Files
certctl/internal/api/handler/m008_admin_gate_test.go
T
shankar0123 8bc9f4eed8 EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phases 5-7: end-to-end serverkeygen
+ profile-driven csrattrs + admin observability with per-status
counters + reload-trust endpoint.

Phase 5 — RFC 7030 §4.4 server-driven key generation:
- internal/pkcs7/envelopeddata_builder.go is the inverse of the
  existing parser/decryptor: AES-256-CBC content cipher + RSA PKCS#1
  v1.5 keyTrans + per-call random IV. Round-trip pinned in test
  (BuildEnvelopedData → ParseEnvelopedData → Decrypt returns the
  original plaintext byte-for-byte).
- ESTService.SimpleServerKeygen runs the full §4.4 flow: parse client
  CSR → require RSA pubkey for keyTrans → resolve per-profile
  algorithm (RSA-2048 default; honors AllowedKeyAlgorithms) → in-
  memory keygen → re-build CSR with server pubkey → run existing
  issuer pipeline → marshal PKCS#8 → CMS-EnvelopedData wrap to a
  synthetic recipient cert wrapping the device's CSR-supplied pubkey
  → zeroize plaintext + PKCS#8 bytes → return CertPEM + ChainPEM
  + EncryptedKey. Typed sentinels ErrServerKeygenRequiresKey-
  Encipherment / ErrServerKeygenUnsupportedAlgorithm /
  ErrServerKeygenDisabled.
- ESTHandler.ServerKeygen + ServerKeygenMTLS emit RFC 7030 §4.4.2
  multipart/mixed with random per-response boundary; per-profile
  SetServerKeygenEnabled gate returns 404 when off (defense in depth
  even if the route was registered).
- New routes POST /.well-known/est/[<PathID>/]serverkeygen +
  /.well-known/est-mtls/<PathID>/serverkeygen; openapi.yaml +
  openapi-parity guard updated.

Phase 6 — Real csrattrs implementation:
- New CertificateProfile.RequiredCSRAttributes []string + migration
  000022_certificate_profiles_csrattrs.up.sql. The migration also
  lands the previously-unwired must_staple column (closes the 5.6
  follow-up loop where the field shipped at the domain + service
  layer but the postgres scan/insert/update never persisted it).
- domain.EKUStringToOID + AttributeStringToOID lookup tables: id-kp-*
  EKUs (RFC 5280 §4.2.1.12) + RFC 5280 DN attributes + RFC 2985
  PKCS#10 attributes + Microsoft Intune device-serial OID.
- ESTService.GetCSRAttrs replaces the v2.0.x nil/204 stub with a
  profile-derived SEQUENCE OF OID ASN.1 marshal. Unknown EKU /
  attribute strings dropped + warning-logged so a typo doesn't take
  down the entire endpoint.

Phase 7 — Admin observability + counters + reload-trust:
- internal/service/est_counters.go: estCounterTab (sync/atomic; 12
  named labels) + ESTStatsSnapshot per-profile shape +
  ESTService.Stats(now) zero-allocation accessor + ReloadTrust()
  SIGHUP-equivalent + SetESTAdminMetadata setter.
- Counter ticks wired into processEnrollment + SimpleServerKeygen at
  every success/failure leg.
- internal/api/handler/admin_est.go mirrors AdminSCEPIntune verbatim:
  Profiles + ReloadTrust handlers + AdminESTServiceImpl. Both
  endpoints admin-gated (M-008 triplet pinned + admin_est.go added
  to AdminGatedHandlers).
- New routes GET /api/v1/admin/est/profiles + POST /api/v1/admin/
  est/reload-trust; openapi.yaml documented; openapi-parity guard
  reproduced clean.
- cmd/server/main.go grows estServices map populated by the per-
  profile EST loop + handed to AdminEST. New MTLSTrust() +
  HasMTLSTrust() accessors on ESTHandler so main.go can pull the
  trust holder for the admin-metadata wire-up.
- Per-profile counter isolation regression test
  (internal/service/est_profile_counter_isolation_test.go) proves
  a future shared-counter refactor would fail at compile-time
  pointer-identity check.

Pre-commit verification (sandbox): gofmt clean, go vet clean
(excluding repository/postgres which the sandbox can't build —
disk-space testcontainers download), staticcheck clean across
cms/trustanchor/api/handler/api/router/scep/intune/ratelimit/
service/pkcs7/domain/cmd/server, go test -short -count=1 green
for every non-postgres package. G-3 docs-drift guard reproduced
locally clean (Phases 5-7 added zero new env vars; Phase 1
already documented per-profile SERVER_KEYGEN_ENABLED).

Spec preserved at cowork/est-rfc7030-hardening-prompt.md. Phases
8-13 (GUI ESTAdminPage / CLI+MCP / libest e2e / bulk revocation /
docs/est.md / release prep) remain — post-2.1.0 work.
2026-04-29 23:57:45 +00:00

174 lines
6.1 KiB
Go

package handler
import (
"go/parser"
"go/token"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"sort"
"strings"
"testing"
)
// Bundle C / Audit M-008: pin the admin-gated handler set.
//
// The audit's request is "Admin-gated operation role-gate test coverage
// needs verification". Verified-already-clean recon: only one handler
// in internal/api/handler/ calls middleware.IsAdmin to gate access:
// bulk_revocation.go — which has 3 dedicated tests
// (NonAdmin_Returns403, AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403,
// AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor) covering all three branches.
//
// This test enforces the invariant going forward by walking every
// .go file in this package, finding every middleware.IsAdmin call
// site, and asserting the file appears in AdminGatedHandlers below.
// Adding a new middleware.IsAdmin call without updating the constant
// AND adding a parallel test triplet fails CI.
// AdminGatedHandlers is the documented allowlist of handler files that
// gate access on middleware.IsAdmin. Every entry MUST have:
// - a non-admin-rejection test ("_NonAdmin_Returns403")
// - an explicit-false-admin-rejection test ("_AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403")
// - an admin-allowed actor-attribution test ("_AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor")
//
// Keys are the handler filenames; values are short descriptions of why
// the gate exists. health.go is an INFORMATIONAL caller of IsAdmin (it
// surfaces the flag to the GUI but does not gate) — explicitly excluded.
var AdminGatedHandlers = map[string]string{
"bulk_revocation.go": "M-003: bulk revocation is fleet-scale destructive — admin-only",
"admin_crl_cache.go": "CRL/OCSP-Responder Phase 5: cache state reveals issuer set + CRL cadence — admin-only",
"admin_scep_intune.go": "SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle Phase 9.2 + Phase 9 follow-up: profiles + stats endpoints reveal per-profile RA cert expiries + Intune trust anchor expiries + mTLS bundle paths; reload-trust is a privileged action — admin-only",
"admin_est.go": "EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phase 7.2: profiles endpoint reveals per-profile counter snapshot + mTLS trust-anchor expiries + auth modes; reload-trust is a privileged action — admin-only",
}
// InformationalIsAdminCallers is the documented allowlist of files that
// call middleware.IsAdmin without using the result to gate access. The
// only legitimate use of an informational call is reporting the flag to
// a downstream consumer (e.g. health.go::AuthCheck reports admin to the
// GUI so it can hide admin-only buttons).
var InformationalIsAdminCallers = map[string]string{
"health.go": "informational: reports admin flag to GUI for affordance gating, no server-side gate",
}
func TestM008_AdminGatedHandlers_PinExpectedSet(t *testing.T) {
actual, err := scanIsAdminCallers(".")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("scan handler dir: %v", err)
}
expected := append([]string(nil), keys(AdminGatedHandlers)...)
expected = append(expected, keys(InformationalIsAdminCallers)...)
sort.Strings(actual)
sort.Strings(expected)
if !slicesEqual008(actual, expected) {
t.Errorf(
"middleware.IsAdmin call sites changed:\n"+
" actual: %v\n"+
" expected: %v\n"+
"\n"+
"If you added a new admin gate, append it to AdminGatedHandlers AND\n"+
"add the 3-test triplet (_NonAdmin_Returns403 / _AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403 /\n"+
"_AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor) — see bulk_revocation_handler_test.go for\n"+
"the template.\n"+
"\n"+
"If you added an informational caller (no gating), append to\n"+
"InformationalIsAdminCallers with a justification.",
actual, expected)
}
}
func TestM008_AdminGatedHandlers_HaveTripletTests(t *testing.T) {
for handlerFile := range AdminGatedHandlers {
base := strings.TrimSuffix(handlerFile, ".go")
// Look for the 3-test triplet in the corresponding _test.go file
// or in any test file in the package — bulk_revocation_handler_test.go
// follows a slightly different naming convention.
matches, err := filepath.Glob("*_test.go")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("glob: %v", err)
}
var foundNonAdmin, foundExplicitFalse, foundAdminPermitted bool
for _, m := range matches {
body, err := os.ReadFile(m)
if err != nil {
continue
}
s := string(body)
// Look for tests that mention the handler base name + the
// expected suffix. Loose match because some test files use
// _Handler_NonAdmin and others use _NonAdmin.
if strings.Contains(s, "NonAdmin_Returns403") {
foundNonAdmin = true
}
if strings.Contains(s, "AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403") {
foundExplicitFalse = true
}
if strings.Contains(s, "AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor") {
foundAdminPermitted = true
}
}
if !foundNonAdmin {
t.Errorf("admin-gated handler %s lacks a *_NonAdmin_Returns403 test", base)
}
if !foundExplicitFalse {
t.Errorf("admin-gated handler %s lacks a *_AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403 test", base)
}
if !foundAdminPermitted {
t.Errorf("admin-gated handler %s lacks a *_AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor test", base)
}
}
}
// --- helpers --------------------------------------------------------------
func scanIsAdminCallers(dir string) ([]string, error) {
entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var out []string
fset := token.NewFileSet()
for _, e := range entries {
name := e.Name()
if !strings.HasSuffix(name, ".go") || strings.HasSuffix(name, "_test.go") {
continue
}
body, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, name))
if err != nil {
continue
}
_, parseErr := parser.ParseFile(fset, filepath.Join(dir, name), body, parser.SkipObjectResolution)
if parseErr != nil {
continue
}
// Substring-match middleware.IsAdmin — cheap and sufficient
// because the import path is fixed and there's no aliasing
// shenanigans elsewhere in this package.
if strings.Contains(string(body), "middleware.IsAdmin(") {
out = append(out, name)
}
}
return out, nil
}
func keys(m map[string]string) []string {
out := make([]string, 0, len(m))
for k := range m {
out = append(out, k)
}
return out
}
func slicesEqual008(a, b []string) bool {
if len(a) != len(b) {
return false
}
for i := range a {
if a[i] != b[i] {
return false
}
}
return true
}