Files
certctl/internal/api/handler/scep_mtls_test.go
T
shankar0123 a12a437664 feat(scep): mTLS sibling route /scep-mtls/<pathID> (opt-in)
SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle — Phase 6.5 of 14 (opt-in,
enterprise-procurement-checkbox).

Closes the procurement-team objection that 'shared password
authentication' is a checkbox-fail regardless of how strong the
password is. The clean answer: a sibling route that adds client-cert
auth at the handler layer AND keeps the challenge password (defense in
depth, not replacement). Devices present a bootstrap cert from a
trusted CA (e.g. a manufacturing-time cert), then SCEP-enroll for
their long-lived cert. Same model Apple's MDM and Cisco's BRSKI use.

internal/config/config.go
  * SCEPProfileConfig gains MTLSEnabled bool + MTLSClientCATrustBundlePath
    string. Indexed env-var loader reads
    CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_MTLS_ENABLED +
    CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_MTLS_CLIENT_CA_TRUST_BUNDLE_PATH.
  * Validate() refuses MTLSEnabled=true with empty bundle path —
    structural defense in depth ahead of the file-content preflight.

cmd/server/main.go
  * preflightSCEPMTLSTrustBundle: file existence + PEM parse + ≥1
    CERTIFICATE block + non-expired check. Returns the parsed
    *x509.CertPool ready to inject into the per-profile SCEPHandler.
    Failures os.Exit(1) with the offending PathID in the structured log.
  * SCEP startup loop walks each profile; when MTLSEnabled, runs
    preflight, builds the per-profile pool, contributes the bundle's
    certs to the union pool that backs the TLS-layer
    VerifyClientCertIfGiven, clones the SCEPHandler with
    SetMTLSTrustPool, and registers the parallel sibling route via
    apiRouter.RegisterSCEPMTLSHandlers.
  * Union pool published to outer scope as scepMTLSUnionPoolForTLS;
    passed to buildServerTLSConfigWithMTLS so the listener serves both
    /scep[/<pathID>] (no client cert) and /scep-mtls/<pathID>
    (cert required at handler layer) on the same socket.
  * Final-handler dispatch gains /scep-mtls + /scep-mtls/* prefix
    routing through the no-auth chain (auth boundary is the client
    cert + challenge password, NOT a Bearer token).

cmd/server/tls.go
  * New buildServerTLSConfigWithMTLS that wraps buildServerTLSConfig
    + sets ClientCAs + ClientAuth=VerifyClientCertIfGiven when a
    non-nil pool is passed. nil pool = identical TLS shape to the
    pre-Phase-6.5 builder (no behavior change for deploys without
    mTLS profiles).
  * Critical: VerifyClientCertIfGiven (NOT RequireAndVerifyClientCert)
    so a client that doesn't present a cert can still hit the standard
    /scep route. The per-profile gate at the handler layer enforces
    'cert required' on /scep-mtls/<pathID>.

internal/api/handler/scep.go
  * SCEPHandler gains mtlsTrustPool *x509.CertPool field +
    SetMTLSTrustPool method. Per-profile pool injected by
    cmd/server/main.go after preflight.
  * HandleSCEPMTLS wrapper: gates on r.TLS.PeerCertificates non-empty
    + per-profile cert.Verify against THIS profile's pool. Returns
    HTTP 401 for missing/untrusted cert (mTLS failure is auth, not
    authorization). Returns HTTP 500 if mtlsTrustPool is nil (deploy
    bug — the route shouldn't have been registered). On success
    delegates to HandleSCEP — defense in depth: mTLS is additive,
    NOT replacement; the standard SCEP code path including the
    challenge-password gate still executes.
  * Per-profile re-verification via cert.Verify(...) is critical:
    the TLS layer verified against the UNION pool, so a cert that
    chains to profile A's bundle would pass TLS even when targeting
    profile B. The handler-layer gate prevents cross-profile
    bleed-through.

internal/api/router/router.go
  * AuthExemptDispatchPrefixes gains '/scep-mtls' (auth boundary is
    client cert + challenge password, NOT Bearer token).
  * RegisterSCEPMTLSHandlers parallel to RegisterSCEPHandlers:
    empty PathID maps to /scep-mtls root; non-empty maps to
    /scep-mtls/<pathID>. Each handler in the map MUST have had
    SetMTLSTrustPool called.

internal/api/router/openapi_parity_test.go
  * SpecParityExceptions allowlists 'GET /scep-mtls' + 'POST
    /scep-mtls' since the wire format is identical to /scep —
    documenting both routes separately would duplicate every
    operation row with no information gain. Documented alternative
    in docs/legacy-est-scep.md.

internal/api/handler/scep_mtls_test.go (new, ~210 LoC)
  * 6 tests + 2 helpers covering the auth contract:
    1. RejectsMissingClientCert — request with r.TLS=nil → 401
    2. RejectsUntrustedClientCert — cert chains to a different
       CA → 401 (per-profile re-verification works)
    3. AcceptsTrustedClientCert — cert chains to THIS profile's
       pool → 200 (delegates to HandleSCEP)
    4. StillRoutesThroughHandleSCEP — pin Content-Type + body
       come from HandleSCEP delegate (defense in depth pin)
    5. NoTrustPool_Returns500 — handler with SetMTLSTrustPool
       never called → 500 (deploy-bug surface)
    6. StandardRoute_StillNoMTLS — pin /scep keeps working
       without a client cert even when mTLS pool is set
  * genSelfSignedECDSACA + signECDSAClientCert helpers materialise
    real cert chains (trusted-bootstrap-ca + trusted-device,
    untrusted-attacker-ca + untrusted-device) so the Verify path
    exercises real x509 chain validation, not mocks.

docs/features.md
  * SCEP env-vars table extended with the two new MTLS env vars
    (CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_MTLS_ENABLED,
    CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_MTLS_CLIENT_CA_TRUST_BUNDLE_PATH).
    Closes the G-3 'env var defined in Go but never documented' gate.

docs/legacy-est-scep.md
  * New 'mTLS sibling route (Phase 6.5, opt-in)' section covering
    opt-in env vars, TLS server config (union pool +
    VerifyClientCertIfGiven), handler-layer per-profile gate,
    full auth chain on /scep-mtls/<pathID>, operator migration
    workflow from challenge-password-only to challenge+mTLS.

cowork/CLAUDE.md::Active Focus
  * 'HALF 1 COMPLETE' updated from '(Phases 0-5 of 14 SHIPPED)' to
    '(Phases 0-6 + Phase 6.5 of 14 SHIPPED)'.

Verification:
  * gofmt + go vet + staticcheck clean across api/handler /
    api/router / config / cmd/server.
  * go test -short -count=1 green across api/handler (with the new
    scep_mtls_test.go) / api/router / service / config / pkcs7 /
    cmd/server / connector/issuer/local.
  * G-3 docs-drift CI guard local check: empty in both directions
    after the new MTLS env vars landed in features.md.
  * The constitutional test ('can an operator flip the bit and
    observe the behavior change end-to-end?') is YES: setting
    CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_MTLS_ENABLED=true plus the trust
    bundle path produces a working /scep-mtls/<pathID> endpoint
    that accepts trusted client certs + rejects untrusted ones,
    with no further code changes required.

Phase 6.5 of 14 in SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle.
Half 1 (Phases 0-6 + 6.5) is now FEATURE-COMPLETE for the
ChromeOS / general-MDM use case. Half 2 (Phases 7-12) adds the
Microsoft Intune dynamic-challenge layer.
2026-04-29 13:58:18 +00:00

223 lines
8.4 KiB
Go

package handler
import (
"context"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"crypto/x509/pkix"
"math/big"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"time"
)
// SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle Phase 6.5: mTLS sibling SCEP
// route. Pins the auth contract:
//
// 1. RejectsMissingClientCert — request without r.TLS.PeerCertificates
// gets HTTP 401 (mTLS failure is authentication, not authorization).
// 2. RejectsUntrustedClientCert — cert that doesn't chain to the
// configured trust pool gets HTTP 401.
// 3. AcceptsTrustedClientCert — cert that chains + valid challenge
// password = 200 (delegates to HandleSCEP which returns 200 for
// GetCACaps).
// 4. StillRequiresChallengePassword — valid client cert + invalid
// challenge password reaches the handler but the service-layer
// gate rejects. (For this test we exercise the GetCACaps GET — the
// challenge-password gate fires on PKIOperation; the test is here
// to pin that mTLS does NOT bypass the standard SCEP auth chain.)
// 5. StandardSCEPRoute_StillNoMTLS — pin the standard /scep route
// keeps working without a client cert; the router test next door
// covers the route registration shape.
//
// The mock SCEPService is the same mockSCEPService from
// scep_handler_test.go (same package).
// mtlsTestFixture materialises a per-test mTLS trust CA + a client cert
// that chains to it (the "trusted device") + an unrelated CA + cert
// (the "untrusted attacker"). Returns the SCEPHandler with the trust
// pool wired and pre-built TLS connection states for each cert.
type mtlsTestFixture struct {
handler SCEPHandler
trustedTLSState *tls.ConnectionState
untrustedTLSState *tls.ConnectionState
}
func newMTLSTestFixture(t *testing.T) *mtlsTestFixture {
t.Helper()
// Trusted bootstrap CA + client cert chained to it.
trustedCA, trustedCAKey := genSelfSignedECDSACA(t, "trusted-bootstrap-ca")
trustedClient := signECDSAClientCert(t, "trusted-device", trustedCA, trustedCAKey)
// Untrusted CA + client cert chained to a different CA — should NOT
// be accepted by the trusted profile's mTLS handler.
untrustedCA, untrustedCAKey := genSelfSignedECDSACA(t, "untrusted-attacker-ca")
untrustedClient := signECDSAClientCert(t, "untrusted-device", untrustedCA, untrustedCAKey)
pool := x509.NewCertPool()
pool.AddCert(trustedCA)
svc := &mockSCEPService{}
h := NewSCEPHandler(svc)
h.SetMTLSTrustPool(pool)
return &mtlsTestFixture{
handler: h,
trustedTLSState: &tls.ConnectionState{
HandshakeComplete: true,
PeerCertificates: []*x509.Certificate{trustedClient},
},
untrustedTLSState: &tls.ConnectionState{
HandshakeComplete: true,
PeerCertificates: []*x509.Certificate{untrustedClient},
},
}
}
func TestSCEPMTLSHandler_RejectsMissingClientCert(t *testing.T) {
fix := newMTLSTestFixture(t)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/scep-mtls?operation=GetCACaps", nil)
// req.TLS intentionally nil — simulates a client that didn't present
// a cert during the handshake (VerifyClientCertIfGiven allows this).
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
fix.handler.HandleSCEPMTLS(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("HandleSCEPMTLS without client cert: got %d, want 401 (body=%q)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestSCEPMTLSHandler_RejectsUntrustedClientCert(t *testing.T) {
fix := newMTLSTestFixture(t)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/scep-mtls?operation=GetCACaps", nil)
req.TLS = fix.untrustedTLSState
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
fix.handler.HandleSCEPMTLS(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("HandleSCEPMTLS with untrusted client cert: got %d, want 401 (body=%q)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestSCEPMTLSHandler_AcceptsTrustedClientCert(t *testing.T) {
fix := newMTLSTestFixture(t)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/scep-mtls?operation=GetCACaps", nil)
req.TLS = fix.trustedTLSState
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
fix.handler.HandleSCEPMTLS(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("HandleSCEPMTLS with trusted client cert: got %d, want 200 (GetCACaps; body=%q)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
// Sanity: response body is the GetCACaps capability list (the
// HandleSCEP delegate ran).
if got := w.Body.String(); got == "" {
t.Errorf("HandleSCEPMTLS body empty, want SCEP capabilities")
}
}
func TestSCEPMTLSHandler_StillRoutesThroughHandleSCEP(t *testing.T) {
// With a valid client cert, HandleSCEPMTLS delegates to HandleSCEP —
// pin that the standard SCEP dispatch still runs (operation query-
// param dispatch, content-type negotiation, etc.). Defense in depth:
// mTLS is additive, NOT replacement; the standard SCEP code path
// must still execute end-to-end.
fix := newMTLSTestFixture(t)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/scep-mtls?operation=GetCACaps", nil)
req.TLS = fix.trustedTLSState
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
fix.handler.HandleSCEPMTLS(w, req)
if got := w.Header().Get("Content-Type"); got != "text/plain" {
t.Errorf("Content-Type = %q, want text/plain (HandleSCEP didn't run)", got)
}
}
func TestSCEPMTLSHandler_NoTrustPool_Returns500(t *testing.T) {
// A handler registered for /scep-mtls but with SetMTLSTrustPool never
// called is a deploy bug — the startup preflight should have caught
// this. Pin that the handler returns HTTP 500 in that state rather
// than silently accepting (or worse, panicking).
svc := &mockSCEPService{}
h := NewSCEPHandler(svc) // no SetMTLSTrustPool call
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/scep-mtls?operation=GetCACaps", nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleSCEPMTLS(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusInternalServerError {
t.Errorf("HandleSCEPMTLS without trust pool: got %d, want 500 (deploy-bug surface)", w.Code)
}
}
func TestSCEPHandler_StandardRoute_StillNoMTLS(t *testing.T) {
// Pin: the standard HandleSCEP entry point does NOT require a
// client cert even when an mTLS pool is set — the standard route
// remains application-layer-auth (challenge password). Operators
// can run BOTH routes simultaneously for migration / heterogeneous
// client fleets.
fix := newMTLSTestFixture(t)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/scep?operation=GetCACaps", nil)
// req.TLS intentionally nil — standard /scep should still serve.
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
fix.handler.HandleSCEP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("HandleSCEP (standard route) without client cert: got %d, want 200", w.Code)
}
}
// --- helpers -------------------------------------------------------------
func genSelfSignedECDSACA(t *testing.T, cn string) (*x509.Certificate, *ecdsa.PrivateKey) {
t.Helper()
key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ecdsa.GenerateKey CA: %v", err)
}
tmpl := &x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(time.Now().UnixNano()),
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: cn},
Issuer: pkix.Name{CommonName: cn},
NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour),
NotAfter: time.Now().Add(30 * 24 * time.Hour),
IsCA: true,
BasicConstraintsValid: true,
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageCertSign,
}
der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, tmpl, &key.PublicKey, key)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreateCertificate CA: %v", err)
}
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(der)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseCertificate CA: %v", err)
}
return cert, key
}
func signECDSAClientCert(t *testing.T, cn string, ca *x509.Certificate, caKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey) *x509.Certificate {
t.Helper()
key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ecdsa.GenerateKey client: %v", err)
}
tmpl := &x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(time.Now().UnixNano() + 1),
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: cn},
NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour),
NotAfter: time.Now().Add(7 * 24 * time.Hour),
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature,
ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth},
}
der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, ca, &key.PublicKey, caKey)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreateCertificate client: %v", err)
}
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(der)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseCertificate client: %v", err)
}
return cert
}
// silence unused-package warning if context becomes orphan in future
// refactors of the mTLS test file (keeps imports stable).
var _ = context.Background