
ActorType: actorType,
Action: action,
ResourceType: resourceType,
ResourceID: resourceID,
Details: json.RawMessage(detailsJSON),
}
if err := s.auditRepo.CreateWithTx(ctx, q, event); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to record audit event: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// RecordEventWithCategoryWithTx records a categorized audit event using
// the supplied repository.Querier so the row is committed in the same
// transaction as the underlying action. Mirrors RecordEventWithCategory
// but takes the Querier (typically *sql.Tx from postgres.WithinTx).
//
// Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-6 closure — closes the gap where Bundle-1+2
// auth-mutation paths emitted the audit row via a separate, non-
// transactional connection. A DB hiccup or connection reset between
// the action and the audit-row INSERT used to leave the action
// committed with no audit trail (CWE-778). With this method, the
// audit row participates in the action's transaction: rollback on
// any failure removes both the action row AND any audit row that the
// caller wrote inside the tx.
func (s *AuditService) RecordEventWithCategoryWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, actor string, actorType domain.ActorType, action, eventCategory, resourceType, resourceID string, details map[string]interface{}) error {
redacted := RedactDetailsForAudit(details)
detailsJSON, err := json.Marshal(redacted)
if err != nil {
detailsJSON = []byte("{}")
}
event := &domain.AuditEvent{
ID: generateID("audit"),
Timestamp: time.Now(),
Actor: actor,
ActorType: actorType,
Action: action,
ResourceType: resourceType,
ResourceID: resourceID,
Details: json.RawMessage(detailsJSON),
EventCategory: eventCategory,
}
if err := s.auditRepo.CreateWithTx(ctx, q, event); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to record audit event: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// List returns audit events matching filter criteria.
func (s *AuditService) List(ctx context.Context, filter *repository.AuditFilter) ([]*domain.AuditEvent, error) {
events, err := s.auditRepo.List(ctx, filter)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to list audit events: %w", err)
}
return events, nil
}
// ListByResource returns all audit events for a specific resource.
func (s *AuditService) ListByResource(ctx context.Context, resourceType string, resourceID string) ([]*domain.AuditEvent, error) {
filter := &repository.AuditFilter{
ResourceType: resourceType,
ResourceID: resourceID,
PerPage: 1000, // reasonable default for single resource
}
events, err := s.auditRepo.List(ctx, filter)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to list audit events: %w", err)
}
return events, nil
}
// ListByActor returns all audit events for a specific actor.
func (s *AuditService) ListByActor(ctx context.Context, actor string) ([]*domain.AuditEvent, error) {
filter := &repository.AuditFilter{
Actor: actor,
PerPage: 1000,
}
events, err := s.auditRepo.List(ctx, filter)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to list audit events: %w", err)
}
return events, nil
}
// ListByAction returns all audit events for a specific action type.
func (s *AuditService) ListByAction(ctx context.Context, action string, from, to time.Time) ([]*domain.AuditEvent, error) {
filter := &repository.AuditFilter{
From: from,
To: to,
PerPage: 1000,
}
events, err := s.auditRepo.List(ctx, filter)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to list audit events: %w", err)
}
// Filter by action on client side (repository may not filter by action directly)
var filtered []*domain.AuditEvent
for _, e := range events {
if e.Action == action {
filtered = append(filtered, e)
}
}
return filtered, nil
}
// ListAuditEvents returns paginated audit events (handler interface method).
func (s *AuditService) ListAuditEvents(ctx context.Context, page, perPage int) ([]domain.AuditEvent, int64, error) {
return s.ListAuditEventsByCategory(ctx, "", page, perPage)
}
// ListAuditEventsByCategory is the Bundle 1 Phase 8 categorized variant.
// Empty eventCategory disables the filter.
func (s *AuditService) ListAuditEventsByCategory(ctx context.Context, eventCategory string, page, perPage int) ([]domain.AuditEvent, int64, error) {
if page < 1 {
page = 1
}
if perPage < 1 {
perPage = 50
}
filter := &repository.AuditFilter{
EventCategory: eventCategory,
Page: page,
PerPage: perPage,
}
events, err := s.auditRepo.List(ctx, filter)
if err != nil {
return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to list audit events: %w", err)
}
// Convert pointers to values for the handler interface
var result []domain.AuditEvent
for _, e := range events {
if e != nil {
result = append(result, *e)
}
}
// TODO: Get total count from repository
total := int64(len(result))
return result, total, nil
}
// ExportEventsByFilter returns audit events matching a date-range +
// optional category filter without pagination — the export handler
// uses this to stream NDJSON for compliance evidence collection.
//
// Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-11 closure: pre-fix, the `audit.export`
// permission was seeded into r-admin and r-auditor (migration 000031)
// but no endpoint enforced it — misleading capability advertisement.
// This method is the service-layer building block for the new
// GET /api/v1/audit/export endpoint.
//
// Bounded callers: the handler enforces a max 90-day range + max-rows
// cap before invoking this; the service-layer method itself is
// permissive so future callers (compliance-job runner, MCP tool) can
// reuse the helper without duplicating the bound enforcement.
func (s *AuditService) ExportEventsByFilter(ctx context.Context, from, to time.Time, eventCategory string, maxRows int) ([]domain.AuditEvent, error) {
if maxRows <= 0 {
maxRows = 50000
}
filter := &repository.AuditFilter{
EventCategory: eventCategory,
From: from,
To: to,
Page: 1,
PerPage: maxRows,
}
events, err := s.auditRepo.List(ctx, filter)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to list audit events for export: %w", err)
}
out := make([]domain.AuditEvent, 0, len(events))
for _, e := range events {
if e != nil {
out = append(out, *e)
}
}
return out, nil
}
// GetAuditEvent returns a single audit event (handler interface method).
func (s *AuditService) GetAuditEvent(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.AuditEvent, error) {
filter := &repository.AuditFilter{
ResourceID: id,
PerPage: 1,
}
events, err := s.auditRepo.List(ctx, filter)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get audit event: %w", err)
}
if len(events) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("audit event not found")
}
return events[0], nil
}