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shankar0123
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# Phase 6 — day-0 admin bootstrap * internal/auth/bootstrap/ (new package): Strategy interface + EnvTokenStrategy with constant-time compare, one-shot consumption via sync.Mutex, optional admin-existence probe. Bundle 2's OIDC- first-admin will plug in alongside as an alternate Strategy. * BootstrapService.ValidateAndMint: validates the operator's CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, mints a 32-byte (64-hex-char) random API key value, persists the SHA-256 hash to api_keys, grants r-admin via actor_roles, AddHashed's the runtime keystore so the just- minted key authenticates the next request without restart, and records bootstrap.consume to the audit trail with category=auth. * internal/auth/keystore.go (new): KeyStore interface + StaticKeyStore (immutable env-var-only path) + MutableKeyStore (env-var keys + DB-loaded api_keys + runtime AddHashed). The auth middleware now consumes a KeyStore so the bootstrap path can extend the lookup table at runtime. * migrations/000031_api_keys.up/down.sql: api_keys table with (id, name UNIQUE, key_hash UNIQUE, tenant_id, admin, created_by, created_at, expires_at, last_used_at). Idempotent. * /v1/auth/bootstrap GET (probe) + POST (mint) — auth-exempt. Both routes documented in api/openapi.yaml + AuthExemptRouterRoutes allowlist updated. The token never leaves internal/auth/bootstrap; the minted plaintext key flows only into the HTTP response body. * Startup warning emitted when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set AND admin actors already exist (config drift signal). * Tests: 4 strategy invariants (empty token born disabled, wrong token=ErrInvalidToken without consumption, one-shot consumption, admin-exists closes path), 5 service tests (happy path + actor- name validation + propagation of strategy errors + nil-deps guard + 32-byte entropy budget), 8 HTTP-handler tests (status 201/410/401/400 mapping + token-leak hygiene scan of slog + audit details + Location header). Token-leak test redirects slog.Default to a buffer for the test scope. # Phase 7 — API-key migration + scope-down CLI * GET /v1/auth/keys handler + service method ListKeys backed by ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Returns one row per (actor_id, actor_type) pair with the slice of role IDs they hold. Permission: auth.role.list. * internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go: AuthListKeys, AuthScopeDown (interactive), AuthScopeDownNonInteractive (JSON config), AuthScopeDownSuggest (--suggest with optional --apply). The synthetic actor-demo-anon is filtered out of every interactive / bulk path; non-interactive flow logs and skips it explicitly. * SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents (pure function): walks 30 days of audit events per actor and returns the narrowest matching role (admin / mcp / viewer / agent / operator) plus a one-line reason. Classification: any admin-shaped action wins; otherwise all-MCP → mcp; all-read-only → viewer; all-agent-shaped → agent; otherwise operator. Test table pins all six classifications. * CLI subcommand tree extended: 'auth keys list' + 'auth keys scope-down [--non-interactive <cfg>] [--suggest [--apply]]'. * CHANGELOG.md leads v2.1.0 with the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS call-out + four flow examples. # Phase 8 — auditor role + event_category column * migrations/000032_audit_category.up/down.sql: ALTER TABLE audit_events ADD COLUMN event_category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'cert_lifecycle' + CHECK constraint (cert_lifecycle/auth/config) + (event_category) and (event_category, timestamp DESC) indexes for the auditor-filter query path. WORM trigger from migration 000018 continues to enforce append-only at the DB layer (DDL is not blocked). * domain.AuditEvent gains EventCategory string (omitempty); domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle / Auth / Config constants. * AuditService.RecordEventWithCategory sibling of RecordEvent; legacy callers stay on RecordEvent (defaults to cert_lifecycle). Auth callers (RoleService, ActorRoleService, BootstrapService) switched to RecordEventWithCategory(..., 'auth', ...). * GET /v1/audit?category=<cat>: handler accepts the optional query param, validates against the enum (400 on invalid value), dispatches through ListAuditEventsByCategory. OpenAPI updated with the new query param + AuditEvent.event_category schema. * Postgres AuditRepository.Create now writes event_category; AuditRepository.List filters on it; AuditFilter.EventCategory gates the WHERE clause. * Tests: 5 audit-category-filter HTTP tests (dispatch routing, back-compat fallback, 400 for invalid values, all 3 enum values accepted, page+category combine, JSON output surfaces the field). 3 auditor-role invariants (auditor holds exactly audit.read+audit.export, no mutating perms, disjoint from viewer except audit.read). # Cross-phase wiring * HandlerRegistry.Bootstrap field added; cmd/server/main.go wires the bootstrap service ahead of RegisterHandlers (extracted assembleNamedAPIKeys helper into auth_backfill.go, moved the keystore + bootstrap construction up alongside the auth repos). * AuthCheckResolver / AuthActorRoleService extended with ListKeys to satisfy the Phase 7 surface; existing fakes updated. * fakeAudit + mockAuditService stubs in tests gain RecordEventWithCategory + ListAuditEventsByCategory; existing tests untouched. # Verifications * gofmt -l: clean across every modified file. * go vet ./...: clean. * staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli + service + repository + cmd + domain: clean. * go test -short -count=1: green across every Bundle-1-touched package — internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler, internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service/auth, internal/service, internal/domain/auth, internal/repository/postgres, cmd/server, cmd/cli, plus internal/scheduler, internal/api/middleware, cmd/agent, internal/mcp.
83 lines
3.3 KiB
Go
83 lines
3.3 KiB
Go
package domain
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"time"
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)
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// AuditEvent records an action taken in the control plane.
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type AuditEvent struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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Actor string `json:"actor"`
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ActorType ActorType `json:"actor_type"`
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Action string `json:"action"`
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ResourceType string `json:"resource_type"`
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ResourceID string `json:"resource_id"`
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Details json.RawMessage `json:"details"`
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Timestamp time.Time `json:"timestamp"`
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// EventCategory (Bundle 1 Phase 8) classifies the event into one
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// of "cert_lifecycle", "auth", or "config" so the auditor role
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// can filter to authentication / authorization events without
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// also seeing every cert.issue. The persistence layer treats an
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// empty value as "cert_lifecycle" (the migration default + the
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// DB CHECK constraint).
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EventCategory string `json:"event_category,omitempty"`
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}
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// Audit event-category constants. Bundle 1 Phase 8 ships exactly
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// three; future bundles extend the enum (and the migration's CHECK
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// constraint) without reshaping the column.
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const (
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// EventCategoryCertLifecycle is the default for cert.* /
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// agent.* / deployment.* / verification.* events.
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EventCategoryCertLifecycle = "cert_lifecycle"
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// EventCategoryAuth covers every auth.role.* / auth.key.* /
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// auth.bootstrap.* event plus the bootstrap.consume action
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// recorded by Phase 6. Auditors filter to this category to
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// review who minted / granted / revoked roles.
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EventCategoryAuth = "auth"
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// EventCategoryConfig covers issuer / target / settings
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// mutations. Distinct from cert_lifecycle so a regulator can
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// review configuration changes separately from cert ops.
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EventCategoryConfig = "config"
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)
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// ActorType represents the entity performing an action.
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type ActorType string
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const (
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// ActorTypeUser represents a federated human identity. Reserved by
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// Bundle 2 (OIDC + sessions) for OIDC-authenticated humans. Bundle 1
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// continues to set this for legacy callers; new code should use
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// ActorTypeAPIKey for API-key-authenticated requests.
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ActorTypeUser ActorType = "User"
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// ActorTypeSystem represents background workers (scheduler loops, GC
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// sweepers, migrations). System actors don't have a credential; the
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// scheduler / startup code passes them directly to AuditService.
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ActorTypeSystem ActorType = "System"
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// ActorTypeAgent represents a certctl-agent identity. Agents poll the
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// control plane outbound; the matched API key carries this actor type
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// when the operator scopes the key to the agent role (Bundle 1
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// Phase 1 ships the agent role with cert.read + agent.heartbeat +
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// agent.job.* permissions).
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ActorTypeAgent ActorType = "Agent"
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// ActorTypeAPIKey represents an API-key-authenticated request whose
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// scope was not narrowed to agent-only. Bundle 1 Phase 1 introduces
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// this so the audit trail can distinguish a human-operator API key
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// from a federated OIDC user (Bundle 2). System actors and agents
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// keep their existing types.
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ActorTypeAPIKey ActorType = "APIKey"
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// ActorTypeAnonymous represents the synthetic actor used when
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// CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none is configured (the demo path). The audit
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// row records "actor-demo-anon" with this type so operators can
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// filter demo activity from real auth in audit reports.
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ActorTypeAnonymous ActorType = "Anonymous"
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)
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